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The South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal award was an overwhelming legal and moral victory for the Philippines. The arbitral tribunal categorically declared that China's nine-dash line claim is incompatible with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, China's defiance of the ruling and refusal to honor and implement the award pose a serious challenge to Manila's victory. In addition, the astonishing shift in Philippine foreign policy direction, alongside the change in government, flouts the arbitral award and undermines previous State policies assertive of Philippine maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea. The current direction of Philippine-China relations under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has demonstrated positive signs of improvement compared with acrimonious bilateral relations pursued by the previous Aquino administration. The arbitral award has largely been set aside in the government's effort to restore amicable economic and diplomatic relations with China. This paper examines the South China Sea arbitral award amidst shifting Philippine foreign policy under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte.

On 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal formed under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) issued its award on the case brought by the Philippines against China over maritime claims in the South China Sea. The landmark victory categorically declared that China's nine-dash line claim is incompatible with the UNCLOS. The award was also an authoritative interpretation of various important issues relating to UNCLOS including the legal status of maritime features, historic rights, and the duty to preserve the marine environment. However, despite the final and binding nature of the arbitral ruling, China continues to reject the ruling. The shift in Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte administration has led to setting aside the ruling in order to restore amicable diplomatic and economic relations with China. This Special Issue of Asian Politics & Policy explores and revisits the South China Sea arbitral award from a multi-faceted perspective, focusing on challenges, implications, and post-arbitration strategies.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has remained an enduring fodder of international news since he was sworn in as the country's 16th president in June 2016. Despite massive criticisms from within the Philippines and overseas, he seems intent on taking his country down an untrodden, dangerous, lawless and bloody path. The president's relentless campaign to eliminate drugs in the country has resulted in a rapidly rising number of deaths occurring on a daily basis. A little more than six months into the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, records show that his anti-drug war campaign has resulted in over 7,000 deaths, or an average of more than 30 people summarily executed in extrajudicial fashion every day. The populist president, whilst otherwise hypersensitive to criticism, remains unfazed by almost universal condemnation by the international community over the extrajudicial killings in the country.

On July 12, 2016, an arbitration Tribunal registered under the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague handed down its unanimous award in the case filed by the Philippines against China concerning the dispute between the two countries over territory and maritime jurisdictions in the South China Sea (SCS). Though the Tribunal's decision did not include aspects related to sovereignty and boundary delimitation between the parties, it rendered final and binding judgments in favor of the Philippines on a host of critical issues as provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to the press statement it issued, there is "no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the 'nine-dash line.'" Second, it also ruled that certain sea areas in the SCS fall within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines and none of the features in the Spratly Islands could generate its own EEZ. Third, it observed that China has caused serious damage to the marine environment and "violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species." Finally, the Tribunal found that China engaged in actions that aggravated the dispute, including "large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands."

The Philippines is a global and regional leader in climate change law and has been active in domesticating its international obligations. In the 1990s, the Philippines created an Inter-Agency Committee on Climate Change to draft policies and prepare strategies for climate change negotiations. The creation of this committee was an early signal of the government's commitment to its duty to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature as provided for by the Philippine Constitution. In 2009, the Philippines enacted the Climate Change Act (cca), the first standalone climate change law in Southeast Asia.

The leadership change in Manila after the May 2016 presidential elections will certainly have significant impact on the country's policy towards China over the ongoing dispute in the West Philippine Sea. The change in Philippine leadership may portend either continuity or dramatic foreign policy shifts when it comes to this heated issue.

The Philippines is in the midst of a transition. The astonishing rise and decisive victory of Rodrigo Duterte in the presidential election in May 2016 marked a significant turning point in Philippine politics. Manila's longstanding territorial and maritime boundary disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea are among the most immediate and intricate foreign policy challenges facing President Duterte. However, in an unexpected twist, previously acrimonious bilateral relations with China have demonstrated signs of improvement while Duterte's relentless and fiercely critical rhetoric against the United States has placed the country's robust and longstanding security and defence relations with America in question. This turn of events heralds uncertain times for both the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

President Rodrigo Duterte has ushered in a new chapter in Philippine foreign policy: one lacking in continuity, coherence and direction. Previously acrimonious relations with China have drastically improved and creative solutions are now being found to disputes in the South China Sea. At the same time, Duterte's fiercely critical rhetoric toward the United States has placed the country's longstanding security alliance in question. These events herald an uncertain time for the Philippines and for Southeast Asia.

