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Unfair knowledge practices easily beset our efforts to achieve health equity within and between countries. Enacted by people from a distance and from a position of power ('the centre') on behalf of and alongside people with less power ('the periphery'), these unfair practices have generated a complex literature of complaints across various axes of inequity. We identified a sample of this literature from 12 journals and systematized it using the realist approach to explanation. We framed the outcome to be explained as 'manifestations of unfair knowledge practices'; their generative mechanisms as 'the reasoning of individuals or rationale of institutions'; and context that enable them as 'conditions that give knowledge practices their structure'. We identified four categories of unfair knowledge practices, each triggered by three mechanisms: (1) credibility deficit related to pose (mechanisms: 'the periphery's cultural knowledge, technical knowledge and "articulation" of knowledge do not matter'), (2) credibility deficit related to gaze (mechanisms: 'the centre's learning needs, knowledge platforms and scholarly standards must drive collective knowledge-making'), (3) interpretive marginalization related to pose (mechanisms: 'the periphery's sensemaking of partnerships, problems and social reality do not matter') and (4) interpretive marginalization related to gaze (mechanisms: 'the centre's learning needs, social sensitivities and status preservation must drive collective sensemaking'). Together, six mutually overlapping, reinforcing and dependent categories of context influence all 12 mechanisms: 'mislabelling' (the periphery as inferior), 'miseducation' (on structural origins of disadvantage), 'under-representation' (of the periphery on knowledge platforms), 'compounded spoils' (enjoyed by the centre), 'under-governance' (in making, changing, monitoring, enforcing and applying rules for fair engagement) and 'colonial mentality' (of/at the periphery). These context–mechanism–outcome linkages can inform efforts to redress unfair knowledge practices, investigations of unfair knowledge practices across disciplines and axes of inequity and ethics guidelines for health system research and practice when working at a social or physical distance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reproductive justice movement started by black women's rights activists made its way into the academic literature as an intersectional approach to women's reproductive autonomy. While there are many scholars who now employ the term 'reproductive justice' in their research, few have taken up the task of explaining what 'justice' entails in reproductive justice. In this paper I take up part of this work and attempt to clarify the relevant kind of freedom an adequate theory of reproductive justice would postulate. To do so, I compare two approaches to reproductive freedom: an approach based on freedom as non‐interference and an approach based on freedom as non‐domination. I then argue that the non‐domination approach better fits the ideals of the reproductive justice movement as set forth by its founders and should be treated as one of the necessary conditions in any non‐ideal account of reproductive justice. Towards the end, I single out epistemic non‐domination as crucial in shaping the narrative around reproductive justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we extend Heidi Hurd's "correspondence thesis" to the termination of pregnancy debate and argue that the same reasons that determine the permissibility of abortion also determine the justifiability of acts involving conscientious objection against its performance. Essentially, when abortion is morally justified, acts that prevent or obstruct it are morally unjustified. Therefore, despite conscientious objection being legally permitted in some global south countries, we argue that such permission to conscientiously object would be morally wrong in cases of morally justifiable termination of pregnancy. After presenting and defending our "correspondence argument" we suggest that conscientious objection should be denied as a matter of public health policy in developing counties, even in cases where adequate referral services are possible. Towards the end, we extend our argument to midwives, nurses, and prospective students in the field. Given their essential position in resource‐poor contexts; they too have no claim to conscientious objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a commentary on the 2022 article by Rachel Fabi and Daniel S. Goldberg which shed light on the wrongs perpetuated by the current funding architecture on research, sponsorship and career development in the field of bioethics. Topics covered include the need for further examination of the causal link between skewed funding priorities and epistemic and racial injustice, the concept and framework of epistemic injustice and the explanation for skew in fundable topics.