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Though integral to thinking about causality, narrative--in particular narrative thinking--has been overlooked in traditional approaches to creativity studies and creative problem solving. Emphasizing the intrinsically speculative and causal aspects of narrative, this study investigates the effectiveness of narrative creativity training as a means of fostering innovative problem-solving skills within the US Army. Through two experiments conducted at the US Army Command and General Staff College, this research compares the outcomes of narrative training against conventional associational creativity training. Our results suggest that specifically narrative capacities are cognitively distinct, can be directly trained, and substantially improve problem solving. This research contributes to scholarship on the practical and empirical applications of narrative theory, as well as scholarship in creativity studies and creative problem solving, evincing the specific utility of narrative thinking in addressing complex, open-ended challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Each year in Wisconsin, thousands of victims of violent crime apply for state-sponsored compensation under the Crime Victim Compensation ("CVC") statute, as they are constitutionally entitled to do. However, the CVC statute excludes from compensation any victim whose conduct "substantially contributed" to their injury or death. This standard replicates Wisconsin's basic test for causation in negligence cases; a crime victim "substantially contributed" to their injury or death if their conduct was a substantial factor in causing it. As this Comment explains, the contributory conduct limitation's causation analysis is incomplete. In negligence cases, Wisconsin courts look to several public policy factors to limit tortfeasors' liability, even where their negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs' injuries. The CVC statute's "substantially contributed" standard involves no such public policy inquiry, which leaves the question of legal causation unanswered. Exacerbated by administrative rules that articulate a myriad of forms of contributory conduct for CVC adjudicators to scrutinize--including the victim's consent, provocation, drug and alcohol consumption, recent criminal history, and incarceration status--the CVC statute's contributory conduct limitation supplies punishingly broad grounds for dismissing meritorious CVC claims. This tortious standard wreaks torturous results--it fails vulnerable crime victims and the intent of the Wisconsin State Legislature. This Comment argues that the CVC statute's "substantially contributed" standard must be changed and offers three improved alternatives. The first proposed approach increases the State's burden of proof as to the contributory conduct limitation; it would oblige the State to prove that a victim substantially contributed to their injury or death beyond a reasonable doubt. The second proposed approach resembles Wisconsin's contributory negligence statute. Denying a CVC claim under this approach would require a finding that the victim's contributory conduct was a greater cause of their injury or death than the perpetrator's criminal conduct. The third proposed approach adopts an adapted version of the first three public policy factors used to determine the scope of liability in negligence cases. This Comment ultimately advocates for the third, or "public policy factors," approach. The "public policy factors" approach is optimal because it entails minimal procedural strain, is legally robust, and recaptures the legislative intent of the CVC statute. In essence, this Comment encourages an approach toward contributory conduct that increases victims' access to the funds they need and deserve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the Jessica Wongso cyanide coffee case, focusing on the doctrine of causality and the proof of criminal actions. The research analyzes the case using qualitative research methods and concludes that the doctrine of causality is crucial in determining the cause of prohibited effects. The judge relied on witness testimony, expert testimony, and evidence to prove Jessica's crime, resulting in a 20-year prison sentence. The article emphasizes the importance of these teachings in criminal law, despite the controversy surrounding the case. The use of indirect evidence in proving Jessica's guilt is also discussed, highlighting the role of evidence in the legal process. [Extracted from the article]

This article introduces definitions for direct, means-end, oblique (or indirect) and ulterior intent which can be used to test for intent in an algorithmic actor. These definitions of intent are informed by legal theory from common law jurisdictions. Certain crimes exist where the harm caused is dependent on the reason it was done so. Here the actus reus or performative element of the crime is dependent on the mental state or mens rea of the actor. The ability to prosecute these crimes is dependent on the ability to identify and diagnose intentional states in the accused. A certain class of auto didactic algorithmic actor can be given broad objectives without being told how to meet them. Without a definition of intent, they cannot be told not to engage in certain law breaking behaviour nor can they ever be identified as having done it. This ambiguity is neither positive for the owner of the algorithm or for society. The problem exists over and above more familiar debates concerning the eligibility of algorithms for culpability judgements that mens rea is usually associated with. Aside from inchoate offences, many economic crimes with elements of fraud or deceit fall into this category of crime. Algorithms operate in areas where these crimes could be plausibly undertaken depending on whether the intent existed in the algorithm or not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the circuit split regarding the requirement of retaliatory intent in whistleblower retaliation claims under Sarbanes-Oxley. Topics include the potential weakening of whistleblower protections, the use of the term "discriminate" with unintended consequences, and proposing revised language to fortify whistleblower protections based on the Whistleblower Protection Act.

