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Israeli constitutionalism has long interested comparative constitutional law scholars, whether due to its geopolitical status, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, its internal divisions, or its unique constitutional evolution. Unlike many other countries that have ratified constitutions after the Second World War, Israel was established as a parliamentary democracy, with an explicit intention to ratify a constitution at a later stage. This did not happen. Instead, it underwent a “constitutional revolution” announced by its Supreme Court. Fitting a revolution, much of comparative constitutional law scholarship has focused on this pivotal moment. The articles in this symposium depart from the scholarship focused on that moment. They seek to critically understand what has become of Israeli constitutionalism in the past decade. In this introduction, we highlight several transformations and features which we believe are essential if one is to understand the extant constitutional order in Israel. These should be understood as background conditions against which Israeli constitutionalism is operating. They include the strengthening of judicial review alongside rising political resistance to the Court’s power; populism in political discourse targeting rule of law institutions; the erosion of individual rights alongside the strengthening of nationalist elements; and increasing divisions inside Israeli society. These challenge the idea of a successful constitutional revolution in terms of its inherent promise to better protect individual rights and safeguard the rule of law. In describing these features, we seek to situate the Supreme Court, judicial review, and the legal-constitutional order generally, in the larger sphere of Israeli society and politics.

A central dilemma in human rights law is how to reconcile the government’s duty to respect freedom with its obligation to protect individuals that might be harmed by the exercise of said freedom. Intolerance toward the dissemination of certain illiberal positions may have adverse social and political unintended results. One central concern is that such a policy would create a common culture that does not appreciate the critical importance of a vibrant public discourse. As such, it might enable governments, in terms of popular legitimacy, to curtail speech beyond the limits of justifiable infringements. Recent developments in Israel illustrate this concern. In recent years, normatively legitimate antiracism legislation was unjustifiably expanded by imposing sanctions on expressions that were deemed harmful to national sentiments or questioning the legitimacy of Israel’s Constitutional Identity as a Jewish state. Similarly, laws against the support of terrorism were followed by prohibitions on advocating boycotts against Israel. This Article proposes to halt the sociological slippery-slope trend of curtailing speech far and beyond the permissible scope of such a policy, by implementing rules-based legal doctrines that may foster a stronger public pressure on the government to protect free speech; restricting the scope of “harm-in-one-step” approach; and providing a clearer definition of the requirement of state neutrality in the context of regulating speech.

