Search

This article takes stock of the growing interest in flourishing measurement. The focus is on three challenges in this domain: the degree of coherent theorizing, the overreliance on psychometric validation, and the questionable universality of the measures. A rigorous process identified the eight most widely documented flourishing measures. All eight measures struggled with the three challenges. First, all measures were constructed on intuitive grounds, whether those bases were existing literatures, personal conceptualizations, or the intuition of an opposition of mental illness and flourishing. Second, all measures were assessed almost exclusively with psychometric studies, with little evidence of theoretical or cultural validity. Finally, all eight measures implicitly or explicitly assume cultural universality without providing theoretical argument or empirical evidence for that assumption. This stock-taking resulted in two main conclusions. First, there are areas of both consensus (e.g., that flourishing is a measurable, multidimensional construct) and dissensus (e.g., the components of flourishing) that can provide bases for future theory and research. Second, systematic theoretical argument is necessary to better understand what flourishing is, how it can be validly measured, and the degree to which it can be considered a universal human experience. It is time to address these theoretical and cultural questions.

The work of psychotherapy is complex and seems to resist algorithmic formulation. Psychotherapy theory, technique, and research help to manage this complexity to some degree, but clinical excellence also seems to require clinical judgment, and this judgment cuts across therapeutic theories. However, the content and process of clinical judgment remain relatively untheorized, often relegated to the “art of psychotherapy.” This article focuses on elucidating clinical judgment in terms of the neo-Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom, which includes recognizing what is salient, integrating multiple considerations, infusing emotional experience with reason, and pursuing an intervention plan with discernment and flexibility. The argument is that practical wisdom provides a rich description of the work of clinically adept therapists by more clearly portraying therapists’ decisions and activities than the general, unsystematic concept of clinical judgment or in terms of the many theories of psychotherapy.

Research suggests that the internet could be considered an arena for both virtuous and vicious behaviors, with observations of enhanced perspective-taking and honest self-reflections occurring alongside evidence of cyberbullying and deceptive communications. In the current study, we explore the role of three widely recognized sources of moral behavior - moral identity, moral disengagement and authoritative parenting – in predicting adolescents’ online empathy and online authenticity. Seven-hundred-and-eighty-eight UK adolescents aged 11-18 years (66% male) completed measures of these key constructs. Structural equation modelling results suggest that parental responsiveness and autonomy granting are positively related to adolescents’ moral identity. In turn, moral identity was positively related to both online empathy and online authenticity. Having a stronger moral identity also meant that adolescents were less likely to morally disengage, and moral disengagement was negatively related to online authenticity in adolescent females. Partial invariance across gender and age was observed. The findings indicate that moral identity encourages moral thoughts, feelings and actions in the online environment, including being authentic and empathic. As the formation and accessibility of one’s moral identity can be promoted, we discuss the implications of these findings for cultivating prosocial behavior in the online environment as well as future research avenues.

Coinciding with the recent psychological attention paid to the broad topic of wisdom, interest in the intellectual virtue of phronesis or practical wisdom has been burgeoning within pockets of psychology, philosophy, professional ethics, and education. However, these discourses are undercut by frequently unrecognized tensions, lacunae, ambivalences, misapplications, and paradoxes. While a recent attempt at conceptualizing the phronesis construct for the purpose of psychological measurement offers promise, little is known about how phronesis develops psychologically, what motivates it, or how it can be cultivated. Many psychologists aspire to make sense of wise thinking without the contextual, affective, and holistic/integrative resources of phronesis. This article explores some such attempts, in particular, a new “common model” of wisdom. We argue for the incremental value of the phronesis construct beyond available wisdom accounts because phronesis explains how mature decision-making is motivated and shaped by substantive moral aspirations and cognitively guided moral emotions. We go on to argue that, in the context of bridging the gap between moral knowledge and action, phronesis carries more motivational potency than wisdom in the “common model.” The phronesis construct, thus, embodies some unique features that psychologists studying wise decision-making ignore at their peril.

Increasing divisiveness and prejudicial conflict in Western societies has accelerated interest in convincing moral knowledge. Although social science is a natural place to seek answers, these scien...

