Search

Insight occurs when a person suddenly reinterprets a stimulus, situation, or event to produce a nonobvious, nondominant interpretation. This can take the form of a solution to a problem (an 'aha moment'), comprehension of a joke or metaphor, or recognition of an ambiguous percept. Insight research began a century ago, but neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques have been applied to its study only during the past decade. Recent work has revealed insight-related coarse semantic coding in the right hemisphere and internally focused attention preceding and during problem solving. Individual differences in the tendency to solve problems insightfully rather than in a deliberate, analytic fashion are associated with different patterns of resting-state brain activity. Recent studies have begun to apply direct brain stimulation to facilitate insight. In sum, the cognitive neuroscience of insight is an exciting new area of research with connections to fundamental neurocognitive processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Often when failing to solve problems, individuals report some idea of the solution, but cannot explicitly access the idea. We investigated whether such intuition would relate to improvements in solving and to the manner in which a problem was solved after a 24- hour delay. On Day 1, participants attempted to solve Compound Remote Associate problems, for which they viewed three problem words (crab, sauce, pine) and tried to generate one solution word (apple) that could form a compound word with each problem word (crabapple, applesauce, pineapple). For problems they failed to solve, participants reported whether they had an intuitive sense that they might have solution related processing in the back of their mind, similar to a Tip-of-the-Tongue (TOT) experience. After an overnight delay, on Day 2 participants attempted to solve unsolved Old problems from Day 1 (mixed among New problems). Participants solved more Old problems for which they reported a TOT on Day 1 than Old problems without a TOT, demonstrating a TOT specific incubation effect. Interestingly, participants reported solving a marginally higher proportion of these TOT problems, compared to No TOT problems, with insight. Results suggest that intuitive TOT judgments are indicative of subthreshold solution related activation that can facilitate eventual problem solving, especially with insight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A sudden comprehension that solves a problem, reinterprets a situation, explains a joke, or resolves an ambiguous percept is called an insight (i.e., the “ Aha! moment”). Psychologists have studied insight using behavioral methods for nearly a century. Recently, the tools of cognitive neuroscience have been applied to this phenomenon. A series of studies have used electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the neural correlates of the “ Aha! moment” and its antecedents. Although the experience of insight is sudden and can seem disconnected from the immediately preceding thought, these studies show that insight is the culmination of a series of brain states and processes operating at different time scales. Elucidation of these precursors suggests interventional opportunities for the facilitation of insight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The authors describe how they have used visual-hemifield and event-related neuroimaging approaches to study their theory specifying some of the neural components of insight. A set of problems developed by the authors, and the use of solvers’ self reports of insight, are presented to argue that advances in our understanding of insight are being unnecessarily stifled by over reliance on traditional insight problems and a widespread failure to determine whether insight has occurred on a solution-by-solution basis. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Comprehension of natural language – stories, conversations, text – is very simple for those doing the comprehending and very complex for cognitive neuroscientists. It also presents a paradox: the advantage of the left hemisphere (LH) for most language tasks is one of the best-established facts about the brain; yet, when it comes to comprehending complex, natural language, the right hemisphere (RH) might play an important role. Accumulated evidence from neuropsychology, neuroimaging, and neuroanatomy suggests at least three roughly separable (but highly interactive) components of semantic processing. Each process in turn has bilateral components, with the RH component performing coarser computations for the same general process. Examining asymmetrical brain and cognitive functions provides a unique opportunity for understanding the neural basis of complex cognition. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

After a person has become stuck on a problem, they sometimes achieve a clear and sudden solution through insight – the so-called Aha! experience. Because of its distinctive experience, the origins and characteristics of insight have received considerable attention historically in psychological research. However, despite considerable progress in characterizing insight, the underlying mechanisms remain mysterious. We argue that research on insight could be greatly advanced by supplementing traditional insight research, which depends on a few complex problems, with paradigms common in other domains of cognitive science. We describe a large set of mini-insight problems to which multiple methods can be applied, together with subjective reports to identify insight problem-solving. Behavioral priming and neuroimaging methods are providing evidence about what, where, and how neural activity occurs during insight. Such evidence constrains theories of component processes, and will help to demystify insight. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