This PhD dissertation is a “research-through-creation” project, which set out to explore and gain insights from the process of writing a science fiction TV series pilot screenplay, that deals with the morally charged subject of human enhancement.Science fiction is a very important genre in today's rapidly changing world, with its continuously advancing technology. Science fiction novels, movies and TV series play a major role in creating a social, moral and cultural discourse about how we, as humanity, can and should deal with current and future technologies and lead the way we evolve. Human enhancement is one of the major technologies which' potential evolvement could disrupt and change society and humanity in a significant way by offering humankind the possibility to transcend natural selection and control how it will develop. The science fiction writer is in a unique position in which he/she needs to mediate science, technology and their psychological, moral and social possibilities in the form of story and drama. When done so successfully, the science fiction writer's work can offer value by contributing to the social discourse. Researching this unique position, between science, social relevance and storytelling, is at the heart of this work. Its objective is to articulate insights and conceptualizations for the considerations, actions and creative decisions required to accomplish this kind of a challenge.To do so I have written two science fiction TV pilot screenplays, an earlier version and a later version. In parallel, I have studied the subject of human enhancement both for its scientific aspect and its philosophical and social aspect, and also studied about the theory and practice of science fiction writing, with an emphasis on stories that deal with human enhancement and current science fiction TV series. The two lines of work inter-related and complement each other.The study of human enhancement and science fiction took part in the progression of the writing from the initial screenplay to the final one, which is considered by me to be more satisfactory in achieving both a good representation of the social and moral issues of human enhancement, and in fulfilling the dramatic potential of the subject.This dissertation includes the screenplays and other creative materials, preceded by a critical essay which describes the study of human enhancement and science fiction, and analyzes the development of the writing process leading up to the final screenplay. The insights gained from the research highlight the importance of the science fiction writer's understanding of the technology he writes about (or the “novum” – the technological/scientific difference-maker); creating a story premise which as a derivative of the technology; exploring the different moral, psychological and social aspects of the chosen technology and translating those to story conflicts and character motivations; and making story-world decisions that best serve the thematic issues the writer wants to convey.; Cette thèse de doctorat est un projet de «recherche à travers la création», qui a pour objectif d'explorer et d'éclairer le processus d'écriture d'un scénario pilote de série télévisée de science-fiction, qui traite du sujet moralement chargé de l'amélioration humaine.La science-fiction est un genre très important dans le monde en évolution rapide, avec sa technologie en constante évolution. Les romans de science-fiction, les films et les séries télévisées jouent un rôle majeur dans la création d'un discours social, moral et culturel sur la façon dont nous, en tant qu'humanité, pouvons et devons faire face aux technologies actuelles et futures et diriger notre évolution. L'amélioration humaine est l'une des technologies majeures dont l'évolution potentielle pourrait bouleverser et transformer la société et l'humanité de manière significative en offrant à l'humanité la possibilité de transcender la sélection naturelle et de contrôler son évolution.L'écrivain de science-fiction occupe une position unique dans laquelle il doit médier la science, la technologie et leurs possibilités psychologiques, morales et sociales sous forme d'histoire et de théâtre. Une fois réalisé avec tant de succès, le travail de l'écrivain de science-fiction peut offrir une valeur ajoutée en contribuant au discours social.La recherche de cette position unique, entre science, pertinence sociale et narration, est au cœur de ce travail. Son objectif est d'articuler des idées et des conceptualisations pour les considérations, les actions et les décisions créatives nécessaires pour accomplir ce type de défi.Pour ce faire, j'ai écrit deux scénarios de pilotes de télévision de science-fiction, une version antérieure et une version ultérieure. En parallèle, j'ai étudié le sujet de la valorisation humaine tant du point de vue scientifique que philosophique et social, ainsi que de la théorie et de la pratique de l'écriture de science-fiction, en mettant l'accent sur les récits traitant du développement humain et de la science-fiction actuelle. Séries télévisées. L'étude de l'amélioration humaine et de la science-fiction a contribué à la progression de l'écriture, du scénario initial au dernier, ce que j'estime plus satisfaisant pour atteindre les deux objectifs. une bonne représentation des enjeux sociaux et moraux de la valorisation humaine et de la réalisation du potentiel dramatique du sujet.Cette thèse comprend les scénarios et autres supports créatifs, précédés d'un essai critique qui décrit l'étude du perfectionnement humain et de la science-fiction, et analyse l'évolution du processus d'écriture menant au scénario final.Les enseignements tirés de la recherche soulignent l'importance de la compréhension de l'écrivain de science-fiction de la technologie sur laquelle il écrit (ou du «novum» - le créateur de différence technologique / scientifique); créer une prémisse d'histoire qui dérive de la technologie; explorer les différents aspects moraux, psychologiques et sociaux de la technologie choisie et les traduire en conflits d'histoire et en motivations de caractère; et prendre des décisions du monde de l'histoire qui répondent le mieux aux questions thématiques que l'auteur veut transmettre.

