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Bargaining with suppliers is a key Purchasing and Supply Management (PSM) activity but there is considerable ambiguity over what bargaining entails and the concept currently lacks a systematic treatment, despite its significant interest to PSM professionals. The literature shows that bargaining can be seen as an adversarial approach to negotiation (in contrast to more integrative/collaborative ones) and also the back-and-forth discussion over price and other variables between buying and supplying organisations to reach an agreement. In addition, many will move between fundamentally distributive and integrative approaches as the discussions play out. A systematic literature review of the Scopus, ProQuest, ScienceDirect, JSTOR and Web of Science databases was undertaken to address this gap, identifying 427 relevant journal papers that were systematically analysed. First, descriptive techniques identified the trajectory of published papers, methods, theories and their industrial context. Second, content analysis identified the key constructs and associated operational measures/variables of bargaining. Third, the constructs have then been ordered temporally and by areas of location (organisational/departmental and individual levels) to generate a model and inform a series of practice-based recommendations at different stages of the bargaining process. The findings will allow future researchers to use the constructs either directly in developing focused hypotheses to test relationships or as a basis for refinement and extension in cumulative theory building and testing. In addition, a series of focused research gaps have been identified, such as addressing the current contradictory findings of the effect of purchasing volume or organisational size on bargaining power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Job security has always been a paramount concern for the trade union movement. This article explores the ways that unions used collective bargaining to gain a measure of job security for their members in the face of deindustrialization as unionized factories in North America began to close in large numbers after the 1970s. These new measures included advance notice, severance pay, plant closing moratoria, restrictions placed on plant movements, transfer rights, and expanding the scope of collective 'social' bargaining to cover training and adjustment. In some sectors, such as automotive, collective bargaining has also been extended into areas normally left to management. The price was often high. Eventually some unions, notably the Canadian Auto Workers (established 1985; part of Unifor after 2013), prioritized winning new capital investments and product lines for unionized plants in their negotiations, though often at the cost of jobs, wage freezes or reductions, and other concessions. By focusing upon auto sector deindustrialization in Canada since the 1980s, we draw lessons from more recent union bargaining strategies, and how they constitute an important element of worker responses to industrial job loss and manufacturing closure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the United States, truck rates for perishable food, the per‐mile rate charged for trucking services to move perishable food from farms to stores, rose substantially in the post‐COVID‐19 pandemic era. We argue that rising truck rates is a signal of a broader shortage of truckers, but the connection between labor shortages, rising truck rates, and a lack of trucking services has yet to be established empirically. In this paper, we develop an empirical examination based on an equilibrium job search, matching, and bargaining framework in which we estimate the role of labor shortages in accelerating driver‐wage growth, and truck rates for agricultural products. We estimate the model by combining US Bureau of Census Current Population Survey data on truck driver wages with USDA‐Agricultural Marketing Service Service data on truck rates to establish the linkage between trucker supply and the demand for trucking services. We find that the COVID‐19 pandemic was responsible for a rise in for‐hire trucker wages of some 38%$38\%$, a rise in average truck rates of nearly 50%$50\%$ and that the gap between trucker‐job openings and successful matches explains a significant, but small, rise in truck rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negotiation is the core of diplomacy, and the various elements and aspects of diplomatic practice closely relate to the organization and conduct of negotiations. This article discusses the impact of diplomatic essentials – diplomacy’s basic features stemming from its idea, spirit, culture, traditions, and methods – on negotiating in diplomatic settings. Diplomats need to use these essentials to negotiate effectively. Therefore, in diplomacy, to be a good negotiator, one needs to be a good diplomat. By analyzing the negotiation implications of diplomatic representation, aspiration, groundwork, timing, intercourse, code of conduct, and language, I argue that the essential features of international diplomacy can be seen as important assets of the strategic management of diplomatic negotiation. In other words, diplomatic actors can have a significant impact on negotiation effectiveness by using and managing these seven diplomatic essentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been considerable interest in studying the effect of female labor market outcomes on intrahousehold bargaining. This paper examines the effects of local labor market opportunities in India on a variety of female bargaining characteristics, including domestic violence and intrahousehold discussion of important issues. Specifically, I utilize district-level data on employment in various occupations to calculate an employment shift-share index that proxies gender-specific labor demand. I find that improvements in labor market conditions for women lead to a decrease in perceptions of domestic violence, whereas improvements in predicted demand for male employment have little or negative effects on women's household bargaining power. When disaggregated by indicators of initial bargaining power, women that have lower levels of initial bargaining power either see no effect on bargaining or experience a backlash effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the welfare impact of expanding the negotiation agenda of an international agreement between asymmetric countries (e.g., including specific negotiations over environmental regulations or labor standards in a conventional trade agreement) and demonstrates why such proposed expansions are contentious. A main result is that agenda expansions that provide more bargaining flexibility will increase