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A large portion of research in the social sciences is devoted to using interventions to combat societal and social problems, such as prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict. However, these interventions are often developed using the theories and/or intuitions of the individuals who developed them and evaluated in isolation without comparing their efficacy with other interventions. Here, we make the case for an experimental design that addresses such issues: an intervention tournament—that is, a study that compares several different interventions against a single control and uses the same standardized outcome measures during assessment and participants drawn from the same population. We begin by highlighting the utility of intervention tournaments as an approach that complements other, more commonly used approaches to addressing societal issues. We then describe various approaches to intervention tournaments, which include crowdsourced, curated, and in-house-developed intervention tournaments, and their unique characteristics. Finally, we discuss practical recommendations and key design insights for conducting such research, given the existing literature. These include considerations of intervention-tournament deployment, characteristics of included interventions, statistical analysis and reporting, study design, longitudinal and underlying psychological mechanism assessment, and theoretical ramifications.

Western countries have witnessed increased hostility towards Muslims among individuals, and structurally in the ways that the media covers stories related to Islam/Muslims and in policies that infringe on the rights of Muslim communities. In response, practitioners have created media interventions that aim to reduce Islamophobia. However, it is unclear what causal effects these interventions have on reducing Islamophobia. Here, we test the effects of 11 media interventions developed by practitioners with an intervention tournament among U.S. samples. In Study 1, we identified three videos that most effectively reduced Islamophobia both immediately after watching and 1 month later. In Studies 2–4, we examined the psychological mechanisms of these successful videos and found an indirect effect of the interventions on reduced support for anti-Muslim policies through recognition of media bias against Muslims. This research highlights that drawing attention to structural biases, including biased media coverage of Muslims, is one potential strategy for ameliorating Islamophobia.

COVID-19 pandemic has changed the world in many ways. At the societal level, disparities in attitudes toward the COVID-19 vaccines have led to polarization and intense animosity. In this study, we use a novel paradoxical thinking intervention that was found to be effective in difficult and violent intergroup contexts, and measure its effectiveness in a novel unobtrusive way in an important and timely context, namely prejudice against vaccine hesitancy. In the midst of a vaccination campaign, 36 young Finnish adults either went through the intervention or through a control condition. Magnetoencephalography then measured a neural response that is thought to reflect intergroup bias and possibly implicit prejudice. This neural response was reduced among the participants receiving the intervention, compared to the control group, thereby suggesting a potential mechanism of intergroup bias that is affected by a psychological intervention even during a campaign that castigates aggressively vaccine-hesitant individuals. The findings reported here contribute to the recent accumulating evidence of the potential of neuroimaging to reveal covert mental effects by psychological interventions. They may also have societal implications for moderating the polarized attitudes in a new era of pandemics.

Members of historically advantaged groups are often unwilling to support actions or policies aimed at reducing inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, even if they generally support the principle of equality. Based on past research, we suggest a self-affirmation intervention (an intervention in which people reflect on a positive trait or value in order to affirm their positive self-image) may be effective for increasing the willingness of advantaged group members to address inequality. Importantly, while self-affirmation has in the past only operationalized as a written exercise, in this project we adapt it into video messages for use in public campaigns. In Study 1, we experimentally tested an initial video adaptation of self-affirmation and found that it is effective in increasing the willingness of advantaged group members to address inequality in the context of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel. Based on this study, an NGO developed a real campaign video and used it in their public campaign, and we tested this applied intervention (in Study 2) and found it to be effective compared to a control condition that only presented information about inequality. Together, these studies represent the first implementation of self-affirmation in real world campaigns and indicate that it can be effective way to increase support for action to address inequality.

