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Made possible by ever-rising technologies and becoming the subject of a social message focused on the concept of security, surveillance is a fittingly topical issue. It is no longer just the classic video camera, but RFID, Iot, chip and many other devices scattered everywhere, which no longer aim solely at the control of the person in the flesh but of his or her virtual body. Total surveillance, then, to examine which it seems not only interesting but also appropriate to adopt the perspective outlined by Jeremy Bentham through the elaboration of an equally pervasive model of control, the Panopticon. After summarily reconstructing the basic principles of the panoptic machine. This article highlights the split that exists today between two forms of monitoring, one indebted to Benthamian thought and one that, on the contrary, seems to surpass it, recalling, finally, how both, though different, seem to forget the Benthamian teaching aimed at fostering democratic surveillance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En marco del aniversario número cuarenta del Código Civil, el Dr. Freddy Escobar, uno de los pocos civilistas nacionales que se ha aventurado al estudio del Derecho Civil desde la filosofía moral, nos brinda algunos importantes alcances respecto a la materia, sus implicancias históricas y su aplicación práctica. Asimismo, realiza un balance respecto del trabajo realizado por el legislador del Código Civil de 1984 desde la mentada perspectiva. A nuestro entender, este es un ejercicio más que necesario, pues en nuestro medio este tipo de balances suelen ser formales o, en el mejor de los casos, dogmáticos. Ahora bien, el aporte del profesor Escobar en este rubro no se limita a los estrechos confines de esta entrevista, sino que se encuentra también (y sobre todo) en su obra escrita. Algunos títulos que recomendamos con entusiasmo son los siguientes: Contratos: Fundamentos económicos, morales y legales (2020), Reglas insensatas: Las inconsistencias conceptuales, estratégicas y políticas del Código Civil (2021), y Justicia correctiva vs. justicia funcional: Aristóteles, Bentham y el sistema de remedios legales (2023). Este Consejo Editorial espera que las siguientes líneas sean tan provechosas para quien las lee como lo fueron para nosotros. Y es que las instituciones, sobre todo las civiles, no pueden evaluarse desde el derecho mismo, sino que deben pasar por el baremo de la moralidad y la eficiencia económica.

En el período 1820-1835 el mundo legal Anglo-Americano estaba sumido en la discusión referida a si el common law debía ser abolido y reemplazado por el sistema de codificación de leyes del derecho continental. Durante este tiempo denominado «Controversia de la Codificación» se debatió por primera vez acerca de la cientificidad de ambos sistemas legales. Los que estaban a favor de la codificación, afirmaban que ésta era más científica porque reducía la complejidad de la ley y simplificaba, a la par que dividía, a los principios de las normas jurídicas, permitiendo así su fácil aplicación al comportamiento humano. Los defensores del common law, en cambio, sostenían que este último sistema era el más científico porque permitía a los jueces basarse en la realidad y la razón humana para construir un sistema reconocido no escrito compuesto de principios y normas jurídicas aplicados como vinculantes. Pero debe evitarse toda mirada simplista sobre esta discusión y no tomar tales argumentos como una doble postura doctrinal. En realidad, estos autores debatieron exclusivamente sobre la cientificidad de ambos sistemas jurídicos tanto desde la estrategia discursiva como desde la objetividad argumentativa. En un contexto de Inter discursividad y lucha contra sus oponentes, deben, a toda costa, replicar y convencer a la opinión pública.