תקציר בעברית: בית המשפט קבע שהנורמה הבסיסית בישראל, בדומה לזו המוכרת בדמוקרטיות המערביות האחרות, היא זו שמתוארת על-ידי התפיסה בדבר "ממשלה מוגבלת". עם זאת, טרם התגבשה בעניין זה הסכמה רחבה. המחלוקת היא בשני מישורים: פוליטית, יש הסבורים שמוטב היה לקבוע שהנורמה הבסיסית של מדינת ישראל היא דמוקרטיה הליכית (או "פורמלית"), שלפיה "הרוב קובע". משפטית, עולות מן הפסיקה גישות שונות בשאלה אם חוקי היסוד הם החוקה הכתובה של מדינת ישראל, או שמא הם רק "נורמות בעלות מעמד חוקתי". להבחנה הזו חשיבות הן לעניין אופן ההצדקה של ההכרה בקיומן של מגבלות על הכנסת ואכיפת הציות להן בדרך של ביקורת שיפוטית והן לעניין סוגית גבולות כוחה של הכנסת לקבוע הוראות בחוקי-יסוד. חיבור זה נועד לספק תשתית נורמטיבית ופוזיטיבית לטענה שהנורמה הבסיסית של מדינת ישראל היא דמוקרטיה ליברלית, כלומר סמכותן של רשויות השלטון תחומות מכוח עקרונות יסוד של ליברליזם. חוק-יסוד: כבוד האדם וחירותו מספק הכשר ציבורי לאכיפת המגבלות על סמכות החקיקה של הכנסת; אך ההכשר הנורמטיבי נובע ישירות מן הנורמה הבסיסית האמורה. חוק היסוד מספק את הכשר הציבורי האמור בעיקר לאור תוכנו, לא משום שהוא חלק מן החוקה הכתובה של ישראל. אחת התוצאות שנובעות מכך היא הצדקה להחלת ביקורת שיפוטית על קביעת הוראות בחוקי יסוד. English Abstract: The Supreme Court of Israel has ruled that the powers of government are limited, and it employs judicial review of legislation, but it is still debated whether Israel has a formal, written constitution. At its essence, the controversy is whether Israel’s Basic Norm reflects the ideal of formal democracy or rather one of a liberal democracy. This paper argues for the former, both positively and normatively, and implements the argument regarding the issue of limits on the legislature’s power to amend Israel’s Basic Laws.

The quarter-century anniversary of Israel's ratification of the major United Nations (UN) human rights treaties is an opportunity to revisit the formal and informal interaction between domestic and international Bills of Rights in Israel. This study reveals that the human rights conventions lack almost entirely a formal domestic legal status. The study identifies a minor shift in the scope of the Israeli Supreme Court's reference to international law, as the Court now cites international human rights law to justify decisions that a state action is unlawful, and not only to support findings that an action is valid. This shift may be the result of other reasons, for instance, a ‘radiation’ of the Court's relatively extensive use of international humanitarian law in reviewing state actions taken in the Occupied Territories. However, it may also reflect a perception of enhanced legitimacy of referring to international human rights law as a point of reference in human rights adjudication following ratification of the treaties.At the same time, the Court continues to avoid acknowledging incompatibility between domestic law and international law. It refers to the latter only to support its interpretation of Israeli constitutional law, as it did before the ratification. This article critically evaluates this practice. While international human rights law should not be binding at the domestic level, because of its lack of sufficient democratic legitimacy in Israel, it should serve as an essential benchmark. The Court may legitimise a human rights infringement that is unjustified according to international law, but such incompatibility requires an explicit justification. The Court, together with the legislature and the government, are required to engage critically with the non-binding norms set by the ratified UN human rights treaties.

Welfare economics—the normative branch of economics—is a consequentialist moral theory. Unlike deontological morality, at least in its basic form it attributes no intrinsic value to prohibitions on active or intentional harming of other people, lying, or promise-breaking, and does not allow people to prioritize their own interests over the overall good. The chapter critically examines several methods of incorporating deontological constraints and options into economic analysis of law and into welfare economics more generally. These methods include an analysis of the long-term and indirect effects of apparently efficient infringements of deontological constraints; a move from act- to rule-consequentialism; incorporating deontological concerns into the definition of good outcomes that should be maximized; and the treatment of moral judgments as preferences whose fulfillment should be maximized along with any other. In addition to these indirect ways, the chapter also examines the integration of thresholds constraints and options into economic analysis of law.

