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Background: Nearly two decades ago, the Eight Americas study offered a novel lens for examining health inequities in the USA by partitioning the US population into eight groups based on geography, race, urbanicity, income per capita, and homicide rate. That study found gaps of 12·8 years for females and 15·4 years for males in life expectancy in 2001 across these eight groups. In this study, we aimed to update and expand the original Eight Americas study, examining trends in life expectancy from 2000 to 2021 for ten Americas (analogues to the original eight, plus two additional groups comprising the US Latino population), by year, sex, and age group., Methods: In this systematic analysis, we defined ten mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive Americas comprising the entire US population, starting with all combinations of county and race and ethnicity, and assigning each to one of the ten Americas based on race and ethnicity and a variable combination of geographical location, metropolitan status, income, and Black-White residential segregation. We adjusted deaths from the National Vital Statistics System to account for misreporting of race and ethnicity on death certificates. We then tabulated deaths from the National Vital Statistics System and population estimates from the US Census Bureau and the National Center for Health Statistics from Jan 1, 2000, to Dec 31, 2021, by America, year, sex, and age, and calculated age-specific mortality rates in each of these strata. Finally, we constructed abridged life tables for each America, year, and sex, and extracted life expectancy at birth, partial life expectancy within five age groups (0-4, 5-24, 25-44, 45-64, and 65-84 years), and remaining life expectancy at age 85 years., Findings: We defined the ten Americas as: America 1-Asian individuals; America 2-Latino individuals in other counties; America 3-White (majority), Asian, and American Indian or Alaska Native (AIAN) individuals in other counties; America 4-White individuals in non-metropolitan and low-income Northlands; America 5-Latino individuals in the Southwest; America 6-Black individuals in other counties; America 7-Black individuals in highly segregated metropolitan areas; America 8-White individuals in low-income Appalachia and Lower Mississippi Valley; America 9-Black individuals in the non-metropolitan and low-income South; and America 10-AIAN individuals in the West. Large disparities in life expectancy between the Americas were apparent throughout the study period but grew more substantial over time, particularly during the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2000, life expectancy ranged 12·6 years (95% uncertainty interval 12·2-13·1), from 70·5 years (70·3-70·7) for America 9 to 83·1 years (82·7-83·5) for America 1. The gap between Americas with the lowest and highest life expectancies increased to 13·9 years (12·6-15·2) in 2010, 15·8 years (14·4-17·1) in 2019, 18·9 years (17·7-20·2) in 2020, and 20·4 years (19·0-21·8) in 2021. The trends over time in life expectancy varied by America, leading to changes in the ordering of the Americas over this time period. America 10 was the only America to experience substantial declines in life expectancy from 2000 to 2019, and experienced the largest declines from 2019 to 2021. The three Black Americas (Americas 6, 7, and 9) all experienced relatively large increases in life expectancy before 2020, and thus all three had higher life expectancy than America 10 by 2006, despite starting at a lower level in 2000. By 2010, the increase in America 6 was sufficient to also overtake America 8, which had a relatively flat trend from 2000 to 2019. America 5 had relatively similar life expectancy to Americas 3 and 4 in 2000, but a faster rate of increase in life expectancy from 2000 to 2019, and thus higher life expectancy in 2019; however, America 5 experienced a much larger decline in 2020, reversing this advantage. In some cases, these trends varied substantially by sex and age group. There were also large differences in income and educational attainment among the ten Americas, but the patterns in these variables differed from each other and from the patterns in life expectancy in some notable ways. For example, America 3 had the highest income in most years, and the highest proportion of high-school graduates in all years, but was ranked fourth or fifth in life expectancy before 2020., Interpretation: Our analysis confirms the continued existence of different Americas within the USA. One's life expectancy varies dramatically depending on where one lives, the economic conditions in that location, and one's racial and ethnic identity. This gulf was large at the beginning of the century, only grew larger over the first two decades, and was dramatically exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. These results underscore the vital need to reduce the massive inequity in longevity in the USA, as well as the benefits of detailed analyses of the interacting drivers of health disparities to fully understand the nature of the problem. Such analyses make targeted action possible-local planning and national prioritisation and resource allocation-to address the root causes of poor health for those most disadvantaged so that all Americans can live long, healthy lives, regardless of where they live and their race, ethnicity, or income., Funding: State of Washington, Bloomberg Philanthropies, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests We declare no competing interests., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY 4.0 license. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Despite widespread acknowledgement that trust is important in a pandemic, few concrete proposals exist on how to incorporate trust into preparing for the next health crisis. One reason is that building trust is rightly perceived as slow and challenging. Although trust in public institutions and one another is essential in preparing for a pandemic, countries should plan for the possibility that efforts to instil or restore trust may fail. Incorporating trust into pandemic preparedness means acknowledging that polarization, partisanship and misinformation may persist and engaging with communities as they currently are, not as we would wish them to be. This paper presents a practical policy agenda for incorporating mistrust as a risk factor in pandemic preparedness and response planning. We propose two sets of evidence-based strategies: (i) strategies for ensuring the trust that already exists in a community is sustained during a crisis, such as mitigating pandemic fatigue by health interventions and honest and transparent sense-making communication; and (ii) strategies for promoting cooperation in communities where people mistrust their governments and neighbours, sometimes for legitimate, historical reasons. Where there is mistrust, pandemic preparedness and responses must rely less on coercion and more on tailoring local policies and building partnerships with community institutions and leaders to help people overcome difficulties they encounter in cooperating with public health guidance. The regular monitoring of interpersonal and government trust at national and local levels is a way of enabling this context-specific pandemic preparedness and response planning., ((c) 2024 The authors; licensee World Health Organization.)

Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

Global competition is the wrong strategic lens for an industrial policy involving critical collective health needs. Threats to US health and national security interests in this sector are transnational, and the inputs required for US biopharmaceutical innovation and resilience are globally distributed. To accelerate innovation in the life sciences, the US needs a targeted strategy that invests in domestic self-sufficiency where it is attainable and important and that mobilizes the international collaborations needed to make and deploy medical technologies to promote human health and a more resilient economy worldwide. The US needs an industrial policy for global health.

Background: The USA struggled in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, but not all states struggled equally. Identifying the factors associated with cross-state variation in infection and mortality rates could help to improve responses to this and future pandemics. We sought to answer five key policy-relevant questions regarding the following: 1) what roles social, economic, and racial inequities had in interstate variation in COVID-19 outcomes; 2) whether states with greater health-care and public health capacity had better outcomes; 3) how politics influenced the results; 4) whether states that imposed more policy mandates and sustained them longer had better outcomes; and 5) whether there were trade-offs between a state having fewer cumulative SARS-CoV-2 infections and total COVID-19 deaths and its economic and educational outcomes., Methods: Data disaggregated by US state were extracted from public databases, including COVID-19 infection and mortality estimates from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation's (IHME) COVID-19 database; Bureau of Economic Analysis data on state gross domestic product (GDP); Federal Reserve economic data on employment rates; National Center for Education Statistics data on student standardised test scores; and US Census Bureau data on race and ethnicity by state. We standardised infection rates for population density and death rates for age and the prevalence of major comorbidities to facilitate comparison of states' successes in mitigating the effects of COVID-19. We regressed these health outcomes on prepandemic state characteristics (such as educational attainment and health spending per capita), policies adopted by states during the pandemic (such as mask mandates and business closures), and population-level behavioural responses (such as vaccine coverage and mobility). We explored potential mechanisms connecting state-level factors to individual-level behaviours using linear regression. We quantified reductions in state GDP, employment, and student test scores during the pandemic to identify policy and behavioural responses associated with these outcomes and to assess trade-offs between these outcomes and COVID-19 outcomes. Significance was defined as p<0·05., Findings: Standardised cumulative COVID-19 death rates for the period from Jan 1, 2020, to July 31, 2022 varied across the USA (national rate 372 deaths per 100 000 population [95% uncertainty interval [UI] 364-379]), with the lowest standardised rates in Hawaii (147 deaths per 100 000 [127-196]) and New Hampshire (215 per 100 000 [183-271]) and the highest in Arizona (581 per 100 000 [509-672]) and Washington, DC (526 per 100 000 [425-631]). A lower poverty rate, higher mean number of years of education, and a greater proportion of people expressing interpersonal trust were statistically associated with lower infection and death rates, and states where larger percentages of the population identify as Black (non-Hispanic) or Hispanic were associated with higher cumulative death rates. Access to quality health care (measured by the IHME's Healthcare Access and Quality Index) was associated with fewer total COVID-19 deaths and SARS-CoV-2 infections, but higher public health spending and more public health personnel per capita were not, at the state level. The political affiliation of the state governor was not associated with lower SARS-CoV-2 infection or COVID-19 death rates, but worse COVID-19 outcomes were associated with the proportion of a state's voters who voted for the 2020 Republican presidential candidate. State governments' uses of protective mandates were associated with lower infection rates, as were mask use, lower mobility, and higher vaccination rate, while vaccination rates were associated with