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In this paper, I examine a fundamental sociological question: how does conflict between groups affect relations within groups? I present a theory specifying the conditions under which groups in conflict will develop stricter norms and more centralized systems of leadership than groups at peace. I evaluate the theory using a laboratory study that tests the causal mechanism while controlling for factors that complicate the study of conflict in the field. Using the intergroup prisoner's dilemma paradigm (Bornstein 2003), I find that intergroup conflict interacts with cultural values to shape group cohesion (contribution to collective action), support for social norms (willingness to engage in costly punishment of those who do not contribute to the group), and the centralization of authority (willingness to switch from a democratic decision-making system to an autocratic system). The results suggest that group conflict plays an important causal role in norm emergence, costly punishment, and the establishment of group hierarchies. The results support classical sociological theories while providing a clearer picture of the causal mechanism. On a practical level, the results suggest that conflict resolution efforts could benefit from emphasizing relationships within as well as between groups. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Survey research finds that mothers suffer a substantial per-child wage penalty that is not explained by human capital or occupational factors (Budig and England 2001). Despite clear documentation of this pattern, the causal mechanism producing it remains elusive because existing research has not been able to distinguish between productivity and discrimination explanations for the motherhood wage penalty. Drawing on status characteristics theory and the literature on the cultural contradictions of motherhood, we suggest that status-based discrimination may be an important factor. To evaluate this argument, we conducted a laboratory experiment in which participants evaluated application materials for a pair of same race, same gender, ostensibly real job applicants who were equally qualified but differed on parental status. The results strongly support the discrimination hypotheses. Relative to other kinds of applicants, mothers were rated as less competent, less committed, less suitable for hire, promotion, and management training, and deserving of lower salaries. They were also held to a stricter performance standard. Men were not penalized for being a parent and appeared to benefit from having children on some measures. We discuss the implications of these findings for the theory presented and for enduring patterns of gender inequality in paid work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding neighborhood emergence, stability, and change is an important goal in the study of social stratification. The neighborhoods people live in affect their quality of life, future life chances, and how they are judged by others (e.g., Wilson 1996, Bourgois 2003). Thomas Schelling (1971) proposed a model of neighborhood self-organization in which agents search for neighborhoods with some proportion of similar agents. In Schelling's model, agents choose neighborhoods based on their desirability, while Schelling assumes that all neighborhoods are equally accessible. This contrasts sharply with observed patterns, in which the most desirable neighborhoods are often the least accessible and agents' income tethers their residential aspirations. I relax Schelling's assumption of perfect accessibility in a simple wealth and status-based model of residential choice. The cost and desirability of neighborhoods is based on the wealth and status of nearby agents. Agents stochastically search the lattice for the most desirable cell they can afford. I manipulate the affordability of housing and the distribution of wealth, measuring the effect of these variables on residential self-organization. Findings include a non-linear effect of affordability on class segregation, as well as suburbanization-like patterns showing dense central clusters of poor agents surrounded by rings of wealthier agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT: Durkheim and others argued that deviance paradoxically promotes group solidarity by uniting individuals in moral outrage and enforcement of shared norms. Maintenance of social boundaries binds the group together and encourages contribution to collective welfare. Durkheim?s reliance on ?social facts? as an explanatory tool, however, left the mechanisms behind this phenomena poorly specified. In contrast, rational choice models clearly specify mechanisms that induce actors to contribute to collective action, but assume opposition only hinders collective action and thus fail to address the Durkheimian possibility that opposition may help collective action by encouraging enforcement. Using a model of bounded rationality, I show support for Durkheim?s primary claim and explore its limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers have found social dilemmas to be useful tools for studying the emergence of bottom-up cooperation and social order. The majority of formal work in this area focuses on either dyadic interactions or undifferentiated groups. In this paper, I formally model the role of network structure on cooperation in social dilemmas using backwards-looking adaptive actors. The model considers network size and structure as well as whether actors use local strategies tailored to specific alters or generalized global strategies. Results indicate that large networks in which actors use global strategies achieve both the highest and lowest levels of cooperation, and that network structure plays a defining role under these circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Informal norms emerge as embedded features of face-to-face behavior, coinciding with other controlling properties of interaction?interactants? status, maturity, intentions, and comfort in social settings. The present paper proposes a theory of interaction general enough to embrace all of these matters. Based in recent discoveries about the brain, the theory provides a model of brain-behavior mechanisms active in attachment. In previous research, we have used computational methods to discover the implications of the model for understanding core patterns in social interaction. But the model can also be used to derive implications about normative behavior. In this paper, we consider the potential applications of the theory for explaining conformity pressures in small groups, and show how the model explains the emergence of informal norms. We illustrate the argument using examples familiar to sociologists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]