People sometimes solve problems with a unique process called insight, accompanied by an "Aha!" experience. It has long been unclear whether different cognitive and neural processes lead to insight versus noninsight solutions, or if solutions differ only in subsequent subjective feeling. Recent behavioral studies indicate distinct patterns of performance and suggest differential hemispheric involvement for insight and noninsight solutions. Subjects solved verbal problems, and after each correct solution indicated whether they solved with or without insight. We observed two objective neural correlates of insight. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (Experiment 1) revealed increased activity in the right hemisphere anterior superior temporal gyrus for insight relative to noninsight solutions. The same region was active during initial solving efforts. Scalp electroencephalogram recordings (Experiment 2) revealed a sudden burst of high-frequency (gamma-band) neural activity in the same area beginning 0.3 s prior to insight solutions. This right anterior temporal area is associated with making connections across distantly related information during comprehension. Although all problem solving relies on a largely shared cortical network, the sudden flash of insight occurs when solvers engage distinct neural and cognitive processes that allow them to see connections that previously eluded them. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) are used to study neural activity in subjects during a verbal task for which they report solutions achieved by insight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People sometimes solve problems with a unique process called insight, accompanied by an ''Aha!'' experience. It has long been unclear whether different cognitive and neural processes lead to insight versus noninsight solutions, or if solutions differ only in subsequent subjective feeling. Recent behavioral studies indicate distinct patterns of performance and suggest differential hemispheric involvement for insight and noninsight solutions. Subjects solved verbal problems, and after each correct solution indicated whether they solved with or without insight. We observed two objective neural correlates of insight. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (Experiment 1) revealed increased activity in the right hemisphere anterior superior temporal gyrus for insight relative to noninsight solutions. The same region was active during initial solving efforts. Scalp electroencephalogram recordings (Experiment 2) revealed a sudden burst of high-frequency (gamma-band) neural activity in the same area beginning 0.3 s prior to insight solutions. This right anterior temporal area is associated with making connections across distantly related information during comprehension. Although all problem solving relies on a largely shared cortical network, the sudden flash of insight occurs when solvers engage distinct neural and cognitive processes that allow them to see connections that previously eluded them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We have developed and tested 144 compound remote associate problems. Across eight experiments, 289 participants were given four time limits (2 sec, 7 sec, 15 sec, or 30 sec) for solving each problem. This paper provides a brief overview of the problems and normative data regarding the percentage of participants solving, and mean time-to-solution for, each problem at each time limit. These normative data can be used in selecting problems on the basis of difficulty or mean time necessary for reaching a solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the time course of hemispheric differences in solution-related activation for insight problems in the United States. Comparison between the semantic coding of right hemisphere (RH) and left hemisphere (LH); Contributions of unconscious processing to insight solutions; Distinction between LH and RH divergence pattern of men and women.

Temporal variability is a fundamental property of brain processes and is functionally important to human cognition. This study examined how fluctuations in neural oscillatory activity are related to problem-solving performance as one example of how temporal variability affects high-level cognition. We used volatility to assess step-by-step fluctuations of EEG spectral power while individuals attempted to solve word-association puzzles. Inspired by recent results with hidden-state modeling, we tested the hypothesis that spectral-power volatility is directly associated with problem-solving outcomes. As predicted, volatility was lower during trials solved with insight compared with those solved analytically. Moreover, volatility during prestimulus preparation for problem-solving predicted solving outcomes, including solving success and solving time. These novel findings were replicated in a separate data set from an anagram-solving task, suggesting that less-rapid transitions between neural oscillatory synchronization and desynchronization predict better solving performance and are conducive to solving with insight for these types of problems. Thus, volatility can be a valuable index of cognition-related brain dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines how hemispheric differences in information processing might contribute to solving insight problems. Two component processes necessary for problem solving; Recognition of the solution; Internal activation of information; Creative thinking and insight from unconscious processing.

Discusses the complementary role for the right- and left-hemisphere of the brain in language comprehension. Benefits of the existence of complementary; Speech perception; Complementary hemispheric processing of voicing versus place of articulation; Decoding of print; Understanding of sentences and discourse.