lower death rates. State GDP and student reading test scores were not associated with state COVD-19 policy responses, infection rates, or death rates. Employment, however, had a statistically significant relationship with restaurant closures and greater infections and deaths: on average, 1574 (95% UI 884-7107) additional infections per 10 000 population were associated in states with a one percentage point increase in employment rate. Several policy mandates and protective behaviours were associated with lower fourth-grade mathematics test scores, but our study results did not find a link to state-level estimates of school closures., Interpretation: COVID-19 magnified the polarisation and persistent social, economic, and racial inequities that already existed across US society, but the next pandemic threat need not do the same. US states that mitigated those structural inequalities, deployed science-based interventions such as vaccination and targeted vaccine mandates, and promoted their adoption across society were able to match the best-performing nations in minimising COVID-19 death rates. These findings could contribute to the design and targeting of clinical and policy interventions to facilitate better health outcomes in future crises., Funding: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, J Stanton, T Gillespie, J and E Nordstrom, and Bloomberg Philanthropies., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests CA reports support for the current work from the Benificus Foundation. ADF reports other financial or non-financial support from Johnson & Johnson, Sanofi, and SwissRe outside of the submitted work. NF reports financial support from WHO and Gates Ventures outside of the submitted work. All other authors declare no competing interests., (Copyright © 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY 4.0 license. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Cholera has played an outsized role in the history of how cities have transformed from the victims of disease into great disease conquerors. Yet the current burden of cholera and diarrheal diseases in the fast-urbanizing areas of low-income nations shows the many ways in which the urban health agenda remains unfinished and must continue to evolve.

International migration has increased since 1990, with increasing numbers of migrants originating from low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Efforts to explain this compositional shift have focused on wage gaps and other push and pull factors but have not adequately considered the role of demographic factors. In many LMICs, child mortality has fallen without commensurate economic growth and amid high fertility. This combination increases young adult populations and is associated with greater outmigration: in the poorest countries, we estimate that a one-percentage-point increase in the five-year lagged growth rate of the population of 15-24-year-olds was associated with a 15 per cent increase in all-age outmigrants, controlling for other factors. Increases in growth of young adult populations led to 20.4 million additional outmigrants across 80 countries between 1990 and 2015. Understanding the determinants of these migration shifts should help policymakers in origin and destination countries to maximize their potential positive effects.

Many months after COVID-19 vaccines were first authorised for public use, still limited supplies could only partially reduce the devastating loss of life and economic costs caused by the pandemic. Could additional vaccine doses have been manufactured more quickly some other way? Would alternative policy choices have made a difference? This paper provides a simple analytical framework through which to view the contours of the vaccine value chain. It then creates a new database that maps the COVID-19 vaccines of Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca/Oxford, Johnson & Johnson, Novavax and CureVac to the product- and location-specific manufacturing supply chains that emerged in 2020 and 2021. It describes the choppy process through which dozens of other companies at nearly 100 geographically distributed facilities came together to scale up global manufacturing. The paper catalogues major pandemic policy initiatives - such as the United States' Operation Warp Speed - that are likely to have affected the timing and formation of those vaccine supply chains. Given the data, a final section identifies further questions for researchers and policymakers., (© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Despite widespread recognition that universal health coverage is a political choice, the roles that a country's political system plays in ensuring essential health services and minimizing financial risk remain poorly understood. Identifying the political determinants of universal health coverage is important for continued progress, and understanding the roles of political systems is particularly valuable in a global economic recession, which tests the continued commitment of nations to protecting their health of its citizens and to shielding them from financial risk. We measured the associations that democracy has with universal health coverage and government health spending in 170 countries during the period 1990-2019. We assessed how economic recessions affect those associations (using synthetic control methods) and the mechanisms connecting democracy with government health spending and universal health coverage (using machine learning methods). Our results show that democracy is positively associated with universal health coverage and government health spending and that this association is greatest for low-income countries. Free and fair elections were the mechanism primarily responsible for those positive associations. Democracies are more likely than autocracies to maintain universal health coverage, even amid economic recessions, when access to affordable, effective health services matters most.