Between April 1820 and April 1822, stimulated by the restoration of the Cádiz Constitution, Bentham devoted himself to writing a number of works on the constitutional reform and colonial rule of Spain, which have been sources of a scholarly debate over Bentham's views on colony. By examining those works, this essay aims to supplement the scholarly debate by drawing attention to a thesis that Bentham developed in his criticism and evaluation of the Cádiz Constitution: a thesis concerning the irreconcilable incompatibilities of liberal constitution and colonisation. I focus on Bentham's critical analyses of the Constitution, and indicate that Spain's colonial rule of Ultramaria not only intensified the weaknesses of the Constitution, but also rendered its merits useless, if not harmful, to the public in both hemispheres. Moreover, I explore the tension that Bentham detected between liberal constitutionalism and colonialism. I maintain that, in Bentham's observation, the civil rights granted by the Cádiz Constitution to the Ultramarians stood to facilitate the enlightenment of citizens and the formation of civil society. As a consequence, the delusion of the Spanish ruling few would be exposed, and the Ultramarians' discontent with exploitation by such foreign rulers would sow the seeds of disobedience and resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Michel Foucault made the Benthamian panoptism cornerstone of his criticism of the modern technology of punishment allegedly "humanitarian" and "rehabilitator" as defended by the Enlightenment, whose maximum expression was manifested as "constant reform of prisons", is no less true that the panoptic model of Jeremy Bentham, which was seen as the summit of a modern correctional system, positive, efficient, economically productive, psychologically accurate and morally healthy, actually had a more theoretical than real impact on Western prison systems. The theory of the panopticon ran into all sorts of economic and technical difficulties that made it an imaginative psychosocial experiment without the possibility of real implantation. Thus, the very concept of "panopticon" ended up going from the noun to the adjective, and all the literature built around the "eye that sees everything" was revealed as an intellectual fiction. This work, of psicohistorical research, tries to outline from its introduction in Spain of that technological project that reformed the presidios that was the panoptic ideology, and how its failure materialized, despite the enthusiasm of its defenders. However, and paradoxically, far from implying this failure a renunciation of the model, it served as an incentive to redirect it towards the reformulation of a genuine "prison theory" - and "the prisoner" - that found articulation in a whole philosophy of the penitentiary reform, the control of the spaces and the treatment of the prisoner that he framed in the juridical changes and in the architectural projects, as well as the very ideal of "re-education”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article argues that Bentham’s metaphysics has until recently been unfairly belittled, and that it in fact built on and surpassed that of David Hume, of whom Bentham was both an attentive student and a fierce critic. Bentham’s logic is metaphysically based, multi-levelled, and comprehensive. First, taking Hume’s empiricism as a starting point, Bentham developed the additional mechanism of “reflection” to facilitate a utilitarian pragmatic resolution to Hume’s skepticism. Second, unlike Hume, Bentham aspired to encyclopedic knowledge, especially of the human mind, which he believed allowed him to place his thought on a more solid and broader foundation. Third, whereas Hume focused on the passive understanding, Bentham captured the interaction between understanding and volition. Fourth, in relation to moral approbation, Hume adopted an approach which highlighted benevolence, whereas Bentham sought to reconcile self-preference with benevolence. Fifth, Hume’s common sense moral philosophy pushed him to associate justice with social convention, and helped to make him a conservative. Bentham developed the principle of utility to direct and push forward social reform for a better world.

The main thesis of this article is that Newman’s famous Idea of a University cannot be fully appreciated without the background of the educational programmes popularized in the first half of the 19th century, which have their matrix in the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. The comparison of these two thinkers shows that Newman built his system of education and arrived at its basic principles precisely by refuting the principles of utilitarianism and liberalism of his time. From this perspective, his work on education no longer remains a quiet prose, but can be seen as a moral and cultural struggle over fundamental values.

Can there be rule of law at sea? In extending the traditionally terrene ideal seaward, there are a range of conceptual difficulties. These difficulties are outlined, and a recurring thought pattern is set out that is found in the traditions of thought about the rule of law as protecting members of a community from the abuse of power. Drawing on Jeremy Bentham's scattered remarks about maritime governance, three assumptions underlying this thought pattern, regarding territoriality, community, and protective function, are identified as requiring modification in the maritime context. Achievement of the rule of law at sea is possible, but reflects a number of limitations as compared to its terrene counterpart, limitations related to these three traditional assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jeremy Bentham is usually seen as an anti-realist political thinker, or a proponent of what Bernard Williams has termed 'political moralism'. This article questions that prevalent view and suggests instead that there are good grounds for considering Bentham a political realist. Bentham's political thought has considerable commonalities with that of the sociologist and political realist Max Weber: both agree that politics is a unique domain of human activity defined by its association with power; that consequently, ethical conduct is unavoidably inflected by power in politics; that a commitment to truth in politics can only ever be contingent; and that politics has a set of basic conditions that it would be not only misguided but dangerous to attempt to transcend. Whilst it is often held that Bentham advanced a reductive framework for understanding politics, in fact, his utilitarianism was a far more realistic approach to political ends and means than has generally been acknowledged, and one that contemporary political theory realists would benefit from taking seriously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent works on political radicalism in the British Isles, the contribution of “philosophic radicalism” is only cursorily mentioned. Indeed, the focus of historiography has moved away from the Westminster circles in which Bentham, Mill and their friends were active and has paid increasing attention to popular movements. In the 1810s and 1820s however, contacts between Benthamites and radical reform groups were numerous. This article draws on Bentham’s collected correspondence for the year 1820. It first explains his position within radical circles in London, before looking at the events of that year under the lens of his letters. Two themes illustrate the close links between radical and utilitarian circles: the fight for the liberty of the press and a shared interest in the liberal revolutions in Spain and Portugal. Bentham’s testimony also highlights the divisions within radical movements.