Abstract Solving problems with insight culminates in an “Aha! moment”: a feeling of confidence and pleasure. In daily life, insights are often followed by important decisions, such as deciding what to do with a new idea. Here, we investigated whether having an Aha! moment affects subsequent decision-making. Because Aha! moments tend to elicit positive affect, which is generally associated with an increased risk-taking tendency, we hypothesized that people would favor a monetary payout with more upside despite greater uncertainty after solving a problem with insight. Participants were asked to solve verbal puzzles and report whether they solved them with insight or without insight. After each puzzle, they chose between two bonuses: a fixed payout or a risk payout with 50% chance of receiving a high or a low payout. Participants were more likely to choose the risk payout after they solved with insight compared to without, suggesting a temporarily higher risk preference. The study provided pre­liminary evidence of a carryover effect - the impact of an Aha! moment on the subsequent risk choice - that can have implications in everyday decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To solve a new problem, people spontaneously engage multiple cognitive processes. Previous work has identified a diverse set of oscillatory components critical at different stages of creative problem solving. In this project, we use hidden state modeling to untangle the roles of oscillation processes over time as people solve puzzles. Building on earlier work, we further developed analytical methods, such as incorporating source separating techniques and identifying the optimal number of states using cross-validation. We extracted brain states characterized by spatio-spectral topographies from time-resolved EEG spectral powers. The data driven approach allowed us to infer the dynamic, trial-by-trial, state sequences, and provided a comprehensive depiction of how various oscillation components interact recurrently throughout the trial. The properties of the states suggest their dissociable cognitive functions. For example, we identified three states with dominant activation in alpha bands but having distinct spatial distributions. People were differentially engaged in these states depending on the stages (e.g., onset or response) and outcomes of the trials (solved with insight or analysis). The current approach, applicable to many tasks requiring extended trial duration, can potentially reconcile findings from previous EEG studies and drive new hypotheses to further our understanding of the complex creative process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Creative problem solving involves search processes, and it is known to be hard to motivate. Reward cues have been found to enhance performance across a range of tasks, even when cues are presented subliminally, without being consciously detected. It is uncertain whether motivational processes, such as reward, can influence problem solving. We tested the effect of supraliminal and subliminal reward on participant performance on problem solving that can be solved by deliberate analysis or by insight. Forty-one participants attempted to solve 100 compound remote associate problems. At the beginning of each problem, a potential reward cue (1 or 25 cents) was displayed, either subliminally (17 ms) or supraliminally (100 ms). Participants earned the displayed reward if they solved the problem correctly. Results showed that the higher subliminal reward increased the percentage of problems solved correctly overall. Second, we explored if subliminal rewards preferentially influenced solutions that were achieved via a sudden insight (mostly processed below awareness) or via a deliberate analysis. Participants solved more problems via insight following high subliminal reward when compared with low subliminal reward, and compared with high supraliminal reward, with no corresponding effect on analytic solving. Striatal dopamine (DA) is thought to influence motivation, reinforce behavior, and facilitate cognition. We speculate that subliminal rewards activate the striatal DA system, enhancing the kinds of automatic integrative processes that lead to more creative strategies for problem solving, without increasing the selectivity of attention, which could impede insight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chairs: Kara D. Federmeier & Seana Coulson Participants: Mark Jung Beeman, Kara D. Federmeier, Seana Coulson, Tamara Swaab [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provides information on the research of the right-hemisphere processing and storage of the brain.

Resting-state fMRI studies have revealed that individuals exhibit stable, functionally meaningful divergences in large-scale network organization. The locations with strongest deviations (called network "variants") have a characteristic spatial distribution, with qualitative evidence from prior reports suggesting that this distribution differs across hemispheres. Hemispheric asymmetries can inform us on constraints guiding the development of these idiosyncratic regions. Here, we used data from the Human Connectome Project to systematically investigate hemispheric differences in network variants. Variants were significantly larger in the right hemisphere, particularly along the frontal operculum and medial frontal cortex. Variants in the left hemisphere appeared most commonly around the TPJ. We investigated how variant asymmetries vary by functional network and how they compare with typical network distributions. For some networks, variants seemingly increase group-average network asymmetries (e.g., the group-average language network is slightly bigger in the left hemisphere and variants also appeared more frequently in that hemisphere). For other networks, variants counter the group-average network asymmetries (e.g., the default mode network is slightly bigger in the left hemisphere, but variants were more frequent in the right hemisphere). Intriguingly, left- and right-handers differed in their network variant asymmetries for the cingulo-opercular and frontoparietal networks, suggesting that variant asymmetries are connected to lateralized traits. These findings demonstrate that idiosyncratic aspects of brain organization differ systematically across the hemispheres. We discuss how these asymmetries in brain organization may inform us on developmental constraints of network variants and how they may relate to functions differentially linked to the two hemispheres. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Creativity has been putatively linked to distinct forms of attention, but which aspects of creativity and which components of attention remains unclear. Two experiments examined how divergent thinking and creative achievement relate to visual attention. In both experiments, participants identified target letters (S or H) within hierarchical stimuli (global letters made of local letters), after being cued to either the local or global level. In Experiment 1, participants identified the targets more quickly following valid cues (80 % of trials) than following invalid cues. However, this smaller validity effect was associated with higher divergent thinking, suggesting that divergent thinking was related to quicker overcoming of invalid cues, and thus to flexible attention. Creative achievement was unrelated to the validity effect. Experiment 2 examined whether divergent thinking (or creative achievement) is related to 'leaky attention,' so that when cued to one level of a stimulus, some information is still processed, or leaks in, from the non-cued level. In this case, the cued stimulus level always contained a target, and the non-cued level was congruent, neutral, or incongruent with the target. Divergent thinking did not relate to stimulus congruency. In contrast, high creative achievement was related to quicker responses to the congruent than to the incongruent stimuli, suggesting that real-world creative achievement is indeed associated with leaky attention, whereas standard laboratory tests of divergent thinking are not. Together, these results elucidate distinct patterns of attention for different measures of creativity. Specifically, creative achievers may have leaky attention, as suggested by previous literature, whereas divergent thinkers have selective yet flexible attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dopaminergic (DA) system may be involved in creativity, however results of past studies are mixed. We attempted to clarify this putative relation by considering the mediofrontal and the nigrostriatal DA pathways, uniquely and in combination, and their contribution to two different measures of creativity–an abbreviated version of the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking, assessing divergent thinking, and a real-world creative achievement index. We found that creativity can be predicted from interactions between genetic polymorphisms related to frontal (COMT) and striatal (DAT) DA pathways. Importantly, the Torrance test and the real-world creative achievement index related to different genetic patterns, suggesting that these two measures tap into different aspects of creativity, and depend on distinct, but interacting, DA sub-systems. Specifically, we report that successful performance on the Torrance test is linked with dopaminergic polymorphisms associated with good cognitive flexibility and medium top-down control, or with weak cognitive flexibility and strong top-down control. The latter is particularly true for the originality factor of divergent thinking. High real-world creative achievement, on the other hand, as assessed by the Creative Achievement Questionnaire, is linked with dopaminergic polymorphisms associated with weak cognitive flexibility and weak top-down control. Taken altogether, our findings support the idea that human creativity relies on dopamine, and on the interaction between frontal and striatal dopaminergic pathways in particular. This interaction may help clarify some apparent inconsistencies in the prior literature, especially if the genes and/or creativity measures were analyzed separately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spatial attention can operate like a spotlight whose scope can vary depending on task demands. Emotional states contribute to the spatial extent of attentional selection, with the spotlight focused more narrowly during anxious moods and more broadly during happy moods. In addition to visual space, attention can also operate over features, and we show here that mood states may also influence attentional scope infeaturespace. After anxious or happy mood inductions, participants focused their attention to identify a central target while ignoring flanking items. Flankers were sometimes coloured differently than targets, so focusing attention on target colour should lead to relatively less interference. Compared to happy and neutral moods, when anxious, participants showed reduced interference when colour isolated targets from flankers, but showed more interference when flankers and targets were the same colour. This pattern reveals that the anxious mood caused these individuals to attend to the irrelevant feature in both cases, regardless of its benefit or detriment. In contrast, participants showed no effect of colour on interference when happy, suggesting that positive mood did not influence attention in feature space. These mood effects on feature-based attention provide a theoretical bridge between previous findings concerning spatial and conceptual attention. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: The neural mechanisms underlying the process of understanding novel and conventional metaphoric expressions remain unclear largely because the specific brain regions that support the formation of novel semantic relations are still unknown. A well established way to study distinct cognitive processes specifically associated with an event of interest is to repeatedly present the same stimulus. The aim of the current study is to examine the neural signatures associated with forming new metaphoric concepts by repeatedly presenting novel as well as conventional metaphors. In an fMRI study, 11 subjects read novel and conventional two-word metaphoric expressions and decided whether the expressions were meaningful. Prior to the study, participants were presented with half of the conventional metaphors and half of the novel metaphoric expressions. The present results revealed that whereas repeated exposure to conventional metaphors elicited repetition suppression within the left supramarginal gyrus, no brain areas showed repetition suppression effects during the repeated exposure of novel metaphors. However, repetition enhancement effects for novel metaphors were found in several brain areas including the bilateral inferior parietal gyri. These findings suggest that the left and right supramarginal gyri are both involved in the conceptualization and the storage of novel semantic relations. This study is important to develop theoretical accounts of the formation of conceptual knowledge for both familiar and novel information. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Psychological theories have suggested that creativity involves a twofold process characterized by a generative component facilitating the production of novel ideas and an evaluative component enabling the assessment of their usefulness. The present study employed a novel fMRI paradigm designed to distinguish between these two components at the neural level. Participants designed book cover illustrations while alternating between the generation and evaluation of ideas. The use of an fMRI-compatible drawing tablet allowed for a more natural drawing and creative environment. Creative generation was associated with preferential recruitment of medial temporal lobe regions, while creative evaluation was associated with joint recruitment of executive and default network regions and activation of the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, insula, and temporopolar cortex. Executive and default regions showed positive functional connectivity throughout task performance. These findings suggest that the medial temporal lobe may be central to the generation of novel ideas and creative evaluation may extend beyond deliberate analytical processes supported by executive brain regions to include more spontaneous affective and visceroceptive evaluative processes supported by default and limbic regions. Thus, creative thinking appears to recruit a unique configuration of neural processes not typically used together during traditional problem solving tasks. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Although it has been consistently shown that readers generate bridging inferences during story comprehension, little is currently known about the neural substrates involved when people generate inferences and how these substrates shift with factors that facilitate or impede inferences, such as whether inferences are highly predictable or unpredictable. In the current study, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) signal increased for highly predictable inferences (relative to events that were previously explicitly stated) bilaterally in both the superior temporal gyri and the inferior frontal gyri. Interestingly, high working memory capacity comprehenders, who are most likely to generate inferences during story comprehension, showed greater signal increases than did low working memory capacity comprehenders in the right superior temporal gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus. When comprehenders needed to draw unpredictable inferences in a story, fMRI signal increased relative to explicitly stated events in the left inferior gyrus and in the middle frontal gyrus, irrespective of working memory capacity. These results suggest that the predictability of a text (i.e., the causal constraint) and the working memory capacity of the comprehender influence the different neural substrates involved during the generation of bridging inferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many people have claimed that sleep has helped them solve a difficult problem, but empirical support for this assertion remains tentative. The current experiment tested whether manipulating information processing during sleep impacts problem incubation and solving. In memory studies, delivering learning-associated sound cues during sleep can reactivate memories. We therefore predicted that reactivating previously unsolved problems could help people solve them. In the evening, we presented 57 participants with puzzles, each arbitrarily associated with a different sound. While participants slept overnight, half of the sounds associated with the puzzles they had not solved were surreptitiously presented. The next morning, participants solved 31.7% of cued puzzles, compared with 20.5% of uncued puzzles (a 55% improvement). Moreover, cued-puzzle solving correlated with cued-puzzle memory. Overall, these results demonstrate that cuing puzzle information during sleep can facilitate solving, thus supporting sleep's role in problem incubation and establishing a new technique to advance understanding of problem solving and sleep cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How accurate are insights compared to analytical solutions? In four experiments, we investigated how participants' solving strategies influenced their solution accuracies across different types of problems, including one that was linguistic, one that was visual and two that were mixed visual-linguistic. In each experiment, participants' self-judged insight solutions were, on average, more accurate than their analytic ones. We hypothesised that insight solutions have superior accuracy because they emerge into consciousness in an all-or-nothing fashion when the unconscious solving process is complete, whereas analytic solutions can be guesses based on conscious, prematurely terminated, processing. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that participants' analytic solutions included relatively more incorrect responses (i.e., errors of commission) than timeouts (i.e., errors of omission) compared to their insight responses. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

