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What accounts for the steady decline in misdemeanour arrest rates in the United States following their peak in the mid-1990s? This article links the fluctuation in low-level law enforcement to changes in the budget and staffing resources cities devoted to policing. This materialist explanation contrasts with accounts that emphasize policy changes like the adoption of community policing. Dynamic panel regression analyses of 940 municipalities indicate low-level arrest rates declined most in places that reduced their police expenditure and personnel, net of crime and other controls. The adoption of community policing was unrelated to misdemeanour arrests. Findings suggest lawmakers should consider how increasing police budgets or police force sizes will likely be accompanied by increases in misdemeanour arrests and their attendant harms.

Does low–level policing increase during gentrification? If so, are police responding to increased crime, increased demand by new residents, or are they attempting to “clean up” neighborhoods marked for economic redevelopment? To address these questions, I construct a longitudinal dataset of New York City neighborhoods from 2009 to 2015. I compile data on neighborhoods’ demographics, street stops, low–level arrests, crimes, 311 calls to the police, and—using a novel measure—property values. Maps, spatiotemporal modeling, and fixed effects regressions compare changes in stops and low–level arrests to changes in several measures of gentrification. I find, on average, calls to the police increased after a neighborhood's middle–class population grew. Calls did not translate into more stops or low–level arrests, however. Net of crime and spatial autocorrelation, police made more order–maintenance and proactive arrests following real estate market growth, suggesting development–directed policing. Property value growth in wealthy and already gentrified neighborhoods was not associated with an increase in arrests, underscoring policing's role in early–stage urban “renewal.” The article includes an analysis of three sources of property value data.

Ethno-racially mixed parentage is rising in frequency, creating a strong challenge to both census classification schemes and, indeed, to common conceptions of ethnicity and race. Majority (white) and minority (nonwhite or Hispanic) parentage predominates among individuals with mixed-family backgrounds. Yet in public presentations of census data and population projections, individuals with mixed backgrounds are generally classified as nonwhite. We analyze 2013 American Community Survey data and summarize the results of important studies to argue that individuals from mixed majority-minority backgrounds resemble whites more than they do minorities in terms of some key social characteristics and experiences, such as where they grow up and their social affiliations as adults. Those with a black parent are an important exception. An implication of this analysis is that census classification practices for mixed individuals risk distorting conceptions of the current population, especially its youthful portion, and promoting misunderstandings of ethno-racial change.

What makes police departments change their practices? Do they transform in isolation, or do they mimic their neighbors? Combining insights from organizational theory and urban sociology, the authors argue that organizational change diffuses, in part, through physically proximate institutions. They apply this theory to an underexamined trend: the decline of misdemeanor arrests in the United States between 1990 and 2018. The study first explores the spatial dynamics of low-level law enforcement by graphing and mapping trends across a range of metropolitan types, finding that suburbs made the fewest low-level arrests and central cities reduced their arrests the most during these years. A spatial autoregressive panel data model reveals that police departments decreased their misdemeanor arrests more when nearby departments did so, net of crime rates and other controls, evincing spatial mimicry. Police reform efforts need not target only state and federal governments but can diffuse outward from city-level changes.

The racially disparate impacts of the carceral state are well studied, but most of the research has focused on large cities. Are suburban and urban policing similar? One trend suggests suburban policing might be in flux: U.S. suburbs underwent a dramatic demographic shift between 1990 and 2014. Their White populations declined sharply and their poor, non-White, and foreign-born populations all grew. During the same time, broken windows policing, with its aggressive enforcement of low-level quality-of-life crimes, gained popularity. Are suburban police departments adopting broken windows strategies or making racially disproportionate arrests in response to recent racial and economic changes? I use panel data ( N = 1,038 suburbs and 50 cities, with eight observations 1990 to 2014) in fixed effects regression models to address these questions. Data are compiled from the Uniform Crime Reporting Program and the Census. Descriptive statistics show that while quality-of-life arrests are down overall, the White–Black disparity in suburban arrests remains extreme, especially in mostly White suburbs. Multivariate models indicate that increases in poor people in a suburb are associated with increases in quality-of-life arrests, while more Hispanic people are associated with fewer arrests. Results suggest that urban and suburban policing dynamics are quite different.

Building on neo-assimilation ideas, we conceptualise the ‘mainstream’ and then find compelling evidence of its expansion in the U.S. in the rising number of individuals who come from mixed minority...

Consumption-side theorists of gentrification examine the flow of middle-class White people into previously working-class neighbourhoods and argue that their demand for housing stimulates gentrification. In contrast, production-side theorists emphasise the movement of capital into previously disinvested neighbourhoods and contend that profit-seeking development increases property values and sparks gentrification. Hybrid theorists argue that consumption and production occur simultaneously. This article operationalises arguments made by each approach, and asks: Do gentrifiers precede rising home values or do rising home values precede gentrifiers? To answer this question of sequence, we build a dataset of census and property tax assessment data for 2192 New York City census tracts between 2009 and 2016. Using cross-lagged regression models with tract and year fixed effects, we find neighbourhoods that experienced an increase in White, middle-class residents had related housing price spikes in each of the subsequent two years. A 1% increase in gentrifiers was associated with a subsequent 2.7% increase in property values. However, housing market growth did not predict future increases in gentrifiers. This suggests that consumption leads production during neighbourhood gentrification, and that developers are reactive, not proactive, in their investment decisions. Focusing on the sequence of gentrification’s subsidiary elements enables city officials, non-profits and social movements to better anticipate gentrification and develop more targeted policies.

By the time they are five years old, nearly 70% of children in the United States have moved home, with a substantial minority moving more than once. These early years are important for children’s later learning and development. Yet, there are a limited number of studies of residential mobility’s impact on young children. The literature indicates the importance of stressful family events, unstable housing, economic hardship, and neighbourhood conditions for residential mobility and child wellbeing. But research seldom examines the impact of these dimensions simultaneously. We used data from the first four waves of the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study to analyse precursors of residential mobility and the association of residential mobility with child behavior (N=2,511) and cognitive capabilities (N=2,033) at age five. Using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE), we find that the frequency of moving is explained by a range of stressful circumstances, including lack of parental employment, partnership transitions, paternal incarceration, unstable housing tenure, and financial hardship. These circumstances are associated with increased likelihood of moving home even when other family and neighbourhood conditions are controlled, suggesting that moving is part of a constellation of events and changes experienced by young children. Using OLS regression models we find that, for young children, the circumstances associated with moving residence appear to be more consequential for child wellbeing than does moving itself, even when children experience multiple moves.