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In this paper, we investigate through microsimulation the link between (1) increases in cohabiting first births; (2) shifting differentials in separation rates for parents who are cohabiting versus married at first birth; and (3) cohort change in overall rates of parental separation. Analyses are based on representative surveys in Italy, Great Britain and Scandinavia (represented by Norway and Sweden). We use the hypothetical populations to decompose changes in parental separation across maternal birth cohorts (1940s to 1950s, 1950s to 1960s, 1960s to 1970s), identifying how much of the change can be attributed to shifts in union status at first birth and how much to change in separation rates for each union type. When cohabiting births were uncommon, increases in parental separation were driven by increases in parental divorce. When cohabiting parenthood became more visible, it also became a larger component, but continued increases in parental divorce also contributed to increasing parental separation rates. When cohabiting births became quite common, the higher separation rates of cohabiting couples begin to play a greater role than marital divorce. When most couples had their first birth in cohabitation, those having children in marriage were increasingly selected from the most stable relationships and their decreasing divorce rates offset the fact that increasing proportions of children were born in somewhat less stable cohabiting unions.

Family dynamics are changing in Europe, but only few studies investigate how cohort completed fertility is affected by partnership behaviours and how this has changed over time. We use microsimulation techniques to investigate the effect of the increasing prevalence of union dissolution on completed fertility levels in Italy and Great Britain, two countries with very different systems of value. We find that the net effect of union instability is to decrease fertility (by about 0.5 children for Italian and 0.2 to 0.4 children for British cohorts) but the magnitude of the difference depends on the timing of union formation and separation. As expected, re-partnering produces more children in new partnerships if the separation occurs earlier. Nonetheless, it is only if separation takes place after the second birth and if all women re-partner that additional childbearing would almost compensate for births lost due to union disruption.

Les niveaux de fécondité des parents et des enfants sont liés mais la force de cette relation intergénérationnelle a rarement été étudiée sur le long terme. Cet article vise à analyser si, et de quelle manière, la fécondité des femmes et des hommes est liée à la fécondité de leur parents au cours du siècle. Utilisant une enquête de grande ampleur liée au recensement (Famille et Logements 2011), nos méthodes d estimation (Poisson et modèle de comptage) tiennent compte de la nature discrète des variables de fécondité, leurs relations non linéaires et le rôle des autres facteurs. Les résultats montrent une corrélation faible mais significative et positive de l ordre de 0,12 à 0,15 toujours plus forte pour les femmes que les hommes, proche des niveaux observés ailleurs. Le nombre de frères et soeurs a un pouvoir explicatif de plus en plus faible au fil des générations, soutenant l idée que la famille a perdu de son influence implicite et explicite sur les choix de fécondité. Avec la diffusion de la famille de deux enfants, les tailles de familles extrêmes (nombreuses et petites) se démarquent et sont plus reproduites. Toutefois, alors que le niveau de fécondité plus élevé des enfants de familles nombreuses est largement expliqué par des facteurs socio-économiques, un mimétisme de fécondité entre parents et enfants prévaut dans les familles de petite taille, résultat qui peut en partie expliquer pourquoi, dans certains pays européens, les niveaux de fécondité restent faibles.

The underlying reality of fertility intentions, expectations and preferences tends to be taken for granted. This is a natural consequence of the assumption, implicit or explicit in most demographic research, that fertility behaviour is governed by rational choice. We question the reality of fertility intentions, expectations, and preferences, and propose instead that they are by and large constructed. Drawing on behavioural economics, psychology, and political science, we develop an outline theory of fertility intentions and preferences that contrasts with the classical rational choice model assumed in most work in this area.We show that there is a relatively high frequency of uncertain responses to questions on fertility intentions and expectations and argue that the uncertainty expressed is genuine. It was largely in response to this finding that our theoretical approach was developed. The presence of uncertain answers to preference and intentions questions is acknowledged in most demographic surveys but their frequency and theoretical and empirical significance has been largely neglected.Preferred family size may, we suggest, be a discovery rather than a goal. Demographic thinking about fertility decisions could be enriched by adopting the idea of constructed preferences from behavioural economics and psychology, together with ideas and debates in political science regarding survey response. The construction of fertility preferences and intentions can account for some hitherto unexplained anomalies in survey findings on fertility intentions and expectations. Preference construction theory provides a novel perspective on fertility intentions and preferences and on family building behaviour, and merits serious empirical investigation in this contex

How does women’s education influence whether they have children or not, how old they are when they have their first child and how many children they go on to have? How has this changed over time for mothers born between 1940 and 1969? This research finds that educational differences in childbearing have increased over time.