This Volume offers an introduction to Israeli legal system. It includes a detailed analysis of the Foundations of the Israeli Law, especially: history and legal sources of Israeli law constitutional law tort law intellectual property law trusts and antitrust law company law labour and tax law family law criminal Law private international law Israel and the EU Israel and international law The authors are specialists in their respective fields and teach at renowned Israeli universities. The volume is highly recommended for students, trainees, but also for lawyers, tax and management consultants, practitioners in business, administration, justice, media and anyone else who comes into contact with Israeli law.

Human rights laws substantially differ across legal systems, despite the fact that liberal democracies share the underlying moral principles of human rights. The differences result from “second order” considerations, ones that determine to what extent human rights law is composed of rules-based norms or is mostly a case-by-case, standard-like analysis. Accordingly, a central element that characterizes a legal system’s human rights law is its “locus” along the rules-standards spectrum. The choice along this spectrum should be shaped by moral considerations about the nature of rights, and by sociological ones, evaluating the expected effect of the form of human rights law on developing a common culture of respect of human rights. The relevant considerations do not induce a decisive judgment, but they present the costs of implementing an open-ended “balancing” approach. Specifically, it is improbable that the optimal form of human rights law is a corner solution of the type of an open standard. And yet, this particular form of human rights law is very popular, a fact that calls for an explanation. This Article suggests that the tendency toward standards is not the result of a principled reasoning but mostly a response to the decline in the public trust in the courts. Employing rules is a rational strategy for a court to shield itself from political actors’ pressure. However, standards enable courts to adjust the scope of judicial review in anticipation of the popular and political reaction to certain rulings. Accordingly, the greater the threats to independence of the judiciary, the closer to the standards-end of the spectrum human right law is expected to be. The choice may thus serve as an indicator of the diffuse popular support for the court, across different legal systems or over time in a given legal system.

A central dilemma in human rights law is how to reconcile the government’s duty to respect freedom with its obligation to protect individuals that might be harmed by the exercise of said freedom. Intolerance toward the dissemination of certain illiberal positions may have adverse social and political unintended results. One central concern is that such a policy would create a common culture that does not appreciate the critical importance of a vibrant public discourse. As such, it might enable governments, in terms of popular legitimacy, to curtail speech beyond the limits of justifiable infringements. Recent developments in Israel illustrate this concern. In recent years, normatively legitimate anti-racism legislation was unjustifiably expanded by imposing sanctions on expressions that were deemed harmful to national sentiments or questioning the legitimacy of Israel’s Constitutional Identity as a Jewish state. Similarly, laws against the support of terrorism were followed by prohibitions on advocating boycotts against Israel. This Article proposes to halt the sociological slippery-slope trend of curtailing speech far and beyond the permissible scope of such a policy, by implementing rules-based legal doctrines that may foster a stronger public pressure on the government to protect free speech; restricting the scope of “harm-in-one-step” approach; and providing a clearer definition of the requirement of state neutrality in the context of regulating speech.