Muslims are consistently the target of dehumanization and hostile policies. Previous research shows that interventions that highlight the hypocrisy wherein people collectively blame entire groups for the heinous acts of individual members of outgroups but not ingroups are effective in reducing animosity towards Muslims. However, these interventions rely on aversive materials (e.g., terrorist acts), which can hinder the scalability of interventions due to individuals’ tendency to resist/avoid challenging and aversive stimuli. In three preregistered studies (combined N = 2,635), we developed and tested a nonaversive, hypocrisy-based intervention that highlights the hypocrisy involved in attributing ingroup members’ prosocial acts to the entire ingroup (i.e., Christians) but not doing the same for outgroup members (i.e., Muslims). Results indicated that this collective praise intervention reliably reduces dehumanization of Muslims, anti-Muslim policy support, and collective blame of Muslims. We argue that the intervention’s use of nonaversive stimuli allows for both practical and scalable applications.

Democracies welcome dissent, but when disagreements turn divisive, they can imperil social cohesion and become toxic to democracy. We review research on the psychological processes associated with toxic polarization. Prior work has generally focused on polarization as a consequence of ideological differences or affective evaluations. We assess recent research on these dimensions, and extend the scope to include psychological processes that motivate hostility in other intergroup settings, but that have only recently been examined in political contexts: dehumanization and ‘meta-perceptions’ (negative evaluations of the ingroup perceived to be held by the outgroup). By examining these processes in the context of equal-status, but ideologically opposite, groups, the research reviewed provides new insight into the ways intergroup evaluations are shaped by political ideological orientations.

Conspiracy theories widely influence our social and political lives. Thus, it is no surprise that in recent years, much research has focused on the factors that may drive the belief in such theories. While we know that different contexts can lead to the development and amplification of conspiracy theories; those involving fear, uncertainty, and loss of control have been found to be particularly influential. In the current paper, we focus on one example for such context: violent intergroup conflicts. We suggest a new theoretical framework emphasizing a possible reciprocal relationship between conspiracy theories and violent intergroup conflicts: intergroup conflict enhances belief in conspiracy theories, which in turn, radicalizes the involved societies and by that hinders peaceful conflict resolution.

Members of societies involved in an intractable conflict usually consider costs that stem from the continuation of the conflict as unavoidable and even justify for their collective existence. This perception is well-anchored in widely shared conflict-supporting narratives that motivate them to avoid information that challenges their views about the conflict. However, since providing information about such major costs as a method for moderating conflict-related views has not been receiving much attention, in this research, we explore this venue. We examine what kind of costs, and under what conditions, exposure to major costs of a conflict affects openness to information and conciliatory attitudes among Israeli Jews in the context of the intractable Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Study 1 (N = 255) revealed that interventions based on messages providing information on mental health cost, economic cost, and cost of the conflict to Israeli democracy had (almost) no significant effect on perceptions of the participants of these prices, openness to new information about the conflict, or support for conciliatory policies. However, the existing perceptions that participants had about the cost of the conflict to Israeli democracy were positively associated with openness to alternative information about the conflict and support for conciliatory policies. Therefore, in Study 2 (N = 255), we tested whether providing information about future potential costs to the two fundamental characteristics of Israel, a democracy or a Jewish state, created by the continuation of the conflict, will induce attitude change regarding the conflict. The results indicate that information on the future cost to the democratic identity of Israel significantly affected the attitude of the participants regarding the conflict, while the effect was moderated by the level of religiosity. For secular participants, this manipulation created more openness to alternative information about the conflict and increased support for conciliatory policies, but for religious participants, it backfired. We discuss implications for the role of information about losses and the relationship between religiosity and attitudes regarding democracy and conflict.

Whereas politicians broker peace deals, it falls to the public to embrace peace and help sustain it. The legacy of conflicts can make it difficult for people to support reconciling and reintegrating with former enemies. Here we create a five-minute media intervention from interviews we conducted with Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) ex-combatants in a Colombian demobilization camp and non-FARC Colombians in neighbouring communities. We show that exposure to the media intervention humanizes FARC ex-combatants and increases support for peace and reintegration. These effects persisted at least three months post-exposure, were replicated in an independent sample of non-FARC Colombians and affected both attitudes (for example, support for reintegration policies) and behaviour (for example, donations to organizations supporting ex-combatants). As predicted, the intervention's effects were mediated by changing conflict-associated cognitions-reducing the belief that ex-combatants are unwilling and unable to change-beyond affective pathways (for example, increased empathy or reduced prejudice).