The purpose of this paper is to argue that social science is an inherently moral enterprise. There are four reasons to see science as a moral endeavor based on the neo-Aristotelian recognition that...

Numerous scholars have claimed that positive ethical traits such as virtues are important in human psychology and behavior. Psychologists have begun to test these claims. The scores of studies on virtue do not yet constitute a mature science of virtue because of unresolved theoretical and methods challenges. In this article, we addressed those challenges by clarifying how virtue research relates to prosocial behavior, positive psychology, and personality psychology and does not run afoul of the fact–value distinction. The STRIVE-4 (Scalar Traits that are Role sensitive, include Situation × Trait Interactions, and are related to important Values that help to constitute E udaimonia) model of virtue is proposed to help resolve the theoretical and methods problems and encourage a mature science of virtue. The model depicts virtues as empirically verifiable, acquired scalar traits that are role sensitive, involve Situation × Trait interactions, and relate to important values that partly constitute eudaimonia (human flourishing). The model also holds that virtue traits have four major components: knowledge, behavior, emotion/motivation, and disposition. Heuristically, the STRIVE-4 model suggests 26 hypotheses, which are discussed in light of extant research to indicate which aspects of the model have been assessed and which have not. Research on virtues has included survey, intensive longitudinal, informant-based, experimental, and neuroscientific methods. This discussion illustrates how the STRIVE-4 framework can unify extant research and fruitfully guide future research.

Romantic relationship breakups induce significant distress, which has prompted interest in the possibility of post-traumatic growth (PTG) following relationship dissolution. However, most studies have relied on retrospective self-reports of growth, raising questions about the actuality of growth following breakup. This prospective study assessed relationship quality prior to breakup, measured growth over time, included a comparison group that did not experience breakup, and tested rival hypotheses to assess PTG in comparison with positive reappraisal (PR). College students ( N = 599) in romantic relationships were recruited as participants and assessed at two time points approximately 10 weeks apart. The primary sample includes participants who experienced a relationship breakup ( N = 100). Results indicated that, following a breakup, participants reported a high degree of breakup distress and perceived growth. The pattern of results suggests that reports of perceived PTG may reflect PR processes, as evidenced by the correlation between optimism at Time 1 and perceived, but not actual, PTG at Time 2. Consistent with previous prospective research, but differing from much of the retrospective research, a measure of “actual growth” was unrelated to distress, perceived growth, or whether the individual experienced a breakup. The results corroborate research suggesting that retrospective reports of PTG may not reflect actual personal growth measured before and after a traumatic event. Results are discussed in terms of the circumstances in which PR or growth in relationship choices and behaviors may be most appropriate.

This article argues that ordinary virtue trait attributions presuppose the existence of realistic traits that fall short of, for example, Aristotelian ideals and that debate about the existence of virtue traits should be reoriented in the light of this fact. After clarifying and motivating that basic thesis, we discuss what the existing psychological research shows about the existence of realistic traits and how future psychological research could be designed to show more. Our first conclusion is that current psychological research (weakly) supports virtue trait optimism not skepticism. Our second conclusion is that psychologists will need to adopt new models and conduct new studies before they can convincingly answer questions about the existence, development and normative significance of virtue traits. In short, we argue that there is no mature science of virtue today but that we can and should develop one. We end by presenting our STRIVE-4 Model, which is designed to guide future work.

About a century ago, there was a shift from humans contracting and dying from infectious diseases to living with non-infectious chronic diseases. Through advancements in medicine, chronic diseases are manageable, however, they are life-long and often debilitating. When chronically ill individuals struggle to adjust, and make sense of their disease, they are likely to benefit from participating in illness support groups. The benefits of support groups are usually explained by proximal factors such as social support. We explore three sets of evolutionary adaptations to provide ultimate explanations for the value of social support: attachment, group membership, and collective identity. These three concepts suggest that support groups assist with regulating emotions, belonging, and integrating chronic illness into one’s identity. Although attachment theory highlights important aspects of coping with chronic illness, it is framed in dyadic terms, which is ill-fitting for support groups. Support groups are beneficial because they capitalize on the ancient adaptations of belonging and collective identity. Practical applications of these evolutionary concepts for chronic illness support groups are discussed.

