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We reviewed the Army's preparation of the Airborne Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Minefield Detection System (ASTAMIDS) program for the low-rate initial production decision program review. Additionally, because ASTAMIDS will provide sensor data to the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS), we reviewed the working relationships between the ASTAMIDS acquisition manager and the acquisition managers developing FCS. Army acquisition managers did not fully use memoranda of agreement to define the current working relationships needed to develop ASTAMIDS as part of the FCS system-of-systems. This made it more difficult for acquisition managers to resolve multiple technical, scheduling, and funding requirements gaps between ASTAMIDS and FCS. The Army Director, Accelerated Capabilities Developments, had not begun to develop the capability production document needed to support the ASTAMIDS low-rate initial production decision program review planned for March 2009. The capability production document is needed to support effective and efficient planning, funding, and execution of the program. The Project Manager, Close Combat Systems, did not work with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to develop a memorandum of agreement to allow the agency to provide effective oversight of contractor development of ASTAMIDS. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) should direct Army acquisition managers to better define working relationships in agreements for developing ASTAMIDS as part of FCS. We made no recommendations to the Director, Accelerated Capabilities Development, or the Project Manager, Close Combat Systems, because the director took responsive action to begin development of a capabilities production document. Additionally, the project manager signed an agreement with the DCMA to allow the agency to oversee contractor development of ASTAMIDS.

This report discusses the processes the Army and the Marine Corps used to generate requirements for the Multi-Mission Radar and the Multi-Role Radar System. We performed this audit in response to allegations made to the DoD Hotline. The allegations concerned the processes the Army and the Marine Corps used to generate requirements for the Multi-Mission Radar and the Multi-Role Radar System which are both multiple-mission radar systems. This report addresses the four allegations made concerning: (1) defining threat requirements and the urgent need for the radars: (2) performing an adequate analysis of alternatives for the radars, to include an assessment of current radar systems, upgrades to current radar systems, and planned radar systems of the other Services: (3) considering combat effectiveness and suitability factors when defining radar requirements: and (4) threatening improper personnel actions against staff wanting to discuss alternative means of meeting radar requirements.

Air Force acquisition and flight test officials affiliated with the Gulf Range Drone Control System Program and the DoD test flight community should read this report. The report addresses allegations to the Defense Hotline concerning mismanagement of the Aerial Targets Program. We performed the audit in response to allegations concerning waste and mismanagement by the Air Force Aerial Targets Systems Program Office. The Hotline allegations were submitted in three letters by an anonymous complainant and addressed concerns about the lack of participation and support by the Air Force Aerial Targets Systems Program Office for the Multi-Service Target Control System Program. Appendix B shows the six primary areas of concern that were identified in the three letters and Appendix C shows the audit response to those concerns.

Who Should Read This Report and Why? Missile Defense Agency program managers who are responsible for the acquisition and management of targets used to test the Ballistic Missile Defense System should be interested in this report. This report addresses allegations made to the Defense Hotline on the effectiveness of the process that the program managers use to acquire and manage the targets. This audit was performed in response to allegations made to the DoD Hotline in March 2003. This report addresses 10 allegations about the effectiveness of the process that the Missile Defense Agency used to manage and acquire targets. A separate report will address the allegations concerning the process that the Missile Defense Agency used to define Ballistic Missile Defense System capabilities. The Missile Defense Agency Targets and Countermeasures Directorate designs, develops, and provides ballistic missile targets to test the Ballistic Missile Defense System. The Directorate's FY 2005 budget consists of an estimated $305 million in research, development, test, and evaluation funds. This budget is supplemented by an estimated $167 million in research, development, test, and evaluation funds from elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System., Project no. D2004AE-0154.

Introduction. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999 requires the Inspector General, DoD, to selectively audit information technology and national security systems certified as Y2K compliant to evaluate the ability of systems to successfully operate during the actual Y2K, including the ability of the systems to access and transmit information from point of origin to point of termination. This is one in a series of reports addressing that requirement. In addition, this is also one in a larger series of reports being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer, DoD, to monitor DoD efforts to address the year 2000 computing challenge. For a listing of audit projects addressing the issue, see the year 2000 webpage on the IGnet at http:I/www.ignet.gov. Objectives. The overall audit objective was to evaluate the ability of the AN/ARC-220 Nap-of-the-Earth Aircraft Communications System to operate successfully in the year 2000, including the system's ability to access and transmit information from point of origin to point of termination. Additionally, the audit determined the adequacy of the contingency plan and the accuracy of the status reports.

Remote control circuit breakers are trip-free thermal devices that combine the functions of a conventional circuit breaker and relay into one device. The remote control circuit breakers are used in the AH-64A Apache Attack Helicopter to prevent electric current overloads to the Hellfire Missile System. The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing performed a technical evaluation of the breakers based on a Hotline allegation that the breakers were defective in design and workmanship. The evaluation objective was to conduct a technical assessment to determine the adequacy of the design, quality control, and acceptance of the remote control circuit breakers. Specifically, we evaluated and tested remote control circuit breakers for design and quality to ensure that the United States Army Aviation and Troop Command (now Army Aviation and Missile Command), McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems, and Texas Instruments complied with manufacturing and quality processes.

Our objective was to determine whether the RCAS funded, was executable, would meet the Army's National Guard and Reserve requirements, and would be fielded to all operational units according to an approved plan.

The Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC) managed electronics inventory valued at $2.1 billion at the beginning of FY 1991. The inventory consisted of 980,000 National Stock Numbers (NSNs). The technical assessment tested nonconformances in three Federal supply classes (FSCs) of electronics parts (resistors, semiconductors, and connectors) drawn from DLA warehouses. In FY 1991, DESC spent $75 million to acquire 11.6 million items for 22,775 NSNs in the three FSCs. Objectives. The primary objective of the assessment was to determine the percentage of nonconforming parts delivered in FY 1991 in each of the three electronics parts Federal supply classes. An additional objective was to assess differences in the percentage of nonconforming electronics parts between those items manufactured to military specifications and those items manufactured to commercial specifications.