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We developed the Knowledge Strategy Orientation Scale (KSOS) to overcome some of the methodological problems inherent in strategic management research: an over-reliance on archival data, the use of single-item measures, and the wildly varying use of proxy measures for focal constructs. This article presents a psychometric evaluation of survey items based upon theoretical insights provided by Holmqvist (2004), March (1991), Levinthal and March (1993), Bierly and Chakrabarti (1996), and Zack (1999) regarding firms knowledge strategies. In a pre-test, principal axis factor analysis on one sample of respondents from 98 different firms indicates that two factors explain a majority of the variance in the eight items and that each item intended to measure Exploration and Exploitation loaded on the appropriate factor. This factor structure is cross-validated on a second sample from the 98 firms using confirmatory factor analysis. The factor structure is reconfirmed in a third sample of respondents from the 98 firms. Regarding the strength of the relationship between exploration, exploitation, distinctive competencies associated with radical innovation, and distinctive competencies associated with incremental innovation, we find full support for one of our hypotheses and partial support for the other. Our results suggest that persons holding different positions in a firm (from CEO to Production Worker) are likely to validly respond to our scale items, that respondents reliably envision the two constructs that we measure as separate entitles, and that these separate entities related mostly as hypothesized to various distinctive competencies., One of the most serious threats to the relatively new field of strategic management research is poor construct measurement (Boyd et al., 2005). Due to the relatively complex nature of [...]

This study examines the relationship between knowledge strategy (exploration or exploitation) and performance, and the possible moderating role of external environment variables. Results from a sample of small manufacturing firms [...]

Given their complexity and tight coupling, one of the most serious challenges high-reliability organizations (HROs) face is how to innovate, learn, and adapt without upsetting the internal processes that lead to their reliability. This paper describes the success of the United States Navy in using a "platform strategy" to facilitate modular innovation in its attack submarine program while maintaining high reliability. We compare the United States' submarine development program against that of the Soviets, who innovated by building a number of different types of nuclear attack submarines to test their new design concepts and thereby aggressively push both manufacturing and performance limits. We illustrate that, by adopting a platform strategy, the U.S. development program was able to sustain reliability by controlling factors that derived from four classes of concern: 1) operational; 2) manufacturing and design; 3) resource limitations, and 4) cultural constraints. The use of a platform strategy assists in maximizing systemwide organizational learning, which helps enrich a culture of reliability. However, at the same time, a platform strategy can hinder revolutionary and architectural innovation and reduce op- erational flexibility. Finally, we consider whether an HRO's innovation strategy is partially shaped by its decision-making process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on identifying external learning sources of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME5) and the relationship between external learning sources and dynamic capabilities. Our results indicate that the most common sources of external learning for SMEs, in order, are customers, suppliers, the scientific community and other industries. The least common sources are competitors, partnerships and consultants. Our results indicate that learning from customers is a predictor of innovation speed, learning from suppliers is a predictor of operational efficiency, and learning from other industries is a predictor of superior process technologies. However, learning from competitors is negatively associated with the development of product technologies and basic research. Additionally, smaller firms in our sample learn more from suppliers and the scientific community than larger firms, while larger firms learn more from partnerships and consultants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the knowledge-based view of the firm as our theoretical underpinning, we study partnerships between industrial firms and university research centers (URCs) in order to identify facilitators of knowledge transfer, particularly focusing on how firms learn from URCs. Data for this study were obtained from senior-level executives from a random sample of one hundred and seventy-three firms located in the northeastern US. Results indicate that social connectedness, trust, URC technology transfer-intellectual property policies, technological relatedness and technological capability are significant facilitators of knowledge transfer. We also found that the type of knowledge transferred, i.e., explicit versus tacit, moderated these relationships. We conclude with implications for future research and R&D policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A successful new product development strategy involves the identification, development, and exploitation of key resources. Such exploitation of a firm's unique knowledge base ultimately leads to successful new products and, in turn, a sustainable competitive advantage. In this paper, we look at a firm's knowledge strategy along three dimensions, and examine the impact of firm size and age on the type of knowledge strategies used to build technological strength and competitive success. The three dimensions of knowledge strategy examined are: extent of emphasis on speed of learning, emphasis on internal versus external sourcing of knowledge, and the development of a broad versus a narrow knowledge base. Using a population of 27 firms from the drug delivery sector of the pharmaceutical industry, we found that firm size and age influenced the success of firm knowledge strategies. Interestingly, we found that the differences in the knowledge strategy dimensions between large and small firms and between old and young firms were not as great as expected. However, we found that firm size and age moderate the relationship between knowledge strategies and technological strength. In other words, firms that used appropriate knowledge strategies for their size and age optimized their technological strength. Concerning size, smaller firms that focused on faster learning and developing a narrow knowledge base were able to optimize technological strength. On the other hand, large firms that developed a broader knowledge base and focused on internal learning achieved similar success. Concerning age, younger firms that maintained connections to external sources of learning and developed a narrower, niche-based knowledge optimized their technological strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Swedish ship Vasa was one of the most spectacular warships ever built. On its maiden voyage in August of 1628, after going less than one mile, the vessel keeled over and sank 110 feet to the bottom of the Stockholm harbor. Fifty crewmembers went down with the ship. It was truly a disaster--and an excellent example of a failure in the new-product development process. In this article, we show how insights gleaned from the Vasa incident are relevant to contemporary organizations. Seven potential problems in new-product development are examined. Together, these problems comprise the Vasa syndrome--a complex set of challenges that can ultimately overwhelm an organization's capabilities. Each problem provides an opportunity to develop managerial competencies in understanding these problem areas, linking these problems to failures described in the Vasa case and contemporary organizations, and determining how to avoid or minimize these problems in the new-product development process. The Vasa case and examples from contemporary organizations demonstrate how history continues to repeat itself in the process of new-product development, and we provide guidelines on how to avoid falling prey to the Vasa syndrome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses strategic management using the dynamic capabilities approach. A study to determine the influence of technological learning and strategic flexibility on organizational performance; The relationship of strategic flexibility and new product development; The internal and external learning dimensions of technological learning; The operationalization of strategic flexibility; Implications for further research; Methods of the study; Conclusions.