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The conjoint-recognition model (CRM) implements fuzzy-trace theory's opponent process conception of false memory. Within the family of measurement models that separate the memory effects of recollection and familiarity, CRM is the only one that accomplishes this for false as well as true memory. We assembled a corpus of 537 sets of conjoint-recognition data, with estimates of CRM's parameters plus goodness-of-fit statistics being available for all the data sets. This corpus was used to conduct a meta-analysis of CRM's underlying process assumptions by pitting two theoretical interpretations of the model against each other: (a) the original interpretation, which assumes that its retrieval parameters tap a single recollection process (verbatim retrieval) and a single familiarity process (gist retrieval), and (b) the dual-recollection interpretation, which assumes that its parameters also tap a second recollection process (context retrieval). The two interpretations generate a series of differential predictions that fall into three groups--namely, predictions about invariant relations among parameters, about the structure of CRM's parameter space, and about the location of individual parameters within the space. When these predictions were evaluated with the corpus, the results converged on the dual-recollection interpretation. The results also resolved a long-standing uncertainty about whether the familiarity process for true memory is semantically or perceptually driven.

The font size effect is a metamemory illusion in which larger-font items produce higher judgments of learning (JOLs) but not better memory, relative to smaller-font items. We conducted meta-analyses to determine what is currently known about how font size affects JOLs and memory accuracy. In addition, we implemented both univariate and multivariate meta-regressions to isolate the moderators of JOL effects and memory effects. The results revealed a small-to-moderate effect of font size on JOLs. There was also a small but significant effect of font size on memory. This suggests that JOLs and memory accuracy both increase with font size, rather than being completely dissociated. Moreover, JOL-memory dissociation only occurred when font size ranged between very small and intermediate. Our working explanation is that the memory effects of font size are tied to (dis)fluency, but its JOL effects are not. Some boundary conditions were identified for font size effects on both JOLs and memory. Specifically, larger font sizes only reliably increased both JOLs and memory accuracy (a) when font sizes ranged from intermediate to very large, (b) when study materials were unrelated word lists, (c) when JOLs were solicited immediately after encoding, and (d) when study time was relatively brief.

Contemporary theories of decision-making are compared with respect to their predictions about the judgments that are hypothesized to underlie risky choice framing effects. Specifically, we compare predictions of psychophysical models, such as prospect theory, to the cognitive representational approach of fuzzy-trace theory in which the presence or absence of zero is key to framing effects. Three experiments implemented a high-power design in which many framing problems were administered to participants, who rated the attractiveness of either the certain or risky options. Experiments also varied whether truncation manipulations were within-subjects or between-subjects and whether both options were present. Violations of both strong and weak rationality were clearly observed in attractiveness ratings of options. However, truncation effects showed that these violations were conditional on the form of the decision problem. Truncation effects that involved adding or subtracting zero--that should not matter in almost all decision theories--showed that such rationality violations were attenuated when zero was deleted, but were amplified when zero was emphasized, per predictions of fuzzy-trace theory. This is the first such demonstration using attractiveness ratings of certain and risky options. Ratings also revealed that framing effects are inherently comparative: The attractiveness of a given option is a function of zero versus nonzero contrasts both within and between options. Indeed, we observed a losing-nothing-is-better effect that violates attribute framing and prospect theory such that a probability of losing nothing was rated as substantially better than a probability of gaining nothing, in accord with fuzzy-trace theory.

The authors investigated the effects of valence and arousal on memory using a dual-process model that quantifies recollective and nonrecollective components of recall without relying on metacognitive judgments to separate them. The results showed that valenced words increased reconstruction (a component of nonrecollective retrieval) relative to neutral words. In addition, the authors found that positive valence increased recollective retrieval in comparison to negative valence, whereas negative valence increased nonrecollective retrieval relative to positive valence. The latter effect, however, depended on arousal: It was reliable only when arousal was high. The present findings supported the notion that emotional valence is a conceptual gist because it affected nonrecollective retrieval and because subjects' recall protocols were clustered by valence. The results challenge the hypothesis that valence affects only recollection, and they clarify previous inconsistent findings about the effects of emotion on memory accuracy and brain activity.

