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Evidence-based policy-making (EBPM) has become both a catch-cry and aspiration of governments. Drawing on ‘the evidence’, governments seek to focus on ‘what works’ and so avoid the pitfalls of policy driven by ideology or values. Critics of EBPM remind us that the policy process remains messy and uncertain and that while research may deliver the latest scientific evidence, it is not always translated effectively into policy. We argue that the problems with EBPM run much deeper. This is not only because of the way in which knowledge is employed by policy-makers but because of the way in which knowledge is collected and communicated to policy-makers. It is well understood that policy actors are boundedly rational and this impacts upon the way in which evidence is used in the policy process. What has not been clearly articulated and is the focus of this article is that bounded rationality applies equally to the production of evidence. Drawing on the work of Polish microbiologist Ludwick Fleck we discuss how the process of systematically collecting and communicating evidence can undermine the aspirations of EPBM. We illustrate this argument with reference to recent policy debates about obesity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is now a fairly substantial literature on private global business regulation which focuses on the rise of non-governmental and private regulatory systems alongside traditional state-based systems. These private systems cross national borders and impact on international trade which, in the intergovernmental realm, is governed by the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this article, the authors argue that while in principle private global regulatory trade regimes do not fall under WTO jurisdiction, in practice they are difficult to keep separate. They therefore have the potential to become a concern within the WTO, not only in legal terms, but also from a political perspective because private global regulatory schemes may (re)introduce the distortions into international trade that WTO rules sought to remove. In some cases, a hybridisation of standards occurs as private standards are recognised by public regulatory structures. National governments may find themselves squeezed between their international obligations and the pressures of their citizens, either to respond to consumer concerns themselves and risk being in conflict with their international obligations or to respond to producers seeking action against 'private red tape' which is nominally beyond the scope of the WTO. The article takes as its case study an international business-to-business agri-food standards body, GLOBALG.A.P., and explores the issues that arise for global trade governance from the growth in private regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the National Party of Australia and on the effect demographic trends will have on the party's relevance in the 21st century. It states that in the 2010 general election, the Nationals increased their share in Australia's House of Representatives to approximately 5.75 percent and comments on how the Nationals have tried to become more of a regional party in response to encroachments of other parties into its former heartland and demographic changes. It mentions that the Nationals hold no seats where urban encroachment is happening and that the Liberal party holds as many non-urban seats as the Nationals. It talks about how the party is strongly identified with rural communities and industries and suggests it needs to develop a regional identity.

Throughout 2006, Commissioner Terence Cole QC conducted an inquiry into the involvement of Australian companies in the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq. The inquiry generated headlines about sanctions-busting behaviour on the part of AWB Limited and whether or not government ministers knew or should have known what was happening during the life of the Programme from 1996 to 2003. An element of the scandal that has received little attention is whether AWB Limited's behaviour was actually that extraordinary, given its status as a private company whose obligation to its shareholders was to maximise profits and which, had it not complied with the Iraqi government's demands to bypass the sanctions regime, could have cost the company a very important market. Drawing on the sanctions literature, this paper examines an essential problem at the heart of sanctions implementation; namely, that while states sign on to these international obligations, it is private companies and individuals that generally bear their cost. The paper considers legislative changes prompted by Commissioner Cole's Report but emphasises their limitations. A key and persistent difficulty for Australia and other states is that enforcing their international obligations depends on the goodwill and integrity of private actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1999, the Australian government privatised the statutory Australian Wheat Board and created AWB Limited, transferring the Board's assets and its export monopoly to a grower-controlled company. In 2000, allegations surfaced that AWB Limited had made payments to Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime in order to secure lucrative wheat exports worth $500 million per annum. Such actions violated the terms of the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Programme and became one of the biggest corporate scandals in Australian history. It also placed considerable pressure on senior ministers in John Howard's coalition government who were vulnerable on a number of issues, including the existence of numerous warning signs and the extent of ministerial awareness. The purpose of this article is to outline and examine the federal government's role in managing the ensuing blame game. It utilises literature on policy fiascos and blame management to create a conceptual framework that is then applied to the unfolding dynamics of the AWB Limited case. It examines issues such as the roles played by the Cole Inquiry and the political language of ministers in steering blame away from ministers and towards AWB Limited and the UN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the National Farmers' Federation (NFF) celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2004, it is timely to reflect on the role of farm groups in agricultural policy making in Australia and revisit the policy changes of the 1970s which provided a major impetus for the NFF's formation. Agricultural policy is often presented as the classic case of policy developed by tight policy communities characterised by stability, shared ideology and limited membership. There has been much debate in the literature about the value of the concept of policy communities in explaining policy development processes and policy change. This article suggests that the combination of ideological and institutional change, particularly in the presence of looser policy networks, can disrupt policy making and lead to network termination resulting in policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]