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Political communication is a precondition of democracy, and democracy depends heavily on the infrastructure of the media system. The media and mediated communication are of central relevance for contemporary societies due to their decisive influence on, and consequences for, political institutions, political actors, and individual citizens. Political actors have learnt to accept that their behavior to a significant extent is influenced by the rules of the game set by the mass media. This transformation has been described as a shift to audience democracy (Manin 1995) or media democracy (Jarren 2008a). The idea of media democracy is an extension of the model of representative democracy. It refers to a development that at its beginning aimed to make politics more inclusive and transparent. In the process policy-makers have become accountable to an ever growing volume of interests and demands from the public - not only in the context of elections but in many phases of the policy process. The pressure on policy-makers to be responsive to public opinion in general and special interests in particular has increased the role of the mass media in many ways. Politicians have grown to rely on the mass media for gauging public opinion (using media coverage as a proxy for public sentiments), and for generating attention, acceptance, and legitimation of their actions (using media channels for public presentation of politics).

We define mediatization as the growing intrusion of media logic as an institutional rule into fields where other rules of defining appropriate behavior prevailed. Mediatization can lead to an enhancement, adaptation, obstruction, or even substitution of political functions by the logic of the media system. At its extreme it can lead to a state of ‘mediatized politics’ where politics ‘has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media’ (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 250). The professional, commercial, and technological production rules of the media - its operating logic - are important requirements which political actors must take into account if they are to receive publicity, public support, and legitimacy. Media logic provides an incentive structure that contextualizes, and often shapes, political processes - particularly those that are dependent on publicity and public support. From this it follows that - contrary to a priori assumptions of a fully transformed ‘media democracy’ - the concept of mediatization does not assume a complete ‘colonialization’ of politics by the media. Rather we expect that some institutions, stages, and activities in the political process will be mediatized more than others, depending on how media-compatible they are (Marcinkowski 2005).

The electoral system for the state presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina guarantees the representation of the three constituent people, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, but it violates the political rights of other ethnic minorities and of citizens who do not identify themselves with any ethnic group. Following the 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Bosnia was urged to reform its electoral law. This paper discusses alternative practices of ethnically based political representation and their possible application in the Bosnian state presidency elections. Several innovative electoral models that satisfy fair political and legal criteria for desirable electoral dynamics in divided societies can be envisaged in the Bosnian context. Specifically, these are: the introduction of a single countrywide electoral district, the adoption of the single non-transferable vote, and the application of a geometrical mean rule. They guarantee the representation of the three constituent people, while strengthening inter-ethnic voting and giving chances to non-nationalist candidates to be elected.

The paper examines determinants of electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe. The application of a hierarchical selection model shows that the strategic entry of minority parties depends on their expected electoral success due both to observed and unobserved factors. Drawing on formal models of electoral entry, the electoral success of new (or niche) parties is expected to be influenced by the costs of entry (determined by electoral thresholds) and the potential for electoral support. The latter depends on the reactions of political competitors and electoral demand, measured here as the size of ethnic groups and the saliency of ethnic issues. In line with these expectations, parties only run if they can expect electoral support sufficient to pass the electoral threshold. This finding would have been overlooked by a naïve model of electoral success which does not take self-selection into account.

Electoral rules have long been held as important for the success of new political parties, but research has neglected the dimension of territory in this equation. This article argues that the territorial structure of social groups, in interaction with the electoral system, makes a crucial difference for the ability of new parties to enter parliament. In district-based electoral systems, social groups that are highly concentrated face much lower hurdles with an own party than groups that are spread throughout the country. The argument is tested on a novel database on ethnic minority groups from post-communist countries in Europe, including 123 minorities in 19 countries. To test hypotheses with complex interaction effects and binary variables, Qualitative Comparative Analysis appears as the most suitable method. After controlling for size and special minority-relevant provisions in the electoral systems, there is strong confirmation for the hypothesised effect.

