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Ethnic division and inequality lie at the heart of Myanmar's internal conflicts. In these conflicts, ethnic women are the most vulnerable group based on their ethnicity and gender. They are not only victims of violence, they have also been systematically marginalized from formal peace processes under both military and civilian governments. This thesis uses a feminist constructivist approach to examine the gendered role of women and girls in Myanmar society and the impacts of armed conflicts on women and girls in the conflict areas. The thesis discusses the history of ethnic divisions in Myanmar since independence in 1948, various peace initiatives pursued by Myanmar governments and the experiences of women and girls during conflict and their involvement in the more recent peace-building process. Drawing on extensive interviews with officials, politicians and civil society representatives, the thesis argues that if a sustainable and just peace is to be built in Myanmar, women need to be given a greater role. It also identifies obstacles that need to be overcome if women are to participate effectively in both formal and informal peace processes.

Small states are perceived as lacking military power. Nevertheless, most maintain military forces. Given their shortfalls in power and capacity what choices do small states make about maintaining military forces and what utility do they gain from them? This issue is not well addressed in small state literature which considers the security of small states but focuses less on their defence planning or the military instruments they maintain. This thesis addresses that issue by examining how small states structure their military forces, why they do so, and whether they provide for relevant and credible military capabilities. This is achieved by examining the structural balance of small state military forces; developing and applying a methodology to describe the process and priorities within the military systems of small states; and developing expectations for military forces in small states from small state literature and military theory as testable propositions to provide a basis for comparison of their military capabilities. The results of this comparison are then analysed with regard to the utility that small states may gain from their military forces and related to wider themes within the field of small state studies to ascertain the benefit that they may gain from them. Four cases of small state military force structures are used. Ireland provides limited military capabilities to meet discrete tasks and roles within a benign strategic environment and its policy of military neutrality. New Zealand, like Ireland, does not face a direct military threat but it has a wide range of security interests. This is reflected in a broad force structure, albeit with modest capabilities based on utility and the benefits of its international partnerships. Norway, on the other hand, does perceive a direct military threat and functions within the NATO security alliance. It maintains forces that are able to operate throughout the conflict continuum as part of the NATO framework but

This thesis examines how Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Malaysia sought to articulate attitudes towards refugee protection during the Indochinese and Rohingya refugee crises. While countries in Southeast Asia are known to be reluctant to discuss and participate in refugee protection, preferring to follow the norm of non-interference encapsulated in the ‘ASEAN Way’ in recent years, over time, attitudes towards refugee protection have varied significantly. The thesis explores the internal and external pressures that have impacted on changing perceptions of refugee protection in Southeast Asia. To explore changes in refugee protection attitudes, I conduct a comparative case study between the Indochinese and Rohingya refugee crises, analysing the responses and the rationale justifying the level of refugee protection in Thailand and Malaysia. These two countries have employed a variety of arguments such as ethnicity, religion and economic costs of treaty accession to inform their practices of refugee protection. In addition, regional/international dynamics and the labelling of refugees have also affected the level of refugee protection as well. Overall, their selective engagement with international refugee law; ethnic considerations; regional influences and the securitisation of refugee crises contribute most to arguments as to why refugee protection attitudes in Southeast Asia have remained poor. My findings indicate that due to the overlapping nature of these factors, any examination of refugee protection attitudes cannot be answered adequately by a single explanation, be it the practice of non-interference or a non-ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention. These attitudes are mostly influenced by internal pressures, with national and regional factors interacting in tandem to produce higher levels of insecurity for the refugees studied in this thesis. Ultimately, this thesis will demonstrate that while refugee protection attitudes in the two refugee

One of the prescient questions within international relations today concerns the rise of China and what strategies states should deploy in response. This is particularly pertinent in the Asia Pacific neighbourhood. Southeast Asian states especially face a perennial challenge: how to balance economic and security interests between China and the US. This thesis examines the concept of hedging as a means of understanding the strategic choices adopted by the Indonesia and the Philippines in response to rising Chinese hegemony in Asia. This thesis applies the innovative hedging model developed by Kuik to determine if Indonesia and the Philippines are hedging China and, if so, what strategies Jakarta and Manila have adopted. The application of Kuik’s model to the foreign policy strategies and behaviours of Indonesia and the Philippines has been a useful approach to determine whether these two cases are hedging China and to what degree. This thesis concludes that Indonesia and the Philippines have adopted hedging strategies comprised of micro options which are not static but fluid and dynamic. This study further demonstrates that understanding the drivers and behaviour of key Southeast Asian states and the degrees to which they are rejecting or accepting power is critical.

This thesis evaluates three of New Zealand’s foreign strategy documents, the China Strategy, the India Strategy, and the ASEAN Strategy. It assesses New Zealand’s performance against these strategies in order to elucidate the interplay between diplomatic, economic, and security strategies, and how this impacts on New Zealand’s approach to these partners. The different elements of policy exist in a complex environment of interdependent flows. In ASEAN strategy, security policy is linked to trade policy; in Indian strategy, international sport is linked with domestic tourism; and with China strategy, global reputation is linked with lowering barriers to trade. To date, New Zealand’s China Strategy has been successful, as New Zealand has performed well against the goals its set for itself. While it may be tempting to suggest emulating the China Strategy in other markets, this thesis argues that the success of the strategy is due to the unique set of circumstances of the two countries. When we look at New Zealand’s approach to India the importance of customisation is evident. Strategies exist in a complex environment where multiple attempts and methods may be required in order to best elucidate the most successful approaches. This work argues that country strategy should be sufficiently adaptive to take into account the complex environment of each nation, while holding New Zealand’s trade interests as a premier function.

