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Data and manuscript for the following paper: Stantić, M., Knyspel, J., Gaches, A., Liu, Y., Bird, G., & Catmur, C. The Oxford Face Matching Test: Short Form Alternative. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.

It has recently been suggested that individual differences in interoception, the perception of the body's internal state, can be considered across four broad categories; objective interoceptive accuracy, subjective interoceptive accuracy, objective interoceptive attention, and subjective interoceptive attention (Murphy et al., 2019). Despite methods to quantify subjective facets of interoception (both beliefs regarding accuracy and beliefs regarding attention) and one's objective interoceptive accuracy, there remains no objective method to quantify the extent t which internal signals are the object of one's attention. Given previous research that suggests atypical attention to internal signals is observed across certain clinical conditions (e.g., anxiety; Khalsa, & Lapidus, 2016), coupled with a growing need to test theoretical models of the structure of interoceptive abilities (e.g., Murphy et al., 2019; 2018), the development of such a task is an urgent research goal. Previous theoretical papers have suggested that experience sampling methods may be used to quantify the extent to which internal signals are the object of one's attention, thereby providing an objective, 'state' measure of attention to internal signals. Whilst this method relies on self-report, the proportion of time that internal signals were the object of an individual's attention can be objectively determined and used to estimate an individual's dispositional tendency to be focused on interoceptive signals (Murphy et al., 2019). The aim of this project is therefore to develop an experience sampling method to quantify the extent to which internal signals are the object of one's attention and use this method to examine the structure of interoceptive abilities. This will be achieved across two stages; (1) Pilot stage: please see https://osf.io/ty7uv. (2) Current test stage: Using the experience sampling method (optimized from the pilot), the current test stage has the following aims: (a) To determine the extent to which objectively measured attention to internal signals (quantified using the experience sampling procedure) is related to subjective reports of one's attention to, and accuracy of perceiving, internal signals (quantified using questionnaires). (b) To examine whether reporting on one's attention to internal signals (vs. reporting on one's attention to auditory signals) alters one's beliefs regarding one's general attention to, and accuracy of perceiving, internal signals (quantified using questionnaires). (c) To identify the extent to which objectively measured attention to internal signals is elated to well-being measures such as depression, anxiety, and stress. (d) To determine the extent to which objectively measured attention to internal signals is related to one's mood and if this varies as a function of depression, anxiety or stress. (e) To test the model proposed by Murphy et al. (2019) by combining data from the experience sampling method, subjective measures of attention to internal signals (assessed using questionnaires), subjective measures of one's beliefs regarding accuracy with which they can perceive internal signals (assessed using questionnaires) and objective measures of interoceptive accuracy (implemented via a smartphone application). These aims may be reported as separate papers.

Interoception, defined as one’s ability to detect and interpret internal, bodily signals such as heart rate, hunger, thirst and satiety (Craig, 2002), has been theoretically implicated in the development of numerous neurodevelopmental and psychiatric conditions, including both anxiety and autism (Ehlers & Breuer 1992; Paulus & Stein, 2010; Quattroki & Friston, 2014). However, the evidential basis for these theories is mixed (Adams et al., 2022; DuBois et al., 2016), despite preliminary evidence that interoception based interventions are efficacious in those with both autism and anxiety (Quadt et al., 2021). The aim of this current study is to gain a better understanding of how interoception may be linked to experiences of anxiety in autistic adolescents who self-report experiencing significant anxiety in their day to day life, using interview-based reflexive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2013). This age group was selected as adolescence marks the peak emergence of anxiety disorders (Kessler et al., 2005), and puberty may mark a critical period for the development of interoception (Murphy et al., 2017). The findings from this study may inform the development of clinical interventions. References: Adams, K. L., Edwards, A., Peart, C., Ellett, L., Mendes, I., Bird, G., & Murphy, J. (2022). The association between anxiety and cardiac interoceptive accuracy: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews, 140, 104754. Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2013) Successful Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for Beginners. SAGE Publication. Craig, A.D.B. (2002). How Do You Feel? Interoception: The Sense of the Physiological Condition of the Body. Nature reviews. Neuroscience. 3. 655-66. DuBois, D., Ameis, S. H., Lai, M. C., Casanova, M. F., & Desarkar, P. (2016). Interoception in Autism Spectrum Disorder: A review. International journal of developmental neuroscience : the official journal of the International Society for Developmental Neuroscience, 52, 104–111. Ehlers, A., & Breuer, P. (1992). Increased cardiac awareness in panic disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 101(3), 371–382. Kessler, R. C., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin, R., Merikangas, K. R., & Walters, E. E. (2005). Lifetime prevalence and age-of-onset distributions of DSM-IV disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication. Archives of general psychiatry, 62(6), 593–602. Murphy, J., Brewer, R., Catmur, C., & Bird, G. (2017). Interoception and psychopathology: A developmental neuroscience perspective. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 45–56. Paulus, M. P., & Stein, M. B. (2010). Interoception in anxiety and depression. Brain structure & function, 214(5-6), 451–463. Quadt, L., Garfinkel, S. N., Mulcahy, J. S., Larsson, D. E., Silva, M., Jones, A. M., Strauss, C., & Critchley, H. D. (2021). Interoceptive training to target anxiety in autistic adults (ADIE): A single-center, superiority randomized controlled trial. EClinicalMedicine, 39, 101042. Quattrocki, E., & Friston, K. (2014). Autism, oxytocin and interoception. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 47, 410–430. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.09.012