the efficiency of the agreement but can result in a less equitable agreement that hurts the country that is at a bargaining disadvantage. Similarly, we demonstrate that decreases in bargaining game asymmetry can also make the disadvantaged country worse‐off even as it increases global welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political leaders value public demonstrations of support from foreign leaders and frequently make concessions in order to obtain them. We model the bargaining dynamics surrounding these exchanges and their impact on the recipient leader's political survival, with a focus on top-level diplomatic visits as a means of signaling international support. Our model addresses two interrelated questions; first, we consider how symbolic displays of support from one leader to another can be informative even when they are "purchased" with concessions, and second, we derive the equilibrium price and political impact of a visit under different bargaining protocols. The incentive to make a concession in exchange for a visit generally undermines a visit's signaling value. We identify a diplomatic resource curse, where the existence of opportunities for diplomatic exchange can force leaders into accepting visit-for-concession deals that leave them worse off than if they were diplomatically isolated. Visits never occur when negotiations are fully transparent. Mutually beneficial quid pro quo diplomacy requires opacity in negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations research suggests that powerful states can use both arms transfers and alliance commitments to improve the security of friendly states. This work largely assumes these different strategies are either complementary or straightforward substitutes for one another. Here, I consider the ways in which arms sales and alignment interact, highlighting the conditions under which arms transfers can either undermine or enhance the credibility of extended deterrent threats. I study a formal model in which a patron can increase a client's defense capabilities through arms transfers, which in turn generate audience costs if the patron fails to defend that client in a conflict. The model yields several important results. Under different conditions arms transfers can either entrap a patron in a war it hoped to avoid or allow it to escape a war it would otherwise have joined. But most strikingly, arms sales can make extended deterrent threats less credible by decreasing the patron's marginal contribution to a joint military effort. The model shows that under some conditions arms transfers can actually cause deterrence failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States often use market access as a bargaining chip in international politics. A state that requires simultaneous compliance in multiple issue areas before granting market access maximizes incentives to comply but also makes them brittle – any targeted states that cannot comply in one issue area have no incentive to comply in any. More generally, programs of economic coercion can achieve at most two of the following three objectives: 1) secure a broad coalition of domestic political support, 2) the association of meaningful trade value with each policy issue, and 3) assurance that enforcing one political issue will not reduce the target's incentives to comply with conditionality on others. Characteristics of the program's domestic constituency, of the issues themselves, and of the international economy are key determinants of how the state prioritizes the three objectives. The trilemma explains the number and types of issues that can be linked to economic value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce the notion of limited consideration into a bilateral, infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining game. Both agents have reference-dependent preferences, and their reference points are dynamically updated. An agent's current consideration set (or focus) is influenced by the last offer he rejected such that the most salient point in that consideration set becomes his current reference point. We provide an implicit characterization of stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibria in our model. Without resorting to asymmetric or incomplete information, we show that our bargaining game can produce delay and disagreement in equilibrium. In addition to analytical results on the disagreement conditions and the nature of agreements, we provide computational comparative statics on model parameters and study their impacts on delay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Originally a domestic product used by West African rural population, shea nut has become an international commodity exported all over the world. However, local periodic markets remain a central site of exchange and nut trading for many women shea nut collectors in Burkina Faso. Using survey data from Burkina Faso, this paper explores the ways in which shea nut collectors navigate shea nut trading. Many collectors engage in early nut trading during the farming season to cover their household subsistence needs, despite the lower shea nut price at that time of the year. The results show that this early market consists mostly of better off shea nut collectors buying nuts from worse off collectors, as the lead firms and wholesalers tend to enter the market later in the season. While the exchanged volumes remain small, this highlights social differentiation among women shea nut collectors, as the better-off collectors are able to invest their shea income in other sources of income, while the other collectors rely on shea for their reproduction needs. Furthermore, this social differentiation is also reflected in different household dynamics and bargaining strategies between spouses, as better-off collectors tend to collaborate to a larger extent with their partners than the other collectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article advances the research on compliance negotiations in the context of the EU's external relations. It develops further the framework on EU compliance negotiations, introduced by Jönsson and Tallberg in 1998, and provides empirical evidence from a case study on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement's implementation. The article suggests three arguments for the expansion of the original framework. Firstly, we add to the framework the case of pre-emptive compliance negotiations, i.e. negotiations in view of anticipated non-compliance. Secondly, it is suggested to supplement the original framework with the 'object of negotiations' category, as the issue at stake influences other variables in compliance negotiations, such as the power relations between the parties and the conflictive vs. cooperative