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The continued economic integration of North America has connected cross-border shoppers along the US-Canadian border. This paper explores the use of the US dollar in Canadian retail establishments along a geographical spine in Saskatchewan and Alberta, Canada. We find that distance away from the border is inversely related to the rate of US dollar acceptance in Saskatchewan. More important to the acceptance decision, however, is business maturity and provincial location in Saskatchewan.

International audience; The border cities of San Diego and Tijuana have experienced increasing cross-border economic, social and political relationships that have brought about the need for increasing governance of regional cross-border issues. Cross-border public, private and non-profit organizations have emerged on both sides of the border. The cross-border cooperation and governance in the San Diego–Tijuana region has promoted both the infrastructure and economic projects that have been required by different public and private organizations. The economic organizations that are considered incumbents are trying to develop a strategic action field in the area of cross-border economic activity. Challengers are represented by organizations looking to encourage educational, cultural and ecological cooperation and are considered actors interacting in an emerging field. Both incumbents and challengers have yet to develop more extensive networks in order to have greater influence in the region.

International audience; This paper seeks to revisit the notion of ‘secondary foreign policy’ through the analysis of cross-border governance in the US–Canada Pacific Northwest border region. Although pro-open border organizations in this borderland support secondary foreign policy principles, they collectively need to adjust them, due to the increasing border securitization on the Canada–US border. In other words, the militarization of the border should not affect mutually beneficial cross-border interactions and relations. Using Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam’s ‘field theory’, this paper analyses how the field of cross-border governance in the Pacific Northwest tends to evolve in a new geopolitical context after 9/11, in which free trade and cross-border flows are subjected to growing ‘primary foreign policy’ security imperatives. The specific focus on two cross-border organizations reveals how primary and secondary foreign policy actors seek to work on joint cross-border projects, in spite of contrasting interests and steady blind spots.

The middle of the 1990s saw the creation of a French–German–Swiss history textbook supported by the European Commission. Disseminated to school instructors in the Upper Rhine, it received generally positive reviews, but ended up on the dusty shelves of school libraries. This result was due to several factors, which are analysed in this article. This acknowledgement of failure leads to the argument that European cross-border cooperation is constrained by a key paradox, referred to as ‘low gravity’, i.e. the attraction of small projects toward the local and regional levels, while major projects are pushed up to the national level.

This dossier invites the Journal of Borderlands Studies (JBS) readership to explore Southern Common Market (Mercosur in Spanish and Mercosul in Portuguese-Brazilian) borders and border spaces. During the second half of the 1980s, Brazil and Argentina start negotiations related to regional integration. These talks shortly result in the foundation of the Mercosur. Thus, in 1991, Argentina and Brazil, along with Paraguay and Uruguay, sign the Mercosur founding treaty, the Treaty of Asuncion, with the ultimate objective of creating a common market. In order to achieve this goal, the Mercosur member states consider that a free trade area and a customs union need to be established, as well as the four freedoms of a common market, i.e. free movement of goods, services, persons and capital (Article 1). Subsequent treaties amend and consolidate this initial agreement. Nevertheless, the original proposed schedule (1991-1994) cannot be completed, confining the Mercosur to a free trade area with an imperfect customs union. However, these international treaties do not limit the Mercosur to a free trade bloc: the institutions of the Mercosur also reveal an intergovernmental organization that coordinates joint macroeconomic and sectoral public policies, implying a community integration purpose (Vervaele 2005, 390-391). Due to this dual facet, the enlargement and deepening of the Mercosur is progressing in several ways. First, neighbouring countries are linked to the Mercosur, as future permanent members (Bolivia and Venezuela), as associate members (Chile, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador), or as observer (Mexico). Second, agreements are signed with third parties, e.g. a free trade agreement with Israel in 2007. Third, institutions are reinforced, for instance through the creation of a permanent dispute resolution mechanism in 2002; besides, members of the Parliament of the Mercosur will be directly elected for the first time in 2010. Finally, in order to counterbalance the asymmetries of the bloc, the Mercosur members create in 2005 a structural fund, known as the Fondo para la Convergencia Estructural del Mercosur (FOCEM).

