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The operator protection factor (OPF) of four biological safety cabinets (BSCs) has been measured under standard and suboptimal conditions.The OPF for one BSC1, two BSC2, and an acid-fast bacilli staining station (AFBSS) was measured using the potassium iodide method for in situ testing of BSCs (CEN12469) over a range of inflow velocities under standard conditions and with common interfering factors (fans, opening doors, and walk pasts).The BSC1 and the AFBSS gave a high level of protection under standard test conditions at all airflows (down to 0.3 and 0.38 m/s, respectively). During interfering processes, the BSC1 and AFBSS gave a high level of protection (OPF10Although BSC2s are capable of giving a high level of performance, this is design dependent and the BSC1 and AFBSS give a more predictable level of performance due to their simpler design. In environments where BSC certification is not possible, they may provide more robust and sustainable primary containment.

OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study was to evaluate whether a Class II type A2 biosafety cabinet in a laboratory could be decontaminated while the laboratory was being fumigated using vaporous hydrogen peroxide or peracetic acid dry fogging. METHODS: To validate decontamination of all parts of the biosafety cabinet, biological indicators were placed at various locations within the biosafety cabinet, including between the pleats of supply and exhaust HEPA filters. To assess whether the operational status of the biosafety cabinet influenced the outcome of its decontamination, fumigation validations were undertaken with the cabinet running and not running. The amount of fumigant and the duration of fumigation remained constant whether the biosafety cabinet was running or not. DISCUSSION: Biosafety cabinet decontamination was successful only when the cabinet was running to facilitate the fumigant’s circulation within the plenums and across the HEPA filters. This study shows both vaporous hydrogen peroxide and peracetic acid dry fogging can be used successfully to decontaminate Class II type A2 biosafety cabinets during laboratory fumigation, provided the biosafety cabinets are operational and running during the fumigation.

Study objective Throughout the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, many emergency departments have been using passive protective enclosures ("intubation boxes") during intubation. The effectiveness of these enclosures remains uncertain. We sought to quantify their ability to contain aerosols using industry standard test protocols. Methods We tested a commercially available passive protective enclosure representing the most common design and compared this with a modified enclosure that incorporated a vacuum system for active air filtration during simulated intubations and negative-pressure isolation. We evaluated the enclosures by using the same 3 tests air filtration experts use to certify class I biosafety cabinets: visual smoke pattern analysis using neutrally buoyant smoke, aerosol leak testing using a test aerosol that mimics the size of virus-containing particulates, and air velocity measurements. Results Qualitative evaluation revealed smoke escaping from all passive enclosure openings. Aerosol leak testing demonstrated elevated particle concentrations outside the enclosure during simulated intubations. In contrast, vacuum-filter-equipped enclosures fully contained the visible smoke and test aerosol to standards consistent with class I biosafety cabinet certification. Conclusion Passive enclosures for intubation failed to contain aerosols, but the addition of a vacuum and active air filtration reduced aerosol spread during simulated intubation and patient isolation.

This study aimed to discuss the prevention methods and recommendations from severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus2 (SARS-CoV-2) during the course of pathology laboratory procedures, before macroscopic dissection and during cytological processes. In the light of the latest scientific data, possible virus viability was evaluated on all surfaces and biopsy samples in Hitit University Faculty of Medicine pathology laboratory. In order to continue the pathology and cytology workflow, virus persistence probabilities according to the size of the biopsies, “intraluminal formaldehyde fixation” before luminal organs and especially bowel dissection, consideration prevention methods from contamination in the cytological and histological work process were determined and suggested. Cytological preparations should not be transported in the open after the smear process and should be transported in protective closed containers. Technical handling of cytology specimens should be performed in a Class II biosafety cabinet with appropriate personal protection equipment. In order to accelerate the drying of the smears, it should be avoided to dry by shaking them in the air or drying with the help of air blowing devices. Before the intraoperative consultation, as in the normal process, clinical and pathology correlation should be established and it should be learned whether the patient carries a risk or not. Given the evolving pathology landscape and the high-risk nature of SARS-CoV-2, a clear understanding of the new information necessary for protection methods and implementation in biopsy process has become increasingly important to help guide for pathology practice. The need to organize definite rules within ‘clinic-laboratory procedures and principles’ to prevent unnecessary risks and spreads of the virus and to keep safety in pathology laboratories at the highest level is clear. Healthcare workers must be vaccinated.