nature of the negotiations. Thirdly, the article unpacks the role of multistakeholder networks in the dynamics of compliance negotiations in the EU's external relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Defense policy makers have become increasingly concerned about conflict in the "gray zone" between peace and war. Such conflicts are often interpreted as cases of deterrence failures, as new technologies or tactics—from cyber operations to "little green men"—seem to increase the effectiveness of low-intensity aggression. However, gray zone conflict could also be a case of deterrence success, where challengers adopt a constrained form of aggression in response to a credible escalation threat. We develop a model that formalizes both scenarios and identifies distinct empirical patterns across the two cases. We use the model's findings to empirically analyze Russian gray zone activity since the 1990s, finding that Russian activity appears, in part, to be restrained by NATO's deterrent threat. Our model also shows that developing gray zone conflict capabilities can lead to more peace but could also backfire and provoke a challenger to escalate to war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a dynamic model of tender offers in which there is trading on the target's shares during the takeover, and bidders can freeze out target shareholders (compulsorily acquire remaining shares not tendered at the bid price), features that prevail on almost all takeovers. We show that trading allows for the entry of arbitrageurs with large blocks of shares who can hold out a freezeout—a threat that forces the bidder to offer a high preemptive bid. There is also a positive relationship between the takeover premium and arbitrageurs' accumulation of shares before the takeover announcement, and the less liquid the target stock, the stronger this relationship is. Moreover, freezeouts eliminate the free-rider problem, but front-end loaded bids, such as two-tiered and partial offers, do not benefit bidders because arbitrageurs can undo any potential benefit and eliminate the coerciveness of these offers. Similarly, the takeover premium is also largely unrelated to the bidder's ability to dilute the target's shareholders after the acquisition, also due to potential arbitrage activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Miscalculations due to lack of information are often seen as one of the main causes of war. Yet, a privately informed country has multiple channels to share information and avoid a costly conflict. I study three ways information can be transmitted – sunk cost signals, audience costs, and military build-up. In a fully decentralised setting, where the uninformed country can perfectly adjust its response to the information it learns, the three channels produce very different outcomes. Sunk cost signals never transmit any information. Information transmission is possible with audience costs when the uninformed country sufficiently values peace. With military build-up, information transmission occurs by accident. It is a by-product of the privately informed country's attempt to increase its strength. I contrast these findings with the case of a constrained uninformed country that can only choose between a limited number of offers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose two solutions to Nash (1950) 's bargaining problem: the Consensus and Compromise solutions. They gradually diverge from the Nash solution. Regarding axioms, we decompose the Nash solution's Axiom IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) into distinct parts. The controversial ones are identified and successively replaced, leading to the Consensus and Compromise solutions. The two replacement parts are: 1). If the additional room for cooperation, resulting from deteriorating non-cooperation, does not offer a better outcome for both players, the solution remains unchanged; 2). A solution should not be the best only for one player, i.e., each player should make at least some concession, no matter how small. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages, the winning probability shifts towards the rising power. We find fewer preventive wars when the power shift is smaller and when the rising state has the commitment power. Communication and repeated interaction decrease the likelihood of preventive wars. High fighting costs almost eliminate such wars when the rising power's first-stage offer is sufficiently large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should a political leader first focus on smaller policy goals or start with the most ambitious policy agenda? We model a political leader who chooses the policy agenda and proposes policies to a responder. The leader has a high or low ability to persuade the responder to agree to a proposal, and both parties are symmetrically uninformed about this ability. If the belief about the leader's ability is low, then it is optimal to start with the ambitious policy, but the reverse is true if the belief is high. Addressing both policies together is dominated by a sequential approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between types of employment and wages by gender and gender pay gaps among permanent, temporary, and informal workers. There are substantial gender inequalities in bargaining, and these inequalities are argued to be more prevalent for temporary and informal jobs. Hence, larger wage penalties for women in such positions are expected. Moreover, the inverse association between wages and non-permanent contracts is larger for low-paid women. To this end, the study employs unconditional quantile regression techniques and counterfactual decomposition analysis, and accounts for selection bias. The dataset is based on labor force surveys over the period 2005–19 in Turkey and focuses on private sector employees. The findings highlight the disproportionate impact of temporary and informal employment on women's earnings and suggest that employment type can be a contributing factor to the gender pay gap in Turkey, particularly for low wage groups. In Turkey, employment opportunities, social norms, and gender roles limit women's bargaining power. Gender inequalities in bargaining can vary significantly across employment types. Women employees with temporary or informal jobs suffer from larger pay penalties. Residual gender pay gaps are larger for low-paid temporary and informal workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round. Our analysis demonstrates that when the initial transfer is large enough, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium consists of a finite number of rounds of delay before an agreement is reached. The equilibrium delay is longer when the players are more patient, and when