I defend counterfactual decision theory, which says that you should evaluate an action in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from, and superior to, causal decision theory, properly so called. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination, an action can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution, an action can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. And in cases of determinism, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your action, even though your action cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict, and for the right reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An editorial is presented on the shift from causation to correlation in modern data technologies, particularly in context of Artificial Intelligence (AI) used by insurance companies. Topics include skepticism about causation as a philosophical concept, the discussions on quantum physics and its implications for cause and effect, and the relevance of correlation in legal domains.

The article focuses on the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) by insurance companies, emphasizing the shift from causation to correlation in modern data processing technologies. Topics include the challenges and skepticism surrounding the concept of causation, incorporating philosophical perspectives, and the potential impact of AI on judicial decision-making, exploring issues related to judicial independence and accountability.

The article deals with a decision of the Supreme Court (OGH) regarding the burden of proof for the existence of causality in favor of the patient in cases of medical malpractice. According to the OGH, it is the responsibility of the doctor or the hospital to prove that the misconduct was most likely not causally related to the patient's harm. The article describes a specific case in which a patient suffered pain due to a delayed diagnosis and treatment, and is seeking compensation. The court has determined that the plaintiff has provided evidence of medical malpractice that led to a delayed diagnosis. The defendant's extraordinary appeal was rejected as there is no significant legal question. Criticism is expressed regarding the burden of proof in medical liability law, as the full burden of proof should not be imposed on the defendant to prove that the medical malpractice was insignificant for the adverse consequences. [Extracted from the article]

Relevance to practice is an open issue for scholars in public policy and public administration. One major problem is the need to produce knowledge that can guide practitioners designing and implementing public interventions in specific contexts. This article claims that investigating the causal mechanisms of policy programs—i.e., modeling why and how they produce outcomes—can contribute to such knowledge. In this regard, mechanisms offer essential information to guide practitioners when replicating, adjusting, and designing interventions. Unfortunately, not all models of mechanisms can inform practice. The article proposes a strategy for design research and practice inspired by reverse engineering: selecting successful programs, causal modeling, assessing the target context, and designing. Scholars should model mechanisms by identifying the program and non-program elements that contribute to the outcome of interest and abstracting their causal powers. Practitioners can use these models, diagnose their target context, and adjust designs to deal with context-specific problems. The proposed research agenda may enhance orientation to practice and offer a middle ground between the search for abstract, general relationships, and single-case analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author advocates for the use of causal graphs to modernize the field of factor investing and set it on a logically coherent foundation. To do this, first he introduces the concepts of association and causation. Second, he explains the use of causal graphs and the real (causal) meaning of the ceteris paribus assumption that is so popular among economists. Third, he explains how causal graphs help us estimate causal effects in observational (nonexperimental) studies. Fourth, he illustrates all of the earlier concepts with Monte Carlo experiments. He concludes that the field of factor investing must embrace causal graphs in order to wake up from its associational slumber. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Minnesota Supreme Court case Staub as Trustee of Weeks v. Myrtle Lake Resort dealing with negligence and application to Minnesota tort law. The court held that in the absence of an alternate theory of causation, a negligence claim supported solely by circumstantial evidence may survive summary judgment.

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation is the property of University of Toronto Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the challenges surrounding the application of the mistake of fact and mistake of law defenses in Texas criminal law. It offers suggestions on how to address them, including the requirement that the mistake of fact defense must be "reasonable," determining intent for an offense, confusion over the relationship between a defendant's mental state and causation, and distinguishing between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law.

The article focuses on the causation question in Missouri's felony murder law, which determines whether a death can be considered the "result of" a felony. It examines two Missouri cases, including State v.Harding and State v. Balbirnie that raise questions on what constitutes "causation" and "proximate cause," offering perspectives on how courts should analyze the issue. It also discusses how Missouri differs from other states in its approach to the proximate cause question.

