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The paper discusses Wittgenstein’s approaches to ethics within two contrastive contexts, e.g., pragmatism and cooperative-discursive normative practice. The first section revisits the fiasco of his early “negative” ethics. The second section subsequently shows how Wittgenstein’s mature concept of blind rule-following displaces normativity but simultaneously becomes the key predictor for discourse ethics (or, rather, a specific kind of it). The final section discusses the pros and cons of finitism in the light of contemporary philosophy of mind. As a conclusion, the author provides evidence for her hypothesis that there is no normative (embodied) mind without a manifest normative competence, which includes moral judgment and discursive competence.

The problem of relativism and realism may appear in hermeneutic and mundane phenomenological projects. In this paper theories of Kuhn, Wittgenstein, Winch, and Bloor are discussed. Kuhn’s theory may be interpreted in at least two ways, one generating the problem of relativism and realism, the second avoiding the problem. Wittgenstein’s treatment of reciprocal understanding across cultural borders does avoid the problem of relativism. Winch, on the other hand, represents a kind of «surfacehermeneutics » that excludes the concepts of truth and validity. Bloor’s position differs from that of Winch. His strong sociology of knowledge-program does, however, imply self-referential inconsistency and excludes the concepts of truth and validity since it insists that scientific knowledge is to be explained solely on the basis of social causes. Sannings-pretensjon er eit essensielt vilkår for alt vitskapleg arbeid. Difor spelar realisme- og relativisme-problemet ei viktig rolle, ikkje berre i forhold til postmodernistisk eller dekonstruktivistisk vitskapsfilosofi, men likeeins i forhold til hermeneutiske eller mundan-fenomenologiske prosjekt, i tillegg til kunnskaps-sosiologi (seinare k-sosiologi). I denne artikkelen skal eg drøfte problemet på basis av Kuhn, Wittgenstein, Winch og Bloor og vise at og kvifor i alle fall Winch og Bloor sine respektive prosjekt ikkje lar seg innløyse.

U ljetnom, posebnom izdanju časopisa Common Knowledge (Perl, 2007), objavljen je članak Davida Bloora u kojem autor analizira današnju poziciju antirelativista i gdje ih poistovjećuje s apsolutistima. Bloor misli na apsolutiste kakav je Joseph Ratzinger čija je posljednja propovijed, dok je bio u funkciji kardinala, glavni motiv za spomenuto izdanje Common Knowledgea. U tom izdanju su članci nastali za potrebe simpozija »Diktatura relativizma«? - Simpozij u odgovor na posljednju propovijed kardinala Ratzingera. Središnja tema ovog članka propitivanje je značaja posljednjeg Bloorova doprinosa epistemološkom sukobu koji je kulminirao 1996. godine objavom Sokalovog članka »Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity«. Bloorova relativizacija Ratova znanosti pokazuje kako argumentacija kojom se služi ne ukazuje na nove pomake i nove spoznaje koje bi mogle obogatiti raspravu. Štoviše, možemo reći da Bloor u svojoj argumentaciji napadajući apsolutno u antirelativističkoj epistemologiji sam biva apsolutan i ulazi u kontradikcije izazvane konstruiranjem diskurzivnog polja i forsiranjem apstraktnih modela znanosti. Bloor se, možda više nego prije u svojim radovima, približava filozofskom dualizmu i time zalazi u područje inače rezervirano za antirelativiste. U zaključku zastupam stav da se unatoč višestrukim mogućim interpretacijama Bloorova teksta ne možepronaći dovoljno originalan i provokativan stav koji bi mogao donijeti promjenu postojeće situacije u Ratovima znanosti., In the special summer edition of Common Knowledge (Perl, 2007) there was an article by David Bloor in which he analyzes today’s position of anti-relativists and equates them with absolutists. Bloor has in mind the type of absolutist like Joseph Ratzinger, whose final homily as a cardinal was the main motive for publishing the aforementioned edition of Common Knowledge. The edition compiled articles which were created for the purpose of the symposium “Dictatorship of Relativism”? – Symposium in Response to Cardinal Ratzinger’s Last Homily. The main focus of this article is on questioning the significance of Bloor’s last contribution to the epistemological conflict which peaked in 1996, when Sokal published his article “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.“ Bloor’s relativization of the Science Wars shows how his argumentation does not indicate to new strides and new findings which could invigorate the debate. Furthermore, we might say that by attacking the absolute in the anti-relativist epistemology, Bloor himself becomes absolute in his argumentation and becomes contradictory as a result of constructing a discursive field and insisting on abstract models of science. Bloor is approaching philosophical dualism, maybe even more than in his earlier work, and thereby he enters an area otherwise reserved for antirelativists. In the conclusion I take the position that despite multiple interpretations of Bloor’s text, there cannot be found a sufficiently original and provocative attitude which could bring change to the current situation in the Science Wars.