Prosocial behaviour is an interdisciplinary topic, involving psychologists, philosophers, and educators. Based on experimental helping research, some moral philosophers have claimed that helping be...

Replies to comments made by P. L. Hill, M. J. Wynn, and B. D. Carpenter (see record 2019-81943-006) on the original article by S. F. Lang and B. J. Fowers (see record 2018-24691-001). Hill, Wynn, and Carpenter's (2020) discussion of Alzheimer's caregiving being motivated by purposeful engagement is a welcome perspective. Their views are timely, given the growing literature on caregiving as a deeply meaningful and worthwhile activity. Hill et al., however, focus on caregivers' subjective perception of caregiving as purposeful, disregarding the source of this perspective. It is reasonable to see the shared relationship history between caregivers and their loved ones as a primary source of the purposefulness of caregiving. This reply offers an integration of caregivers' purposeful activity with shared identity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

This study is guided by the research question, are personality traits, character traits, situational factors, and their interaction all necessary to explain helping behavior? 121 undergraduates' scores on the Agreeableness scale of the Big Five Inventory and the Kindness scale of the Values in Action Inventory were examined in conjunction with experimentally induced positive, neutral, or negative mood via false feedback on a bogus intelligence test. The number of spilled pencils participants helped retrieve in a “mishap” was the measure of helping. Kindness significantly predicted helping behavior, but neither feedback condition nor Agreeableness was significantly related to helping. Interactions between Kindness, Agreeableness, and feedback conditions were non-significant. These results highlight a stronger contribution to helping behavior from the trait of Kindness than from the trait of Agreeableness and situational factors.

Doris (2015b) develops a theory of moral agency to avoid a skeptical challenge arising from psychology studies indicating that (im)moral behavior is caused by trivial situational factors. His theory is flawed in attending only to situational influences on behavior and neglecting individual differences such as moral identity and virtue. A focus on individual differences in resilience to influence from trivial situational factors defangs the skeptical challenge and offers a better account of moral agency.

Theoretical psychology has developed and matured tremendously in recent years, putting its members in the position to deeply contemplate what a flourishing theoretical psychology might look like. This article examines that question through an Aristotelian lens, following the argument that flourishing is a matter of the excellent expression of a being or collective’s natural functions. The discussion identifies 4 key functions of theoretical psychologists, researching, reflecting upon, reexamination of, and reformulation of psychological theory, research, and practice. The excellent expression of these functions is presented as the way to achieve the central goods of theoretical psychology, with 4 goods highlighted: knowledge, identity, communion, and meaningful contributions. The conclusion is that theoretical psychology can flourish as a subdiscipline by remaining true to its nature and functions.

Wendt, Gone, and Nagata raise some very important questions about harm in psychotherapy and initiate a valuable dialogue between scholars of potentially harmful therapy and multicultural counseling and psychotherapy. This comment enlarges upon the authors’ view that harms cannot be understood independently of goods by providing an argument that goods have an inherent place in psychotherapy and in multicultural viewpoints. The goods of psychotherapy (e.g., justice, respect) are ordinary and widely endorsed rather than esoteric or objectionable. Identifying these goods makes it possible to organize them into a coherent hierarchy that enables an integration of the primarily individual goods of standard psychotherapy and the primarily communal goods of a multicultural perspective. This can facilitate a mutually informative and enriching dialogue between scholars from these two domains. The hope is to encourage a more open discussion of the goods of psychotherapy, thereby fostering a more reflective, progressive discipline.

Poor construct definition has characterized research on virtue, beginning with Hartshorne and May’s honesty studies and continuing to the present. Recently, scholars have begun to define virtues in ways that improve the prospects for measuring virtue constructs, but a coordinated, programmatic approach is necessary for success in virtue measurement. A brief overview of the construct of virtue includes six key elements that can structure virtue assessment design. Recent research on the trait/situation problem suggests that situational factors do not obviate traits. Veridicality issues such as social desirability and positive illusions are significant challenges for self-report virtue measurement. In summary self-report measures, these challenges can be met with a number of methods, including directly assessing social desirability and item construction to remove social desirability. These challenges can also be met using other-reports, experience sampling, or experimental procedures. A brief discussion of construct validity in virtue measurement leads to the conclusion that many studies with a variety of methods are necessary to establish valid measures of virtue.