Employment discrimination has progressed past the days of overt prejudices. In today's society, employment discrimination manifests as stereotypes that perpetuate negative results. Those who suffer from stereotypic discrimination have long been denied redress for these wrongs. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bostock, this Note argues, is a way forward. This Note argues that case law has developed, and should continue to develop, in a way that recognizes racial stereotyping as discriminatory. This Note explores the history of this case law and examines how the theory of causation from Bostock can be used to better the jurisprudence on racial stereotyping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a theoretical and doctrinal explanation of how the but-for test links gains to the wrong that produced them. Gain-based damages cases focus on the gain resulting from the defendant's tortious behaviour. In these cases, the contrastive aspect of the but-for test, requiring the factfinder to consider the hypothetical result that would have occurred had the right thing happened instead of the defendant's wrongdoing, is not confined to the question of reasonability, as it is in negligence cases. Rather, in gain-based damages cases, the factfinder faces the open-ended normative task of determining the hypothetically appropriate scenario that contrasts with the wrongdoing that happened in reality. For this reason, in gain-based damages cases, the normative sensitivity of the but-for test is revealed in full. The article explains how this sensitivity influences the result of the but-for test expressing the amount of gain causally attributed to the defendant's wrongdoing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Praxis Filosófica is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article concerns the issue of causation under Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the related foundational question of the legal character of command responsibility under that provision. It has two aims. First, it notes that across the proceedings in Bemba , judges were united in understanding command responsibility as a mode of liability. It then sets out four different positions on the question of causation in Bemba and argues that none is convincing — that none is able to escape the tensions that follow from that understanding of the legal character of command responsibility. Second, it suggests that the Court revisit that foundational understanding itself: it proposes that the Court interprets Article 28 as establishing a separate offence of omission and argues that such a reading of the Statute is plausible and attractive in principle and policy terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research aims to test the relationship of influence and correlation of creative thinking, As the independent variable with his skills that have been adopted, Represented by (frameworks of creative thinking, causation, and synthesis )In the quality of work life in its subdimensions (compensation, share, supervision, work environment, opportunities for growth and development (as a dependent variable, By adopting the descriptive analytical method, The research sample includes officials of the people of the General Directorate of Education in Baghdad, Rusafa II, They numbered (93) individuals, who represent the research community, By adopting the questionnaire as the main tool for data collection, distributed to all sample members, and retrieve (74) valid for statistical analysis, A number of appropriate statistical methods were used in the research, Which represented (arithmetic mean, standard deviation, correlation, regression, Facronbach's coefficient and split-half), And the most prominent conclusions that were reached were embodied in the existence of a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable (creative thinking) with its dimensions with the dependent variable (quality of work life) with its dimensions, In the research sample, there is a significant effect of the independent variable (creative thinking) with its dimensions, on the dependent variable (quality of work life) with its dimensions, The research sample also showed the ability to show creative thinking skills, And that they have the ability to adopt change and put forward innovative ideas that increase the strength of the organization and achieve its goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyses of factual causation face perennial problems, including preemption, overdetermination, and omissions. Arguably, the thorniest are cases of omissive overdetermination, involving two independent omissions, each sufficient for the harm, and neither, independently, making a difference. A famous example is Saunders, where a pedestrian was hit by a driver of a rental car who never pressed on the (unbeknownst to the driver) defective (and, negligently, never inspected) brakes. Causal intuitions in such cases are messy, reflected in disagreement about which omission mattered. What these analyses mistakenly take for granted, is that at issue is the 'efficacy' of each omission. I argue, on the contrary, the puzzle of omissive overdetermination favors taking the act/omission distinction seriously. Factual causation, properly understood precludes omissions (i.e. omissions are not causal). Of course, the law also attaches liability to omissions, but this works differently from liability for real causes (e.g. omissions have a duty requirement, they also respond differentially to difference-making considerations). The manner in which liability attaches for omissions differs from that of straightforward causal liability, and is entirely dependent on the underlying causal structure. Attention to that structure (e.g. that the driver's hitting the pedestrian with his car is what actually caused the injury) sheds light on which omissions matter (e.g. driver's failure to press on the brakes) and why (because that failure removes a defense the driver would have to liability for the accident he caused). Other cases, where the parties' connection is entirely omissive (e.g. two physicians fail to detect independently lethal conditions), come out differently (tracking moralized elements). The analysis offered makes better sense of both why omissive determination cases are puzzling and how to resolve them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shareholder class actions provide improved access to statutory remedies in instances of company misconduct. However, access to these remedies hinges on the ability of plaintiffs to satisfy the causal requirements of the relevant statutory claim. In particular, the requirements for establishing causation in the case of a company's failure to adhere to continuous disclosure obligations or misleading or deceptive conduct has been disputed. TPT Patrol Pty Ltd v Myer Holdings Limited adds clarity to this debate by adopting the prognosticated 'market-based' theory of causation. This article examines why market-based causation is available as a matter of law and in doing so, highlights its distinction from other traditional media of establishing causation for shareholder loss. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The causal effect of supervening events on damages for contractual breach is uncertain. This paper elucidates some of the circumstances in which supervening events, which occur subsequent to the termination of a contract on the basis of a breach, may affect the assessment of damages. Ultimately, the paper concludes that in such circumstances a contractual breach will not entitle an injured party to damages for the whole of the expected contractual performance where expected performance would have been affected by steps which might be taken by a contracting party or by supervening events. There is a two step process. The injured party must demonstrate the extent to which the contractual breach has caused the loss of expected performance. It is then necessary to consider the value of the expected performance. However, the paper acknowledges that application of this principle may prove difficult in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Situations in which a deceased person has died in the course of "fright, escape or selfpreservation'1 have long posed complex causation questions for the criminal law. The Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal has had the opportunity in recent years to consider the situation where a victim's death follows threats or intimidation delivered by the defendant. In Yarran v The State of Western Australia, decided in 2019, the Court focused on the role that section 272 of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act (1913) plays in resolving the difficult causation issues which can arise in these sorts of cases. While the earlier case of TB v The State of Western Australia2 had resolved some of the questions associated with the operation of section 272, Yarran directly raised the issue of the victim's reaction to the threats or intimidation: what relevance should the "unreasonableness" or "disproportion" of a victim's response to an accused's threats have to the question whether the accused caused' that response under S272? Is the nature of the victim's response part of the legal causation inquiry, or does it only concern the criminal responsibility (scope of liability) inquiry within the excuse of Accident? This article explains the court's approaches to this question and highlights some of the more general, fundamental questions raised by the case around the relationship between the different causation provisions in the WA Criminal Code. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Yeoman's Row Management Ltd v Cobbe, Lord Walker opined that "... equitable estoppel is a flexible doctrine which the court can use ... to prevent injustice caused by the vagaries and inconsistency of human nature. But it is not a sort of joker or wild card to be used whenever the court disapproves of the conduct of a litigant who seems to have the law on his side". Such colourful descriptions of equitable estoppel are not difficult to find. Professor Birks once described estoppel as a volcano in the law... destabilised and which is seeking a new stability. This article seeks to identify, clarify, and explore the three forms of causal questions that inform equitable estoppel. The discussion is significant because causal issues arise across the estoppel inquiry. Causation operates as a brake on liability which demarcates reparative responsibility and in so doing performs important normative work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Limited, the Supreme Court discussed a doubles-the-risk test based on epidemiological studies for the proof of individual causation in toxic tort litigation in the United Kingdom. The issue was obiter in the Appeal. Differing views were expressed and the speeches cannot be interpreted as rejecting the test as a matter of law. Unsurprisingly, therefore, reference continues to be made to the test and the analogous argument that causation can be proved by a statistical likelihood of a better outcome in the absence of breach. It is generally accepted that risk-based epidemiological evidence is admissible in litigation. This raises the question of the continued forensic role of such evidence in English common law. We use a case study with variations to indicate a range of issues that may arise in the application of epidemiological evidence. The issues are multi-faceted and demonstrate why a simple formulaic rule based on doubling of the risk (a relative risk of two') could never work. An arbitrary cut-off at a relative risk of two would lead to injustice. Whilst the epidemiological evidence is telling us something of relevance, it does not answer all the questions that are specific to a particular case at a particular moment in time. A better understanding of epidemiological evidence and how it can be applied in individual cases will assist, but it is reasonable to anticipate that considerable controversy will persist in clinical negligence and toxic tort litigation. For that reason, we propose a structured approach to the assessment and use of epidemiological evidence in litigation. This approach may assist decisionmakers and others as they navigate the current muddles and misconceptions that surround the forensic role of such evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While it has been inforce for more than four decades, the Charter's application to law enforcement activity by private actors remains uncertain. In this article, Professor Penney examines the jurisprudence and proposes reforms in three areas: (i) the exercise of statutory "citizens' arrest" powers: (ii) pri.vate actors committing investigative