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I risultati di una ricerca empirica condotta su un campione di 8.937 imprese italiane non quotate e 58.548 osservazioni annue relative al periodo 1996-2005 mostrano che la detenzione di liquidità da parte delle imprese Italiane non quotate supporta sia il modello del trade-off sia la teoria della gerarchia finanziaria. Infatti, la liquidità è detenuta in misura maggiore dalle imprese più rischiose e dalle imprese con maggiori prospettive di crescita. Allo stesso tempo, detengono più liquidità le imprese caratterizzate da cicli finanziari più lunghi e da minori deficit finanziari, come predetto dalla teoria dell’ordine di scelta. L’evidenza raccolta mostra anche che le imprese non quotate che distribuiscono dividendi detengono maggiore liquidità, che la liquidità può essere considerata come un debito negativo e che il capitale circolante netto rappresenta un buon sostituto del debito. Sembra inoltre che le imprese con maggiori riserve di liquidità facciano più investimenti in un orizzonte successivo di diversi anni. Una ripartizione geografica delle imprese italiane nelle tre macroaree, Nord, Centro e Sud, ha inoltre evidenziato qualche differenza significativa circa il livello di liquidità detenuto e l’effetto di alcune variabili.

Extant literature has usually argued that firms that unify dual class shares are likely to increase shareholder value. We examine the universe of Italian dual class unifications over the 1974-2005 period and show that the unification process is considerably more complex than described in prior literature. In over half the universe, Italian voting shareholders are not compensated for allowing their voting rights to be diluted, and, not surprisingly, experience a price decline at the announcement of unifications. While non-voting shares appreciate in value at the announcement there is little evidence that the unification increases total firm value. We argue that share unifications are designed to benefit the controlling shareholders and, in several cases, controlling voting shareholders use the unification to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders.

Italian corporate governance is characterized by advanced regulations (equalling or exceeding the continental European average) but a low degree of enforcement. The ownership structure of listed companies is highly concentrated, and public companies with dispersed ownership are rare. Most of the time, a majority shareholder (a family, a company or the government) controls a relevant stake of voting rights and exercises full control of the company. Legal devices such as pyramidal groups, non-voting shares and voting agreements are relatively widespread and allow separation of ownership from control, especially in family groups. It follows that the typical agency conflict is not between managers and shareholders, as in the United States or the United Kingdom, but between majority and minority shareholders.

Con il termine Internal Dealing si identificano le operazioni compiute sui titoli di una società quotata da un elenco di persone “rilevanti”. La comunicazione di tali operazioni al mercato segue il duplice obiettivo di contrastare i reati riconducibili ad abusi di mercato (insider trading e aggiottaggio) e migliorare il grado di trasparenza ampliando lo spettro di informazioni price sensitive da comunicare al mercato. Sulle operazioni di Internal Dealing dal 1° Gennaio 2003 vigeva un obbligo di comunicazione imposto dal Regolamento dei Mercati Organizzati e Gestiti da Borsa Italiana S.p.a., mentre dal 1° Aprile 2006 tale obbligo deriva dalla Market Abuse Directive (n°6/2003) recentemente recepita nell’ordinamento italiano (L. n°62/2005 e Delibera Consob n°15232/2005). Il presente lavoro ha analizzato il primo anno di applicazione della normativa sull’Internal Dealing (680 avvisi e 5136 singole transazioni), analizzando il soggetto comunicante, il rispetto della tempistica di comunicazione e la collocazione della transazione in termini di performance ex ante ed ex post dei titoli oggetto dell’operazione.

Il lavoro affronta i temi e le problematiche delle diverse aree funzionali dell'impresa con un approccio innovativo e interattivo.