Pre-registration prior to data collection for a replication study. See original study here: https://osf.io/ek8hj

It has recently been suggested that individual differences in interoception, the perception of the body’s internal state, can be considered across four broad categories; objective interoceptive accuracy, subjective interoceptive accuracy, objective interoceptive attention and subjective interoceptive attention (Murphy et al., 2019). Despite methods to quantify subjective facets of interoception (both beliefs regarding accuracy and beliefs regarding attention) and one’s objective interoceptive accuracy, there remains no objective method to quantify the extent to which internal signals are the object of one’s attention. Given previous research that suggests atypical attention to internal signals is observed across certain clinical conditions (e.g., anxiety; Khalsa and Lapidus, 2016), coupled with a growing need to test theoretical models of the structure of interoceptive abilities (e.g., Murphy et al., 2019; 2018), the development of such a task is an urgent research goal. Previous theoretical papers have suggested that experience sampling methods may be used to quantify the extent to which internal signals are the object of one’s attention, thereby providing an objective measure of attention to internal signals. Whilst this method relies on self-report, the proportion of time that internal signals where the object of an individual’s attention can be objectively determined and used to estimate an individual’s dispositional tendency to be focused on interoceptive signals (Murphy et al., 2019). The aim of this project is therefore to develop an experience sampling method to quantify the extent to which internal signals are the object of one’s attention and use this method to examine the structure of interoceptive abilities. This will be achieved across three stages: Pilot stage: The piloting stage will assess the feasibility of an experience sampling method to quantify attention to interoceptive signals, implemented via a smartphone application (the PIEL survey: https://pielsurvey.org/). Piloting will be used to determine drop out, incompletions and variation in scores as a function of time of day and day of the week. As such, the overall aim of the pilot is to optimise the test procedure. However, this pilot will also examine the extent to which reporting on one’s attention to internal signals over time (during the experience sampling procedure) influences one’s beliefs regarding one’s general disposition to pay attention to, and to accurately perceive, internal signals (see test stage 1). Test stage 1: Using the experience sampling method (optimised from the pilot), test stage 1 has the following aims: 1) To determine the extent to which objectively measured attention to internal signals (quantified using the experience sampling procedure) is related to subjective reports of one’s attention to, and accuracy of perceiving, internal signals (quantified using questionnaires; see variables and indices). 2) To examine whether reporting on one’s attention to internal signals (vs. reporting on one’s attention to auditory signals) alters one’s beliefs regarding one’s general attention to, and accuracy of perceiving, internal signals (quantified using questionnaires; see variables and indices). 3) To identify the extent to which objectively measured attention to internal signals is related to wellbeing measures such as depression, anxiety and alexithymia. 4) To determine the extent to which objectively measured attention to internal signals is related to one’s mood and if this varies as a function of depression, anxiety or alexithymia. Test stage 2: Will use the experience sampling method to test the model proposed by Murphy et al., (2019) along with subjective measures of attention to internal signals (assessed using questionnaires), subjective measures of one’s beliefs regarding the accuracy with which they can perceive internal signals (assessed using questionnaires), and objective measures of interoceptive accuracy (implemented via a smartphone application). These aims may be reported as separate papers.

