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Research Summary: This study extends recent findings that inventor CEOs increase innovative output in large established firms by examining how their involvement in the innovative process influences the nature of innovations produced. Our theory suggests that inventor CEOs who take a hands‐on approach to innovation lead their firms to engage in more exploitative rather than exploratory innovation. We further posit that this effect is particularly strong for insider inventor CEOs, and especially founders, but weaker for outsiders and when the firm's board has broader industry experience. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 1994 to 2010 and inventor CEOs' engagement in patenting as an indicator of hands‐on involvement, we find considerable support for our predictions. Managerial Summary: CEOs with hands‐on experience innovating can substantially increase innovative output in large established firms. Yet, we show that inventors who remain directly engaged in their firms' innovation activities as CEO can limit their scope to incremental innovations that exploit existing technologies as opposed to more radical innovations that result in novel product or service offerings. These tendencies are stronger for inventors who come to the CEO position from inside the firm, especially founders, but weaker when the firm's board has broader industry experience. Overall, our study reveals an important tradeoff for large firms of having an inventor as CEO, how hands‐on involvement by inventor CEOs may narrow their firms' innovative trajectories, and how or when these tendencies can be mitigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The executive labor market (ELM) is a topic of interest that spans several academic fields. The outcomes of the ELM, including executive selection, succession, and compensation, are important considerations as they influence executive decision making and other organizational outcomes. Yet, a comprehensive framework of ELM dynamics currently does not exist. To address this shortcoming, we reviewed the existing literature using five fundamental questions: (1) What executive jobs are available? (2) Who is available to fill executive jobs, and what is valued on the ELM? (3) Who signals interest in the executive jobs? (4) Who gets offered/accepts the executive job, and what is the agreed-upon compensation? (5) How do status and social capital influence ELM outcomes? By answering these questions, our review provides a framework for integrating existing research on the ELM while suggesting avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop theory to explain how CEOs' observable personality traits influence market perceptions of firm risk and shareholder returns. Using a linguistic tool to measure nearly 3,000 CEOs' personality traits, we find that CEOs' observed levels of conscientiousness, neuroticism, and extraversion have important consequences for the perceived riskiness of the firm, as reflected in stock volatility. We also find that these traits alter the relationship between stock risk and returns. Whereas financial economic theory generally posits a positive relationship between risk and returns, on average, we find that this relationship may be either positive or negative for a specific firm depending upon the observed personality of its CEO. Our theory and findings extend upper echelons research by showing that CEOs' personality traits not only affect market perceptions of the firm but also how those perceptions translate into value creation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing from the organizational identification literature, we theorize that founder CEO succession decisions are dependent on the strength of these CEOs' organizational identification with their firms. Our theoretical premise is that factors that decrease founder CEOs' organizational identification—namely, prior entrepreneurial experience and the number of cofounders—will positively affect their voluntary succession. Conversely, factors that increase founder CEOs' organizational identification—specifically, the length of time that their organization was a private firm and core founder status—will negatively affect their voluntary succession. We find strong support for our arguments in the context of firms that undertook an initial public offering during the period from 2000 to 2013. Our findings enable us to illustrate that founder CEOs' succession decisions may be better understood by considering factors that might influence their psychological traits rather than focusing only on their performance and control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how executives' prior employment ties to interlocking directors, or those who hold additional board seats or executive positions at outside firms, influence individual executive interfirm mobility. As organizational boundary spanners, interlocking directors may be able to influence executive outcomes both within and outside of executives' current firms. But given natural constraints on internal promotion for executives, we suggest most executives will tend to leverage ties to interlocking directors to access external opportunities, as manifested by movement to outside firms. Analysis of interfirm mobility among a sample of Standard & Poor's 1500 executives between 2000 and 2014 offer support for this idea. We find a positive association between individual executives' prior employment ties to interlocking directors and their hazard of movement to outside firms, including to the other firms where these directors serve. At the same time, we argue and find that the strength of this latter relationship will further depend on directors' competing motivations owing to their specific positions in the focal and interlocking firms. Whereas holding a lead position on the focal firm's board (i.e., as chairperson or lead independent director) weakens this relationship, holding the position of chief executive officer in the interlocking firm strengthens it. Our theory and findings highlight the unique and important role of interlocking directors in executive interfirm mobility and, in doing so, contribute novel insights regarding how ties to boundary spanners can influence individual outcomes for those to whom they are linked. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1638. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Behavioral Theory of the Firm suggests that performance below an aspiration triggers problemistic search that can lead to organizational change and risk-taking. This compelling perspective has spawned considerable empirical examination of diverse strategic outcomes as firms' responses to performance feedback. However, empirical studies have provided inconsistent evidence of problemistic search effects on various organizational search outcomes. This empirical controversy is likely attributed to the fact that most research has considered problemistic search as a firm-level and relatively routinized process with a high degree of automaticity in firms' responses to performance feedback while overlooking the role of managerial agency. Rather than viewing problemistic search as an automatic firm-level process, we believe that behavioral responses are shaped, at least partially, by top executives, notably CEOs. To this end, we first examine whether problemistic search effects vary across a range of organizational change and risk outcomes. We then explore whether the relative size of firm and CEO effects varies across different search outcomes. Using a multilevel approach, we show not only the heterogeneity in problemistic search effects on different organizational outcomes but also heterogeneity in the relative size of firm and CEO effects on these outcomes. While firm effects are substantial in directing some strategic decisions, as proposed by the problemistic search model, CEO effects are large for certain organizational outcomes, such as changes in resource allocation. This study serves as a jumping-off point for future theorizing and empirical work on problemistic search that incorporate the role of managerial agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: We introduce an open‐source dataset documenting the reasons for CEO departure in S&P 1500 firms from 2000 through 2018. In our dataset, we code for various forms of voluntary and involuntary departure. We compare our dataset to three published datasets in the CEO succession literature to assess both the qualitative and quantitative differences among them and to explore how these differences impact empirical findings associated with the performance‐CEO dismissal relationship. The dataset includes eight different classifications for CEO turnover, a narrative description of each departure event, and links to sources used in constructing the narrative so that future researchers can validate or adapt the coding. The resulting data are available at (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4543893). Managerial Summary: This article describes the development of an open‐source database of all CEO dismissals and departures in the S&P 1500 between 2000 and 2018. Prior research on CEO turnover either does not capture the cause of departure or has coded the event independently, leading to inconsistencies and a lack of transparency in coding schemes. This has made it difficult to generate knowledge on the causes and consequences of CEO dismissal. We describe how we developed the database, and we explore how our dataset compares to prior CEO dismissal research. The resulting data are available at (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4543893). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of publicly traded U.S. Internet firms found that firm market evaluation was strongly associated with corporate governance characteristics. The markets may sort firms based on such characteristics, because they are correlated with desired but unobservable characteristics and actions.