In terms of the distinction between relationalist and substantialist philosophies of science opened up by American pragmatist thinkers like Dewey and Bentley, Bentham's social ontology is relationalist and anti-substantialist. When the ontology is combined with his emphasis on ordinary language as the basis of social reality, it is seen to have thematic connections to later developments in social science such as social constructionism, social phenomenology, ethnomethodology and, due to its intent to critically question-received fictions, to neo-Marxian and other concerns about objectivation and reification. Also, by re-reading Bentham's theory of fictions as a theory of vernacular language habits, it can be shown to have empirical relevance for the sociology of language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper is providing a comprehensive & comparative study of Utilitarianism & Sarvodaya. Both the ideologies establish as democratic ideologies but there is a big difference between democratic parameters and characteristics of utilitarianism. We found utilitarianism is not a core democratic ideology as this does not follow the very core principles of the common good and the equality of democracy. Comparatively, Sarvodaya is based on equality. Sarvodaya seems to have the welfare of all means as it is basically rooted in Sanskrit term Sarv and Udaya with ‘Gun Sandhi’, which stands for uplift or welfare for all. It shows its bonding with the pure democratic characteristics widely accepted. The founder of utilitarianism is Jeremy Bentham and his brilliant student John Stuart Mill amended and updated this theory. The beginning utilitarianism was initially not related to social morality, but later on, amendments established its relations with social morality. The basic concept of utilitarianism stands for a high level of happiness and pleasure as Bentham believes that human nature is derived only by pleasure and pain. But, here it does not force to distribute this happiness and pleasure equally to everyone. The basic idea here goes with ‘maximum pleasure for maximum people’. If we want to understand the instruments of this maximum pleasure, utilitarianism goes with the result or the consequences of an act rather than the instruments or the good or bad ways it is achieved, so this emphasises end over means. Sarvodaya here means upliftment of all classes of society, And on a bigger scale, it refers to Universal upliftment or progress. It is originally a Upanishadic Idea of ‘Sarve Bhavantu Sukhinah:’ means all sentients being happy and at peace. The Sarvodaya term was first coined by Mahatma Gandhi After reading Ruskin Bond’s ‘unto this last’. After that, it was highlighted as Gandhian socialism. After this Gandhi used this term for his political-philosophical ideas. Later many Gandhian thinkers like Vinoba Bhave, Jai Prakash Narayan embraced “Sarvodya” as a name of Social Movement in Post Independent India. Utilitarianism and Sarvodaya both ideas are emphasising the pleasure/upliftment of humans. But according to comprehensive analysis utilitarianism has an emphasis on the happiness of Maximum numbers, whether Sarvodaya’s object is to work for every person’s happiness in the society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

« 2 + 2 = 4 is a question of language. » Bentham J., Rationale of judicial evidence, London, Hunt & Clarke, 1827, Vol. III, p. 274. « The beginning and the end are never the most interesting [...]. Only the middle is interesting. [...]. We start again from the middle. French people think too much in terms of tree: the tree of knowledge, tree points, alpha and omega, roots and summit. It is the contrary of a blade of grass. Not only grass grows in the middle of things, but it grows itself from the middle. [...] Grass has a line of flight but it has no rooting. We have grass in our head; not a tree: that is the meaning of what thinking is; what is a brain: «a certain nervous system» of grass ». [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Jeremy Bentham put forward a distinctive and original theory of representative democracy which can be helpfully analysed through his concept of the 'deputy'. A deputy, Bentham argued, evoked a specific political relationship between governors and the governed – a relationship that was functionally different to that between the people and a 'representative' or a 'delegate'. Whereas a representative was suggestive of too great a degree of governmental independence from the people and a delegate implied an excessive dependency of governors upon the governed, a deputy for Bentham best described the relationship between the rulers and the ruled that should subsist in a representative democracy. A political form based on deputies, who were to be relatively free to conduct the business of government yet simultaneously accountable to their sovereign electors, was the only way in his eyes to guarantee the promotion of utility in politics and the security of the people from being misruled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1798–1799, Bentham lent his