When people try to solve a problem, they go through distinct steps (encoding, ideation, evaluation, etc.) recurrently and spontaneously. To disentangle different cognitive processes that unfold throughout a trial, we applied an unsupervised machine learning method to electroencephalogram (EEG) data continuously recorded while 39 participants attempted 153 Compound Remote Associates problems (CRA). CRA problems are verbal puzzles that can be solved in either insight-leaning or analysis-leaning manner. We fitted a Hidden Markov Model to the time-frequency transformed EEG signals and decoded each trial as a time-resolved state sequence. The model characterizes hidden brain states with spectrally resolved power topography. Seven states were identified with distinct activation patterns in the theta (4–7 Hz), alpha (8–9 Hz and 10–13 Hz), and gamma (25–50 Hz) bands. Notably, a state featuring widespread activation only in alpha-band frequency emerged, from this data-driven approach, which exhibited dynamic characteristics associated with specific temporal stages and outcomes (whether solved with insight or analysis) of the trials. The state dynamics derived from the model overlap and extend previous literature on the cognitive function of alpha oscillation: the " alpha-state " probability peaks before stimulus onset and decreases before response. In trials solved with insight, relative to solved with analysis, the alpha-state is more likely to be visited and maintained during preparation and solving periods, and its probability declines more sharply immediately preceding a response. This novel paradigm provides a way to extract dynamic features that characterize problem-solving stages and potentially provide a novel window into the nature of the underlying cognitive processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies showed that liberals and conservatives differ in cognitive style. Liberals are more flexible, and tolerant of complexity and novelty, whereas conservatives are more rigid, are more resistant to change, and prefer clear answers. We administered a set of compound remote associate problems, a task extensively used to differentiate problem-solving styles (via insight or analysis). Using this task, several researches have proven that self-reports, which differentiate between insight and analytic problem-solving, are reliable and are associated with two different neural circuits. In our research we found that participants self-identifying with distinct political orientations demonstrated differences in problem-solving strategy. Liberals solved significantly more problems via insight instead of in a step-by-step analytic fashion. Our findings extend previous observations that self-identified political orientations reflect differences in cognitive styles. More specifically, we show that type of political orientation is associated with problem-solving strategy. The data converge with previous neurobehavioural and cognitive studies indicating a link between cognitive style and the psychological mechanisms that mediate political beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rebus puzzles and compound remote associate problems have been successfully used to study problem solving. These problems are physically compact, often can be solved within short time limits, and have unambiguous solutions, and English versions have been normed for solving rates and levels of difficulty. Many studies on problem solving with sudden insight have taken advantage of these features in paradigms that require many quick solutions (e.g., solution priming, visual hemifield presentations, electroencephalography, fMRI, and eyetracking). In order to promote this vein of research in Italy, as well, we created and tested Italian versions of both of these tests. The data collected across three studies yielded a pool of 88 rebus puzzles and 122 compound remote associate problems within a moderate range of difficulty. This article provides both sets of problems with their normative data, for use in future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Creative ideas seem often to appear when we close our eyes, stare at a blank wall, or gaze out of a window-all signs of shutting out distractions and turning attention inward. Prior research has demonstrated that attention-related brain areas are differently active when people solve problems with sudden insight (the Aha! phenomenon), relative to deliberate, analytic solving. We directly investigated the relationship between attention deployment and problem solving by recording eye movements and blinks, which are overt indicators of attention, as people solved short, visually presented problems. In the preparation period, before problems eventually solved by insight, participants blinked more frequently and longer, and made fewer fixations, than before problems eventually solved by analysis. Immediately prior to solutions, participants blinked longer and looked away from the problem more often when solving by insight than when solving analytically. These phenomena extend prior research with a direct demonstration of dynamic differences in attention as people solve problems with sudden insight versus analytically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Creativity has previously been linked with atypical attention, but it is not clear what aspects of attention, or what types of creativity are associated. Here we investigated specific neural markers of a very early form of attention, namely sensory gating, indexed by the P50 ERP, and how it relates to two measures of creativity: divergent thinking and real-world creative achievement. Data from 84 participants revealed that divergent thinking (assessed with the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking) was associated with selective sensory gating, whereas real-world creative achievement was associated with “leaky” sensory gating, both in zero-order correlations and when controlling for academic test scores in a regression. Thus both creativity measures related to sensory gating, but in opposite directions. Additionally, divergent thinking and real-world creative achievement did not interact in predicting P50 sensory gating, suggesting that these two creativity measures orthogonally relate to P50 sensory gating. Finally, the ERP effect was specific to the P50 – neither divergent thinking nor creative achievement were related to later components, such as the N100 and P200. Overall results suggest that leaky sensory gating may help people integrate ideas that are outside of focus of attention, leading to creativity in the real world; whereas divergent thinking, measured by divergent