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This editorial provides a brief summary of the results of our research project entitled “Trade, Growth and Economic Inequality in the Asia-Pacific Region”, which explores and documents the linkages between international trade and inequality in the Asia-Pacific Region. The project’s eleven research papers find some evidence that trade or FDI contribute to inequality, some evidence that it reduces inequality and some evidence of no causal relationship. These seemingly conflicting results are not at all surprising given the complex relationships involved and the different countries, time periods, and means of measuring inequality, trade and FDI our authors adopted.

In this paper, we examine trade policy determinants and trade reform in a developing country setting by using a political economy of trade policy model where the government determines tariffs by balancing the political support from the producers against consumers and places a higher political weight on producers' welfare relative to average citizens. We then expand it in several directions to guide our subsequent estimations at the three-digit industry level for Colombia between 1983 and 1998. We account for import substitution motives for protection and the government's move away from these policies leads to unilateral trade liberalization. We innovatively allow the political weights to vary based on key industry variables beyond a common denominator. The sectors with higher employment, labor cost, and preferential trade agreement (PTA) import shares receive a larger political weight compared to otherwise similar sectors. The novelty of our approach is estimating the effect of sectoral characteristics on protection filtered through the political weights. We obtain more realistic estimates for these weights and provide some evidence for a slowing down effect of PTAs for trade liberalization.

The conference was held on Dec 14-15, 2015 co-organized by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and East-West Center (EWC) in Honolulu. Participants from China, Japan, Korea and the United States discussed the economic future of the major North Pacific countries and the importance of economic cooperation among them. Major topics in each session were (1) Trade (2) Macroeconomic Perspectives and (3) Finance. The first topic, "Trade", related to the China'a trade strategy, China's Belt-Road Initiative, Korea's Eurasia Initiative, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). The second topic, "Macroeconomic Perspectives", aimed to tackle global or regional economic problems through the understanding of the macreconomic policies of the emerging market economies, uncertainty in the economic conditions of the United States, China's New Economic Norms, and the struggle of the East Asian International Order. The third topic, "Finance", aimed to provide an analytical perspective over currency convertibility, unconventional monetary policies, and prospect of cooperation between Belt-Road Initiative and TPP in the global economic governance. The conference concluded with the major findings and policy implications from the earlier sessions, particularily, monetary policy response in emerging economies and the importance of strengthing the North Pacific cooperation were discussed.

South Korea has experienced a great U-turn in its inequality trends during the past few decades. In this paper, we explore the role of international trade in its wage inequality dynamics over the 1998–2012 period, using a unique household panel survey. Our analysis reveals that most of the overall wage inequality occurs within sectors and educational groups rather than between them. However, the share in total inequality of the “between” variation across sectors and educational groups has moderately increased over time. Furthermore, we document that almost the entire aggregate wage inequality in both manufacturing and services occurs within different trade-exposure categories rather than between them, and this pattern is persistent through time. These results suggest that international trade might not be the main driving force behind the rising wage dispersion in South Korea in the last two decades.

There has been an explosion in the number of preferential trade agreements in the past decade. Preferential trade agreements are characterized by liberalization with respect to only a few partners and thus they can potentially clash with and retard multilateral trade liberalization. Despite this important concern with preferential trade agreements, there is almost no systematic evidence on whether they actually affect multilateral trade liberalization. The authors model the effect of preferential trade agreements on multilateral trade liberalization and show that preferential trade agreements slow down multilateral trade liberalization unless they have a common external tariff and allow for internal transfers. Next, they use detailed data on product-level tariffs negotiated by the European Union in the past two multilateral trade rounds to structurally estimate their model. The authors confirm the main prediction-the European Union's preferential trade agreements have clashed with its multilateral trade liberalization--and find that the effect is quantitatively significant. Moreover, they also confirm several auxiliary predictions of the model and provide new evidence on the political economy determinants of multilateral liberalization in the European Union.

Two of the most important trade policy developments to take place since the 1980s are the expansion of preferential trade agreements and temporary trade barriers, such as antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing duties. Despite the empirical importance of preferential trade agreements and temporary trade barriers and the common feature that each can independently have quite discriminatory elements, relatively little is known about the nature of any relationships between them. This paper surveys the literature on some of the political-economic issues that can arise at the intersection of preferential trade agreements and temporary trade barriers and uses four case studies to illustrate variation in how countries apply the World Trade Organization's global safeguards policy instrument. The four examples include recent policies applied by a variety of types of countries and under different agreements: large and small countries, high-income and emerging economies, and free trade areas and customs unions. The analysis reveals important measurement and identification challenges for research that seeks to find evidence of systematic relationships between the formation of preferential trade agreements, the political-economic implications of their implementation, and the use of subsequent temporary trade barriers.

There has been a proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the last two decades. This paper analyzes the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on external tariffs in small economies where protection decisions are made politically. It extends the Grossman and Helpman (1995) model by determining tariff rates endogenously instead of assuming they are fixed during or after the formation of FTAs. We show that when an FTA is established, the tariff rates that apply to non-members essentially decline. More importantly, we investigate the interaction between endogenous tariff determination and the feasibility of an FTA. We find that the expectation of tariff reductions under endogenous tariffs could make an otherwise feasible FTA if tariffs were fixed become infeasible. However, if domestic import-competing sectors are relatively smaller and the government places a significant weight on political contributions relative to social welfare, an FTA with endogenous tariffs may be more likely to be feasible than an FTA assumed to fix external tariffs.