In their recent article, Williams and Gantt (2013) make the provocative claim that the only way to account for human aspiration is to recognize the existence of an eternal soul. Although it is possible to argue for such a position, their exposition is plagued by unsubstantiated assertions, false dichotomies, straw-person arguments, appeals to authority, and disregard for large psychological literatures related to their claims. These problematic forms of argumentation are inadequate to the task that these authors set for themselves and show insufficient respect for many potential interlocutors. In their apparent eagerness to discuss their eternal soul thesis, Williams and Gantt dismiss the work of scholars in positive psychology, virtue ethics, and “mainstream psychology” with whom they share extensive common ground, thereby neglecting the richness and fruitfulness of these scholars’ contributions to the topic of human aspiration.

Research on goal choice has been limited by restricted explanatory categories, unidimensional quantitative ratings of goal importance, and limited samples in academic settings. Open-ended inquiry can yield a much richer picture of goal choices. This grounded theory interview study with 11 college graduates assessed goal importance three times over four months. The grounded theory of goal importance had four coding levels: three theoretical categories (hedonic motives, eudaimonic motives, and structural motives), seven thematic codes, 19 axial codes, and 56 basic codes. Very diverse reasons were reported for goal choice, reflecting aspects of many goal pursuit theories. Respondents gave multiple reasons for pursuing each goal, often in multiple theoretical categories. Basic codes provided the most explanatory information, with higher level categories offering more descriptive information. Results suggest that only complex theories of goal pursuit can encompass the range of goal motives and that qualitative...

Relationship quality is the most frequently assessed construct in the intimate relationships literature. Dozens of assessment instruments exist, but the vast majority conceptualize relationship quality in terms of satisfaction (or a similar construct), which focuses on the hedonic (pleasure or happiness) dimension of the relationship. Some scholars question whether the richness and depth of adult intimate relationships can be captured by satisfaction ratings and suggest focusing on a complementary eudaimonic (human flourishing) dimension of the relationship. This study evaluates the development of the Relationship Flourishing Scale, a 12-item measure of eudaimonic relationship quality that assesses meaning, personal growth, relational giving, and goal sharing. The study supports the construct validity of the Relationship Flourishing Scale, including its content, concurrent, convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity. Its incremental validity and independence suggest that it provides information about deeper and richer aspects of relationship quality than do current hedonic relationship quality measures. (PsycINFO Database Record

Aristotle’s function argument suggests that the human good is found in the excellent expression of natural human functions and that virtues are the character strengths that make it possible to fulfill those functions. An evolutionary understanding of human nature recognizes humans as an ultrasocial species that features group living, cooperation, and profound interdependence. Group inclusion was essential to survival and reproduction during human evolution. Therefore, a social exclusion detector is an extremely important adaptation that enables the individual to monitor the threat of ostracism. Social exclusion activates a key part of the neural network that registers physical pain, the anterior cingulate cortex, making social exclusion literally painful. The human function of group living is fulfilled by activities that promote belonging, a central human good. Extensive research documents the essential role of belonging in human flourishing. The primary virtue associated with belonging is loyalty, and belonging is the direct, everyday expression of group membership.

Psychologists are increasingly interested in the topic of eudaimonia, a term adopted from ancient Greek philosophers (with most modern views traceable to Aristotle), referring to human flourishing. Conceptual confusion remains because investigators generally have not clarified how and why they have appropriated Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia. This chapter presents a close interpretation of Aristotle’s view and explores continuities and discontinuities in psychologists’ application of this original concept to provide a theoretical baseline and increase conceptual clarity. Eudaimonia is explored as an ethical concept referring to the best kind of life, which is an outgrowth of humans’ natural endowments. Eudaimonia is a form of activity (that includes subjective experience, but is not limited to it), comprised by the pursuit of ends that are choiceworthy for human beings. Eudaimonia is a unified way of life, but it has multiple constituents (e.g., belonging, justice, and social harmony). Eudaimonia is related to, but distinct from pleasure (hedonia). Human flourishing is a matter of a complete life that encompasses virtue or excellence, and Aristotle saw it as the ultimate aim of human life. The chapter concludes with several major challenges for eudaimonia researchers.