This chapter examines the role of the Coastal State in maritime regulation and enforcement. It will be divided into four sections. The first will discuss the general jurisdictional competence of Coastal States in order to provide a basic contextual information to the chapter. The second will examine the enforcement and regulatory powers of the Coastal State in the various maritinme zones of jurisdiction. The third will discuss contemporary challenges and enforcement issues. The final section will be the conclusion, which will provide some final observations and recommendations.

The Philippines is in the midst of a transition. The astonishing rise and decisive victory of newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte marks a significant turning point in the landscape of Philippine politics. Duterte's inimitable style outraged his critics, embarrassed imperial Manila's entrenched elites, and triggered disquieting ripples across the globe to an audience unaccustomed to the foul-mouthed, tough-talking, long-time mayor of Davao City in southern Philippines. But the Philippine electorate, angry and despondent, economically disenfranchised, and frustrated with perennial problems of corruption, crime and illegal drugs, massively supported his incendiary campaign. The resounding protest vote that catapulted Duterte into victory is a clear call for change from a nation weary of traditional politics and broken promises.

In this book, James Manicom contests the orthodox view that the strategic rivalry between China and Japan will escalate into a fullblown military conflict. The book concedes that the East China Sea will be the likely medium for Sino–Japanese military rivalry and cyclical tensions will persist; however, it makes the compelling case that cooperation will endure.

On 12 July, Manila was the global epicentre of news whose waves and ripples have not dissipated since. In a celebrated legal battle many have characterised as the epic clash between David and Goliath, the Philippines overwhelmingly emerged the victor. It was widely acclaimed as the triumph of international law, the great equaliser. It was the exemplary illustration that small, weak states can confidently challenge powerful nations, standing on equal footing with them and bolstered only by the enduring principle that law and right will always triumph and prevail over brute power and might.

The Philippines is among the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change. The 2014 Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) placed the Philippines, of 193 countries rated, as the ninth most at risk to the physical and economic impacts of climate change. The country's capital, Manila, is considered the second most vulnerable of the world's megacities to the effects of climate change.

Separating the Malay Peninsular and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore form the most convenient route connecting the East and the West. The East Asian economic powerhouses of Japan, China and South Korea rely on these Straits to transport oil from their Middle Eastern suppliers. The emergence of China as one of the world's major economic power has enhanced the usage of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as important maritime conduits for the Chinese economy.

This paper will examine the arbitration case filed by the Philippines against China over the West Philippine Sea on 22 January 2013. The first part, and by way of introduction, will provide a concise summary of the competing territorial and maritime jurisdictional claims over the South China Sea highlighting recent developments. The second part will discuss the system of dispute settlement under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as relevant international jurisprudence and State practice. The third part will examine the arbitration case in greater detail discussing its factual antecedents and the specific reliefs sought by the Philippines. In the final part, the paper will conclude with an evaluation and analysis of the arbitration case in the context of its potential implications to the management of conflict and resolution of the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) awarded Batu Puteh (Pedra Branca) to Singapore in 2008. However, the sovereignty over the Middle Rocks, a maritime feature that is located about one kilometre from Batu Puteh was granted to Malaysia. This decision left a huge impact for maritime boundary delimitations in this region and incited mixed feelings among Malaysians, Singaporeans and the global community as a whole. Quite recently, the Sultan of Johor has suggested for a special team to be established in making an appeal against the decision of the ICJ in 2008. This article therefore discusses the potential legal and political implications should both Malaysia and Singapore, agree to revive this case again at the ICJ. This article concludes that while this suggestion may possess merits, it is nevertheless more feasible for Malaysia and Singapore to resolve the related disputes through bilateral negotiations so as to preserve the concept of good neighbourliness and to avoid unnecessary disputes in the future.