The chapter introduces a new approach to attitude change, termed paradoxical thinking. It suggests that messages that are consistent with an individual's view, but formulated in an amplified, exaggerated, or even absurd manner, lead to an extended process of deliberative thinking and arouse lower levels of resistance compared to conventional persuasive approaches that use attitude-inconsistent messages. We argue that attitude-inconsistent messages are often automatically rejected among highly involved individuals with extreme views. The paradoxical thinking approach is intended to lead individuals to perceive their held societal beliefs or the current situation as farfetched and implausible, and ultimately, to lead to unfreezing and reevaluation of held attitudes. Eventually, unfreezing may lead to openness to alternative, more moderate viewpoints that may then be adopted. We introduce four variables that are part of the process (i.e., threat to identity, surprise, disagreement with the message, and unfreezing) and present empirical evidence supporting this conception with studies conducted mostly vis-a-vis conflict-supporting attitudes in the context of an intractable conflict.

In 16 independent samples from five countries involving ~7,700 participants, we employ a mixture of cross-sectional, longitudinal, and quasi-experimental methods to examine the effect of intergroup contact on (a) the blatant dehumanization of outgroups, and (b) the perception that outgroup members dehumanize the ingroup (meta-dehumanization). First, we conduct a meta-analysis across 12 survey samples collected from five countries regarding eight different target groups (total N = 5,388) and find a consistent effect of contact quality on dehumanization and meta-dehumanization. Second, we use a large longitudinal sample of American participants ( N = 1,103) to show that quality of contact with Muslims at Time 1 predicts dehumanization of Muslims and meta-dehumanization 6 months later. Finally, we show that sustained semester-long “virtual contact” between American and Muslim college students is associated with reduced American students’ ( N = 487) dehumanization of, and perceived dehumanization by, Muslims.

People’s actions toward a competitive outgroup can be motivated not only by their perceptions of the outgroup, but also by how they think the outgroup perceives the ingroup (i.e., meta-perceptions). Here, we examine the prevalence, accuracy, and consequences of meta-perceptions among American political partisans. Using a representative sample ( n = 1,056) and a longitudinal convenience sample ( n = 2,707), we find that Democrats and Republicans equally dislike and dehumanize each other but think that the levels of prejudice and dehumanization held by the outgroup party are approximately twice as strong as actually reported by a representative sample of Democrats and Republicans. Overestimations of negative meta-perceptions were consistent across samples over time and between demographic subgroups but were modulated by political ideology: More strongly liberal Democrats and more strongly conservative Republicans were particularly prone to exaggerate meta-perceptions. Finally, we show that meta-prejudice and meta-dehumanization are independently associated with the desire for social distance from members of the outgroup party and support for policies that harm the country and flout democratic norms to favor the ingroup political party. This research demonstrates that partisan meta-perceptions are subject to a strong negativity bias with Democrats and Republicans agreeing that the shadow of partisanship is much larger than it actually is, which fosters mutual intergroup hostility.

This chapter examines the psychological dimensions and consequences of acknowledgment versus denial of the in-group’s collective victimization. Denial can entail different forms and be literal, interpretative, or implicatory. Likewise, acknowledgment can entail factual acknowledgment, empathic acknowledgment, or even the perpetrator group’s possession of a negative identity. The authors discuss why and how these different forms of acknowledgment and denial matter, the societal means through which acknowledgment versus denial can occur, whose acknowledgment (e.g., perpetrator group vs. third parties) is most relevant in which context, and which events are most important to acknowledge. The chapter reviews findings demonstrating that acknowledgment can improve psychological well-being and intergroup attitudes, while lack of acknowledgment has the opposite effect. The underlying psychological processes that have been studied so far include identity, processes related to the groups’ relationship (e.g., trust), concerns over justice, and affective processes.

