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That it is raining is a reason I have to bring my umbrella. But the reason for which I bring it is that it complements my outfit. Fashion, rather than function, is my basis for bringing the umbrella. This relation between an action or attitude and its basis is the basing relation. I defend a novel account of the basing relation. Chapter 1 focuses on a fundamental instance of basing: inference. I construe drawing a conclusion from premises as in part being caused by (consideration of) those premises to draw that conclusion. But one can be caused to believe a conclusion by some premises without thereby inferring; one might associate from some beliefs to another, as in a daydream. I invoke representational states to distinguish genuine inferences from mere associations. More specifically, in representing the premises as supporting the conclusion, one is thereby committed to that support relation obtaining. So drawing a conclusion has a distinctive functional role, which I call the hereby-commit role. Inferring is akin to the agent’s thinking, “I hereby commit to the premises’ supporting the conclusion”. Chapter 2 broadens the Hereby-Commit Account from inference to all instances of basing. A doing-caused-by-a-reason is an action done on the basis of that reason just in case, and because, the doing plays the hereby-commit functional role. For instance, to bring the umbrella on the basis of its complementing my outfit is to commit—in the very bringing—to the umbrella’s complementing my outfit favoring bringing it. To act on the basis of a reason is thus not merely to be buffeted about by causal forces, but to take a rational stand. Chapter 3 introduces considerations about basing to a debate from which they have been absent. Although the details are contested, it is widely accepted that logic is normative in some sense. However, discussion of logic’s normativity has been overly parochial. In addition to the norms that have been suggested, we should consider basing norms. I argue that countenancing basing norms defuses the most pressing challenge to logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one correct logic.

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Roughly, there are many distinct logics and they’re equally good. Logical normativism is the view that logic is inherently normative. Roughly, consequence relations impose normative constraints on reasoners whether or not they are aiming at truth-preservation. It has widely been assumed that logical pluralism and logical normativism go together. This thesis questions that assumption. I defend an account of logical pluralism without logical normativism. I do so by replacing Beall and Restall’s normative constraint on consequence relations with a constraint concerning epistemic goals. As well as illuminating an important, unnoticed area of dialectical space, I show that distinguishing logical pluralism from logical normativism has two further bene ts. First, it helps clarify what’s at stake in debates about pluralism. Second, it provides an elegant response to the most pressing challenge to logical pluralism: the normativity objection.