Avant le début des années 1990, la coopération transfrontalière (CT) restait figée à un niveau politique très limité, disposant de peu de moyens et freinée parfois par l'Etat central, promouvant presqu'exclusivement des relations de bons voisinages. Or à partir de cette période, INTERREG oblige différents acteurs à se mobiliser pour canaliser les fonds communautaires injectés dans les régions transfrontalières. Ces acteurs n'appartiennent pas seulement aux entités infra-étatiques : selon les compétences de chaque collectivité territoriale, l'Etat respectif va intervenir (cas de la France via le Préfet) ou non (Allemagne, Espagne ou Suisse, en principe) ; la Commission envoie des représentants dans chaque instance politique de décision transfrontalière pour émettre un avis.Chaque région transfrontalière a donc une configuration particulière, une singularité qui s'exprime notamment dans cet exercice multi-niveau du politique, où s'articulent un niveau supra-national (Commission Européenne), un niveau national (Etats), un niveau infra-national (les collectivités infra-étatiques) et les citoyens/la « société civile ». Si la Commission s'efforce de faire apparaître un espace public transfrontalier européen, la marge de manœuvre qu'elle laisse ou que s'approprient les autres acteurs tend à susciter l'invention d'une pluralité d'espaces publics transfrontaliers. Chaque acteur est soumis à des contraintes externes et internes, mais il lui reste, malgré ces fateurs politiques, économiques et sociaux propres à son environnement national, régional et transfrontalier, un champ d'action dans lequel il va tenter de faire prévaloir ses intérêts. C'est dans ce cadre solidaire ou conflictuel que se crée, s'invente, un espace politique d'un nouvel ordre. La comparaison du Rhin Supérieur (avec deux programmes INTERREG, Pamina et Rhin Supérieur Centre-Sud) avec l'Eurorégion méditerranéenne permet de contempler chaque espace public transfrontalier : en dépit de caractères communs donnés par les éléments structurels d'INTERREG, chaque région transfrontalière offre son génie en modelant un espace public original. La transformation de chaque espace public donne à voir comment les acteurs se mobilisent pour se rendre plus visibles, acquérir plus de compétences, etc : la création de la Communauté de Travail des Pyrénées ou du Congrès du Rhin Supérieur répondent ainsi à un manque d'espace public, ressenti par les instances infra-étatiques.Le lobbying croissant de régions européennes plus ou moins riches auprès de la Commission, leur demande de reconnaissance en Europe (via le Comité des Régions ou l'Association des Régions d'Europe) est un autre élément dans la création de cet espace public multi-nivelé.Des relations entre régions transfrontalières peuvent enfin exister, de manière informelle ou institutionnelle (LACE-TAP).Cet espace public transfrontalier multiple et multi-nivelé demande donc à être examiné et analysé, dans le but de répondre à plusieurs questions : quelles sont les contraintes lourdes que subissent les régions transfrontalières en Europe ? Certaines régions échappent-elles à certaines de ces contraintes – lesquelles ? Quel est le rapport à l'interculturalité entre ces divers niveaux ? Comment les instances infra-étatiques se sont-elles approriées les traités internationaux de Bayonne et de Karlsruhe ? Quels sont les facteurs principaux qui jouent sur les possibilités d'invention d'un espace public transfrontalier ? Quel est le personnel politique et administratif chargé de gérer ce nouvel espace public ? Comment les fonctions de ce personnel sont-elles créées, occupées et transformées ? Cet espace public transfrontalier constitue-t-il lui même un nouvel échelon dans l'espace public européen ?

International audience; The global border and migratory control generally involves states, although they are not the only actors. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) plays an increasing role, not only to spread neoliberal representations, practices and public policies toward countries of the global South, but also to manage neoliberal public policy on behalf of some states. In this paper, the theory of fields allows first to analyze the role of the IOM. Secondly, one of these policies is analyzed, the Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas Temporales en Canadá (PTAT-C), managed by the IOM, which is used to send Guatemalan temporary workers to Canadian farms; thus, it is possible to observe how a neoliberal control, aimed at exploiting this work force, is deployed; finally, an analysis of the labour contract and of an arbitration award show discriminatory, anti-union and illegal conditions.; El control fronterizo y migratorio implica generalmente los estados, pero no son los actores únicos. La Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) tiene un papel creciente, no solamente para difundir representaciones, practicas y políticas públicas neoliberales hacia países del Sur global, sino también para administrar políticas neoliberales por cuenta de ciertos estados. En este artículo, la teoría de los campos permite analizar la función de la OIM. En segundo lugar, se examina una de estas políticas, el Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas Temporales en Canadá (PTAT-C), gestionado por la OIM, que permite enviar a trabajadores temporales guatemaltecos a haciendas canadienses; así, es posible observar como un control neoliberal cuya meta es explotar a esta mano de obra se forma; finalmente, un análisis del contrato de trabajo y de una sentencia de arbitraje señala condiciones discriminatorias, antisindicales e ilegales.; Le contrôle frontalier et migratoire mondial implique généralement les Etats, mais ils ne sont pas, de loin, les seuls acteurs. L’Organisation Internationale des Migrations (OIM) y occupe une place croissante, non seulement pour diffuser des représentations, des pratiques et des politiques néolibérales du contrôle frontalier et migratoire en direction de pays du sud, mais aussi pour mener directement des politiques néolibérales pour le compte de certains Etats. Dans cet article, la théorie des champs permet d’abord d’analyser le rôle de l’OIM. Dans un second temps, une de ces politiques est examinée, le Programme de Travailleurs Agricoles Temporaires au Canada (PTAT-C), géré par l’OIM, qui permet d’envoyer des travailleurs temporaires du Guatemala dans des fermes canadiennes ; ainsi, il donne à voir comment se déploie un contrôle néolibéral, destiné à exploiter cette main d’œuvre ; enfin, une analyse du contrat de travail et d’une sentence arbitrale dévoilent des conditions discriminatoires, antisyndicales et illégales.

International audience; The re(b)ordering efforts made by states over the last three decades, for instance the securitization of some border areas and harsher visa policies, may denote an evolution of the international migration regime. The increase of migrant and refugee flows in the 1970s and 1980s (Hatton 2012), coupled with demographic and security challenges in developing countries (Geddes 2005), started to significantly alter an international migration regime that was essentially based on the notion of ‘control’ (Pécoud 2010; Georgi 2010). In the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the wars in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia added further policy makers’ concerns about the regulation of permanent and temporary migrations and refugee flows. A new regime, based on a global policy agenda relying particularly on the concept of ‘migration management’, was originally formulated by Bimal Ghosh, in 1993. Ghosh further developed this concept of ‘migration management’ in the 1996 project known as the New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People (NIROMP), funded by the Swedish, Dutch and Swiss governments (Ghosh 2000). Ghosh proposed a comprehensive international migration regime, designed to tackle what was perceived as current and future migration policy crises, and focuses on both migrants and refugees (Geiger and Pécoud 2010). Yet, Sassen argues that these two categories, migrants and refugees, cannot be merged: “there are separate regimes for refugees in all these countries and an international regime as well, something that can hardly be said for immigration” (1996, 64). Nonetheless, Ghosh’s ‘migration management’ approach was welcomed and later borrowed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This notion of ‘migration management’ became a mantra of the IOM, “committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society” (IOM 2015e).

International audience