In this article, we examined the effect of external cues on first offers in negotiation. Specifically, we present the results of three experiments and an internal meta-analysis through which we investigated the relations between buyers’ external characteristics, which serve as cues of economic wealth, including their clothes, cars and country of origin, and sellers’ first offers in negotiation. We found that when external cues indicated wealth, counteroffers were less beneficial to those communicating the cues, resulting in higher first offers by their counterparts. We suggest, and provide empirical evidence, that these effects will emerge as long as the wealth signal is salient and perceived as an indication for the counterpart’s ‘deep pockets’, or ability to pay.

Given the central role of anger in shaping adversarial policy preferences in the context of intergroup conflict, its reduction may promote conflict resolution. In the current work, we drew on psycholinguistic research on the role of language in generating emotions to explore a novel, extremely subtle means of intervention. Specifically, we hypothesized that phrasing conflict-relevant policies in noun form (vs. verb form) would reduce anger and impact policy support correspondingly. Results across three experimental studies in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict supported these expectations for both support for concessions (Studies 1–3) and retaliatory policies (Study 3), with reduction in anger mediating the salutary impact of noun form (vs. verb form) on policy support. These results expand our understanding of the influence of language on emotions and policies in the context of conflict and have applied relevance for conflict-resolution efforts.

Conflict-resolution interventions based on the paradoxical thinking principles, that is, expressing amplified, exaggerated, or even absurd ideas that are congruent with the held conflict-supporting societal beliefs, have been shown to be an effective avenue of intervention, especially among individuals who are adamant in their views. However, the question as to why these interventions have been effective has remained unanswered. In the present research, we have examined possible underlying psychological mechanisms, focusing on identity threat, surprise, and general disagreement. In a small-scale lab study and a large-scale longitudinal study, we compared paradoxical thinking interventions with traditional interventions based on providing inconsistent information. The paradoxical thinking interventions led rightists to show more unfreezing of held conflict-supporting beliefs and openness to alternative information, whereas the inconsistency-based interventions tended to be more effective with the centrist participants. Both studies provide evidence that the effects were driven by identity threat, surprise, and lower levels of disagreement.

Two large-scale surveys conducted in Israel (Study 1A) and the Palestinian Authority (Study 1B) show that the belief by group members that people in the “enemy” group acknowledge their victimhood (i.e., Holocaust and Nakba for Jews and Palestinians, respectively) is associated with Israeli-Jews’ readiness to accept responsibility for Palestinian sufferings and offer apologies. For Palestinians, this belief is linked to a perceived higher likelihood of a reconciled future with Israelis. Three field experiments demonstrate that a manipulated high level of acknowledgment of Jewish victimhood by Palestinians (Studies 2 and 4) and of Palestinian victimhood by Israeli-Jews (Study 3) caused greater readiness to make concessions for the sake of peace on divisive issues (e.g., Jerusalem, the 1967 borders, the right of return) and increased conciliatory attitudes. Additional analyses indicate the mediating role of increased trust and reduced emotional needs in these relationships.

Self-censorship is of great importance in societies involved in intractable conflict. In this context, it blocks information that may contradict the dominant conflict-supporting narratives. Thus, self-censorship often serves as an effective societal mechanism that prevents free flow and transparency of information regarding the conflict and therefore can be seen as a barrier for a peacemaking process. In an attempt to understand the potential effect of different factors on participants’ willingness to self-censor (WSC) conflict-related information, we conducted three experimental studies in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Study 1 revealed that perception of distance from potential information recipients and their disseminating capabilities lead to higher WSC. Study 2 replicated these results and also showed that fulfilling different social roles has an effect on the WSC. Finally, study 3 revealed that the type of information has a major effect on WSC.

