The Chinese stock market is characterised by a high proportion of state-owned enterprises (hereafter called SOEs). To improve their performance and competitiveness, the Chinese government has implemented a series of SOE reforms since 1978. One of the main tasks of the SOE reforms has been to create a modern enterprise system. However, the existing literature provides limited and mixed evidence on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms among listed SOEs (e.g. Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012; Ke et al., 2012; Reddy and Yu, 2014; Liu et al., 2015). The listed central enterprises (hereafter called listed CEs) are the leading enterprises among listed SOEs, as they are generally large in size and in important or monopoly industries related to the national security of the country. In addition, they are more politically sensitive, as they are ultimately controlled by the central enterprises that are solely owned by the central government. In other words, the central government is the ultimate owner of listed CEs. In this thesis, the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms among listed CEs is investigated, with the focus being on three aspects: the affiliated directors that are nominated from the central enterprise or its affiliations, the independent directors on the corporate board, and the supervisory board. After controlling for the potential endogeneity issue and conducting multiple robustness checks, first it is found that the significant deviation of the control and cash-flow rights motivates central enterprises to appoint more affiliated directors on the corporate board in the next period. Also, the proportion of affiliated directors has an inverse U-shaped relation to the subsequent firm value of listed CEs. This result implies that too many affiliated directors on the corporate board lead to lower firm value in the next period among listed CEs. This research also involves examining the contemporaneous relationship between affiliated directors and firm value in listed CEs and it is concluded that these two factors jointly affect each other. Second, it emerges that the independent director system is an effective mechanism for improving the investment efficiency of listed CEs, i.e. when more than 47.3% of directors on the corporate board are independent. In addition, it is elicited that the U-shaped relationship between the proportion of independent directors and investment efficiency is a unique phenomenon among listed CEs by conducting a PSM (propensity score matching) approach. This study also involves extending the test into over- and under-investment scenarios and the result is that the aforementioned relationship is only presented in listed CEs with over-investment issues. This indicates that the independent director system plays a more efficient role in reducing investment inefficiency caused by over-investment problems. Last, this research identifies that a large supervisory board, older supervisors, and more than three female supervisors on the supervisory board can improve the financial reporting quality of listed CEs. Affiliated supervisors from the central enterprise or its affiliations and significant age diversity of the supervisory team have a negative effect on financial reporting quality among listed CEs. Moreover, employee representatives on the supervisory board and the average compensation of the supervisory board have no significant impact on the financial reporting quality of listed CEs. The findings are important in the context of the existing literature. This research is one of the few contemporary studies examining the influence of the central government as the ultimate owner and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms among a specific kind of SOE, which has a tight connection with the central government.