the transfer is initially higher and depreciates slower. Nevertheless, the game's chaotic characteristic makes it arduous to forecast the exact number of delayed rounds or which player will make the ultimate decision. This game can be applied to many social scenarios, particularly those with exogenous costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops a novel approach for studying the influence of supranational institutions in international cooperation. While earlier research tends to treat member states as a collective yielding influence on supranational institutions, we unpack this collective to explore differentiated supranational influence. To this end, the article makes three contributions. First, it develops a method for measuring differentiated supranational influence that makes it possible to identify which member states give ground when a supranational institution is influential. Second, it theorizes the sources of differentiated supranational influence, arguing that states are more likely to accommodate a supranational institution when they are more dependent on the resources of this institution. Third, it illustrates the usefulness of this approach empirically through an analysis of the influence of the European Commission in European Union bargaining. The analysis suggests that our approach can measure and explain differentiated supranational influence under conditions of both heightened crisis and everyday politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within a formal model of international agreements in the shadow of renegotiations and domestic competition, we highlight three important ways elections shape international agreements. Elections determine who will be in control of policy in the future, which affects how leaders bargain today. Elections also determine the deals policymakers will agree to. Finally, proposers have the opportunity to shape the contours of domestic political competition with what is offered in pre-electoral bargaining. We identify that several canonical results in the literature – like the Schelling conjecture or the idea that hawkish leaders have an innate bargaining advantage over dovish leaders – only hold under certain restrictions on how voters evaluate their leaders. In contrast, we show paradoxically that when voters are prospective, electoral incentives shade the ability for domestic leaders to negotiate better deals for their publics. Counterintuitively, this leads to hawks agreeing to more conciliatory agreements than doves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the state's behavior in negotiations with one non-state group influence the behavior of other non-state actors? We argue that the dynamics of different conflicts within the same country are interdependent, and that a state develops a reputation through its interactions with each conflict party. This reputation provides a valuable source of information that other groups use to judge the state's cooperative intentions. When a state develops a reputation for cooperation, this increases the likelihood of (indirect) reciprocation from other groups. More specifically, we argue that when states enter into (and honor) a ceasefire with one rebel group, they demonstrate a credible reputation for cooperation. A credible reputation for cooperation, we posit, increases the likelihood that other conflict parties enter into ceasefires with the state, or that they de-escalate their military activities. We test our claims using the new civil conflict ceasefire dataset and find support for our argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a vertically related market where one quantity-setting and another price-setting downstream firm negotiate the terms of a two-part tariff contract with an upstream input supplier. In contrast to the traditional belief, we show that the price-setting firm produces a higher output and earns a higher profit than the quantity-setting firm when bargaining is decentralised. Additionally, both firms produce the same output, whereas the profit is higher under the price-setting firm than the quantity-setting firm when bargaining is centralised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are some states open to talking while fighting while others are not? We argue that a state considering opening negotiations is concerned not only with the adverse inference that the opposing state will draw, but also the actions that the opposing state might take in response to that inference. We use a formal model, with assumptions grounded in extensive historical evidence, to highlight one particular response to opening negotiations—the escalation of war efforts—and one particular characteristic of the state opening negotiations—its resilience to escalation. We find that states are willing to open negotiations under two conditions: when their opponents find escalation too costly, and when there is a signal of high resilience that only the highly resilient care to use. To illustrate the dynamics of the second condition, we offer an extended case study detailing North Vietnam's changing approach to negotiations during the Vietnam War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper studies bargaining games involving players with present-biased preferences. The paper shows that the relative timing of bargaining rewards and bargaining costs will determine whether the players' present-bias will affect bargaining outcomes. In cases where players agree to a bargain in period 1 and experience all bargaining payoffs in period 2, the players will act in a time-consistent fashion. When time-inconsistent players incur immediate bargaining costs to produce delayed rewards, they will have an incentive to procrastinate. On the other hand, when players receive immediate bargaining rewards and incur delayed costs, they will have incentives to agree to bargains too soon and to agree to inefficient bargains. The paper shows that the players' awareness of their own and the other player's present-biased preferences will determine whether they engage in repeated time-inconsistent bargaining. A naïve player who engages in time-inconsistent bargaining will suffer welfare losses. We show that time-inconsistent bargaining can also create spillover welfare losses for other players. A time-consistent player who is counterparty-naïve about the other player can suffer spillover welfare losses that can be higher than those incurred by the time-inconsistent player. As a result, counterparty-sophisticated players will have an incentive to use cross-commitment devices to reduce the likelihood of spillover welfare losses. The paper also shows that cross commitment devices that target immediate payoffs dominate cross-commitments that target delayed payoffs. Finally, the paper shows