services to Patrick Colquhoun in drafting Bills to regularize the new Thames Police Office and establish a Central Board of Police. While recognizing Colquhoun as the "author of the system," Bentham brought his own utilitarian philosophy to bear on the task, and his arguments shed light on the twin role of licensing in both providing the finance necessary for an expansion of police and in generating a flow of information for use in deterring, detecting, and apprehending criminals. The Police Gazette and the Calendar of Delinquency were to be official publications of the proposed Board of Police, which combined the promulgation of information (thus increasing public knowledge through the understanding) with the effort to mould public opinion (thus influencing the will). Dissemination of facts provided grist to the existing moral sanction's mill and facilitated cooperation between the people and the agents of penal law. In reaction to anxiety about contagion from revolutionary France, Bentham also explicitly seeks to guide and direct public opinion, thus connecting his police writings directly with the esoteric elements of indirect legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: A new species of Lamiaceae, Cyanocephalus glocimarii, of the tribe Ocimeae subtribe Hyptidinae from the state of Tocantins, Brazil, is described, illustrated and its phylogenetic position is provided. Morphologically, this species is unusual in its indumentum of dendroid trichomes (those on the peduncle have branches ending in small gland cells). Its conservation status, as a species at present only known from the type collection, is considered. The taxonomic history of the genus Cyanocephalus is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Photo by Jr Korpa on Unsplash INTRODUCTION The moral authority of advance directives (ADs) is contingent on one of two metaphysical concepts of personhood common in the West. The first tradition originated in the ideas of David Hume and Jeremy Bentham. Hume asserts that the idea of personhood is socially fabricated and that we are nothing more than “bundles” of sensations.”[1] Bentham is famous for developing a utilitarian ethical approach predicated on Hume’s reductionist theory, a person who asserts the morally right act is the one which maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain.[2] The second metaphysical tradition, which grants moral authority to ADs, stems from the work of John Locke[3] and John Stuart Mill.[4] Locke conceived of persons as beings that are “rational, concerned, continuing, and self-conscious,”[5] and Mill understood that persons act in a manner that maximizes their holistic goods, not only the sum of their experience of pleasure or pain.[6] In the 1980s, this metaphysical divergence on personhood materialized in a debate between Ronald Dworkin, whose reasoning parallels that of Locke and Mill, and Rebecca Dresser, who employs an approach that comports with that of Hume and Bentham. The debate focused on the real case of an incompetent patient named Margo who developed early-onset Alzheimer’s and, despite her condition, “or maybe somehow because of it,”[7] led a remarkably cheerful life. She no longer identified with the provision in her AD to forgo any life-sustaining medical treatment after she could no longer recognize her loved ones. When she contracted pneumonia, an ethical dilemma emerged as her prior preferences recorded when she was competent conflicted with her contemporary preferences regarding her end-of-life care. Dworkin argues that Margo’s precedent autonomy, i.e., her past ability to govern her future self through a directive and the corresponding obligation of her current self to follow the directive, has moral authority over her current treatment, but Dresser objects, asserting that because Margo is now a “new person”[8] the AD is no longer relevant.[9] In this essay, I argue that precedent autonomy morally authorizes ADs when dementia renders patients medically incompetent because it respects their dignity as persons, not merely pleasure-seeking creatures. The Case: Margo, ‘the Happy Alzheimer’s Patient’ In Margo’s Logo, Dr. Andrew Firlik describes the life of an Alzheimer’s patient he visited frequently while interning in gerontology.[10] Because she developed the disease at a relatively young age, Margo had virtually no physiological problems and lived a “carefree” life consisting of flipping through mystery novels and painting the same image every day during art class.[11] Firlik describes her life almost romantically, commenting that “there is something graceful about the degeneration her mind is undergoing, leaving her carefree, always cheerful.”[12] He does not mention Margo’s early stages of dementia which were perhaps characterized by confusion, anxiety, and existential fear, as is often the case with diseases that erode mental capacity.