This article explores a eudaimonic approach (a focus on human flourishing) for its value in enriching marital quality theory. Spouses' marital satisfaction is reinterpreted as the match between their actual marriage and their marital goals. Goal pursuit is proposed as a primary area of assessment and research in marital quality. Two dimensions of goal pursuit are highlighted. First is a continuum ranging from individually attainable goals to shared goals, which are always collective achievements. Second is a range of goals in which the means and ends are separable (instrumental) to goals in which the means and ends are inseparable (constitutive). These dimensions systematically encompass many currently disconnected areas of marital research, which indicates significant heuristic value in a eudaimonic theory of marital quality.

This study investigated an Aristotelian model of eudaimonic and hedonic well-being that distinguishes between goal orientations in which the means and ends are separable (instrumental) and in which the means and ends are inherently related (constitutive). Eudaimonic well-being was expected to be related to constitutive goal orientation and hedonic well-being was expected to be related to both constitutive and instrumental goal orientation. Personal identification with activities was expected to mediate the relationship between constitutive goal orientation and eudaimonic well-being. Personal enjoyment was expected to mediate the relationship between instrumental goal orientation and hedonic well-being. Factor analysis supported the independence of constitutive and instrumental goal orientation measures. As predicted, SEM results suggested that there were independent pathways to eudaimonic and hedonic well-being, with strong mediation in both pathways. Results were consistent with Aristotle's [Aristotle (1...

This article explores the pervasive, but insufficiently examined assumption of instrumental rationality in psychology. Instrumental rationality has five characteristics: there is a sharp separation between means and ends; ends are subjective preferences and means are strategies or tools; the effectiveness of means is central; means are dispensable when ineffective; and actors are independent of the means. Psychology’s almost exclusive reliance on means—ends explanations of human behavior is called instrumentalism. Instrumentalism encourages perceiving everything as means toward one’s ends, adopting an exploitive stance toward persons and the environment, and becoming alienated from others and the world, and it effectively obscures and distorts non-instrumental activity. A constitutentends framework is presented in which ends are inseparable from means and actors identify with or embody means rather than use them in pursuing goals, which confers meaning, coherence, and cumulativeness on the activities. The article concludes that instrumental action is subordinate to constitutive action in optimal human life.

Recent studies have applied Grottfredson and Hirschi's General Theory of Crime to investigate whether college students' inclinations toward internet software piracy is related to low self-control and opportunity (i.e., computer ownership). Given the widespread use of the internet to illegally obtain copies of music and movies, it is important to understand the factors in this form of piracy as well. This study applied the self-control perspective to examine the attitudes of high school students toward the internet piracy of music and movies. Attitudes toward the internet piracy of music and movies were related to self-control, biological sex, internet experience, affiliation with deviant peers, and grade level in this study of high school students. This information is important because studies of internet piracy had not yet confirmed the presence and predictability of internet piracy in high school students. This study also suggests that piracy prevention efforts may be most appropriately focused on high school age individuals and directed toward increasing self-control.

Character is central to positive psychology's efforts to understand and promote human flourishing. Despite the importance of character and ubiquitous references to Aristotle, virtue theory remains underdeveloped in positive psychology. This article elaborates three key aspects of virtue ethics for understanding flourishing: goodness, the unity of character, and character types. Positive psychologists have not developed a substantial concept of what is good, which is essential because virtues are defined as the enduring personal qualities necessary for pursuing particular goods. Positive psychologists present virtue in a fragmented manner, focusing on a few `signature strengths,' whereas virtue ethicists generally emphasize the unity of character and the development of a full range of virtues. Because positive psychologists have not recognized the four character types in addition to virtuous character, they often misconstrue the continent character as virtuous, and many of their descriptors of the good life do not differentiate well between the virtuous and the vicious character types.