that time-inconsistent bargaining can lead to inefficient delays in agreeing to bargains and in exiting bargaining relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We point out an equivalence between a class of games in which players negotiate while fighting and a class of games in which a buyer and seller negotiate over terms. Importantly and perhaps ironically, bargaining before fighting is strategically distinct from bargaining before a change of ownership but bargaining while fighting is equivalent to bargaining before a change of ownership. These connections and intuition from models of bilateral trade help shed light on two mechanisms for learning while frighting: inference based on observing strategic choices and information leakage on the battlefield. Debates on the relative importance of these to mechanism are addressed; some subtle clarifications to extant arguments are provided. Moreover, the importance of learning hard information from the battlefield is connected to work on Coasian Dynamics with information leakage and avenuse for future work relying on advances in behavioral theory are sketched out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze a dynamic bargaining game where parties can agree to implement a policy change, which is costly (beneficial) in the short-run but beneficial (costly) in the long-run. When the status-quo is endogenized (at least in some components), we show that the more farsighted party can induce their rival to accept the short-run costs of policy changes designed to generate benefits in the long-run. This is more common when players' asymmetries are less pronounced, the status-quo is fully endogenized and the state depreciates more quickly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalizing economies and long-distance trade rely on individuals from different cultural groups to negotiate agreement on what to give and take. In such settings, individuals often lack insight into what interaction partners deem fair and appropriate, potentially seeding misunderstandings, frustration, and conflict. Here, we examine how individuals decipher distinct rules of engagement and adapt their behavior to reach agreements with partners from other cultural groups. Modeling individuals as Bayesian learners with inequality aversion reveals that individuals, in repeated ultimatum bargaining with responders sampled from different groups, can be more generous than needed. While this allows them to reach agreements, it also gives rise to biased beliefs about what is required to reach agreement with members from distinct groups. Preregistered behavioral (N = 420) and neuroimaging experiments (N = 49) support model predictions: Seeking equitable agreements can lead to overly generous behavior toward partners from different groups alongside incorrect beliefs about prevailing norms of what is appropriate in groups and cultures other than one's own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can an individual impact a phenomenon as overwhelming and complex as war? Do leaders impact interstate war dynamics? Leaders high in grandiose narcissism focus their efforts on maintaining their inflated self-image during war by striving desperately for victory. While most leaders sacrifice their historical image for state interests, more narcissistic leaders only exit wars if they "win", or overcome threats to their self-image. Narcissists essentially ignore revealed information and create deadlock to avoid looking like losers. In other words, narcissistic leaders encourage us to look beyond traditional rationalist models of wartime dynamics. This paper analyzes United States' interstate war duration from 1897 to 2007 and finds support for the argument that more narcissistic United States presidents extend war duration. This paper also compares Eisenhower's handling of the Korean War and Nixon's handling of the Vietnam War as an illustrative probe of causal mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I analyze a model of coalition war termination in which continued fighting prevents power from shifting in an enemy's favor but causes power to shift between partners. War ends in equilibrium when both across- and within-side distributions of power are sufficiently stable, but coalition politics can shorten or lengthen the war. When within-side power is shifting but the rising partner's stakes in the war are low, the war ends "early," before fighting can solve the underlying bargaining problem. When continued fighting strengthens the rising partner sufficiently, its declining partner acquiesces in continued fighting when intramural discord is costly or coalition exit is unattractive, causing the war to end "late," well after the enemy's power has been stabilized. I use the model to account for the early end of World War I and the late end of the Paraguayan War and then discuss implications for research design, war outbreak, and balancing coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

First offers play a significant role in negotiations as they anchor negotiators' perceptions and influence negotiation outcomes in favor of the first-offer proposer. However, negotiation is a joint decision-making process in which a first offer is typically succeeded by a counteroffer. The impact of a counteroffer has not yet been systematically researched. We propose that a counteroffer influences negotiation outcomes like a first offer. In addition, we conceptualize the "anchor zone" as the distance between the first offer and the counteroffer. We theorize that the anchor zone influences negotiation outcomes because it captures additional information compared to a single offer. To test our hypotheses, we conducted two studies: Study 1 was a vignette study (n = 190) in which participants reacted to a counteroffer that they received based on their first offer as part of a simulated negotiation. Study 2 was an online experiment (n = 212) in which participants negotiated by exchanging offers with no further communication. Our analysis suggests that the counteroffer is a significant predictor of economic outcomes. Thus, it works like a first offer, but with a lower impact. In addition, the anchor zone predicted how far the final agreement was from the first offer. Furthermore, we found that the third offer, the average concessions, and the number of offers mediated the effects of the counteroffer and anchor zone on economic outcomes. Finally, we discovered that a more aggressive counteroffer reduced the subjective value of both negotiators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We elucidate when and why men negotiate assertively. Threatening masculinity should increase men's willingness to negotiate assertively in salary negotiations, which are viewed as masculine, but