One of the most important gatherings of the world's economic leaders, the G20 Summit and ministerial meetings, takes place in June, 2019. The Summit presents a valuable opportunity to reflect on the provision and receipt of development assistance for health (DAH) and the role the G20 can have in shaping the future of health financing. The participants at the G20 Summit (ie, the world's largest providers of DAH, emerging donors, and DAH recipients) and this Summit's particular focus on global health and the Sustainable Development Goals offers a unique forum to consider the changing DAH context and its pressing questions. In this Health Policy perspective, we examined trends in DAH and its evolution over time, with a particular focus on G20 countries; pointed to persistent and emerging challenges for discussion at the G20 Summit; and highlighted key questions for G20 leaders to address to put the future of DAH on course to meet the expansive Sustainable Development Goals. Key questions include how to best focus DAH for equitable health gains, how to deliver DAH to strengthen health systems, and how to support domestic resource mobilisation and transformative partnerships for sustainable impact. These issues are discussed in the context of the growing effects of climate change, demographic and epidemiological transitions, and a global political shift towards increasing prioritisation of national interests. Although not all these questions are new, novel approaches to allocating DAH that prioritise equity, efficiency, and sustainability, particularly through domestic resource use and mobilisation are needed. Wrestling with difficult questions in a changing landscape is essential to develop a DAH financing system capable of supporting and sustaining crucial global health goals., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Background: Previous analyses of democracy and population health have focused on broad measures, such as life expectancy at birth and child and infant mortality, and have shown some contradictory results. We used a panel of data spanning 170 countries to assess the association between democracy and cause-specific mortality and explore the pathways connecting democratic rule to health gains., Methods: We extracted cause-specific mortality and HIV-free life expectancy estimates from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2016 and information on regime type from the Varieties of Democracy project. These data cover 170 countries and 46 years. From the Financing Global Health database, we extracted gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, also covering 46 years, and Development Assistance for Health estimates starting from 1990 and domestic health spending estimates starting from 1995. We used a diverse set of empirical methods-synthetic control, within-country variance decomposition, structural equation models, and fixed-effects regression-which together provide a robust analysis of the association between democratisation and population health., Findings: HIV-free life expectancy at age 15 years improved significantly during the study period (1970-2015) in countries after they transitioned to democracy, on average by 3% after 10 years. Democratic experience explains 22·27% of the variance in mortality within a country from cardiovascular diseases, 16·53% for tuberculosis, and 17·78% for transport injuries, and a smaller percentage for other diseases included in the study. For cardiovascular diseases, transport injuries, cancers, cirrhosis, and other non-communicable diseases, democratic experience explains more of the variation in mortality than GDP. Over the past 20 years, the average country's increase in democratic experience had direct and indirect effects on reducing mortality from cardiovascular disease (-9·64%, 95% CI -6·38 to -12·90), other non-communicable diseases (-9·14%, -4·26 to -14·02), and tuberculosis (-8·93%, -2·08 to -15·77). Increases in a country's democratic experience were not correlated with GDP per capita between 1995 and 2015 (ρ=-0·1036; p=0·1826), but were correlated with declines in mortality from cardiovascular disease (ρ=-0·3873; p<0·0001) and increases in government health spending (ρ=0·4002; p<0·0001). Removal of free and fair elections from the democratic experience variable resulted in loss of association with age-standardised mortality from non-communicable diseases and injuries., Interpretation: When enforced by free and fair elections, democracies are more likely than autocracies to lead to health gains for causes of mortality (eg, cardiovascular diseases and transport injuries) that have not been heavily targeted by foreign aid and require health-care delivery infrastructure. International health agencies and donors might increasingly need to consider the implications of regime type in their efforts to maximise health gains, particularly in the context of ageing populations and the growing burden of non-communicable diseases., Funding: Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation., (Copyright © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY 4.0 license. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Demographic and epidemiological changes are shifting the disease burden from communicable to noncommunicable diseases in lower-income countries. Within a generation, the share of disease burden attributed to noncommunicable diseases in some poor countries will exceed 80 percent, rivaling that of rich countries, but this burden is likely to affect much younger people in poorer countries. The health systems of lower-income countries are unprepared for this change. We examined the shift to noncommunicable diseases and estimated preparedness for the shift by ranking 172 nations using a health system capacity index for noncommunicable disease. We project that the countries with the greatest increases in the share of disease burden attributable to noncommunicable disease over the next twenty-five years will also be the least prepared for the change, as they ranked low on our capacity index and are expected to have the smallest increases in national health spending. National governments and donors must invest more in preparing the health systems of lower-income countries for the dramatic shift to noncommunicable diseases and in reducing modifiable noncommunicable disease risks.

