Search

This thesis examines how air power has affected navies using the case of the United Kingdom between 1945 and 1957. Air power has given rise to numerous theories about its effect on the use of force, in which its impact on navies has been a particular theme. Many thinkers have interpreted air power as a strategic, operational and tactical challenge to navies, which would render them redundant and obsolete. Such ideas originated between the two World Wars but have continually reappeared since 1945 and were often influential in the British debate. During the period under consideration, the Royal Navy was challenged in a series of defence reviews. Although these serious and repeated attacks were generally motivated by financial considerations, they were justified primarily by claims relating to air power. It was argued that nuclear-armed air power would be sufficient to win wars, while any nuclear war would leave little role for navies. Later, this argument shifted to an emphasis on deterrence of war and it was suggested that naval forces were not vital to this deterrent. Although the Admiralty continued to justify a capability to defend sea communications as both a deterrent to war and vital in it, this case did not find favour with the government. During the mid-1950s, however, an alternative focus for the Navy emerged in the form of policing and limited wars, east of Suez. Conflicts in Korea and the Suez demonstrated that such conflicts could occur and that mobile naval forces, particularly carrier aviation, were well suited to intervention in them. It was also argued that land-based aircraft could take over some of the roles traditionally performed by naval forces, notably that of strike (against warships and shore targets) but also that of protecting shipping. These arguments were successfully defeated by the Admiralty. Land-based aircraft proved a useful complement to warships and naval aviation in protecting shipping but could only replace them in very limited areas. The Royal Navy differed from the US Navy in its conception of power projection against the land. Its capability for this task was thrown increasingly into doubt by growing Soviet submarine and air power and came to be justified by east of Suez commitments.

It has been over a century since Sir Julian Corbett published Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, yet today it continues to be regarded as one of the key foundation texts on maritime strategy. Its ideas and propositions were first tested in the First World War, but the century that followed provided many other opportunities for evaluation across a range of scenarios wherever maritime power was used as an instrument of national policy. Yet the character of seapower, and indeed the maritime domain itself, was constantly evolving and so it is right that the enduring relevance of Some Principles continues to be regularly debated. Such debate however is too often polarized between a focus on either Corbett's historical contemporary relevance in the early twentieth century, or his modern relevance today. There has been little serious attempt to explore and bridge the gap between the two and analyse his ideas over a longer timeframe, across changing circumstances, and from differing national viewpoints or interpretations. It would be unrealistic to expect every historical strategic theory to remain relevant in perpetuity, but those that do endure tend to do so because they identify fundamental truths that are largely immune to contextual and/or technological change. Thus, there remains much still to be gained from studying 'classic' strategists like Thucydides, Machiavelli, Sun Tzu, or Clausewitz for example. But does Corbett belong in the same canon or are we sentimentally over-attached to a book that now belongs more properly on the history shelf rather than the strategy one? This thesis uses historical evidence to put Some Principles to the test across the century of conflict, crisis, and evolution of strategic thought and technology that followed its publication in 1911. It aims to assess its fundamental and universal nature, its longevity, and its enduring strategic relevance as an analytical model, by exploring Corbett's original intent and contemporary context; his core ideas on maritime strategy; the gaps, errors or omissions in his analysis and method; and where his ideas have been (or still can be) evolved or extrapolated. In doing so it ultimately aims to determine the extent to which Some Principles continues to merit its status as an enduring classic work of strategy, and explain why. This is primarily an analysis of Some Principles therefore, not Corbett himself, nor his personal impact and influence - although that remains a secondary theme where pertinent. The thesis concludes that despite never being originally intended as a general text, Some Principles nevertheless holds up surprisingly well in terms of both universal application and enduring relevance over time and circumstance. There remain flaws and omissions, but when considered in their original 1911 context, some become more understandable whilst others suggest deliberate choices rather than flawed analysis. Of Some Principles' core ideas and concepts, those situated at the uppermost levels of strategy remain remarkably enduring despite the considerable geo-political, societal, and technological changes since 1911. Others however, situated closer to what we might term the operational or tactical levels in modern parlance, offer a more mixed picture with evidence of necessary evolution, expansion, adaptation and even some cyclical obsolescence before returning to more contemporary relevance over time. Even so, fundamentally these too remain broadly recognisable from their original 1911 format, and in general Corbett's focus on strategic outcomes not tactical activities has stood the test of time well, albeit with some modification required along the way.