not in negotiations about flexible working hours, which are viewed as feminine. In two experiments including men from Germany and the United States (U.S.; total N = 1,010), men were either threatened in terms of their masculinity or not. In Study 1, following the threat manipulation, men negotiated either salary or flexible working hours. The results from Study 1 revealed that threatened men (relative to nonthreatened men) reported more ambitious goals, intended to make more ambitious offers, and actually made more ambitious offers, but only when negotiating salary. In Study 2, men always negotiated salary, yet received different kinds of feedback involving threats to their masculinity. The results from Study 2 revealed that threatening feedback based on both men's prescriptions and men's proscriptions (e.g., a lack of assertiveness and pronounced weakness), in particular, led men negotiating salary to report more ambitious goals, intend to make more ambitious offers, and actually to make more ambitious offers. Altogether, our research revealed that men show heightened assertiveness when under a specific threat and negotiating a male-typed topic. An important question for future research is to what extent our findings generalize across different intersecting identities, demographics, and cultures. Public Significance Statement: In high-stakes and everyday negotiations, men often strongly assert themselves—a choice that can affect their own and other people's occupational life (e.g., when negotiating their pay or when representing an organization). Our two experiments illuminated in which situations men are particularly likely to negotiate assertively. Men made ambitious offers especially when they experienced a threat to their masculinity and when negotiating a topic that has a masculine connotation, such as salary (but not flexible working hours). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

African states fight each other far more often by simultaneously supporting rebels in each other's intrastate conflicts than by engaging in direct warfare. While nearly half of these mutual interventions between 1960 and 2010 were resolved via bilateral negotiated settlements, the majority of cases ended due to events in, or actions by, only one of the two states. What explains this variation? We argue that different combinations of combat outcomes in the two intrastate conflicts determine the severity of interstate commitment concerns and, therefore, the likelihood of a successful settlement. Specifically, we hypothesize that commitment problems are likely to be overcome only when both states experience stalemates or successes in their battles with rebels. By contrast, if both states suffer combat defeats, major commitment concerns on both sides make a settlement very unlikely. Finally, a combination of defeats and stalemates or successes also makes a settlement unlikely, as the state with the upper hand is likely both unwilling and unable to commit credibly to a settlement. We use several cases to illustrate our theory and then demonstrate how its causal mechanism works by leveraging within-case variation from the Chad–Sudan mutual intervention. We show that the two states reached a settlement only once both were winning at home while their rebel clients were losing abroad. Three alternative explanations—third-party threats, pressure, and security guarantees—cannot explain the settlement. Overall, our study extends bargaining theory to a new empirical domain and contributes to theorizing how its information and commitment logics interact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We construct a parametric family of (modified) divide-the-dollar games: when there is excess demand, some portion of the dollar may disappear and the remaining portion is distributed in a bankruptcy problem. In two extremes, this game family captures the standard divide-the-dollar game of Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) (when the whole dollar vanishes) and the game studied in Ashlagi et al. (Math Soc Sci 63:228–233, 2012) (when the whole dollar remains) as special cases. We first show that in all interior members of our game family, all Nash equilibria are inefficient under the proportional rule if there are 'too many' players in the game. Moreover, in any interior member of the game family, the inefficiency increases as the number of players increases, and the whole surplus vanishes as the number of players goes to infinity. On the other hand, we show that any bankruptcy rule that satisfies certain normatively appealing axioms induces a unique and efficient Nash equilibrium in which everyone demands and receives an equal share of the dollar. The constrained equal awards rule is one such rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Women perceive specific strategies developed to support their performance in compensation negotiations as ineffective and are unlikely to use them—suggesting an implementation gap. We examined whether providing theoretical rationales—explaining how specific strategies are meant to work—attenuates this gap. Furthermore, we explored a novel cause of it: women's expectations regarding the perpetuation of gender roles upon using a strategy. In two studies (N = 1,254), we observed that regardless of the provision of the rationales, women expected all examined specific strategies to be less economically effective and most of them to perpetuate gender roles more than regular assertiveness. Moreover, especially women's expectations regarding economic outcomes decreased their intentions to use most specific strategies. Women also expected most specific strategies to lead to less favorable social evaluations than yielding, which again led to their lower intentions to use them. Altogether, negotiation trainers and educators should consider that explaining how specific strategies are meant to work is not enough to close the implementation gap and to reduce gender inequality in negotiations. To attenuate the implementation gap, they may need to enable women to more fully experience how using specific strategies can improve their negotiation performance. Online slides for instructors who want to use this article for teaching are available on PWQ's website at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/03616843221128484. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to prove that the outcomes stemming from interactions on assignment markets bring about coordination in case of a stochastic matching subject to various forms of expectations. We consider an exchange network with stochastic matching between the pairs of players and analyze the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. The cases of convergent expectations, divergent expectations and of social preferences are studied. The extension of earlier works lies in the consideration of a stochastic matching on a graph dependent on the weights of edges. The results show that, in all three cases, the dynamics converges rapidly to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, which is an equilibrium that combines notions of stability and fairness. In the first two scenarios, the numerical simulations reveal that the convergence toward a fixed point is speedily achieved at the value of the outside option. In the third scenario, the fixed point promptly converges to the value of the outside option supplemented by the surplus share. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Men and women negotiate differently, which might create gender inequality in earnings from bargaining. We study the role of gender and gender pairing in bilateral bargaining, using an artefactual field experiment in rural Uganda, in which pairs of participants bargain over the division of a fixed amount of resources. We vary the gender composition of the bargaining pairs as well as the disclosure of the participants' identities. We find gender differences in earnings and agreements, but only when identities and, thus, genders are disclosed. Women in same-gender pairs obtain higher final earnings than men and women in mixed-gender pairs, which is due to the lower likelihood of disagreement among women-only pairs. We identify gender differences in demands and demand inconsistency--the money left on the table once demands are corrected for beliefs about the counterpart's demand--as mechanisms behind the observed gender differences in bargaining outcomes. In addition, we find that gender differences in demand inconsistency are related to gender differences in education and a measure of expected generosity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This case study in the evolution of heterodox economics describes the emergence of feminist perspectives on care provision and their implications for a larger theory of bargaining over the distribution of gains from cooperation. It testifies to the hybrid vigor of diverse and ongoing efforts to challenge the narrow focus of the neoclassical paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this review, we identify emerging trends in negotiation scholarship that embrace complexity, finding moderators of effects that were initially described as monolithic, examining the nuances of social interaction, and studying negotiation as it occurs in the real world. We also identify areas in which research is lacking and call for scholarship that offers practical advice. All told, the existing research highlights negotiation as an exciting context for examining human behavior, characterized by features such as strong emotions, an intriguing blend of cooperation and competition, the presence of fundamental issues such as power and group identity, and outcomes that deeply affect the trajectory of people's personal and professional lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts (PNCC) dataset, which identifies whether a state-party and rival non-state armed group is in the formal negotiation phase of a peace process. The PNCC goes beyond recording instances of peace talks by offering a conceptual framework to identify when a government-rebel group dyad is at risk of formal negotiations. It explicitly considers issues central in event-history modelling, including censoring and the observation period. The PNCC also provides detailed information on negotiations, including the date and location of peace talks, and whether negotiations were bilateral or through mediation. The PNCC is the first source to distinguish mediated and non-mediated civil conflict negotiations under a single framework. Structured over the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset with global coverage for 1975-2013, the PNCC is integrable to commonly used civil war datasets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conduct a series of experiments in which two subjects bargain over five options. Following an experimental design closely related to De Clippel et al. (Am Econ Rev 104:3434–3458, 2014), we evaluate the performance of three bargaining mechanisms: (α) one subject shortlists a block of three options before the other chooses one among them, (β ) both subjects veto options simultaneously and in a block, and (γ ) both subjects veto options simultaneously and gradually one after the other. We document that the non-symmetric shortlisting mechanism (α) is highly efficient, but our data also suggest the existence of a first-mover advantage as subjects become more experienced. The simultaneous mechanism (β ) is less efficient than (α) and generates a high level of ex-post inequality. The gradual veto mechanism (γ ) is no less efficient than (α), but has the important advantage of shutting down the possibility of any first-mover advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some governments engage in genocide or politicide during civil war while others do not? I argue that leader tenure influences bargaining possibilities between the regime and rebels. Rebels face less uncertainty about a longer-tenured leader's willingness to commit to concessions to end the conflict with terms that better the rebels' position. This narrows the longer-tenured leader's ability to credibly offer the rebels concessions. Facing a constrained bargaining environment, longer-tenured leaders become more likely to turn to atrocity in an effort to fully defeat the opposition group and its supporters. Statistical analysis of all genocide and politicide in civil war since 1946 supports this claim. Evidence from Milosevic's atrocities in Kosovo help illustrate the mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China has returned attention to the links between power transitions and war. In this literature, three different causal mechanisms can be confused. This essay disentangles them. Power transitions can lead to three kinds of war: preventive, accidental, and revisionist. Formal models tend to study the first, in which a declining state tries to delay or prevent a rival's ascent. However, major wars during great power transitions are usually initiated by the rising state, not the declining one. To describe these historical cases, less formal theories, especially neorealism and neoclassical realism, focus on accidental and revisionist wars, but these theories tend to fall back on nonrational mechanisms to connect changing power to the risk of conflict. This leaves a theoretical gap: Why would a rising, rational actor deliberately choose conflict, i.e. start a revisionist war? To suggest an answer, this essay demonstrates how a simple change in standard bargaining models—incorporating