The amount of international aid given to address noncommunicable diseases is minimal. Most of it is directed to wealthier countries and focuses on the prevention of unhealthy lifestyles. Explanations for the current direction of noncommunicable disease aid include that these are diseases of affluence that benefit from substantial research and development into their treatment in high-income countries and are better addressed through domestic tax and policy measures to reduce risk-factor prevalence than through aid programs. This study assessed these justifications. First, we examined the relationships among premature adult mortality, defined as the probability that a person who has lived to the age of fifteen will die before the age of sixty from noncommunicable diseases; the major risk factors for these diseases; and country wealth. Second, we compared noncommunicable and communicable diseases prevalent in poor and wealthy countries alike, and their respective links to economic development. Last, we examined the respective roles that wealth and risk prevention have played in countries that achieved substantial reductions in premature mortality from noncommunicable diseases. Our results support greater investment in cost-effective noncommunicable disease preventive care and treatment in poorer countries and a higher priority for reducing key risk factors, particularly tobacco use., (Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.)

Background: There has been tremendous progress over the last decade in the development of health products--drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics--for neglected diseases. There are now dozens of candidate products in the pipeline., Purpose: Our purpose is to assess challenges that will arise in later-stage clinical development of these candidate health products and propose a strategy that would help bring the costs, risks, and finances for their clinical trials into a better, more sustainable balance., Methods: We conducted a literature review of clinical trial-related publications, interviewed individuals sponsoring and conducting interventional clinical trials for neglected diseases, and analyzed data from Clinicaltrials.gov, a clinical trials registry, on neglected disease clinical trials initiating subject recruitment between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2009. We quantified Clinicaltrials.gov data into country-specific participation in clinical trials and aggregated them into geographic regions. We employed bioinformatics and keyword methods to classify trials by type of intervention, sponsor, study phase, and therapeutic area., Results: Two substantial bottlenecks threaten our capacity to bring these candidate neglected disease therapies to those in need. First, the research and regulatory capacity in many neglected disease-endemic settings is not adequate to support the clinical trials that need to occur there in order to complete the development of these products. Second, even with expected attrition in the pipeline, current levels of financing are insufficient to support the clinical development of these products under current cost assumptions., Limitations: The proportion of trials of relevant studies not registered on Clinicaltrials.gov is not known, but is thought to be smaller post-2005, after the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors initiated a policy requiring investigators to deposit information about trial design into an accepted clinical trials registry before beginning patient enrollment., Conclusions: Realizing the promise of the neglected disease product pipeline will require not only increased funding for large-scale clinical trials and capacity building, but also greater attention to how these trials and their regulatory pathways can be improved to reduce unnecessary costs, delays, and risks to trial subjects. We propose a two-prong strategy: (1) adaptation and adoption of emerging research on 'sensible guidelines' for reducing large-scale, randomized clinical trial costs to the demands of the neglected disease product pipeline and (2) regional approaches to regulation and ethical review of clinical trials for health products for neglected diseases.