Interoception refers to the central nervous system's processing of internal physiological signals, such as heartrate and appetite signals (Khalsa et al., 2018). Fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS) is a disorder characterised by chronic widespread pain, in addition to fatigue, sleep disturbances, and autonomic disturbances (Sarzi-Puttini et al., 2020). Previous research suggests that FMS might be associated with altered interoceptive processing, across various components of interoception. However, the patterns of findings are complex, and appear to be dependent on the component of interoception that is being measured. For example, some studies have found group differences in levels of interoceptive sensibility (i.e., the self-reported tendency to focus on interoceptive signals) between people with fibromyalgia and healthy matched participants. The direction of these group differences varies depending on the sub-facet of interoceptive sensibility that is being examined (Borg et al., 2018; Valenzuela-Moguillansky et al., 2017; Schmitz et al., 2021; for further discussion of interoception measures, see Desmedt et al., 2021). Regarding the accuracy component of interoception, some studies have found that people with FMS evidence lower levels of cardiac accuracy (as measured using the heartbeat counting task) compared to matched healthy participants (Di Lernia et al., 2020; Duschek et al., 2015). However, several other studies have failed to demonstrate this group difference (Borg et al., 2018; Rost et al., 2017; Valenzuela-Moguillansky et al., 2017). Within this body of research, a negative association between FMS symptom severity and heartbeat counting task scores has been identified (Duschek et al., 2017), and another study found a negative association between meta-cognitive interoceptive awareness (confidence-accuracy correspondence) and pain symptoms in FMS (Borg et al., 2018). Finally, recent research suggests that a soft-touch paradigm (which activates interoceptive unmyelinated C-Tactile afferents) can reduce pain symptoms in chronic pain conditions, including FMS (Di Lernia et al., 2020). In sum, previous research suggests that FMS might be associated with altered interoceptive processing, but there have been some difficulties in replicating extant findings. In tandem with this issue, the validity of existing measures of cardiac accuracy has been widely challenged recently, with evidence indicating that they are susceptible to both physiological and psychological confounds (e.g., Desmedt et al., 2020; Murphy et al., 2018; Ring et al., 2015; Zamariola et al., 2018). To address these problems, the aim of the present study is to examine cardiac interoceptive accuracy in adults with fibromyalgia using a recently-developed method: the Phase Adjustment Task (Plans, Ponzo et al., 2020). In this task, participants’ heartrate is detected using a smartphone camera, and participants use a dial to advance or delay auditory tones until they perceive the tones to be synchronous (in-phase) with their heartbeat. The task appears to be free from the confounds of other cardiac measures in healthy adults (Plans, Ponzo et al., 2020), and can be completed at home using an iPhone app, making it far more accessible than traditional heartbeat perception tasks. We are aiming to examine whether subgroups of people with FMS can be identified according to interoceptive accuracy levels, and to explore the factors of FMS symptomology that might characterise these groups. We will also gather feedback on the usability of the task. If we find that this task is valid for use with people with FMS, we might be able to examine the links between internal bodily awareness and fibromyalgia symptoms more closely in future research (e.g., using longitudinal methods), which could lead to improvements in the diagnosis and monitoring FMS.

Research shows that people have more complex mental representations of members of their ingroup compared to members of their outgroup (Linville, 1982). The main aim of this study is to investigate whether this effect can be observed in the context of groups defined by ideological stance, as well as to investigate whether people attribute more complex opinions to members of their ideological ingroup compared to members of their outgroup. Participants will indicate their views on a personally important issue before learning the views of what they believe to be two previous participants on the same issue. This information will be manipulated such that one person is in the participant's ideological ingroup and the other is in their outgroup. Participants will be told that their task is to predict the views of the two previous participants on other issues and that their accuracy will determine whether they get a bonus payment. They will have the chance to buy information about each previous participant's personality, which will act as a measure of the complexity of their representations for them. When predicting each previous participant's views they will have a choice between simple and complex opinions, acting as a measure of the opinion complexity they attribute to them. We expect participants to choose to buy fewer traits, and predict simpler opinions, for outgroup members compared to ingroup members, indicating simpler representations of outgroup minds and simpler opinions being attributed to the outgroup.

Understanding others, such that we can infer their mental states, is an important part of social interaction (Heyes & Frith, 2014). To do so, people use their theory of mind to infer people’s shifting beliefs, intentions and desires (Wellman, 2014) that underpin our social interactions. Yet societies are becoming increasing polarised – on the basis of political persuasion, religion, ethnicity and social background (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015) – which suggests that individuals are getting worse at understanding those who differ from themselves. Indeed, previous studies have shown that people attribute fewer and less sophisticated mental states to members of out-groups (Demoulin, 2004) and perceive them to experience less complex emotions than members of their in-group (Harris & Fiske, 2009). This may be due to in part because mental state inference is an effortful process, with resources only deployed when there is sufficient motivation (Zaki, 2014). This means that the extent to which we engage with another person’s mental states depends on whether doing so is consistent with our current goals, e.g., the need to maximise positive affect or to promote affiliation. When this motivation is lacking, people may instead rely on cognitive shortcuts such as stereotyping (Spaulding, 2017). The degree to which people are motivated to fully consider a mind may therefore be a function of whether the target mind is perceived as in-group or out-group. Indeed, in cases where people’s experience or perceptions of an out-group are negative, there is evidence that this interferes with the motivation to perform effortful mindreading (Perez-Zapata, Slaughter & Henry, 2016; Adams et al., 2010; Gönültas et al., 2019), leading to reduced accuracy in inferring their mental states. This illustrates how perception of a target mind as being “out-group” can influence the ability and propensity to perform accurate mindreading. An important question then is how motivated/prone people are to seek information beyond group status when predicting the views of in-group vs out-group members and how this affects their accuracy. Aims: 1) To quantify and assess participants’ propensity to consider the minds of others and whether propensity differs as a function of group-status, i.e., whether the target mind is in-group or out-group. 2) To assess whether people’s accuracy in predicting the mental states of another differs as a function of group-status. 3) To assess whether people’s metacognitive accuracy (i.e., appropriate degree of confidence in their own ability to accurately predict the mind of others) differs as a function of group-status. 4) To assess whether the degree to which people update their predictions about the mental state of target minds – and how accurately and optimally they do so – differs as a function of group-status.

Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; autistic individuals) may exhibit atypical face perception because they fail to process faces holistically. In the context of this hypothesis, it is critical to determine whether autistic individuals exhibit diminished susceptibility to the composite face illusion, widely regarded as key marker of holistic face processing. To date, however, previous studies have yielded inconsistent findings. In light of recent evidence suggesting that facial emotion cues increase the strength of the composite face illusion in typical individuals, the present study sought to determine whether the presence of facial emotion also modulates the strength of the composite face illusion in autistic individuals, many of whom experience difficulties recognizing facial expressions. We therefore measured composite face effects in a sample of autistic individuals (N = 20) and matched typical controls (N = 29) using an incidental emotion procedure in which distractor regions varied systematically in their emotion strength. As expected, the presence of facial emotion in the distractor regions of composite face arrangements increased the strength of the illusory distortion induced. The extent of the modulation by facial emotion was similar in the two groups. The composite effects seen in the ASD group were qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those seen in the typical group, suggestive of intact holistic processing in this population.

**Please note that this paper has now been published - there are some minor changes following reviewer feedback, so we'd suggest accessing the final version if possible. Published DOI is here: 10.1016/j.rasd.2020.101531 **Alexithymia, a difficulty identifying and communicating one’s own emotions, affects socio-emotional processes, such as emotion recognition and empathy. Co-occurring alexithymia is prevalent in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and underlies some socio-emotional difficulties previously attributed to autism. Socio-emotional abilities are examined during behavioural diagnostic assessments of autism, yet the effect of alexithymia on these assessments is not known. In this study, two previously collected samples of Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) assessments were used to examine the relationship between alexithymia and ADOS score. Participants included 96 women with anorexia, and 147 adolescents who were either high in autistic symptoms, or whose twin had high autistic symptoms. We examined 1) the impact of alexithymia on meeting the criteria for autism/ASD, 2) correlations between alexithymia and ADOS subscales, and 3) whether alexithymia predicted scores on specific ADOS items, selected a priori based on the literature. In the adolescent group, parent-reported (but not self-reported) alexithymia predicted autism/ASD diagnosis, correlated with both sub-scales, and predicted scores on ADOS items. Fewer associations were observed in the anorexic sample, but the presence of alexithymia predicted a near fourfold increase in the likelihood of meeting diagnostic criteria for autism/ASD in this sample.

Humans are intrinsically social animals, forming enduring affiliative bonds [1]. However, a striking minority with psychopathic traits, who present with violent and antisocial behaviors, tend to value other people only insofar as they contribute to their own advancement [2, 3]. Extant research has addressed the neurocognitive processes associated with aggression in such individuals, but we know remarkably little about processes underlying their atypical social affiliation. This is surprising, given the importance of affiliation and bonding in promoting social order and reducing aggression [4, 5]. Human laughter engages brain areas that facilitate social reciprocity and emotional resonance, consistent with its established role in promoting affiliation and social cohesion [6-8]. We show that, compared with typically developing boys, those at risk for antisocial behavior in general (irrespective of their risk of psychopathy) display reduced neural response to laughter in the supplementary motor area, a premotor region thought to facilitate motor readiness to join in during social behavior [9-11]. Those at highest risk for developing psychopathy additionally show reduced neural responses to laughter in the anterior insula. This region is implicated in auditory-motor processing and in linking action tendencies with emotional experience and subjective feelings [10, 12, 13]. Furthermore, this same group reports reduced desire to join in with the laughter of others-a behavioral profile in part accounted for by the attenuated anterior insula response. These findings suggest that atypical processing of laughter could represent a novel mechanism that impoverishes social relationships and increases risk for psychopathy and antisocial behavior. ispartof: CURRENT BIOLOGY vol:27 issue:19 pages:3049-3055 ispartof: location:England status: published