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In this paper, we evaluate the consequences of super-active fiscal policy rules - that is, rules that call for tax cuts and/or spending increases as the government's debt level rises - in a standard New Keynesian model subject to an occasionally-binding zero lower bound on the monetary policy interest rate. We show that such seemingly irresponsible, debt-financed fiscal stimulus at the ZLB, unbacked by any promise of future tax increases or spending cuts, not only improves economic stability by acting as an automatic stabilizer, but also, somewhat paradoxically, reduces government debt accumulation. When evaluated using a model-consistent measure of welfare, fiscal rules calibrated to the U.S. response during both the Great Recession and COVID recession, combined with a weak monetary policy response to inflation, outperform a monetary policy that responds strongly to inflation and reduce the frequency of episodes at the ZLB.

I study the welfare performance of a policy regime of fiscal activism in which fiscal policy acts as an automatic stabilizer and controls inflation, while monetary policy pegs the nominal interest rate. When evaluated through the lens of a standard New Keynesian model, accounting for price and wage rigidities and for a zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate, fiscal activism can substantially outperform inflation targeting in the face of both demand shocks and technology shocks. Fiscal activism can also eliminate the occurrence of ZLB episodes.

We analyse the welfare impact of greater wage flexibility in the presence of an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate.We show that the ZLB constraint generally amplifies the adverse effects of greaterwage flexibility onwelfare when the central bank follows a conventional Taylor rule. When demand shocks are the driving force, the ZLB implies that an increase in wage flexibility reduces welfare even under the optimal monetary policy with commitment. Gal´ı acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through an I+D Grant (ECO2017-87827) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).

We analyze the welfare impact of greater wage flexibility while taking into account explicitly the existence of the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. We show that the ZLB constraint generally amplifies the adverse effects of greater wage flexibility on welfare when the central bank follows a conventional Taylor rule. When demand shocks are the driving force, the presence of the ZLB implies that an increase in wage flexibility reduces welfare even under the optimal monetary policy with commitment.

I compare nominal GDP level targeting to flexible inflation targeting in a small New Keynesian model subject to the zero lower bound on nominal policy rates. First, I study the performance of optimal discretionary policies. I find that, for a standard calibration, inflation targeting under discretion leaves the economy open to a deflationary trap. Nominal GDP level targeting under discretion, by contrast, provides a firm nominal anchor to the economy. Second, I study simple policy rules and the role of smoothing in the rules. With smoothing, a Taylor-type rule performs as well as a nominal GDP level rule. These result suggest that inflation targeting should not be ditched. Still, it can be improved significantly, by using policy rate smoothing to anchor inflation firmly.

We study interactions between monetary policy, which sets nominal interest rates, and fiscal policy, which levies distortionary income taxes to finance public goods, in a standard, sticky- price economy with monopolistic competition. Policymakers´inability to commit in advance to future policies gives rise to excessive inflation and excessive public spending, resulting in welfare losses equivalent to several percent of consumption each period. We show how appointing a conservative monetary authority, which dislikes inflation more than society does, can considerably reduce these welfare losse and that optimally the monetary authority is predominatly concerned about inflation. Full conservatism, i.e., exclusive concern about inflation, entirely eliminates the welfare losses from discretionary monetary and fiscal policymaking, provided monetary policy is determined after fiscal policy each period. Full conservatism, however, is severely suboptimal when monetary policy is determined simultaneously with fiscal policy or before fiscal policy each period.

Policymakers often use the output gap, a noisy signal of economic activity, as a guide for setting monetary policy. Noise in the data argues for policy caution. At the same time, the zero bound on nominal interest rates constrains the central bank's ability to stimulate the economy during downturns. In such an environment, greater policy stimulus may be needed to stabilize the economy. Thus, noisy data and the zero bound present policymakers with a dilemma in deciding the appropriate stance for monetary policy. I investigate this dilemma in a small New Keynesian model, and show that policymakers should pay more attention to output gaps than suggested by previous research.

Does an inflation conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985) remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy? To provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic stochastic sticky price economy with monopolistic distortions. Monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility. We find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary commitment robustly generates too much inflation. A conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable. Exclusive focus on inflation by the central bank recoups large part - in some cases all - of the steady state welfare losses associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment. An inflation conservative central bank tends to improve also the conduct of stabilization policy.

Ignoring the existence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates one considerably understates the value of monetary commitment in New Keynesian models. A stochastic forward-looking model with lower bound, calibrated to the U.S. economy, suggests that low values for the natural rate of interest lead to sizeable output losses and deflation under discretionary monetary policy. The fall in output and deflation are much larger than in the case with policy commitment and do not show up at all if the model abstracts from the existence of the lower bound. The welfare losses of discretionary policy increase even further when inflation is partly determined by lagged inflation in the Phillips curve. These results emerge because private sector expectations and the discretionary policy response to these expectations reinforce each other and cause the lower bound to be reached much earlier than under commitment. JEL Klassifikation: E31, E52

This paper characterizes the optimal inflation buffer consistent with a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates in a New Keynesian sticky-price model. It is shown that a purely forward-looking version of the model that abstracts from inflation inertia would significantly underestimate the inflation buffer. If the central bank follows the prescriptions of a welfare-theoretic objective, a larger buffer appears optimal than would be the case employing a traditional loss function. Taking also into account potential downward nominal rigidities in the price-setting behavior of firms appears not to impose significant further distortions on the economy. JEL Klassifikation: C63, E31, E52 .

We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear. A calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound. Rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not imply positive average inflation rates in equilibrium. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to (non-binding) mark-up shocks.

We determine optimal discretionary monetary policy in a New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. Nominal interest rates should be lowered faster in response to adverse shocks than in the case without bound. Such ‘pre-emptive easing’ is optimal because expectations of a possibly binding bound in the future amplify the effects of adverse shocks. Calibrating the model to the US economy we find the easing effect to be quantitatively important. Moreover, the lower bound binds rather frequently and imposes significant welfare losses. Losses increase further when inflation is partly determined by lagged inflation in the Phillips curve. Targeting positive inflation rates reduces the frequency of a binding lower bound, but tends to reduce welfare compared to a target rate of zero. The welfare gains from policy commitment, however, appear significant and are much larger than in the case without lower bound.

We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear. A calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound. Rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not require targeting a positive average rate of inflation. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to (non-binding) mark-up shocks. JEL Klassifikation: C63, E31, E52 .

We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear. A calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound. Rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not require targeting a positive average rate of inflation. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to (non-binding) mark-up shocks.