Search

This article extends the current literature on European far left parties by investigating the socio-demographic, ideological and attitudinal profile of the French far left voter in the 2012 Presidential Elections. Particular emphasis is placed on the impact of the economic crisis on the sudden electoral rise of the French far left and factors such as economic hardship, change of economic conditions, attitudes toward economic inequality and Euroscepticism. Results suggest that explanations based purely on economic factors fall short of explaining the totality of the French far left vote, especially if compared with the other parties of the French far left. Instead, attitudes toward Europe and post-materialism are central in the understanding of the renaissance of the French far left. Based on these findings we reach a number of conclusions regarding the future of far left parties in France and Europe.

Examining Board: Pr Mark N. Franklin, European University Institute (EUI Supervisor), Dr. Bruno Cautrès, CNRS – Cevipof Sciences Po Paris (External Supervisor), Pr. Stefano Bartolini, European University Institute, Pr. Russell J. Dalton, University of California at Irvine. Defence date: 25 July 2012 PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses European integration challenges the social boundaries of nation states and this phenomenon is not without consequences for individual attitudes. Within public debate, the impact of European integration on the welfare states has been extensively discussed, but we still lack conclusive analysis of the consequences for individual support for Europe. This thesis is an attempt to complement our knowledge on the logics of support for European integration. It investigates how individuals account for the economic and social consequences of integration and documents the logic underlying one the most salient issues in the present debate on Europe: redistribution. It investigates the individual and structural effects of redistribution on attitudes towards Europe, with a particular emphasis on how these effects develop across time and across different national contexts. Specifically, this study determines under what conditions European integration is perceived by citizens as a threat to national welfare regimes, and what are the consequences in terms of political allegiance. The causal mechanism is tested at three levels and over three different periods: at the European level (public opinion in Europe Twelve) and from 1986 to 2010, at the national level (public opinion in the Member states of Europe Fifteen), from 1996 to 2006, at the individual level, in 2009, in the twenty seven Member states of the European Union. Findings show that social protection has both structural and individual level effects on support for Europe, providing a narrative for changes in the level of support for Europe over time and explaining a large share of between-country differences, at the aggregate level. At the individual level, both welfare regimes and welfare issues have a strong impact on support for Europe. When it comes to social protection, the European Union works like a distant, yet strong, threat for individuals.

Recent scholarly work has underlined the importance of being cautious about the notion of Euro-skepticism by putting stress on alternative concepts and measures. This theoretical and empirical contribution has enriched the debate on support for Europe and its potential multidimensionality. However, the fit between theoretical conceptualization and measured attitudes is still under-investigated. Do European citizens actually express different types of support? To what extent are these attitudes structured as we think? This paper investigates the different dimensions that individuals associate with “support for Europe†and whether it varies across national context. We test the empirical validity of three conceptualizations of support for Europe: (a) diffuse versus specific support, (b) identity versus diffuse support, (c) static versus dynamic perception of the European Union. To investigate these patterns, we relied on survey data from Eurobarometer. Methodologically, we use item-response theory modelling. This paper demonstrates that attitudes towards Europe are structured but in a less fine-grained manner than hypothesized in the literature. The distinction between diffuse and specific support is robust at the European scale as well as within each national context. Consequently, we provide an empirical tool to comparatively measure support in all member states. However it is not the case for the other dimensions of support, especially identity, and we advocate caution in using this variable as an explanatory variable.

Recent scholarly work has underlined the importance of being cautious about the notion of Euro-skepticism by putting stress on alternative concepts and measures. This theoretical and empirical contribution has enriched the debate on support for Europe and its potential multidimensionality. However, the fit between theoretical conceptualization and measured attitudes is still under-investigated. Do European citizens actually express different types of support? To what extent are these attitudes structured as we think? This paper investigates the different dimensions that individuals associate with 'support for Europe' and whether it varies across national context. We test the empirical validity of three conceptualizations of support for Europe : (a) diffuse versus specific support, (b) identity versus diffuse support, (c) static versus dynamic perception of the European Union. To investigate these patterns, we relied on survey data from Eurobarometer. Methodologically, we use item-response theory modelling. This paper demonstrates that attitudes towards Europe are structured but in a less fine-grained manner than hypothesized in the literature. The distinction between diffuse and specific support is robust at the European scale as well as within each national context. Consequently, we provide an empirical tool to comparatively measure support in all member states. However it is not the case for the other dimensions of support, especially identity, and we advocate caution in using this variable as an explanatory variable.

