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Investigating historical sources for positions on animals and animal ethics within philosophy of the Islamic world is a profound challenge, given the quantity and diversity of possible source texts. This article argues that Ibn Sīnā’s (Avicenna, d. 428/1037) philosophy provides a hitherto unappreciated account of animal well-being. By tracing his conception of providence to that of essences, and by highlighting the role of psychological powers in ensuring the attainment of essential goods, this article argues that Avicenna can account both for essential goods and interests proper to individual species and for the capacity of animals to attain these goods and interests. This account rests on Avicenna’s rich teleology, which includes the role of the lawgiver as the upholder of justice within human society. In the end, human goods and animal goods are articulated with the same overarching account, which human beings are called to know.

This paper is devoted to a fascinating passage in Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), in which he argues that non-human animals have rational souls. It is found in hisMulaḫḫaṣ fī l-manṭiq wa-l-ḥikma(Epitome on Philosophy and Logic). Following a discussion of the afterlife, Faḫr al-Dīn suggests that animals should, like humans, be capable of grasping universals, and that they are aware of their own identity over time. Furthermore, animal behavior shows that they are capable of rational planning and problem-solving. We contextualize these arguments with reference to Faḫr al-Dīn’s other philosophical works, and also compare the considerations he raises to ideas found in modern-day animal ethics, drawing here especially on the work of Mark Rowlands. The paper concludes with a translation of the passage.