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La France figure parmi les rares inventeurs du premier système international structuré, qui naquit en 1648 à la faveur de la paix de Westphalie. Ses dirigeants successifs, et peut-être même son opinion publique, en ont tiré la conviction qu’elle avait ainsi hérité d’un rôle diplomatique décisif, la fameuse « responsabilité particulière », mise en avant presque à chaque crise internationale, aucune d’elles ne devant la laisser indifférente.

During the time of bipolarity, the notion of regional power merged with that of middle power, suggesting a limited international capacity controlled by the game of superpowers and disposing of a rather weak autonomy of action. Today, the situation has substantially changed: one of the paradoxes of globalization is that it has strengthened the influence of local actors and emancipated them from their former tutors. At the same time, the fall of the Berlin Wall has opened the regional powers of yesterday to the international sphere. Ultimately, the transformation of conflicts and their increasingly social foundation transforms proximity in resources: regional powers are obviously more and more involved in the conflict systems that border or involve them. The Middle East is thus becoming a remarkable field for the regionalization of powers to be achieved: states that used to be mere allies or marginal groups, are now seeking recognition, then proactivity and finally participation in the solution of conflicts. This triple initiative marks the diplomacies of Turkey and Iran but also that of Saudi Arabia and, depending on the circumstances, others too. Having understood this, Russia has scored points in the region, while the Westerners have been losing considerable advantages trying to counter it.

L'hégémonie est plus souvent sollicitée comme figure rhétorique que comme concept scientifique. Elle suscite tour à tour la fascination et la détestation, autant la peur que l'espoir de protection. Appliquée aux États-Unis, elle a nourri en même temps l'américanophilie et l'antiaméricanisme. Quand elle trébuche, elle inspire la crainte des uns, la satisfaction des autres et un certain sentiment de sourde revanche chez beaucoup. Elle épouse les concepts les plus variés : domination, puissance, superpuissance, jusqu'à "hyperpuissance", étonnante notion élaborée par un ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères, au moment même où l'ascendant américain semblait plus que jamais en question...

This article argues that the debate on “new wars” and “post-Westphalian” wars and conflicts misses a crucial dimension, that of the importance of weakness in the relations between states as well as...

The sharp break that began with contemporary globalization followed the double defeat of colonization and of hegemony. The demise of bipolarity led to the end of a protective mechanism that enabled the old powers to hold onto their illusions, their privileges and an outmoded superiority, as they still held sway over the international agenda through the cold war and detente. Defeat on one side, disengagement on the other: the new relationship to the other was becoming an issue. There were three reactions to these challenges, all three expressed through an evolving American foreign policy, grappling more than any of the others with the uncertainties of power. These responses were formed over the course of the last successive presidencies: controlling the entire world, governing it from afar, or withdrawing into the domain of its national interests. George W. Bush was thus the champion of neoconservatism, Barack Obama that of neoliberalism, and Donald Trump of neonationalism. The other powers would align themselves in their own way with these urgently devised inventions.

The world today is hostage to decolonization, marked by its failures. The old world has been unable to accommodate the new one within the community of so-called “civilized” nations. Yet there are few exceptions, such as in Japan and Latin America, between 1947, date of the independence and partitioning of India, and the last wave of decolonization in the mid-1970s, no one knew how to open the door to the newcomers in a suitable way. In the aftermath of the colonial order, a post-colonial order was rebuilt based on trusteeship over the recently “emancipated” states. This was the purpose of the British Commonwealth, of the “Community” designed by General de Gaulle in 1958, and the notorious “Francafrique.” It was overlooked that these new states had their own histories and could not safely follow down the Western path of nation-building… This chapter explores the concepts of weak states and neocolonialism, how an instrumental vision of the South developed, why the Middle East can be seen as a volcano. It also questions issues of proximity and civilizational depth, the new conflicts and so called multi-level wars, and finally turns to the question of power, its powerlessness, and the power of the weak.

In talking about the Cold War, the term “bipolarity” is frequently used, including in the very definition of the underlying notion of “polarity.” If we are to put things in perspective with a subject that is more complex than it seems, we must first consider that polarity is an exception in the international history, and then learn to distinguish between power polarity and group polarity, two major realities that are often confused. The former describes competition among states that may claim power status, in other words that have the objective resources to do so and are perceived as such by others. What is the use of being objectively powerful if others fail to acknowledge that capacity? This chapter will first consider issues of nuclear reality and ideological antagonism before questioning the transition from antagonism to diarchy. It will examine the erosion of the bipolar system stemming from the South and from so-called peripheral conflicts, the contentious legacy of non-alignment and the fleeting illusion of unipolarity. Finally, the author stresses what an “apolar” world may be and how it may have finally caused the return of the oligarchic club.

France was a great power, but that assertion should be explained through a story that must be grasped in all its complexity. First, France was a power at a time when that notion was still imbued with its full meaning. There is a certain synchrony between the central role played by this country since the end of the Middle Ages and the rise of the notion of power as an organizing principle of the international system. It is clear, however, that at the end of the First World War there was a break in France’s international relations and its place in the concert of nations. This final chapter will discuss the notions of power and grandeur, European leadership, Gaullism, postcolonialism and the dilemmas and options of a mid-level power. The author then explores France’s turnaround and neoconservatism, before questioning the country’s capacity to step outside of itself and look beyond November 13th.

To understand the confused evolution or the indignities of the international system at the beginning of the twenty-first century one needs to first grasp what came before it and understand the way international relations have been configured throughout the modern era. This chapter will consider the issues of sovereignty, competition, and power as the fragile cornerstones of the Westphalian order, before turning to the strengths and weaknesses of the oligarchic governance.

Understanding the nature of international relations today by looking at traditional geopolitical maps and absorbing strategic reflections only, is insufficient. Societies are bursting into areas once reserved only for diplomacy. The 1980s ICT (Information and Communication Technology) boom played a fundamental role in transforming even social behavior. It was the real factor of globalization that lastingly revolutionized the planet. This chapter first examines this invisible revolution of societies and nation-states and how the social took over key geostrategic considerations. The author questions the two globalizations and the revenge of the local, and finally opens the debate on what a new sociology of international relations may be.

The international arena is inseparable from social actors, their behavior, culture, and expectations. We’ve come a long way since the European concert that brought together princes and dynasts with the same mindset and culture. Today, the politics of diplomacy are perpetually hostage to the density of globalization and the complexity of—sometimes clashing—narratives. The end of bipolarity had fueled the illusion that the United States remained alone on its hegemonic pedestal, a posture which, as we established earlier, has been extremely rare throughout history while, until 1989, the proceeding aspiration only manifested on a diarchic basis, versus the Soviet Union and with it. We also saw that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unipolar illusion lasted little more than three or four years. After examining the illusions and setbacks of hegemonic power, this chapter turns to the three stages of the American reaction and the appeal and limits of soft power. The author then considers the frustrated Russian empire, the European Union’s lost opportunities, the emerging countries frustrated expansion, and finally turns to China and questions its discretion and assertion.