Le présent mémoire s’interroge sur les méthodes et résultats des politiques d’appuis à la société civile menées par l’Union européenne au Mali. On y analyse les conséquences positives et négatives sur la société civile malienne et sur l’Union européenne. On remarque que les aides au développement permettent aux organisations de la société civile de développer leur communauté, de progressivement s’organiser et de mobiliser la population. Mais les mécanismes de ces mêmes aides les rendent dépendantes des bailleurs de fonds et les déresponsabilisent progressivement. Du côté de l’Union européenne, ces appuis font d’elle un acteur essentiel au cœur de la politique malienne. Le Mali constitue un terrain de créativité pour les institutions européennes qui développent des outils pour augmenter la collaboration entre les États membres et l’UE. Néanmoins, le système bureaucratique lourd rend difficile l’adaptation au terrain pour l’Union et en fait un acteur plus ou moins contestés dans la région., This paper examines the methods and results of the European Union's civil society support policies in Mali. It analyzes the positive and negative consequences on Malian civil society and on the European Union. It is noted that development aid allows civil society to develop their community and to gradually organize themselves. But the mechanisms of this aid make them dependent on donors and progressively disempower them. For the European Union, this support makes it an essential actor at the heart of Malian politics. Mali is a creative field for the European institutions, which are developing tools to increase collaboration between the member states and the EU. Nevertheless, the cumbersome bureaucratic system makes it difficult for the Union to adapt to the terrain and makes it a more or less contested actor in the region.

Le contrôle des parlements nationaux envers les affaires européennes a récemment reçu beaucoup d’attention autant des institutions de l’Union européenne (UE) que des auteurs participant à la littérature sur le déficit démocratique. Pour autant, si plusieurs travaux ont démontré comment ce contrôle pouvait contribuer à améliorer la médiatisation des enjeux européens ou encore la transposition des directives, son rôle sur les attitudes des citoyens tient souvent du postulat et n’a jusqu’à présent fait l’objet d’aucune recherche. En mobilisant les données issues du projet Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL) récoltées entre 2010 et 2012, cette étude adopte une méthodologie quantitative avec pour ambition de mesurer l’influence que le contrôle parlementaire des affaires européennes pourrait avoir dans la formation des attitudes envers l’UE. Étant donné que les attitudes envers le niveau national et européen sont étroitement reliées, nous avons en premier lieu démontré que le contrôle parlementaire participait à renforcer la confiance envers le parlement national. En ce qui concerne le niveau européen, nos résultats indiquent que le contrôle parlementaire semble avoir un effet antagoniste sur la confiance envers l’UE avec d’une part la capacité institutionnelle des parlements ayant un effet positif, et d’autre part l’activité parlementaire ayant un effet négatif. Cette recherche, bien qu’exploratoire et donc perfectible, pose ainsi les bases d’une meilleure compréhension du rôle que pourraient jouer les parlements nationaux dans la formation des attitudes envers l’UE., The oversight of national parliaments over European affairs has recently received a great deal of attention, both from institutions of the European Union (EU) and from authors contributing to the literature on the democratic deficit. However, while several studies have shown how this control could contribute positively to the media coverage of European issues or to the transposition of directives, its role on citizens' attitudes is often postulated and has so far not been demonstrated. By mobilizing data from the Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL) project collected between 2010 and 2012, this study adopts a quantitative methodology with the ambition of measuring the influence that parliamentary oversight over European affairs could have in shaping attitudes towards the EU. Since attitudes towards the national and European level are closely linked, I first demonstrated that parliamentary oversight helps to build confidence in the national parliament. Regarding the European level, the results indicate that parliamentary control seems to have an antagonistic effect on trust in the EU; on the one hand, the institutional capacity of parliaments have a positive effect, and on the other hand, the parliamentary activity has a negative effect. This research, although exploratory and therefore preliminary, thus lays the foundations for a better understanding of the role that national parliaments could potentially play in shaping attitudes towards the EU.