This study aims to investigate the extent to which Islam influences Indonesian foreign policy in the post-Suharto era. Specifically, this research intends to examine under what circumstances the influence of Islam on Indonesian foreign policy will be substantial and under what conditions it will have less of an effect. Focusing on the era of the administration of President Yudhoyono, the issues covered in this study embrace Indonesia’s policies towards Iran’s nuclear programme, Kosovo’s independence and Palestinian statehood. This study puts emphasis on the interplay between Muslim groups and the government in relation to the conduct of the country’s foreign policy. As interest groups, Muslim groups in Indonesia have had significant concerns about Muslim issues in both Indonesia’s domestic affairs and in its foreign policy. In general, this study argues that there has been an increased role for Islam in Indonesia’s post-Suharto foreign policy. Islamic elements and Muslim groups’ aspirations have been increasingly included and accommodated in the country’s foreign policy. These accommodations are made to the extent that the aspirations these views reflect do not contradict fundamentally with Pancasila as state philosophy, the 1945 constitution and the country’s vital national interests, mainly those related to territorial integrity. Specifically, the case of the Iranian nuclear programme has showed that the government ‘bowed’ to the Muslim groups’ pressures which were backed by the parliament. The government changed its position from supporting UNSC resolution 1747 on sanctions against Iran to abstaining on the similar resolution no. 1803. In this regard, the influence of Muslim groups on the country’s foreign policy was important and substantial as Muslim groups’ interests and members of parliament’s interests did converge against the government’s policy on that matter. The Kosovo case has demonstrated an opposite effect. The government apparently firmed up its non

In 1965 New Zealand was an active member of alliances designed to contain the People’s Republic of China in South East Asia. Late the previous year, the Defence Council had warned Cabinet that New Zealand could be at war with China and/or Indonesia in six months. Less than seven years later New Zealand recognised China, as Britain and the US military presences were exiting from South East Asia. These events bookend a radical reshaping of New Zealand’s defence policies and its attitude towards China. The existing scholarship on New Zealand’s Cold War defence policies has underemphasised the role of China in New Zealand’s grand strategy and the scholarship on Sino-New Zealand relations has also largely ignored defence policy. This thesis uses recently released files from the Ministry of Defence to provide new insight into the construction of China as a threat during the mid-1960s and the challenges faced in meeting that perceived threat. New Zealand’s Forward Defence policy was one designed to contain China and Beijing-supported revolutionary groups in South East Asia. This strategy was predicated on active British or American support for containment. SEATO and ANZAM provided the basis of New Zealand war planning and day-to-day operations in Asia respectively. With the British decision to withdraw from South East Asia and the American quagmire in Vietnam, New Zealand had to reassess its position in South East Asia as containment of China was no longer thought possible. The need for a containment strategy was based upon a conceptualisation of China as a growing and hostile power. This view saw China as eventually developing the means to dominate South East Asia and threaten Australasia directly as Japan had done in 1942. This perception of China changed with the emergence of the Cultural Revolution. New Zealand officials watched from Hong Kong as violence and mass political disorder challenged established sources of authority. They took the view that Mao was in direct

Historically, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and Myanmar’s Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) held tremendous levels of domestic political influence. Following independence in the 1940s, both countries experienced a short and unstable democratic period. Largely due to the weakness of civilian institutions, and the special place of the TNI and the Tatmadaw in society, both militaries became the most dominant political actors in their respective countries. In 1998, President Suharto’s government fell, which instigated a period of political reform whereby the TNI removed itself from the political realm. It would seem as if democratisation has seen the TNI lose significant political clout. However, is it this simple? Does democratisation mean a total loss of political influence for the military? This paper seeks to understand to what extent the TNI lost political influence in the democratic era and whether similar developments are likely for Myanmar’s Tatmadaw. To answer this question, this paper will review literature on influence, democracy and civilmilitary relations in order to produce a thematic framework of indicators that can be used for further analysis on the TNI and the Tatmadaw. Once a framework has been laid, this paper will investigate the Indonesian experience, focusing on pre-democracy (1945-1998), before shifting to see how influential the TNI is in the democratic era (1998-2015). The Tatmadaw’s political influence will then be examined in the junta period (1948-2015). Once the Tatmadaw current state is understood, this paper will provide informed judgements on the likely influence of the Tatmadaw in a future democratic Myanmar. This paper found that in the post-Suharto era, the TNI still retains political influence as a result of its strong standing in Indonesian society, involvement in off-budget income generation, and a strong internal security role, as well as weak civilian institutions. Although the TNI no longer have a dominant role in Indonesia p

This thesis examines the ways in which ideologies of royalism, militarism, and Jihad influenced the behaviour of contending Muslim factions in the 1857 Indian rebellion. The historiography has focused almost exclusively on the ideological motivation of Muslims who fought against the East India Company, with little mention of the large number of Punjabi Muslims and North West Frontier Pathans who chose to collaborate with the British against their co-religionists. The dominant themes of anti-colonialism, nationalism, proto-nationalism and Jihad that emerge in the literature overlook the role of moderating factors that link ideology to behaviour. Another tendency has been to apply the essentially modern concepts of nationalism and its variants to a pre-modern Indian Muslim setting. This thesis addresses these gaps by providing a framework for analysing the ideological functions of royalism, militarism and Jihad for both pro and anti-British Muslims. Drawing on insights from political and cognitive approaches of decision-making, this study demonstrates how the dynamics of information processing moderated the relationship between these ideologies and the combat behaviour of the belligerents. It finds that the process produced different outcomes of behaviour for the key individuals and groups in the 1857 rebellion. The methodology employed is comparative case studies of four regions with the most active Muslim resistance and collaboration groups. This thesis hopes to contribute to the growing literature on new approaches to the study of the 1857 Indian rebellion.