1. Threat and Punishment in Public Good Experiments
- Author
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Charles Noussair, David Masclet, Marie Claire Villeval, Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Department of Economics, Tilburg University [Netherlands], Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO), Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal (UQAM), Krannert School of Management, Purdue University [West Lafayette], Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Dao, Taï, École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Bernardini, Sophie
- Subjects
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior ,punishment ,History ,Test ,Polymers and Plastics ,jel:H41 ,050109 social psychology ,Gefangenendilemma ,Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering ,Threats,cheap talk,sanctions,public good,experiment ,Order (exchange) ,Economics ,C92 ,Sanctions ,050207 economics ,[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance ,ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS ,media_common ,jel:C92 ,threats ,Public economics ,experiment ,05 social sciences ,sanctions ,Public good ,16. Peace & justice ,Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ,[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance ,H41 ,Economics and Econometrics ,Punishment ,media_common.quotation_subject ,jel:D63 ,non binding announcements ,Cheap talk ,0502 economics and business ,Institution ,ddc:330 ,0501 psychology and cognitive sciences ,Business and International Management ,JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods ,Strafe ,Social dilemma ,Öffentliches Gut ,public good experiment ,General Business, Management and Accounting ,threats, cheap talk, sanctions, public good, experiment ,public good ,JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ,D63 ,cheap talk - Abstract
Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short-run. Could the introduction of pre-play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost associated with actual punishment, so that they increase overall welfare ? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to punish others based on their contribution levels to a public good. After observing others' actual contributions, they choose their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is improved, but only in the long run. However, the possibility of sanctioning differences between threatened and actual punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the absence of threats.
- Published
- 2023
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