Quarante pour-cent des Européens refusent d’avoir des Roms comme voisins, alors que 80 % de ceux-ci n’entretiennent pas de contact direct avec eux. Cette étude observe les mécanismes de construction des attitudes envers les Roms. Elle analyse la production de ces attitudes au sein de deux milieux similaires, mais où les politiques d’intégration locales envers les Roms divergent, résultant en des conditions des contacts intergroupes différentes. Cette analyse part des postulats théoriques selon lesquels l’intégration des migrants est un enjeu d’action publique locale et que des interactions sociales de qualité structurent les attitudes des uns par rapport aux autres. À partir d’entrevues semi-dirigées réalisées dans les communes françaises de La Courneuve et d’Ivry-sur-Seine, quatre théories sont testées : la théorie du contact, l’effet halo, l’effet des politiques municipales et l’influence des médias. Il en ressort que la mise en oeuvre de politiques municipales en faveur de l’intégration des Roms permet d’améliorer leurs conditions de vie et ainsi de déconstruire des préjugés imputables à leur situation de précarité. Par ailleurs, l’analyse illustre la manière dont les médias activent, entretiennent ou consolident la façon de percevoir les Roms., Data show that 40% of Europeans refuse to have Roma as their neighbours, while 80% of them do not even have direct contact with them. Based on these observations, this study analyzes how attitudes toward Roma are constructed. It proposes to investigate this mechanism in two similar environments, but where local integration policies toward Roma diverge, resulting in dissimilar conditions of intergroup contact. The analysis is premised on two theoretical assumptions: that the integration of migrants is a local public policy issue; and that intergroup contact organizes attitudes between majority and minority cultures. Thus, from semi-structured interviews in the French municipalities of La Courneuve and Ivry-sur-Seine, four theories are empirically tested: the contact theory, the halo effect, the impact of local immigrants integration policies, and media influence. This study demonstrates that the implementation of municipal policies in favour of Roma integration can improve their living conditions and thus deconstruct prejudices attributable to their precarious situation. In addition, it illustrates how the media activate, maintain, or strengthen the way Roma are perceived.

Lors des dernières élections européennes de 2014, un nombre considérable de sièges au Parlement européen (PE) a été obtenu par des partis eurosceptiques, ces partis traduisant une position très critique face à l’Union européenne (UE). Pourtant, parmi les électeur·rice·s de ces formations politiques, plusieurs citoyen·ne·s considèrent l’appartenance de leur pays à l’UE comme une bonne chose. Conséquemment, cette étude propose d’analyser les motivations sous-jacentes au vote des europhiles pour des partis eurosceptiques. À l’aide de données rendues disponibles dans l’Étude électorale européenne de 2014, trois hypothèses basées sur les concepts des soutiens diffus et spécifique, du vote sur enjeux et de la saillance, ainsi que du vote d’opposition, sont testées au moyen de régressions logistiques. Les résultats issus de l’analyse quantitative sont ensuite approfondis grâce à une dizaine d’entretiens réalisés en avril et mai 2019 avec des électeur·rice·s de la France insoumise., After the 2014 European elections, a significant number of seats in the European Parliament (EP) were gained by Eurosceptic parties, those parties showcasing a position that is strongly opposed to the European Union (EU). Interestingly, among their voters can be found several citizens who believe their country’s membership of the EU to be a good thing. Hence, this research proposes to analyse the Europhiles’ underlying motivations to vote for a Eurosceptic party. With data made available by the European Election Study – Voter study of 2014, three hypotheses based on the concepts of diffuse and specific support, issue voting, opposition voting, and salience are tested with logistic regressions. The results from the quantitative analysis are then taken further with the help of data from interviews conducted in April and May 2019 with voters of la France insoumise.