a nonzero probability of indecisive war—can ground realist intuitions on rationalist foundations. It further shows how this change leads immediately to an intuitive, formal definition of stability that aligns naturally with existing informal work. Then, contrary to existing realist theory, it shows why the rigorous analysis of realist assumptions leads to a nonmonotonic relationship between the offense/defense balance and war. It thus uses realism to inform and potentially redirect formal scholarship; it also uses formal scholarship to sharpen the logical foundations of realism and, in so doing, derive novel empirical predictions. The essay concludes by applying this synthesis to the rise of China today and indicating directions for deepening the formal/realist synthesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We experimentally investigate the role of two-sided reputation-building in dynamic bargaining. In the absence of outside options, rational bargainers have an incentive to imitate obstinate types that are committed to an aggressive demand, inducing delay. Outside options remove this incentive and ensure immediate agreement whenever two rational bargainers match. Our data support the hypothesis that outside options cut down on imitation and ensure timely agreements, but only if subjects share a belief about what constitutes obstinacy. Further, we find that outside options are exercised excessively and that efficiency is no better than it is in their absence. We ascribe this result to the presence of fairness preferences in the subject pool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price haggling and show that bargaining can become a "trap," where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer's valuation). This arises when one party is impatient about capturing zero surplus (e.g., Rubinstein 's example of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with costless unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally removes the trap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes an evolutionary game theoretical model in which individuals negotiate to reach a compromise settlement on who takes the dominant role in a dominant-subordinate relationship. The negotiation process is formalized by bargaining theory in economics, which makes our model different from alternative models on the formation of dominant-subordinate relationships based on detailed biological mechanisms. We find that evolution leads to a "cooperative" ("selfish") behavior when an individual takes the dominant (subordinate) role. For example, consider two Polistes wasps in a nest-building pair who try to determine the role assignment of the queen and the subordinate cofoundress. After the roles are assigned, the queen chooses between either sharing or monopolizing reproduction, and the subordinate chooses between exerting either a high or a low effort in rearing or foraging activities. According to our model's prediction, the queen's behavior (sharing reproduction) increases the collective fitness of the colony but potentially hurts her reproductive interest, while the subordinate's behavior (exerting a low effort) decreases the productivity of the colony but helps her to save energy. Such a behavior pair is evolutionarily stable because it guarantees an individual to have the comparative advantage in taking the dominant role against any other individuals via negotiation. This result may shed new light on understanding the formation of dominant-subordinate relationships. In addition, agnostic of detailed biological mechanisms, our mathematical formulation of dominant-subordinate relationships might also have wide applications in animal behavior and beyond, as its empirical support is found in article wasps and humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we introduce input price discrimination into vertical product differentiation model to analyze the impact of input price discrimination on social welfare. We find that the input price discrimination improves the supply of high-quality products in the market, and lead to the increase of consumer surplus. The effect of input price discrimination on social welfare is influenced by the pricing contract of input. When the price of input is determined by upstream firm, the input price discrimination reduces social welfare. While the input price discrimination increases social welfare when the price of input is determined by bargaining of upstream and downstream firms. • We consider a vertically related industry with vertical product differentiation. • When the price of input is determined by upstream firm, the input price discrimination reduce social welfare. • The input price discrimination increases social welfare when the price of input is determined by bargaining. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is motivated by the puzzle of diminishing gains in the European Union budget bargaining for governments with a Eurosceptic domestic audience, even as Euroscepticism is increasingly represented in national legislatures. Engaging literature on fiscal federalism in the European Union and the institutionalist politics of its budgetary process, we argue that European integration diminishes the ability of member states' governments to leverage Euroscepticism to extract concessions from the European Union budget. This is because Euroscepticism is becoming less exceptional, and greater differentiation in integration reduces the will to reward those seen as systematically less committed to integration. Running panel-corrected standard errors regressions on Operating Budgetary Balances since 1977, we find that in intergovernmental bargaining, domestic popular Euroscepticism is an advantage, but parliamentary Euroscepticism is not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

n players choose investment levels that determine a bargaining problem. Investments model pre-bargaining preparations such as arming and hiring legal aid—costly actions that turn out to be beneficial only if the agents do not reach an agreement. In the bargaining problem, payoffs are distributed according to an exogenously given bargaining solution. Investment influences positively the investor's disagreement payoff, but it also has a cost, which is modeled as a shrinkage of the feasible set. Two types of shrinkage are considered. Under either one, the investment is a waste from an ex-post point of view, because the agents end up reaching an agreement. The equilibrium level of wastefulness is increasing in the bargaining solution's disagreement sensitivity. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is less disagreement sensitive than the Nash solution, and is therefore better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]