The outbreak of Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia SARS-CoV-2 has necessitated the reinforcement of infection control measures in the hospital and laboratory setting. Contact and droplet infection control measures are advised for handling patients diagnosed with COVID-19 and airborne precautions for procedures that generate aerosols.Risk assessment is conducted for all steps of laboratory processes viz. preanalytical, analytical and postanalytical. Standard Precautions must be followed at all times when laboratory staff handle clinical specimens that may contain infectious microorganism. Standard precautions must include hand hygiene along with the use of personal protective equipment (PPE). All samples are collected in appropriate containers and all containers are decontaminated by 62-71% ethanol (alcohol) before transporting them to the laboratory in triple packaging.All samples should undergo initial processing in a biosafety cabinet (BSC). It should be ensured while undertaking all technical procedures that there is minimal formation of aerosols and droplets.All biomedical waste should be disposed as per state and national guidelines. Decontamination includes use of 1% sodium hypochlorite, 62-71% ethanol for surface disinfection or Hydrogen peroxide (0.5%).These laboratory biosafety measures are important to minimise the risk of laboratory transmission of COVID-19 to health care workers.

Processes like single-cell isolation demand an immensely sterile environment and a remarkably magnified plat-form, such as the optical microscope, to analyze the growth of the cell lines and in the precise selection of cells from them. State-of-the-art technologies fail to provide microscopes compatible inside the biosafety cabinets, and therefore the samples are constantly moved from the safety cabinets to the microscope repeatedly for analysis. This, in turn, increases the risk of contamination of the sample as well as the laboratory surroundings. We report the design and development of an automated optical microscope adaptable in the safety cabinet and can be employed for cell isolation processes. Experiments were carried out using the developed imaging system, and results reveal the system’s reliability in cell biology applications.

Covid-19 pandemic is becoming increasingly hazardous to humans, necessitating the use of additional Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as N95 Filtering Face-Mask Respirators (FFRs) and face shields to ensure the safety of our frontline personnel. The production of these is becoming an enormous burden, and researchers are attempting to alleviate this stress by designing systems that can make FFRs reuse [1] . Here we present a photocatalytic oxidation sterilization system based on UV-light and synergistically used metal oxide nanoparticles catalyst panels. It is a portable system for fast sterilization of FFRs to suit the growing and urgent requirements. Two indigenous ultraviolet (UV) light sterilization assemblies, having lantern UV-lamps arrangement and peaking at wavelength 254 nm, are fitted within a conventional Class II A2 biosafety cabinet in the developed system to deactivate bacteria and viruses from FFRs, in a portable protective environment. Metal oxide nanoparticle catalysts coated plates are utilized in conjunction with UV lamps in the advanced photocatalytic process. The system is optimized to deliver a UV dose of 1000 mJ/cm 2 for assured decontamination of FFRs in around 5 minutes of treatment time (CDC guidelines for UV dosage for FFR decontamination [2] ). The optimized system is exposed to 10 5 spores (Geobacillus Stearothermophilus) to verify sterilizing efficiency, and we achieved a 5 LOG reduction within 5 minutes of UV-exposure. In addition to bacteria and viruses, it can also remove odors, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and any other suspended particles from FFRs. One can prepare more than 150 masks for reuse every day using the developed portable system.

Made available in DSpace on 2022-04-29T08:31:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2021-06-02 Introduction: The biological safety cabinet (BSC) is a collective protective device used to hold aerosols produced in laboratory procedures. The BSC protects workers, material handling, and the environment. It relies on ultraviolet light (UV) lamps that have germicidal action, altering the nucleic acids of microorganisms. Objective: The objective of the present study was to evaluate the germicidal action of BSC class II type A2 UV light against the culture of two bacterial species with different conditions of exposure to UV light. Methods: For the research, the bacteria Staphylococcus aureus ATCC 25923 and Klebsiella pneumoniae ATCC 10031 were used, at a concentration of 1.5x108 Colony Forming Units/ml (CFU/ml), which were seeded in Petri biplates. Use UV light under different conditions and times. Results: The bacterial species showed the same growth or inhibition profile when subjected to different exposure conditions. Petri dishes with the cover open and protected or not with sterilization packaging showed bacterial inhibition at 15 and 20 minutes. The microorganisms in the biplates protected by the aluminum foil and in the biplates with the cover on, regardless of the time and condition, showed bacterial growth. Conclusion: With the results obtained, it is suggested that the germicidal action of UV light was effective, ensuring adequate decontamination and ensuring quality in laboratory biosafety. Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho- UNESP Faculdade de Tecnologia de Bauru- FATEC, SP Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho- UNESP Botucatu. Hospital Estadual de Bauru, SP Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho- UNESP Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho- UNESP Botucatu. Hospital Estadual de Bauru, SP

