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This article examines the relation between internal audit function (IAF) quality and investment efficiency, a recurring value-added corporate activity critical to firm survival and profitability. We argue that an IAF, unlike other information intermediaries, is uniquely positioned to have access to firm-specific, private information—particularly related to localized, firm-specific risks. If a more competent IAF incrementally improves the information that is generated and communicated to management (while not participating directly in decision-making), we should observe more productive capital investment decisions from firms with higher quality IAFs relative to firms with lower quality IAFs. Through this enhanced information channel, we find that IAF quality is associated with investment efficiency. This result holds for both under- and overinvestment, although not in tests of all subsamples. We also document that this effect is more pronounced for firms with more complexity and for firms with greater investment opportunities. Our evidence indicates that IAF quality provides measurable and economically meaningful value to an organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY: We examine the association between Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports and a firm's cost of equity capital, measured using seasoned equity offering (SEO) discounting. SEO discounting occurs when the offer price is lower than the prior day's market price of the firm's shares and represents "money left on the table" for issuing firms. We document an economically significant, positive association between SEO discounting and the use of an auditor found to be deficient by the PCAOB for clients of triennially inspected auditors. Cross-sectional evidence suggests that this relation is stronger for clients with lower analyst following and disclosed material weaknesses in financial reporting controls, and weaker if the auditor issues a going concern modification. Our evidence is consistent with PCAOB inspections providing meaningful information about audit quality to market participants, particularly for clients of smaller, triennially inspected auditors. Data Availability: All data are from publicly available sources. JEL Classifications: M42. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY: On April 11, 2017, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged KPMG with using confidential information relating to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's planned inspections of KPMG. The incident was colloquially labeled the KPMG "steal the exam scandal." We use this setting to investigate whether the market finds information concerning individual partner identity useful. Since KPMG withheld the names of the audit partners involved in the scandal, the market was unable to distinguish between rotation-induced audit partner turnover and regulatory-related audit partner terminations. Following information economics models of nondisclosure, we predict the market would use information about KPMG audit partner turnover as evidence of regulatory-related audit partner terminations and impose costs on KPMG audit clients who experienced audit partner turnover. The results are consistent with our prediction as KPMG's overall reputation was not damaged, whereas audit engagements involving audit partners that were potentially involved in the scandal were. Data Availability: All data was obtained from publicly available sources. JEL Classifications: M42; M48. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]