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This article argues that regulatory trust is established and maintained through a relationship between stakeholders and the government, with the former group of organizations and individuals relying on their understanding of this relationship. Federal administrative law in the United States makes the expectations about the regulatory environment on which stakeholders rely more meaningful by granting stakeholders the right to bring actions in court when their expectations are being (or seem likely to be) dashed. To make this argument, I begin with the threshold question of how courts serve as a forum for voicing claims of distrust in regulatory regimes. I then consider the importance of political accountability over regulatory decision making, illustrating the concerns about the structure of agencies that regulate consumer and housing finance. Next, I will discuss a second major challenge to trust that arises from the extent to which the authority of regulatory agencies is circumscribed by legislation. Along the way, I draw on the case law presented to argue that problems of trust in financial regulation center on the reliance interests of stakeholders. Finally, the argument suggests a research agenda into trust as a reliance interest that I sketch in the conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laws such as 0.08 blood alcohol content, open container, and license revocation provide a policy framework for reducing drinking and driving. Drinking and driving behavior is difficult to assess; unlike property and violent crimes, where incidence statistics can approximate behavior, most drink-driving trips go undetected. The authors develop a novel measure of drink-driving propensity by estimating an item response model using national survey data. The authors illustrate their measures in the aggregate and as they relate to law enforcement efforts in the American states. (Contains 4 tables, 4 figures and 8 notes.)