Les partis du camp rose-vert se révèlent être les gagnants des apparentements de listes. Pour les élections au Conseil national entre 1995 et 2007, ils ont non seulement utilisé activement l’instrument des apparentements, mais ils ont également pu gagner jusqu’à six nouveaux mandats par année électorale. Grâce à de nombreux sous-apparentements, les Verts et les petits partis de gauche ont pu enregistrer de nombreux sièges supplémentaires. Cela démontre que les apparentements répondent à leur but, à savoir la correction des inégalités provoquées par la clé de répartition de D’Hondt pour les élections au système proportionnel. Mais d’un autre côté, les apparentements conduisent aussi à une diversité plus grande dans les listes proposées par le PS et par les Verts, et contribuent à ce qu’un maximum d’électrices et d’électeurs soit représenté au Parlement. Des apparentements incohérents au niveau politique restent l’exception.

Im internationalen Vergleich zeichnen sich die Schweizer Kantone durch eine besonders intensive Zusammenarbeit aus. Die Entwicklung und die Struktur dieser Zusammenarbeit auch ‚horizontaler Föderalismus‘ genannt, analysieren wir basierend auf einer Datenbank der Konkordate zwischen den Schweizer Kantonen. Wir zeigen, dass der horizontale Föderalismus seit der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts besonders gewachsen ist, weil die kleinräumigen administrativen Strukturen der sozialen Integration über Kantonsgrenzen hinweg kaum mehr entsprechen, die Kantone aber trotzdem kaum Politikkompetenzen an den Bund abgegeben haben. Zudem spielt die horizontale Zusammenarbeit für die sprachregionale Koordination in Politikbereichen kantonaler Kompetenzen ein.

Daniel Bochsler is a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Zurich. He received his PhD (2008) from the University of Geneva, where his dissertation was on electoral systems and party systems in 20 Central and Eastern European democracies, with a special focus on party nationalisation. His research is centered on the effect of political institutions, namely electoral systems and referendums. He has stayed at Universities in Tartu, Irvine (University of California), and Budapest (Central European University), and has conducted field research in Serbia.

The book extends research on the territorial structure of party systems (party nationalization) to 20 post-communist democracies. It explains party nationalisation as a consequence of ethnically oriented politics, and shows how party nationalisation can increase our understanding of electoral systems. Electoral systems are the central pillar of every constitutional design. To understand their effect on party systems, we need to consider the issue of territory. Electoral system studies have attempted to explain the format of party systems in post-communist democracies. Usually, proportional representation allows for large multi-party systems and single-seat district elections leading to two-party competition, yet studies on post-communist Europe seem to reveal something different. Are post-communist democracies so chaotic that they surpass the limits of the electoral system school? This study considers the importance of territory: it matters not only how many votes parties get, but also where they get them. The book extends research on the territorial structure of party systems (party nationalization) to 20 post-communist democracies. It explains party nationalization as a consequence of ethnically oriented politics, and, by extending common models of electoral systems, it shows how party nationalization can increase our understanding of electoral systems

‘Condorcet cycles’ (or ‘paradoxes of cyclical majorities’) are an empirically rare phenomenon. A referendum in the Swiss canton of Bern on 28 November 2004 presents a rare occurrence. This study presents a new multi-option referendum procedure that makes Condorcet cycles visible, and it argues that in this case, the paradox might have resulted from strategic voting patterns.

The study of the territorial distribution of votes in elections has become an important field of the political party research in recent years. Quantitative studies on the homogeneity of votes and turnout employ different indicators of territorial variance, but despite important progresses in measurement, many of them are sensitive to size and number of political parties or electoral districts. This article proposes a new ‘standardised party nationalisation score’, which is based on the Gini coefficient of inequalities in distribution. Different from previous indicators, the standardised party nationalisation score weights for the sizes of territorial units (such as electoral districts) within a country, and considers the different numbers of territorial units in different countries.

There are far-reaching expectations that electronic democracy will increase political participation, and include previously underrepresented groups in politics. So far, however, there is little empirical evidence to monitor such trends. In 2007, Estonia became the first country to organize national parliamentary elections in which all voters had a choice of casting their vote at traditional polls, or over the Internet. This study analyses individual data from a special survey of 1000 respondents, as well as aggregated election results for, the 234 Estonia municipalities. Instead of attracting new voters, it seems, Internet voting mostly substituted for existing votes at the polls. Furthermore instead of attracting social groups that usually abstain from elections, Internet voting has for the most part attracted the same politically well-established groups. Finally, it seems that the effects of this new voting technology are not politically neutral: Internet voters favoured political parties that receive strong support from the ethnic majority and from wealthy areas. If it is to have any effect on political participation, Internet voting seems poised to increase inequalities, rather than level them.