An increasing number of firms with dual class shares are deciding to unify their shares around the world. Though the return to “one share one vote” is usually considered good news, the unification can give rise to a wealth transfer between the two classes of shares, especially in the presence of high voting premia and no form of compensation to voting shareholders. These conditions characterize most of Italian dual class unification (DCUs) made in the 1982-2005 period. Italian DCUs, differently from any other country, gave rise to a significantly negative reaction of the voting shares and no significant variation in the firm’s overall value. The actual reactions on the two classes of shares also appear well aligned with what expected from a wealth-transfer framework developed in the paper. Changes in firm’s value are positively correlated with larger ownership of the largest and second largest shareholders, while negative correlated with high voting premia and large fractions of nonvoting equity Unification as a new form of (minority voting) shareholders’ expropriation is further confirmed by five case studies where the majority shareholder buys relevant blocks of nv-shares, sells voting shares or approves stock option plans on nv-shares just some months before the unification announcement.

An increasing number of firms with dual class shares are deciding to unify their shares around the world. Though the return to one share-one vote system is usually considered good news for voting shareholders, the unification can give rise to a wealth transfer between the two classes of shares, especially in the presence of high voting premia and no form of compensation to voting shareholders. These conditions characterize most of Italian dual class unification (DCUs) made in the 1982-2005 period. Different from any other country, in Italian DCUs, voting shares earn significantly negative returns Changes in firm’s value are positively correlated with larger ownership of the largest and second largest shareholders, and negatively correlated with high voting premia and large fractions of non-voting equity. We also provide more detailed evidence on five cases where the majority shareholder buys relevant blocks of non-voting shares, sells voting shares or approves stock option plans on non-voting shares a few months before the unification announcement.

An increasing number of firms with dual class shares are deciding to unify their shares around the world. Though the return to “one share one vote” is usually considered good news, the unification can give rise to a wealth transfer between the two classes of shares, expecially in the presence of high voting premia. This paper develops a model that quantifies the wealth effects on the two classes of shares depending on the type of unification, the voting premium and the equity structure. The model shows that voting shareholders can be substantially harmed by a 1:1 unification in the presence of high voting premia. The model predictions are then tested and validated on Italian unifications, characterized by the presence of a majority shareholder, high value of voting rights and no form of compensation for voting shareholders. Unifications can be a form of expropriation of minority voting shareholders, as confirmed by five case studies where majority shareholders hedge or even take advantage of such operations by engaging in the following activities some months before the unification decision: buying relevant blocks of nv-shares, selling voting shares or approving stock option plans on nv-shares. At the stock unification announcement the price of a voting share in the five case studies dropped by a minimum of –4.26%, to a maximum of –10.41%, consistent with the assertion that dual class unifications expropriate minority-voting shareholders to the benefit of the controlling shareholders.

This paper tries to offer a review of the literature on the main privatisation methods adopted by the Central and East European Countries which have joined European Union in 2004. After having analysed the major advantages and shortcomes of each privatisation method the paper briefly describes the privatisation processes adopted by each single country.

La riforma del diritto delle societa` di capitali (D.Lgs. n. 6/2003) ha introdotto innovazioni estremamente rilevanti nella disciplina delle cooperative, con particolare riguardo al tema del finanziamento dell’impresa, che pone problemi del tutto peculiari in questa forma di societa`. Di seguito si esamineranno, nella prospettiva economico-finanziaria ed in quella societaria, alcuni aspetti specifici che rivestono una particolare importanza rispetto al rapporto con il mercato dei capitali.

An increasing number of firms with dual class shares are deciding to unify their sharesaround the world. In the most common type of stock unification a non-voting share can be converted into a voting share. In most countries either the price differential between the two classes of shares is low or a form of compensation for voting shareholders is provided. Italian stock unifications see the highest value of voting rights and no form of compensation for voting shareholders. I observe the 43 Italian stock unifications made in the 1974-2003 period and I develop a model that quantifies their wealth effects on the two classes of shares. Stock unifications can be a form of expropriation of minority voting shareholders, as confirmed by five case studies where majority shareholders hedge or even take advantage of such unifications by engaging in the following activities some months before the unification decision: buying relevant blocks of nv-shares, selling voting shares or approving stock option plans on nv-shares. At the stock unification announcement the price of a voting share in the five case studies dropped by a minimum of –4.26%, to a maximum of –10.41% confirming that dual class unifications can expropriate minority-voting shareholders to the benefit of the controlling shareholder and “lucky” minority nv-shareholders.