In this paper, I empirically examine trade policy determinants and trade reform in a developing country setting by using a political economy of trade policy model to guide my estimations for Colombia between 1983 and 1998. I introduce a novel approach to estimating the extra political weights placed by the government on the well-being of producers relative to average citizens. This is under the assumption that producers are organized in terms of trade policy while the public is not. I measure the impact of sectorial characteristics on tariffs indirectly through political weights as a novel alternative to nonstructurally estimating them as determinants of protection. Accordingly, I obtain more realistic estimates as compared to the earlier literature. I also show that it is important to control for the drastic unilateral trade reform shock that affects all sectors and I test the effect of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on tariffs in the presence of such trade liberalization. I find that protection is higher in sectors that are important exports for preferential partners which may be seen as a slowing down effect of PTAs for Colombia. The estimations account for endogeneity and omitted variable bias concerns.

Turkey has been an active user of antidumping since the 1990s and more recently added safeguards and countervailing duties to its temporary trade barriers (TTBs). Turkey is a founding member of the World Trade Organization and formed a customs union with the European Union (EU) in 1996. It has also signed numerous preferential trade agreements the EU has been involved in as part of its EU candidacy. The drastic intra and extra-group trade liberalization brought by the relations with the EU seems to be important determinants in the rise of Turkey’s contingent protection over the last decade. Moreover, apart from an increase in the number of initiations, the higher rate of initiations finding support and sluggishness in the removal of TTBs over time appear to have played a role in their build-up. Turkey has been significantly affected by the 2008-9 global economic crisis and at the same time kept increasing the use of TTBs. The increase as of 2009 was in line with the recent upward trend but the response to the crisis may come with a lag. In general, Turkey does not target established EU members with TTBs although there is no restriction. Turkey mainly targets developing countries, especially China, at rates disproportional to their import market share.

In this paper, I start out with a standard political economy of trade policy model to guide the subsequent estimation of the determinants of trade policy in a developing country. I carefully test the model with Colombian data from 1983 to 1998 accounting for endogeneity and omitted variable bias concerns and then expand it empirically in several directions. I show that it is important to control for the impact of a drastic trade reform shock that affects all sectors and disentangle its effect from preferential trade agreements (PTAs). I find that protection is higher in sectors that are important exports for preferential partners which may be seen as a stumbling block effect of PTAs for Colombia. I also relax the assumption of fixed political weights that measure the extra importance of producers' welfare relative to consumers in the government objective. I measure the impact of sectoral characteristics on tariffs indirectly through political weights as a novel alternative to nonstructurally estimating them as determinants of protection. Accordingly, I obtain more realistic estimates for the political weights further contributing to the literature.

Turkey has been an active user of antidumping since the 1990s and more recently added safeguards and countervailing duties to its temporary trade barriers (TTBs). Turkey is a founding member of the World Trade Organization and formed a customs union with the European Union (EU) in 1996. It has also signed numerous preferential trade agreements the EU has been involved in as part of its EU candidacy. The drastic intra and extra-group trade liberalisation brought by the relations with the EU seems to be important determinants in the rise of Turkey's contingent protection over the last decade. Moreover, apart from an increase in the number of initiations, the higher rate of initiations finding support and sluggishness in the removal of TTBs over time appear to have played a role in their build-up. Turkey has been significantly affected by the 2008-9 global economic crisis and at the same time kept increasing the use of TTBs. The increase as of 2009 was in line with the recent upward trend but the response to the crisis may come with a lag. In general, Turkey does not target established EU members with TTBs although there is no restriction. Turkey mainly targets developing countries, especially China, at rates disproportional to their import market share.

There has been a proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the last two decades. In this paper I analyze the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on external tariffs under a political economy setup. I extend the Grossman and Helpman (1995) model by determining tariff rates endogenously instead of assuming they are fixed during or after the formation of FTAs. I show that for an exogenously established FTA, the tariff rates that apply to non-members essentially decline once the FTA is formed. More importantly, I investigate the interaction between endogenous tariff determination and the feasibility of an FTA. I find that the expectation of tariff reductions under endogenous tariffs makes an otherwise feasible FTA under fixed tariffs become infeasible. However, if domestic import-competing sectors are relatively smaller, an FTA is more likely to be feasible as compared to fixed tariffs.

There is a growing literature that investigates the effect of trade liberalization on productivity. Nearly all such studies assume that trade policy is determined independently of productivity, hence it is exogenous. The author shows that this assumption is not valid in general, both theoretically and empirically, and that researchers may be underestimating the positive effect of liberalization on productivity when they do not account for the endogeneity bias. On the theory side, he demonstrates that under a standard political economy model of trade protection, productivity directly influences tariffs. Moreover, this productivity-tariff relationship partly determines the extent of liberalization across sectors even in the presence of a large exogenous unilateral liberalization shock that affects all sectors. The link between productivity and tariffs is maintained after the author includes in his political economy model a learning-by-doing motive of protection, which also serves as the source of liberalization. On the empirical side, he examines total factor productivity (TFP) estimates obtained at the firm level for Colombia between 1983 and 1998, and finds that more productive sectors receive more protection within this period. In estimating the effect of productivity on tariffs, he controls for the endogeneity of the two main right-hand-side variables-the inverse import penetration to import demand elasticity ratio and productivity-by using materials prices, the capital to output ratio, a measure of scale economies, and the TFP of the upstream industries as robust instruments. The author also accounts for the large trade liberalization between 1990 and 1992, and finds that the sectors with a higher productivity gain are liberalized less. Finally, he illustrates a system of equations estimation and shows that the positive impact of liberalization on productivity grows stronger when corrected for the endogeneity bias.

This paper updates the Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2001) cross-country deposit insurance database and extends it in several important dimensions. This new data set identifies both recent adopters and the ones that were not covered earlier due to a lack of data. Moreover, for the first time, it provides historical time series for several variables and adds new ones. The data were collected by surveying deposit insurance institutions and related agencies as well as through the use of various other country sources.