[13] Still, arguably in her current state Margo is happy and therefore should be given non-invasive treatments, like oral antibiotics, to extend her life if she contracts pneumonia. The argument to adhere to her previous wishes against such life-prolonging treatments may seem cruel. However, Dworkin argues that to ignore her AD would compromise her autonomy and dignity and constitute the greater cruelty. Dworkin contra Dresser Dworkin uses the framework of experiential and critical interests to defend the moral authority of precedent autonomy. Experiential interests roughly parallel Bentham’s conception of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, whereas critical interests are focused on the actions that lend “genuine meaning and coherence to our lives.”[14] Critical interests comport with Locke’s valuing rationality and with Mills’ appreciation of the big picture taken holistically. Dworkin’s conception of personhood emphasizes our pursuit of critical interests over and above our pursuit of experiential interests, indicating that there is a moral superiority to critical interests. For example, parents willingly give up sleep to sustain the critical interest of raising children and athletes endure pain to improve their odds of victory. The pursuit of critical interests lends genuine meaning to our lives. In contrast, a life characterized by the constant pursuit of experiential interests is often meaningless. Dworkin’s dichotomy of interests grounds his view of precedent autonomy because the critical interests encoded in ADs represent the “whole person”[15] - all the relationships, values, and narrative richness of personhood before the onset of late-stage dementia. If we ignore the AD, we disregard the autonomy of Margo’s “whole person” in favor of her immediate preferences. Dworkin’s view of autonomy argues that we should honor Margo’s precedent autonomy even if we believe it conflicts with her best interest because persons have the right to act “out of a distinctive sense of their own character”[16] in writing the narrative of their life. Ignoring her AD would be "an unacceptable form of moral paternalism”[17] because it effectively authors a conclusion to the story of Margo’s life that she explicitly wished to avoid, ignoring the strongest living articulation of her autonomy. Dworkin further argues the moral authority of Margo’s precedent autonomy through the principle of beneficence, the ethical obligation to promote the patient’s welfare.[18] It would be cruel to subject Margo to a chapter of life that she did not want to lead, a life that conflicts with her critical interests, even if she no longer remembers those interests. Thus, to genuinely act in the best interest of the patient, the doctor must adhere to her competent conception of what is best for her “whole person”, not merely her current experiential interests. Dresser argues that when patients with incurable dementia lead enjoyable lives, we should ignore their previous wishes. She raises an epistemic and a moral objection to Dworkin’s argument in favor of precedent autonomy. Her epistemic argument points out that when she wrote the AD, Margo did not know what quality her life would have with dementia, therefore carrying out a preference based on such limited information would not respect autonomy.[19] This argument fails to recognize that individuals make decisions all the time without knowledge of the outcome, so to disregard Margo’s AD because she did not know whether her experiential interests would be fulfilled is unjustifiably paternalistic. Furthermore, Dresser implicitly asserts that if Margo were to know the quality of her life with dementia in advance, she would not have authored the same AD. However, this removes the possibility of Margo autonomously prioritizing her critical interests regardless of the experiential outcomes. Margo likely did know that people can (and often do) lead enjoyable lives with dementia yet she still chose to word the AD to not prolong life once her critical interests could not be satisfied. Dresser’s moral argument against precedent autonomy contends that because Margo can no longer recognize her previous preferences, she is a metaphysically distinct person, and that the AD is therefore not applicable. Dresser claims that the “drastic psychological alteration that has occurred” to Margo has “produce[d] a new person.”[20] This metaphysical assertion carries significant moral weight. If we consider Margo the Alzheimer’s patient to be a distinct individual from the woman who wrote the AD, then executing an AD is akin to sentencing an innocent person to death. However, Dresser’s claim is predicated on the flawed assertion that dramatic psychological changes over time produce an entirely new individual. Children, for example, undergo substantial psychological changes from infancy to adolescence, yet we regard them as continuous individuals.[21]Ultimately, we must consider persons rather than pleasure-seeking subjects to be the locus of autonomous decision making, therefore moral authority is granted to precedent autonomy in cases like Margo’s. Locke’s emphasis on rationality also supports following the AD. Personal identity, in Locke’s view, is meaningfully linked to persistence over time and the ability to rationally self-reflect – abilities which Margo presently lacks. He writes in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “a thinking intelligent Being, … has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.”