thinking tests which emphasize numerous responses within a limited time, may require selective sensory processing more than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study investigated the limits of semantic processing without awareness, during continuous flash suppression (CFS). We used compound remote associate word problems, in which three seemingly unrelated words (e.g., pine, crab, sauce) form a common compound with a single solution word (e.g., apple). During the first 3 s of each trial, the three problem words or three irrelevant words (control condition) were suppressed from awareness, using CFS. The words then became visible, and participants attempted to solve the word problem. Once the participants solved the problem, they indicated whether they had solved it by insight or analytically. Overall, the compound remote associate word problems were solved significantly faster after the problem words, as compared with irrelevant words, were presented during the suppression period. However this facilitation occurred only when people solved with analysis, not with insight. These results demonstrate that semantic processing, but not necessarily semantic integration, may occur without awareness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this study we examined asymmetric semantic activation patterns as people listened to conversations and narratives that promoted causal inferences. Based on the hypothesis that understanding the unique features of conversational input may benefit from or require a modified pattern of conceptual activation during conversation, we compared semantic priming in both hemispheres for inferences embedded in conversations and in narratives. Participants named inference-related target words or unrelated words presented to the left visual field-right hemisphere (lvf-RH) or to the right visual field-left hemisphere (rvf-LH) at critical coherence points that required an inference in order to correctly understand an utterance in the context of the conversation or narrative. Fifty-seven undergraduates listened to 36 conversations or narratives and were tested at 100 target inference points. During narrative comprehension, inference-related priming was reliable and equally strong in both hemispheres. In contrast, during conversation comprehension, inference-related priming was only reliable for target words presented to lvf-RH. This work demonstrates that priming for inference-related concepts can be measured with input in conversational form and suggests the language processing style of the RH is advantageous for comprehending conversation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Behavioral and neuroimaging findings indicate that distinct cognitive and neural processes underlie solving problems with sudden insight. Moreover, people with less focused attention sometimes perform better on tests of insight and creative problem solving. However, it remains unclear whether different states of attention, within individuals, influence the likelihood of solving problems with insight or with analysis. In this experiment, participants (N = 40) performed a baseline block of verbal problems, then performed one of two visual tasks, each emphasizing a distinct aspect of visual attention, followed by a second block of verbal problems to assess change in performance. After participants engaged in a center-focused flanker task requiring relatively focused visual attention, they reported solving more verbal problems with analytic processing. In contrast, after participants engaged in a rapid object identification task requiring attention to broad space and weak associations, they reported solving more verbal problems with insight. These results suggest that general attention mechanisms influence both visual attention task performance and verbal problem solving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown that people solve insight or creative problems better when in a positive mood (assessed or induced), although the precise mechanisms and neural substrates of this facilitation remain unclear. We assessed mood and personality variables in 79 participants before they attempted to solve problems that can be solved by either an insight or an analytic strategy. Participants higher in positive mood solved more problems, and specifically more with insight, compared with participants lower in positive-mood. fMRI was performed on 27 of the participants while they solved problems. Positive mood (and to a lesser extent and in the opposite direction, anxiety) was associated with changes in brain activity during a preparatory interval preceding each solved problem; modulation of preparatory activity in several areas biased people to solve either with insight or analytically. Analyses examined whether (a) positive mood modulated activity in brain areas showing responsivity during preparation; (b) positive mood modulated activity in areas showing stronger activity for insight than noninsight trials either during preparation or solution; and (c) insight effects occurred in areas that showed mood-related effects during preparation. Across three analyses, the ACC showed sensitivity to both mood and insight, demonstrating that positive mood alters preparatory activity in ACC, biasing participants to engage in processing conducive to insight solving. This result suggests that positive mood enhances insight, at least in part, by modulating attention and cognitive control mechanisms via ACC, perhaps enhancing sensitivity to detect non-prepotent solution candidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: People can solve problems in more than one way. Two general strategies involve (A) methodical, conscious, search of problem-state transformations, and (B) sudden insight, with abrupt emergence of the solution into consciousness. This study elucidated the influence of initial resting brain-state on subjects’ subsequent strategy choices. High-density electroencephalograms (EEGs) were recorded from subjects at rest who were subsequently directed to solve a series of anagrams. Subjects were divided into two groups based on the proportion of anagram solutions derived with self-reported insight versus search. Reaction time and accuracy results were consistent with different cognitive problem-solving strategies used for solving anagrams with versus without insight. Spectral analyses yielded group differences in resting-state EEG supporting hypotheses concerning insight-related attentional diffusion and right-lateralized hemispheric asymmetry. These results reveal a relationship between resting-state brain activity and problem-solving strategy, and, more generally, a dependence of event-related neural computations on the preceding resting state. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Insight occurs when problem solutions arise suddenly and seem obviously correct, and is associated with an “Aha!” experience. Prior theorizing concerning preparation that facilitates insight focused on solvers' problem-specific knowledge. We hypothesized that a distinct type of mental preparation, manifested in a distinct brain state, would facilitate insight problem solving independently of problem-specific knowledge. Consistent with this hypothesis, neural activity during a preparatory interval before subjects saw verbal problems predicted which problems they would subsequently solve with, versus without, self-reported insight. Specifically, electroencephalographic topography and frequency (Experiment 1) and functional magnetic resonance imaging signal (Experiment 2) both suggest that mental preparation leading to insight involves heightened activity in medial frontal areas associated with cognitive control and in temporal areas associated with semantic processing. The results for electroencephalographic topography suggest that noninsight preparation, in contrast, involves increased occipital activity consistent with an increase in externally directed visual attention. Thus, general preparatory mechanisms modulate problem-solving strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, participants listened to and comprehended short stories implying or explicitly stating inference events. The aim of this study was to examine the neural mechanisms that underlie inference generation, a process essential to successful comprehension. We observed distinct patterns of increased fMRI signal for implied over explicit events at two critical points during the stories: (1) within the right superior temporal gyrus when a verb in the text implied the inference; and (2) within the left superior temporal gyrus at the coherence break or when participants need to generate an inference to understand the story. To find the most compelling evidence of neural activity during inference generation, we examined fMRI signal at these two critical points separately for people with high working memory capacity (i.e., those individuals who are most likely to draw inferences during text comprehension). Interestingly, high working memory individuals showed greater fMRI signal for implied than explicit events in the left inferior frontal gyrus at the coherence break compared to low working memory individuals. This present study provides evidence that areas within the superior temporal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus are heavily recruited when individuals generate inferences, even during ongoing comprehension that demands many cognitive processes. In addition, the data suggest that the right hemisphere superior temporal gyrus is particularly involved during early inferential processing, whereas the left hemisphere superior temporal gyrus is particularly involved during later inferential processing in story comprehension. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

According to the Gestalt theorists, restructuring is an essential component of insight problem-solving, contributes to the "Aha!" experience, and is similar to the perceptual switch experienced when reinterpreting ambiguous figures. Previous research has demonstrated that pupil diameter increases during the perceptual switch of ambiguous figures, and indexes norepeinephrine functioning mediated by the locus coeruleus. In this study, we investigated if pupil diameter similarly predicts the switch into awareness people experience when solving a problem via insight. Additionally, we explored eye movement dynamics during the same task to investigate if the problem-solving strategies used are linked to specific oculomotor behaviors. In 38 participants, pupil diameter increased about 500 msec prior to solution only in trials for which subjects report having an insight. In contrast, participants increased their microsaccade rate only prior to non-insight solutions. Pupil dilation and microsaccades were not reliably related, but both appear to be robust markers of how people solve problems (with or without insight). The pupil size change seen when people have an "Aha!" moment represents an indicator of the switch into awareness of unconscious processes humans depend upon for insight, and suggests important involvement of norepinephrine, via the locus coeruleus, in sudden insight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study used functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) to examine the role of focused attention in divergent thinking and real-life creativity. Participants completed a Navon task, on which the stimuli consisted of a large letter made up of the smaller version of the same (congruent), or a different (incongruent) letter. Participants were cued to identify a letter at either the local or at the global level. A smaller congruency effect - how much faster people responded on the congruent than on the incongruent trials - was an index of focused attention. Overall, larger behavioral congruency effect was accompanied with increased activation in the anterior superior temporal gyrus (aSTG), and with increased activation in the left precuneus. Individual differences in divergent thinking, however, were associated with smaller behavioral congruency effect, as well as with smaller right aSTG increase on the incongruent versus congruent targets, suggesting that people with better performance on the divergent thinking tests have more focused attention. Real-world creativity was not associated with the congruency effect, or with any of the regions implicated in the congruency effect. Implications and directions for future research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]