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This paper examines the effects of an international quality‐enhancing technology spillover on the international industry distribution and innovation in a dynamic North‐South model. When a Southern firm receives a technology transfer from the North through international licensing, the technology spills over to other Southern firms by enhancing the quality of their products. We find that a stronger spillover effect depresses both Northern innovative R&D and Southern adaptive R&D, and thus is welfare‐impairing both for the advanced country and recipient country. The results cast doubt on the common view that regards the technology spillover as a positive externality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the wage and welfare effects of the competition policy in a platform economy. An increase in downstream platform providers widens the skilled‐unskilled wage gap in the short run. Moreover, competition brings about a beneficial price pass‐through effect but a detrimental cost‐pushing effect on upstream manufacturers. This leads to business dynamism in manufacturing firms. By numerical simulations, the number of manufacturing firms increases, thus further widening wage inequality in the long run. The optimal number of platform providers is smaller when the business‐stealing effect is larger, whereas it is larger when the price pass‐through effect is greater. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the distributive and welfare effects of cross‐ownership by firms in a general equilibrium economy on the product and factor markets. The cross‐ownership of equities, such as collusion, tends to be anticompetitive, thereby narrowing the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor in the short term with the existing number of firms. In the capital market, reducing capital cost through cross‐ownership causes new firms to enter the market in the long term. This firm‐entry effect induced by cross‐ownership through an increase in the number of competitors generates a competitive force that exacerbates wage inequality and reduces welfare in the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the impact of status seeking behavior on the growth of income. Conventional wisdom suggests that such behavior should stimulate the growth rate. We introduce a general status indicator as an average of relative income and another that reflects relative expenditure on a status good in a simple dynamic model. We show that the conventional approach, which includes only concern for relative income, matters for growth. Otherwise, higher relative expenditure on a status good does not have any additional impact on optimal growth beyond the golden rule. Thus, the accepted wisdom that relative status concern always stimulates incentive for growth is called into question and provides fresh policy perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]