Introduction: Keeping a contamination free environment in the laboratory has commonly been achieved by one of two ways: a flame or a biosafety cabinet (BSC). However, it has been frequently observed that these two practices have been combined, where a heat source has been used within the BSC. As flames require flammable gasses and cause hot air to rise, it was hypothesized that these could lead to a loss of BSC containment, as BSCs rely on unidirectional downflow air. Objectives: The objective of this study was to determine whether BSCs can maintain containment when a heat source is operated within the work area. Methods: Several heat sources (Bunsen burner, High Heat Bunsen Burner, Spirit Lamp and Bacti-cinerator) were placed within two sizes of BSCs (4-foot and 6-foot), and smoke was used to visualize airflow disturbances, air cleanliness was measured by particle counting , and aerosol microbiological testing was conducted to ascertain containment. The risk of introducing a flammable gas into a BSC was also calculated. Results: Large flamed Bunsen burners were found to have the most detrimental effects on the ability of the BSC to maintain containment, especially in the center of the work area, while the smaller heat sources were more variable. Containment was completely lost in the 4-foot BSC, whereas the 6-foot BSC was capable of maintaining containment in only a few conditions. The BSC was also calculated to be able to maintain the required volume of flammable gas needed to operate the burners, not taking into consideration unintended leaks. Conclusions: Overall, it was determined that BSCs cannot operate safely and reliably while housing a heat source, as it could cause unexpected contamination of the work or the worker, or BSC ignition or explosion.

Laboratory training is the cornerstone of science education in higher education. However, in several cases hands-on experimental procedures are not possible, and therefore technology provide alternative educational methods. One of the rapidly evolving technologies, namely Virtual Reality (VR) can offer multiple benefits in laboratory training through the development of simulations and virtual laboratories that support, facilitate, and promote an effective their learning experience. We present an empirical research carried out at the Department of Molecular Biology and Genetics of the Democritus University of Thrace during the winter semester of the academic year 2020-2021. 51 undergraduate students carried out a Virtual Reality activity aiming to train them to the use of a Class II Biosafety Cabinet (BSC) in an immersive virtual environment. Our results show that VR approach was highly and enthusiastically accepted by the students; they reported that they had an authentic learning experience which enabled them to better achieve the learning objectives. However, in some cases symptoms like dizziness and blurry image were reported most likely due to equipment, showing that improvement of the equipment used in VR is needed. Article visualizations

Objectives The main aim of this work was to compare the methods of DNA isolation in the moulds of genus Mucorales with special regard to the amount and purity of the DNA acquired. The acquired DNA was then amplified by specific real-time PCR. Design Five DNA extraction procedures were carried out in a Class 2 Biosafety cabinet in a dedicated room with suitable biosafety precautions and appropriate biowaste disposal methods. A total of 6 Mucorales clinical strains were used. Results From the viewpoint of concentration and purity, methods A shown abundant amount of fungal DNA whereas methods E report a pure fungal DNA with R260/280 of 1.7 near the optimal 1.8. The DNA quantity reach statistically difference at ANOVA test with p value 0.0005 Conclusion Overall, the E method was the most efficient method in the extraction of DNA from fungal cultures compared to the other methods considering time, cost, technical expertise, and instrumentation. Use of this assay will allow researchers to obtain DNA from fungi quickly for use in molecular assays

Burkholderia pseudomallei is a tier 1 select agent that is associated with laboratory-acquired melioidosis, with international guidelines recommending isolate handling within a class II biosafety cabinet (BSC) in a biosafety level 3 (BSL3) facility. In low-resource settings, this may not be practical; therefore, we aimed to assess the risk of laboratory-acquired melioidosis during routine work. Prior exposure to the organism was determined with a questionnaire and concomitant serology. Of 30 laboratory scientists handling B. pseudomallei on 1,267 occasions outside a biosafety cabinet, no infections were documented and all participants remained seronegative. Additionally, we performed controlled environmental air sampling during 78 laboratory handling events, including plate opening, oxidase testing, and McFarland suspension creation. None of the experiments demonstrated aerosolization of the organism. This study suggests the risk of laboratory-acquired melioidosis is low. However, individual laboratories will need to undertake a risk assessment, including melioidosis endemicity, availability of resources for containment, the nature of routine handling to be undertaken, and the presence of predisposing risk factors for infection in the staff concerned. Additionally, laboratories should take region-specific guidelines into consideration. Further research is required to better inform on the overall risk of infection in the microbiology laboratory.

