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There are important reasons for states to recognize and enforce the judgments of other states' courts. There are also reasons that may militate against recognition or enforcement of certain foreign judgments, making it appropriate to calibrate or "fine tune"the presumption favoring recognition and enforcement so it is not applied too broadly. Most calibration principles, such as the principle that a judgment from a court lacking jurisdiction should not be recognized, are case-specific. However, one calibration principle that is, to our knowledge, unique to the law of the United States stands out: The principle of systemic calibration, according to which U.S. courts must not recognize or enforce foreign judgments "rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law."In this Article, we aim to shed empirical light on how U.S.-style systemic calibration operates in practice. We find that state-of-origin indicator scores related to systemic adequacy are on average higher when U.S. courts recognize or enforce foreign judgments than when they refuse to do so. Moreover, the probability of recognition and enforcement increases as these indicator scores increase. However, in only six of the 587 opinions in our dataset did a court refuse recognition or enforcement based explicitly on the systemic inadequacy ground. Thus, while the level of systemic calibration in U.S. courts is high, it is mostly achieved implicitly. Finally, even judgments from states with low systemic adequacy scores are sometimes recognized or enforced by U.S. courts.

The European Union has just adopted a set of amendments to the Brussels / Regulation, which governs jurisdiction to adjudicate, parallel proceedings, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This article discusses the Regulation and the adopted amendments regarding recognition and argues that these amendments are part of a deeper set of structural and conceptual changes in the law of transnational litigation in the European Union over the last two decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the implementation and enforcement of U.S. court judgments abroad, with focus given to obstacles associated with recognition-state sovereignty, the protection of public interest in the recognition state, and protections of the party or parties that the U.S. judgment has been leveled against. Other topics addressed include the U.S. legal discovery process, the perception of U.S. litigation abroad, and American state power.

Reports on the debate on the merits and demerits of group and class action litigation hosted by the Duke University School of Law and the Faculte de droit de l'Universite de Geneve in Switzerland. Participants; Highlights of the debate.