From Piaget to the present, traditional and dual-process theories have predicted improvement in reasoning from childhood to adulthood, and improvement has been observed. However, developmental reversals--that reasoning biases emerge with development--have also been observed in a growing list of paradigms. We explain how fuzzy-trace theory predicts both improvement and developmental reversals in reasoning and decision making. Drawing on research on logical and quantitative reasoning, as well as on risky decision making in the laboratory and in life, we illustrate how the same small set of theoretical principles apply to typical neurodevelopment, encompassing childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, and to neurological conditions such as autism and Alzheimer's disease. For example, framing effects--that risk preferences shift when the same decisions are phrased in terms of gains vs. losses--emerge in early adolescence as gist-based intuition develops. In autistic individuals, who rely less on gist-based intuition and more on verbatim-based analysis, framing biases are attenuated (i.e., they outperform typically developing control subjects). In adults, simple manipulations based on fuzzy-trace theory can make framing effects appear and disappear depending on whether gist-based intuition or verbatim-based analysis is induced. These theoretical principles are summarized and integrated in a new mathematical model that specifies how dual modes of reasoning combine to produce predictable variability in performance. In particular, we show how the most popular and extensively studied model of decision making--prospect theory--can be derived from fuzzy-trace theory by combining analytical (verbatim-based) and intuitive (gist-based) processes. (Contains 2 tables and 4 figures.)

A developmental reversal in false memory is the counterintuitive phenomenon of higher levels of false memory in older children, adolescents, and adults than in younger children. The ability of verbatim memory to suppress this age trend in false memory was evaluated using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Seven and 11-year-old children studied DRM lists either in a standard condition (whole words) that normally produces high levels of false memory or in an alternative condition that should enhance verbatim memory (word fragments). Half the children took 1 recognition test, and the other half took 3 recognition tests. In the single-test condition, the typical age difference in false memory was found for the word condition (higher false memory for 11-year-olds than for 7-year-olds), but in the word fragment condition false memory was lower in the older children. In the word condition, false memory increased over successive recognition tests. Our findings are consistent with 2 principles of fuzzy-trace theory's explanation of false memories: (a) reliance on verbatim rather than gist memory causes such errors to decline with age, and (b) repeated testing increases reliance on gist memory in older children and adults who spontaneously connect meaning across events. (Contains 2 tables.)

Counterintuitive age increases have been reported for the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory illusion. The current theoretical explanation of this effect assumes that it is due to age increases in spontaneous interconnection of DRM list words' meanings. To test this explanation, 11-year-olds and young adults studied DRM lists under conditions that (a) encouraged them to form such meaning-based connections or (b) discouraged them from doing so. In line with the explanation, the usual developmental increase in false memory disappeared in the first condition but was preserved in the second condition. Also in line with the explanation, conjoint recognition analyses revealed that encouraging participants to form meaning connections increased their reliance on gist-based similarity judgments.

To test theoretical predictions about the role of meaning connections in false memory, the effects of semantic cues and list repetition on children's false memories were evaluated across early childhood to mid-adolescence using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. True recall and false recall increased from 7 to 13 years. Study list repetition increased true recall of list words with the magnitude of this effect largest in the older children and adolescents. Repetition reduced false recall of critical lures in all age groups. Consistent with theoretical predictions, false recall of critical lures increased when children were informed of the thematic gist of each list prior to study.

"Numeracy," so-called on analogy with literacy, is essential for making health and other social judgments in everyday life [Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (in press). The importance of mathematics in health and human judgment: Numeracy, risk communication, and medical decision making. "Learning and Individual Differences."]. Recent research on numeracy in health decision making has shown that many adults fail to solve simple ratio and decimal problems, concepts that are prerequisites for understanding health-relevant risk communications. In addition, adults exhibit a ratio bias, in which higher frequencies bias probability judgments, and denominator neglect, described by Reyna and Brainerd (e.g., [Reyna, V. F. (1991). Class inclusion, the conjunction fallacy, and other cognitive illusions. "Developmental Review, 11", 317-336.; Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1994). The origins of probability judgment: A review of data and theories. In G. Wright & P. Ayton (Eds.), "Subjective probability." (pp. 239-272). New York: Wiley.]) and independently by Epstein (e.g., [Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious. "American Psychologist, 49", 709-724.]). Along with research in education and cognitive development, this work demonstrates that adults have difficulty with a broad range of ratio concepts, including fractions, proportions, risks and probabilities. The psychological mechanisms underlying this difficulty are characterized using dual-processes approaches such as fuzzy-trace theory, simple and effective interventions are described that eliminate common problem-solving errors, and implications for the effective use of numerical information in risk communication are discussed.