Cell products consisting of human cells are being actively researched and developed in the areas of regenerative medicine and drug testing platforms. In regenerative medicine, some cell products are used as cell injections, while others are used as a graft with three-dimensional (3D) structures. Using the Kenzan method, it is possible to produce large 3D cell structures that are several centimeters in size. Cyfuse Biomedical K.K. (Cyfuse) is developing 3D cell products as well as equipment for Bio 3D printing. Cyfuse has developed a Bio 3D printer with the following features: (1) it is sufficiently compact to set up in a biosafety cabinet; (2) it allows the flexibility to fabricate several forms of multicellular constructs, in order to expand its potential contribution to research. This chapter introduces the concept of equipment for automatic manufacturing of cell products in regenerative medicine and the functions required for Bio 3D printing using the Kenzan method.

We retrospectively investigated cases of false-positive diagnoses using the BIOFIRE (R) FilmArray (R) meningitis/encephalitis (ME) panel to measure the impact of using a dedicated biosafety cabinet combined with preventive measures to reduce the prevalence of false-positive diagnoses due to pre-analytical in-laboratory contamination. False-positive results were identified by reviewing clinical data, biological parameters and cytology results of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) samples showing discrepant results between the FilmArray ME panel and routine PCR assays. A total of 327 CSF were analysed over 16 weeks in point-of-care (POC) A and B, over two 8-week periods, periods 1 and 2. The analysis yielded 30 (9 center dot 17%) detection of at least one pathogen including 21/30 (70%) viruses and 9/30 (30%) bacteria. During period 1, POC-A and POC-B manipulated CSF under a non-dedicated hood featuring laminar flow, whereas during period 2, CSFs were manipulated under a dedicated biosafety cabinet without any airflow in POC-A. During period 1, false positives were detected in 3/114 CSF (2 center dot 63%) in POC-A and 1/36 (2 center dot 77%) in POC-B (P = 0 center dot 97); during period 2, false positives were detected in 0/139 CSF (0%) in POC-A and 1/38 (2 center dot 63%) in POC-B (P = 0 center dot 23). All false positives were bacterial. The use of a dedicated cabinet without ventilation along with preventive measures during period 2 in POC-A significantly reduced the number of false-positive results (P = 0 center dot 05). Preventive measures described in this study can mitigate false positives when using PCR-based multiplex assays such as the BIOFIRE FilmArray ME Panel for the diagnosis of meningitis and other infectious diseases.

Despite widespread concern regarding cytokine storms leading to severe morbidity in COVID-19, rapid cytokine assays are not routinely available for monitoring critically ill patients. We report the clinical application of a digital protein microarray platform for rapid multiplex quantification of cytokines from critically ill COVID-19 patients admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) at the University of Michigan Hospital. The platform comprises two low-cost modules: (i) a semi-automated fluidic dispensing/mixing module that can be operated inside a biosafety cabinet to minimize the exposure of the technician to the virus infection and (ii) a 12–12–15 inch compact fluorescence optical scanner for the potential near-bedside readout. The platform enabled daily cytokine analysis in clinical practice with high sensitivity (