Self-censorship, defined as an “act of intentionally and voluntarily withholding information from others in the absence of formal obstacles” often serves as a barrier to resolving intractable conflicts. Specifically, in order to protect the group, and in absence of objective constraints such as institutionalized censorship, individuals practice self-censorship and support its practice by other society members. This prevents free flow and transparency of information, within a society, regarding the conflict and the adversary. In an attempt to investigate the factors that contribute to the functioning of self-censorship as a sociopsychological barrier to conflict resolution, a longitudinal study was conducted among a large sample of Jews in Israel. The survey was administered in three waves: a few months before, during, and a few months after Israel's Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip. The findings showed that armed confrontation can increase support for self-censorship. In addition, the findings revealed that personal characteristics (e.g., authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, siege mentality) predicted support for self-censorship, which, in turn, mediated the effect of personal characteristics on support for negotiations and for providing humanitarian aid. The theoretical as well as the applied implications of the findings are discussed.

In the present research, we introduce a conceptualization of the Tendency for Interpersonal Victimhood (TIV), which we define as an enduring feeling that the self is a victim across different kinds of interpersonal relationships. Then, in a comprehensive set of eight studies, we develop a measure for this novel personality trait, TIV, and examine its correlates, as well as its affective, cognitive, and behavioral consequences. In Part 1 (Studies 1A-1C) we establish the construct of TIV, with its four dimensions; i.e., need for recognition, moral elitism, lack of empathy, and rumination, and then assess TIV's internal consistency, stability over time, and its effect on the interpretation of ambiguous situations. In Part 2 (Studies 2A-2C) we examine TIV's convergent and discriminant validities, using several personality dimensions, and the role of attachment styles as conceptual antecedents. In Part 3 (Studies 3–4) we explore the cognitive and behavioral consequences of TIV. Specifically, we examine the relationships between TIV, negative attribution and recall biases, and the desire for revenge (Study 3), and the effects of TIV on behavioral revenge (Study 4). The findings highlight the importance of understanding, conceptualizing, and empirically testing TIV, and suggest that victimhood is a stable and meaningful personality tendency.

Self-censorship is defined as intentionally and voluntarily withholding information from others in absence of formal obstacles. We conducted cross-sectional and longitudinal research to develop a quantitative measure of individuals’ Self-Censorship Orientation (SCO) and investigated its correlates and outcomes in the context of the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Stage 1 investigated the factor structure of the scale and its convergent and discriminant validity in a representative sample (N = 499). Findings revealed two negatively related factors representing preferences for self-censorship and for disclosure of information. The factors were distinct from measures of similar constructs and correlated as expected with variables representing conservatism, ingroup commitment and universalistic values. In Stage 2, participants were re-surveyed five months later to establish test-retest reliability and predictive validity. SCO factors assessed at Stage 1 predicted readiness to conceal or reveal information portraying the ingroup’s conduct in the conflict negatively beyond all Stage 1 measures. The SCO scale provides a reliable and valid instrument for future investigations of self-censorship and its individual and societal implications.

Self-censorship is of great importance in societies involved in intractable conflict. In this context, it blocks information that may contradict the dominant conflict-supporting narratives. Thus, self-censorship often serves as an effective societal mechanism that prevents free flow and transparency of information regarding the conflict and therefore can be seen as a barrier for a peacemaking process. We begin the chapter by describing the distinguishing characteristics of intractable conflicts, most notably the socio-psychological barriers that fuel this type of conflict, focusing on self-censorship. Then we turn to review research conducted with the Jewish-Israeli population, which provides empirical evidence of the operation of self-censorship as a barrier, its antecedents, and consequences. Finally, we discuss a number of conclusions that stem from the reviewed literature.