intrusions after consulting with police: and (iii) private actors obtaining personal information from the accused and disclosing it to police. The existing doctrinal confusion, he argues, stems from the courts' failure to faithfully adhere to section 32(1)'s language and foundational interpretive jurisprudence. That provision makes the Charter applicable to any investigative intrusion involving a meaningful degree of responsibility or culpability by the state, whether in its legislative or administrative capacity. Conversely, intrusions that cannot fairly be attributed to the state can never trigger Charter protection, even if governmental actors were causally implicated, Professor Penney accordingly argues that as coercive legislative powers, citizens' arrests are subject to the Charter (though in a manner differing from detention powers exercised by police). He also proposes a modest amendment the state agency doctrine requiring something more than mere jactual causation to trigger the Charter's application. Lastly, he contends that the Charter should not apply to the passive receipt by police of information from third parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The present study aimed to evaluate the surge capability of Shahid Rajaee Trauma Hospital in Shiraz City, Iran, in response to a mass causality incident. Materials and Methods: This descriptive study was conducted in Shahid Rajaee Hospital in Shiraz in 2017. The Delphi technique was used in this study. Three checklists were used for the Emergency Department, Operating Room, and Intensive Care Unit. The surge capacity was calculated for each unit based on the formulas derived from different studies. Results: The surge capacities of the Emergency Department, Intensive Care Unit, and Operating Room were obtained 36%, 20%, and 17.5%, respectively. Shahid Rajaee Hospital of Shiraz can quickly increase its capacity by 27% based on the scenario defined in this study. However, if an accident leads to more causalities, it will likely face several limiting factors for increasing the surge capacity. Conclusion: Due to the critical role of hospitals in the crisis, it seems that the studied hospital should look for ways to increase its surge capacity to cope with unexpected accidents as soon as possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionnellement, un lien de causalité « direct et certain » était exigé entre une faute et un dommage afin de pouvoir engager la responsabilité indemnitaire d'un individu. Cependant, la lecture de la jurisprudence permet d'objectiver que la causalité ne doit plus nécessairement être ni directe, ni certaine. En effet, même si la présence d'un état antérieur a longtemps permis d'exclure un lien direct entre un fait dommageable et les séquelles en découlant, la Cour de cassation estime maintenant que les prédispositions pathologiques ne doivent plus être prises en compte (pour une exclusion ou une réduction du droit d'indemnisation) si celles-ci étaient latentes et qu'elles n'ont été révélées que par le fait dommageable. De même, parfois, les demandeurs apportent à l'appui de leurs prétentions des faisceaux de preuves et arguments qui ne peuvent que contraindre les magistrats à mettre de côté l'absence de certitude absolue sur le plan scientifique. Il a même été créé des présomptions d'imputabilité dans certains domaines de la réparation du dommage corporel (accidents de la circulation et accidents de travail). Le déroulement et la teneur des expertises médicolégales se trouvent alors bousculés, tant pour l'expert que pour l'avocat de la victime. Traditionally, a "direct and certain" causal link was required between fault and harm in order to engage an individual's compensatory liability. However, upon reading case law, it is possible to note that causality no longer necessarily has to be either direct or certain. Indeed, although the presence of a previous condition long enabled the exclusion of a direct link between a harmful event and its aftereffects, the French Court of Appeal (Cour de Cassation) now considers that pathological predispositions must no longer be taken into account (in respect of an exclusion or a reduction in the right to compensation) if these were latent, and only revealed by the harmful event. Similarly, on occasion the plaintiffs support their claims with bundles of evidence and arguments that can but force magistrates to set aside the absence of absolute certainty on a scientific level. Presumptions of accountability have even been put forward in some areas of personal injury compensation (traffic accidents and workplace accidents). The conduct and content of forensic expertises are then disrupted, both for the expert and for the victim's lawyer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on theologians with the insights and limitations of philosophical treatments of divine determinism. Topics include defending beliefs about freedom and goodness being compatible with the possibility of divine determinism; and highlighting an implication of the theological distinction between primary and secondary causality between divine and human agency.

Whenever a litigant needs to prove that a certain result was caused in a specific way, what could be more compelling than citing the infinitesimal probability of that result emanating from an alternative natural cause? Contrary to this intuitive position, in the present article, I argue that the contention that a result was due to a certain cause should remain unaffected by statistical evidence of the extremely low probability of an alternative cause. The only scenario in which the low probability of a natural cause would be relevant to the case at hand is if it were contrasted with another piece of statistical evidence: the frequency of the criminal activity among people who are similar to the accused. However, by connecting the use of probabilistic generalisations in legal fact-finding to the issue of free will, I hold that, in Criminal Law, contrasting frequencies in this manner is objectionable—as a matter of principle—regardless of how reliable the statistical analysis is. Consequently, if the low probability of a natural cause is probative only if contrasted with another piece of statistical evidence that is objectionable, then neither piece of evidence should be admitted in criminal trials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]