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Even with accumulating knowledge, no consensus regarding the understanding of intelligence or cognition exists, and the universal brain bases for these functions remain unclear. Traditionally, our understanding of cognition is based on self-evident principles that appear indisputable when looking only at our species; however, this can distance us from understanding its essence (anthropocentrism, corticocentrism, intellectocentrism, neurocentrism, and idea of orthogenesis of brain evolution). Herein, we use several examples from biology to demonstrate the usefulness of comparative ways of thinking in relativizing these biases. We discuss the relationship between the number of neurons and cognition and draw attention to the highly developed cognitive performance of animals with small brains, to some "tricks" of evolution, to how animals cope with small hardware, to some animals with high-quality brains with an alternative architecture to vertebrates, and to surprising basal cognitive skills in aneural, unicellular organisms. Cognition can be supplemented by the idea of a multicellular organism as a continuum, with many levels of cognitive function, including the possible basal learning in single cells. • No consensus regarding the understanding of intelligence or cognition exists. • We discussed intelligence/cognition in an up-to-bottom manner. • Several molecular structures with information-processing capacity exist in organisms. • Cognition can be supplemented by the idea of a multicellular organism as a continuum, with many levels of cognitive function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a well-established fact in representationalist cognitive science that concrete concepts influence human perception. In radical, anti-representationalist cognitive science, however, the case is far from clear. One reason for this is that proponents of Radical Enactivism (REC) yet have to clarify whether perceptual activity involving concepts is bound to rely on mental content or if it instantiates basic, contentfree cognition. The purpose of this paper is to show that concept-involving perception instantiates REC-style basic cognition. The paper begins by considering 'cognitive projection' as the term is introduced by Distributed Cognition research. Although being introduced as a means for exploring concept-based perception in non-representationalist terms, I argue that 'cognitive projection' comes with mentalist overtones and unclarities concerning its linguistic basis. With the purpose of overcoming these shortcomings, I unfold a REC-friendly reading of Wittgenstein's writings on aspect perception, arguing that basic concept-involving perception is an instantiation of basic cognition. Concludingly, with the aim of ensuring compatibility, I make a connection between conceptual aspect perception and the REC notion of attentional anchors. The latter has been introduced to explore the role of material artefacts in the context of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics educational design but has, I submit, the potential for being extended to other practical contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Strategies for similarity-based categorization are abstracting the categories' central tendency (the prototype) or memorizing exemplars. • The prototype strategy requires focusing on similarities associated to category membership and ignore irrelevant differences. • The detail-focused cognitive style in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) could impair prototype abstraction. • There is evidence for ASD-related difficulties in prototype-distortion tasks, but considerable inconsistencies exist in literature. • Sensitive computational approaches are needed to uncover individual differences and potential compensatory strategies. Similarity-based categorization, as an important cognitive skill, can be performed by abstracting a categories' central tendency, the so-called prototype, or by memorizing individual exemplars of a category. The flexible selection of an appropriate strategy is crucial for effective cognitive functioning. The detail-focused cognitive style in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) has been hypothesized to specifically impair prototype-based categorization but to leave exemplar-based categorization unimpaired. We first give an overview of approaches to investigate prototype-based abstraction in the prototype-distortion task, with an emphasis on model-based approaches suitable to discern the two strategies on the individual level. The second part summarizes literature speaking to prototype-based categorization in ASD using that task. Despite considerable inconsistencies, most studies appear to confirm that autistic individuals have more difficulties to perform prototype-distortion tasks than non-autistic individuals. We highlight how inconsistencies in literature can be resolved by taking the differences in task designs into account. The current review illustrates the need for sensitive computational approaches, suitable to detect hidden individual differences and potential compensatory strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radical Enactivism holds that the best explanation of basic forms of cognition is provided without involving information of any sort. According to this view, the ability to perceive visual affordances should be accounted for in terms of extensional covariations between variables spanning the agent's body and the environment. Contrary to Radical Enactivism, I argue that the intensional properties of cognition cannot be ignored, and that the way in which an agent represents the world has consequences on the explanation of basic sensorimotor abilities. To support this claim, I show that the perception of visual affordances is not segregated from higher forms of cognition; rather, it is modulated by the agent's ability to recognize the semantic identity of the visual target. Accordingly, since the semantic recognition of an object involves a way of representing it under a certain description, it can be inferred that the perception of visual affordances cannot be accounted for without considering the intensional properties of cognition. This poses an explanatory issue for Radical Enactivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Enactivism is a family of theories that construe action as constitutive of cognition and reject the need to postulate representations in order to explain all cognitive activities. Acknowledging a biologically basic, non-representational mode of cognition, however, raises the question of how to explain higher or more complex cognitive acts, what we call explanatory integration challenge. In this paper, we critically discuss some attempts to meet that challenge through scaling up basic cognition and through scaling down complex cognition within the enactivist research program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We evaluate a growing trend towards anti-representationalism in cognitive science in the context of recent research into the development and maintenance of anorexia nervosa in cognitive neuropsychiatry. We argue two things: first, that this research relies on an explanatorily robust concept of representation—the concept of a long-term body schema; second, that this body representation underlies our most basic environmental interactions and affordance perception—the psychological phenomena supposed to be most hospitable to a non-representationalist treatment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive remediation is a promising pathway for ameliorating cognitive impairment of patients with schizophrenia. Here, we investigate predictors of improvement in problem-solving ability for two different types of cognitive remediation – specific problem-solving training and training of basic cognition. For this purpose we conducted a re-analysis of a randomized controlled trial comparing these two training approaches. The main outcome measure was improvement in problem-solving performance. Correlational analyses were used to assess the contribution of clinical, cognitive and training-related predictors. In the problem-solving training group, impaired pre-training planning ability was associated with stronger improvement. In contrast, in the basic cognition training group antipsychotic medication dose emerged as a negative predictor. These results demonstrate that predictors for successful cognitive remediation depend on the specific intervention. Furthermore, our results suggest that at least in the planning domain patients with impaired performance benefit particularly from a specific intervention. (JINS, 2014, 20, 1–6) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]