Resolving intergroup conflicts is one of humanity’s most important challenges. Social psychologists join this endeavor, not only to understand the psychological foundations of intergroup conflicts but also to suggest interventions that aim to resolve conflicts peacefully. The present article begins by describing a specific type of conflict, namely, an intractable conflict that has distinguishing characteristics. One characteristic that fuels its intractability is the presence of socio-psychological barriers. These barriers result in one-sided information processing that obstructs the penetration of new information to promote peace: Members of a society immersed in an intractable conflict are frozen in their conflict-supporting societal beliefs. The most challenging question is how to unfreeze these beliefs, to overcome these barriers. Various interventions have been designed to promote intergroup peace, within a new taxonomy specifying the nature and goals of the interventions. Peace-promoting interventions can be divided into three categories: (a) interventions that provide contradictory information, (b) interventions that provide information through experiences, and (c) interventions that teach a new skill. Finally, a number of conclusions and limitations stem from the reviewed interventions, suggesting a new line of intervention based on “paradoxical thinking.”

In the current paper, we report a large-scale randomized field experiment, conducted among Jewish Israelis during widespread violence. The study examines the effectiveness of a “real world,” multichanneled paradoxical thinking intervention, with messages disseminated through various means of communication (i.e., online, billboards, flyers). Over the course of 6 wk, we targeted a small city in the center of Israel whose population is largely rightwing and religious. Based on the paradoxical thinking principles, the intervention involved transmission of messages that are extreme but congruent with the shared Israeli ethos of conflict. To examine the intervention’s effectiveness, we conducted a large-scale field experiment (prepost design) in which we sampled participants from the city population (n = 215) and compared them to a control condition (from different places of residence) with similar demographic and political characteristics (n = 320). Importantly, participants were not aware that the intervention was related to the questionnaires they answered. Results showed that even in the midst of a cycle of ongoing violence within the context of one of the most intractable conflicts in the world, the intervention led hawkish participants to decrease their adherence to conflict-supporting attitudes across time. Furthermore, compared with the control condition, hawkish participants that were exposed to the paradoxical thinking intervention expressed less support for aggressive policies that the government should consider as a result of the escalation in violence and more support for conciliatory policies to end the violence and promote a long-lasting agreement.

For most of his career, Daniel Bar-Tal has been one of the more prolific contributors to the understanding of the psychological foundations of intergroup conflicts, with extensive writings on intractable conflicts. In recent years, Bar-Tal, along with his students, has taken upon himself the mission of finding new ways—using new approaches, different from the ones usually used by social psychologists—to intervene and overcome the psychological barriers in order to promote peace. Based on Bar-Tal’s writings, we begin this chapter by elaborating on the sociopsychological barriers and their detrimental effect on societies immersed in intractable conflicts. We then review and discuss the virtues and limitations of new interventions, derived mainly, but not exclusively, from the work of Bar-Tal and his students, that have been designed to overcome these barriers and promote intergroup peace. Finally, following the limitations that stem from the interventions reviewed, we suggest a new line of interventions based on what is termed paradoxical thinking.

In societies involved in an intractable conflict, there are strong socio-psychological barriers that contribute to the continuation and intractability of the conflict. Based on a unique field study conducted in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, we offer a new avenue to overcome these barriers by exposing participants to a long-term paradoxical intervention campaign expressing extreme ideas that are congruent with the shared ethos of conflict. Results show that the intervention, although counterintuitive, led participants to express more conciliatory attitudes regarding the conflict, particularly among participants with center and right political orientation. Most importantly, the intervention even influenced participants9 actual voting patterns in the 2013 Israeli general elections: Participants who were exposed to the paradoxical intervention, which took place in proximity to the general elections, reported that they tended to vote more for dovish parties, which advocate a peaceful resolution to the conflict. These effects were long lasting, as the participants in the intervention condition expressed more conciliatory attitudes when they were reassessed 1 y after the intervention. Based on these results, we propose a new layer to the general theory of persuasion based on the concept of paradoxical thinking.