[22] From this diachronic view of identity, Locke characterizes persons as agents. Margo, in contrast, no longer has these abilities and has lost her sense of personhood and agency. It is only through our ability to self-reflect and project our values onto the current situation that we can be said to be persons. Dresser makes an erroneous metaphysical assertion in saying that the late-stage Alzheimer’s patient is a new person due to “substantial memory loss and other psychological changes.” It is exactly these changes which rob late-stage Alzheimer’s patients of their personhood. Utilitarianism and Advance Directives The two founding figures of Utilitarian ethics, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, agreed that the ‘right’ action is the one which maximizes utility in a given situation, but they disagreed on what sorts of consequences constitute utility. Bentham focused merely on the quantity of pleasures, asserting that the right action would result in the most favorable balance between pleasure and pain.[23] Pursuant to this hedonistic calculus which disregards the quality of pleasure, the right action is to ignore Margo’s AD by providing the life-saving treatment. This would be the most ethical choice according to Bentham because it produces a greater sum of pleasure than her death, regardless of her prior critical interests. Hume’s view of experiences also overvalues pleasure as opposed to cognition. When applied to Margo, who essentially experiences a bundle of sensations without the ability to rationally appreciate them, Hume’s viewpoint would negate the AD vis a vis Bentham’s calculus. Yet, Margo’s AD concerned ranking the characteristics of life that would justify prolonging it which included experiences like remembering one’s narrative and having meaningful relationships with friends and loved ones. These values transcend the immediate sense data that Bentham factors into the utilitarian sum. The philosophies of Hume and Bentham not only impede dignity, and negate autonomy, they impose a limited, outside view on what persons value. Mill criticized Bentham’s approach to utilitarianism because it was indiscriminate in its valuation of different pleasures, implicitly leading to the conclusion that distinctly human pleasures “of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination and of the moral sentiments” are no more valuable than animal pleasures “of mere sensation.”[24] In Mill’s view this degrades the moral status of humans. If our pleasures are no different, then Bentham suggests that our moral status is equivalent to that of animals, which is clearly problematic. In an example of the flaws of utilitarian applications, in a purely quantitative utilitarian calculus, the life of an immortal oyster is more desirable after a certain amount of time than the life of the jovial and accomplished composer, Joseph Hayden.[25] If given the choice, I suspect an overwhelming majority of people would prefer to live as a human being that feels pain over an animal that feels only simple pleasures. Even though human life is often characterized by stress, uncertainty, and vulnerability, the profound heights of the human condition justify life according to Mill’s philosophy. Mill’s utilitarianism focused on the quality rather than the quantity of pleasures, and thus he would argue that following Margo’s AD will result in the outcome with the greatest utility because she is no longer capable of pursuing higher pleasures.[26] Her current existence is characterized only by experiential pleasures, which according to Mill, is not a life worth living.[27] CONCLUSION A consequence of the reductionist view of personhood endorsed by Hume, Bentham, and Dresser is an erroneous moral equivalence between animals and humans and a disregard for human dignity. Dworkin’s framework of critical interests and Mill’s version of Utilitarian ethics support the moral authority of precedent autonomy by defending the narrative quality of life, the important pursuit of higher pleasures, and a dignified characterization of humanity. [1] Hume, D. & P. H. Nidditch (ed.). (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hume posits a distinct ontology of self: “each of us is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions that follow each other enormously quickly and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (Hume, 1978, p.131) [2] Bentham, J. (1789, 1907). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [3] Locke, J. (1948). An essay concerning human understanding, 1690. [4] Mill, J. S. (1861, 1998). Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [5] Rich, B. A. (1997). Prospective autonomy and critical interests: A narrative defense of the moral authority of advance directives. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 6(2), 138-147. Chicago [6] Mill, J. S. (1861, 1998). Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [7] Firlik, A. D. (1991). Margo's logo. JAMA, 265(2), 201-201. [8] Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report, 25(6), 32-38. [9] Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report, 25(6), 32-38. [10] Firlik, A. D. (1991). Margo's logo. JAMA, 265(2), 201-201. [11]Firlik, A. D. (1991). Margo's logo. JAMA, 265(2), 201-201. [12]Firlik, A. D. (1991). Margo's logo. JAMA, 265(2), 201-201. [13] Menzel, P. T., & Steinbock, B. (2013). Advance Directives, Dementia, and Physician‐Assisted Death. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 41(2), 484-500. [14] Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report, 25(6), 32-38. [15] Dworkin, R. (1994). Life’s dominion. An argument about abortion, euthanasia and individual freedom. New York: Books V, 69-101. [16] Dworkin, R. (1994). Life’s dominion. An argument about abortion, euthanasia and individual freedom. New York: Books V, 69-101. [17] Dworkin, R. (1994). Life’s dominion. An argument about abortion, euthanasia and individual freedom. New York: Books V, 69-101. [18] Dworkin, R. (1994). Life’s dominion. An argument about abortion, euthanasia and individual freedom. New York: Books V, 69-101. [19] Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report, 25(6), 32-38. [20] Dresser, R. (1995). Dworkin on dementia: elegant theory, questionable policy. Hastings Center Report, 25(6), 32-38. [21] Rich, B. A. (1997). Prospective autonomy and critical interests: A narrative defense of the moral authority of advance directives. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 6(2), 138-147. Chicago [22] Locke, J. (1948). An essay concerning human understanding, 1690. [23] Bentham, J. (1789, 1907). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [24] Mill, J. S. (1861, 1998). Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [26] Mill, J. S. (1861, 1998). Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [27] Mill, J. S. (1861, 1998). Utilitarianism, Roger Crisp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Autonomous machines are moving rapidly from science fiction to science fact. The defining feature of this technology is that it can operate independently of human control. Consequently, society must consider how ‘decisions’ are to be made by autonomous machines. The matter is particularly acute in circumstances where harm is inevitable no matter what course of action is taken. This dilemma has been identified in the context of autonomous vehicles driving under the regulation of domestic law and, there, governments seem to be moving towards a utilitarian solution to inevitable harm. This leads one to question whether utilitarianism should be transposed into the context of autonomous weapons which might soon operate on the battlefield under the gaze of humanitarian law. The argument here is that it should because humanitarian law includes the core principle of ‘proportionality’, which is fundamentally a utilitarian concept – requiring that any gain derived from an attack outweighs the harm caused. However, while human soldiers are always able to come to a view on proportionality, albeit subjective, there is much doubt over how an autonomous weapon might determine what is proportionate. There is a very large gap between our embryonic understanding of utilitarianism in relation to autonomous vehicles manoeuvring around a city on one hand; and what would be required for armed robots patrolling a battlespace on the other. Bridging this gap is fraught with difficulty but perhaps the best starting point is to take Bentham’s expression of utilitarian mechanics and build upon them. With conscious effort and, ideally, collaboration, states could use the process of applying his classic theory to this very modern problem to raise the standard of protection offered to those caught up in conflict.

Resumo O presente artigo tem por objetivo examinar de que forma o contexto histórico-filosófico do século XIX influenciou a compreensão nietzschiana acerca do ascetismo. Para tanto, foi necessário se afastar da obra de Nietzsche e levar a cabo uma pesquisa de ordem filológica em textos filosóficos que tratavam do tema no referido século, a qual trouxe à baila a hipótese de que o termo "ascetismo" - apesar de possuir raízes doutrinárias, conceituais e etimológicas na antiguidade e na idade média - surge nos textos da filosofia europeia apenas no século XIX. Ao longo da argumentação também se evidencia como a interpretação e o uso utilitarista da noção de ascetismo foi essencial para a elaboração da crítica nietzschiana ao ideal e às práticas ascéticas.

The Principle of Utility can be regarded as the keystone of the Benthamite ethical and political thought. In fact, it is at the core of Bentham's two major works Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation and Deontology. At the same time, the question has been raised about its foundation. This paper is aimed at showing that this foundation can be found in the elenctic defense he proposes at the beginning of his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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