Background: Good laboratory practices in terms of biosecurity and biosafety are essential for the protection of laboratory personnel, the populations and the environment. If not implemented, the risk of pathogen spreading from the laboratory is conceivable. In addition, in current African geopolitical context, the reliable practices such as the protection, control and tracking of valuable biological material will prevent their loss, theft, uncontrolled access and potential misuse. WAHO, with the support of KfW is implementing trainings of trainers on biosecurity in the ECOWAS region in a project called PROALAB. PROALAB team realized that many partners were aiming at implementing in parallel quite similar non internationally certified programs in the ECOWAS region. Therefore, PROALAB decided to organize a meeting of key stakeholders in order to pool efforts, avoid duplication, and harmonize strategies and procedures. Objective: Develop a harmonized strategy and harmonized procedures for the training of health professionals in biosecurity/biosafety and biohazard risk management in ECOWAS member countries to pass internationally certified biosafety and biosecurity examinations. Methods: Programs of each of the institutions were presented and discussed. A regional program on biosecurity/biosafety training was elaborated during group working and a regional program of certification of trainers was discussed and validated. A work plan and timeline were developed through group working. Results: In the ECOWAS region, some countries are more advanced in biosecurity training. Training is generally organized by national biosecurity associations with the support of the IFBA or other partners (WHO, FMx, PHE, etc.). Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Mali seem more advanced and could be solicited to organize training for less-advanced countries. The IFBA certification covers five domains: (1) Biorisk management, (2) biosecurity, (3) biosafety cabinet, (4) biological waste management and (5) biocontainment facility. The technical working group decided consensually that basic training for biosecurity managers in the laboratories should cover the first two domains. More advanced experts advising governments should be trained in the other domains progressively. Progressive training could be built on the 3 levels Nigerian/Ivoirian system of “basic-advanced-consolidated (or expert)” system. Existing module from WHO, FMx, IPD, IPCI and other ECOWAS countries should be adapted to match the international certification needs. Practical training should also be organized in the laboratory by the same institutions that will be allowed to deliver a practical certificate on behalf of WAHO. Conclusion: With the extension of laboratory activities in the context of strengthening the surveillance programs in the ECOWAS region, more expertise on biosecurity is needed. With the support of national biosecurity associations, WAHO could play a role in harmonizing reinforcing training on biosecurity and legislation.

Novel coronavirus infection [coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)] has spread to more than 203 countries of various regions including Africa, America, Europe, South East Asia and Western Pacific. The WHO had declared COVID-19 as the global public health emergency and subsequently as pandemic because of its worldwide spread. It is now one of the top-priority pathogens to be dealt with, because of high transmissibility, severe illness and associated mortality, wide geographical spread, lack of control measures with knowledge gaps in veterinary and human epidemiology, immunity and pathogenesis. The quick detection of cases and isolating them has become critical to contain it. To meet the increasing demand of the diagnostic services, it is necessary to enhance and expand laboratory capabilities since existing laboratories cannot meet the emerging demand. Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is a BSL-2 (Biosafety Level 2) agent and needs to be handled in biosafety cabinet using standard precautions. This review highlights minimum requirements for the diagnostic laboratories opting testing of material for the diagnosis of COVID-19 and associated biorisk to the individuals and to the community.

With the ongoing novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the number of individuals that need to be tested for COVID-19 has been rapidly increasing. A walk-through (WT) screening center using negative pressure booths that is inspired by the biosafety cabinet has been designed and implemented in Korea for easy screening of COVID-19 and for safe and efficient consultation for patients with fever or respiratory symptoms. Here, we present the overall concept, advantages, and limitations of the COVID-19 WT screening center. The WT center increases patient access to the screening clinics and adequately protects healthcare personnel while reducing the consumption of personal protective equipment. It can also increase the number of people tested by 9-10 fold. However, there is a risk of cross-infection at each stage of screening treatment, including the booths, and adverse reactions with disinfection of the booths. These limitations can be overcome using mobile technology and increasing the number of booths to reduce congestion inside the center, reducing booth volume for sufficient and rapid ventilation, and using an effective, harmless, and certified environmental disinfectant. A WT center can be implemented in other institutions and countries and modified depending on local needs to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Most laboratory techniques are performed in biosafety cabinets (BSCs) to provide contamination control of the experiments. By using specifically directed airflow and high-efficiency particulate air...

The emergence of highly infectious diseases such as Hepatitis and HIV increasingly drives the importance of health and safety in medical laboratories. This study compared the biosafety and biosecur...

Objectives Work-related carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) has been reported in different occupations, including laboratory technicians, so this study was carried out to determine the prevalence and the associated personal and ergonomic factors for CTS among laboratory technicians. Methods A cross-sectional study was conducted among 279 laboratory technicians at King Fahd Hospital, Saudi Arabia, who filled in a self-administered questionnaire, including questions regarding their demographic criteria, occupational history, job tasks, workplace tools, ergonomic factors at work, and symptoms suggestive of CTS. Physical examinations and electrodiagnostic studies were carried out for those who had symptoms suggestive of CTS to confirm the diagnosis. Univariate and multivariate analysis were performed for both personal and physical factors in association with confirmed CTS among laboratory technicians. Results The prevalence of CTS among the laboratory technicians was 9.7% (27/279). The following were the statistically significant risk factors for CTS among them: gender (all cases of CTS were female, P=0.00), arm/hand exertion (OR: 7.96; 95% CI: 1.84-34.33), pipetting (OR: 7.27; 95% CI: 3.15-16.78), repetitive tasks (OR: 4.60; 95% CI: 1.39-15.70), using unadjustable chairs or desks (OR: 3.35; 95% CI: 1.23-9.15), and working with a biosafety cabinet (OR: 2.49; 95% CI: 1.11-5.59). CTS cases had significant longer work duration (17.9 ± 5.6 years) than CTS non-case (11.5 ± 7.4 yeas) with low OR (1.108). Conclusion This study demonstrates some personal and ergonomic factors associated with CTS among the laboratory technicians, including female gender, arm/hand exertion, pipetting, repetitive tasks, working with a biosafety cabinet, and an unadjusted workstation.

