1. Nothing at Stake in Knowledge
- Author
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Rose, David, Machery, Edouard, Stich, Stephen, Alai, Mario, Angelucci, Adriano, Berniūnas, Renatas, Buchtel, Emma E., Chatterjee, Amita, Cheon, Hyundeuk, Cho, In-Rae, Cohnitz, Daniel, Cova, Florian, Dranseika, Vilius, Lagos, Angeles Erana, Ghadakpour, Laleh, Grinberg, Maurice, Hannikainen, Ivar, Hashimoto, Takaaki, Horowitz, Amir, Hristova, Evgeniya, Jraissati, Yasmina, Kadreva, Veselina, Karasawa, Kaori, Kim, Hackjin, Kim, Yeonjeong, Lee, Minwoo, Mauro, Carlos, Mizumoto, Masaharu, Moruzzi, Sebastiano, Olivola, Christopher Y., Ornelas, Jorge, Osimani, Barbara, Romero, Carlos, Rosas Lopez, Alejandro, Sangoi, Massimo, Sereni, Andrea, Songhorian, Sarah, Sousa, Paulo, Struchiner, Noel, Tripodi, Vera, Usui, Naoki, Vazquez del Mercado, Alejandro, Volpe, Giorgio, Vosgerichian, Hrag Abraham, Zhang, Xueyi, Zhu, Jing, Rose, D, Machery, E, Stich, S, Alai, M, Angelucci, A, Berniūnas, R, Buchtel, E E, Chatterjee, A, Cheon, H, Cho, I-R, Cohnitz, D, Cova, F, Dranseika, V, Lagos, Á E, Ghadakpour, L, Grinberg, M, Hannikainen, I, Hashimoto, T, Horowitz, A, Hristova, E, Jraissati, Y, Kadreva, V, Karasawa, K, Kim, H, Kim, Y, Lee, M, Mauro, C, Mizumoto, M, Moruzzi, S, Olivola, C Y, Ornelas, J, Osimani, B, Romero, C, Rosas, A, Sangoi, M, Sereni, A, Songhorian, S, Sousa, P, Struchiner, N, Tripodi, V, Usui, N, Vázquez del Mercado, A V, Volpe, G, Vosgerichian, H A, Zhang, X, Zhu, J, Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Rose, David, Machery, Edouard, Stich, Stephen, Alai, Mario, Angelucci, Adrian, Berninas, Renata, Buchtel, EMMA E., Chatterjee, Amita, Cheon, Hyundeuk, Cho, In-Rae, Cohnitz, Daniel, Cova, Florian, Dranseika, Viliu, Lagos, Angeles Eraña, Ghadakpour, Laleh, Grinberg, Maurice, Hannikainen, Ivar, Hashimoto, Takaaki, Horowitz, Amir, Hristova, Evgeniya, Jraissati, Yasmina, Kadreva, Veselina, Karasawa, Kaori, Hackjin, Kim, Kim, Yeonjeon, Lee, Min-Woo, Mauro, Carlo, Mizumoto, Masaharu, Moruzzi, Sebastiano, Olivola, Christopher, Ornelas, Jorge, Osimani, Barbara, Lopez, Alejandro Rosa, Romero, Carlo, Sangoi, Massimo, Sereni, Andrea, Songhorian, Sarah, Sousa, Paulo, Struchiner, Noel, Tripodi, Vera, Usui, Naoki, Mercado, Alejandro Vázquez del, Volpe, Giorgio, Vosgerichian, Hrag Abraham, Zhang, Xueyi, and Zhu, Jing
- Subjects
knowledge, contextualism, invariantism, stakes, experimental philosophy ,knowledge ,Experimental philosophy ,Gettier problem ,folk epistemology ,stakes ,Epistemology ,Epistemic contextualism ,cross-cultural ,ddc:128.37 ,Knowledge ,stakes knowledge cross-cultural ,experimental philosophy - Abstract
Many philosophers hold that stakes affect ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Here’s a version of a pair of cases aimed at supporting this: Bob and his wife are driving home on Friday and considering whether to stop at the bank to deposit a check. The lines at the bank are very long and so Bob considers coming back on Saturday. In the low stakes version, nothing of importance hinges on whether the check is deposited; in the high stakes version, it is very important that the check be deposited. Bob’s wife asks whether the bank will be open on Saturday. Bob says he drove past the bank last Saturday, and it was open. However, his wife points out that banks sometimes change their hours. Bob says “I know the bank will be open tomorrow”. In the low stakes case, many philosophers maintain that Bob does indeed know that the bank will be open; in the high stakes case, these philosophers maintain that Bob is ignorant – his statement that he knows the bank will be open tomorrow is false. These philosophers also maintain that this pattern of judgments is what we would expect from competent speakers confronted with this and similar cases (e.g., Cohen, 1999, 2013; DeRose, 1992, 2009; Fantl and McGrath, 2002; Nagel, 2008; Rysiew, 2001; Stanley, 2005).Though many philosophers agree that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, there is disagreement about what explains this. One view, epistemic contextualism, holds that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions can vary across conversational contexts (e.g., DeRose, 2009). For instance, Bob’s statement “I know the bank will be open tomorrow” can be true in low stakes contexts and false in high stakes contexts. Another view, interest-relative invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions vary according to conversational contexts. Instead, cases like the Bank cases show that practical factors—i.e., stakes—play a distinctive role in determining whether the knowledge relation obtains (e.g., Stanley, 2005). Yet another alternative, which we’ll call classical invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that practical factors, such as stakes, play a direct role in determining whether the knowledge relation obtains. Instead, stakes affect knowledge ascriptions only by affecting our assessment of factors that have traditionally been taken to constitute or be necessary for knowledge, such as e.g., belief, quality of evidence, etc. (e.g., Bach, 2005; Weatherson, 2005; Ganson, 2007; Nagel, 2008). If this is right, then the role of stakes in knowledge ascriptions fails to motivate such surprising views as epistemic contextualism or interest-relative invariantism. Naturally, epistemic contextualists and interest-relative invariantists deny this, claiming that even when the factors that have traditionally been taken to constitute or be necessary for knowledge are held fixed, stakes continue to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions (e.g., DeRose, 2009; Lawlor, 2013). So we see a dispute over what best explains the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions. It is thus extremely surprising that a wide range of empirical evidence suggests that ordinary knowledge ascriptions fail to display any sensitivity to stakes (e.g., Buckwalter, 2010; Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015; Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; May, Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull, and Zimmerman, 2010; Turri, forthcoming; though see e.g., Pinillos, 2012; Pinillos and Simpson, 2014; Sripada and Stanley, 2012). If stakes really do not play any role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, one of the main motivations for epistemic contextualism and interest relative invariantism would be undermined. Perhaps these different explanations of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascription are born out of nothing more than a myth (Schaffer and Knobe, 2009). If so, classical invariantism about knowledge might be best supported—not because it provides the best explanation of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, but rather because the failure of stakes to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascription would undercut an important motivation for its two competitors, epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. These radical alternatives to classical invariantism, lacking evidence in support of one of their important motivations, should perhaps then fall. Classical invariantism would stand. In the remainder of this article, we’ll disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We’ll accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism.
- Published
- 2019