When properly used and adequately maintained, a biological safety cabinet (BSC) provides protection to the laboratory worker, the products, and the environment. Knowledge about proper use of the BS...

Background & Aim Aseptic processing is one of the most important issues in the production of cell-based products which are handled by opening the culture vessels. The practical level of aseptic processing depends on the design of aseptic environment where the equipment for research are installed in the cell manufacturing facility. An aseptic environment where biosafety cabinet (BSC) is installed as the aseptic processing area (Grade A) has vulnerability due to manual operations crossing between aseptic processing area and its surrounding area. Though robustness of an aseptic environment where isolator system is installed is much higher than that in the BSC, the facility cost of the isolator system may be more expensive. On the other hand, the facility with BSC has more lot out risks in production due to biological contamination, resulting in higher manufacturing cost. When the cost of goods for a cell-based product is calculated, it must be considered adding on the required resources with the failure probability of cell manufacturing caused by biological contamination. Methods, Results & Conclusion In this study, biological contamination risks depend on the design of aseptic environment construction has been assessed by introducing the method of work breakdown structure (WBS). Then the failure probability of cell manufacturing caused by biological contamination was simulated with consideration of the possibilities which is based on the particle contamination in the product depending on the equipment usage in facility. It is expected that the established assessment model will be useful for design of cell manufacturing facility.

In order to dilute and effectively remove the bioaerosol in the negative pressure isolation ward, a certain amount of flow rate, i.e., the air change rate, is needed.

Millions of Americans contract food poisoning or are affected by microbial pathogens each year. Rapid, sensitive detection of dilute levels of pathogens in foods, produce, water, and biomanufacturing process samples is key to consumer protection; however, current enrichment methods require as much as a full day to enrich viable bacterial pathogens to detectable levels. Our lab previously demonstrated the ability to concentrate and detect dilute levels of pathogens, within 8 hr, from various food matrices using microfiltration in our continuous cell concentration device (i.e., C3D) with one or two filter modules. This short communication describes the design, materials and construction, layout, and operational characteristics of a four filter module multiplexed system based on a four channel device. Benefits are a 2× greater sample capacity than an equivalent duplex system (achieving the same time to result of less than 8 hr from sample preparation to detection), simpler operation, and a footprint enabling operation inside a biosafety cabinet instead of requiring a BSL-2 room. Flow rate variability through four channels fit within an operational envelope of ±3%; flow rates are reproducible from one run to the next thus ensuring relatively simple, concurrent processing of samples.

Recombinant protein production in the baculovirus expression vector system (BEVS) has emerged as a system of choice for the production of recombinant human proteins for R&D purposes. Scale-up protein production in insect cells past the one or two liter volume generally utilizes disposable cellbag bioreactors that provide a means to scale to the 5-25L range in a single vessel. However, cellbags can be expensive and their use requires capital investment in dedicated rocker platforms and their associated air pumps and exhaust heaters. Additional equipment, such as tube welders and liquid pumps are often also deployed for the sterile transfer of media outside of a biosafety cabinet. Herein it is reported that Sf9, Sf21 and High Five insect cells demonstrate normal growth characteristics when cultured at the 2.5 L level in 3 L Erlenmeyer flasks, or at the 4.5 L level in 5 L Erlenmeyer flasks in standard laboratory shakers. In addition, a direct comparison of the expression levels of four separate proteins at the 4.5 L scale in 5 L flasks versus those at the 5 L scale in 10 L cellbags demonstrates that protein production is equal to, or slightly better, in the flasks versus the cellbags. The adoption of high-volume shake flasks for routine recombinant protein production in insect cells has a number of advantages over disposable bioreactors in terms of ease of use, and equipment and disposables costs.

BIOLOGICAL SPILL RESPONSE method to be used in the event of a biosafety incident.

BIOLOGICAL SPILL RESPONSE method to be used in the event of a biosafety incident.