תקציר בעברית: בחיבור זה, שנכתב לכבודו של הנשיא אשר גרוניס לרגל פרישתו, אנו מבקשים להצטרף לביקורתו של הנשיא גרוניס על היעדר קו מנחה בפסיקה באשר להבחנה בין איזון אופקי לאיזון אנכי. הטענה היסודית שמוצעת כאן היא שלהבחנה בין שני המבחנים חשיבות רבה בקביעת היקף ההגנה על זכויות אדם ואין מקום לזנוח אותה. ההבחנה בין איזון אנכי לאופקי אינה צריכה להתבסס על קביעת מדרג של אינטרסים או זכויות, ובעיקר איננה צריכה להיות מוכרעת על פי הקביעה אם האינטרס אשר לשם הגנה עליו פוגעים בזכויות מסווג כאינטרס ציבורי או כזכות חוקתית. העובדה שבהקשר מסוים קיימת "התנגשות" בין זכויות חוקתיות אינה מספיקה כשהיא לעצמה כדי לבסס את המסקנה שיש להסתפק במבחן של איזון אופקי. הגישה המוצעת כאן מבוססת על אפיונו של מבחן האיזון האנכי כמבחן עקרוני, שלפיו פגיעה בזכות חוקתית יכולה להיות מוצדקת – בכפוף ליישום אד הוק של דרישת המידתיות – רק אם היא מקיימת שורה של כללים, ובהם הדרישה להסמכה בחוק, ההסתברות שהפגיעה בזכות החוקתית הכרחית לקידום התכלית הראויה היא גבוהה מספיק ועוד. המקרים שבהם יש להחיל איזון אופקי הם רק אלה שבהם ראוי לוותר על דרישות הסף שמאפיינות את האיזון האנכי, כלומר המקרים שבהם אין יסוד לחשש שמעשה השלטוני גורם פגיעה לא מוצדקת בזכויות חוקתיות. אלה הם מקרים חריגים, שבהם הפגיעה בזכות החוקתית היא מימוש חובה המוטלת על השלטון, מכוח דיני זכויות האדם, לפעול להגנה על זכותו של אחד באמצעות פגיעה בזכותו של אחר. במרבית המקרים שבהם מופעלת סמכות שלטונית באופן הפוגע בזכות חוקתית של אחד הפגיעה אינה תוצאה של מימוש חובה כאמור, אפילו אם המעשה השלטוני נועד להגן על זכות חוקתית של אחר, ולכן יש להחיל איזון אנכי. English Abstract: The article, written (in Hebrew) in honor of President (Rt.) Asher Grunis, in the occasion of his retirement from the bench, joins President Grunis’ critique of the lack of settled doctrine in the Israeli Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the distinction between so-called “vertical” and “horizontal” balancing tests. Unlike the use of these terms in other legal systems, to denote the distinction between an infringement of a human rights by a state action (vertical application) and a private action (horizontal application), the Israeli Court applies both tests in evaluating the validity of state action. The Article explores the differences between the two tests and the circumstances in which each should be used. The article suggests that the vertical balancing test is primarily rules-based. According to this test, an infringement is prima facie wrong, a presumption that is refuted only if a set of stringent requirements is met, including: legality, probability-threshold, and more. Horizontal balancing test should be employed only when the state action should not be classified as prima facie wrong. Accordingly, we suggest that the decision when to apply each test should be based neither on setting a ranking of interests or rights nor on the decision whether the interest that the state action aims to enhance is categorized as a human right or a public interest. The existence of a conflict between human rights is insufficient to justify employing the less demanding horizontal balancing test. This test should apply only in exceptional circumstances, in which the state action infringes a right of one person to fulfil the government’s positive obligation to protect another person’s right. We suggest that the Court’s current tendency to apply in a large number of cases the horizontal balancing test, which provides a lesser protection of rights, and is a standard-based, in unjustified. The argument is demonstrated by discussing, inter alia, the evaluation of the permissibility of various anti-terror measures, defamation suits, and the government’s duty to reveal information that infringes the right to privacy.

תקציר בעברית: מקובל להבחין בין שני ענפים מרכזיים של המשפט הציבורי: משפט ציבורי מוסדי ודיני זכויות האדם. אף שההבחנה בין שני התחומים אינה חדה, יש לה בסיס רחב. הפסיקה שניתנה בשני העשורים האחרונים מבטאת שניות מעניינת באשר למעמד החוקתי של המשפט הציבורי המוסדי. מצד אחד, הוכר בפסיקה מעמד חוקתי של שורה של נורמות מוסדיות שאינן מנויות במפורש בחוקי היסוד, באופן שמוביל להגבלה ניכרת של כוחה של הכנסת. מצד שני, בית-המשפט בחר לבסס את המעמד החוקתי של הנורמות הללו דווקא על חוק-יסוד: כבוד האדם וחירותו, באמצעות הקביעה שלכל אדם זכות חוקתית לכך שהשלטון יפעל כדין. גישה זו אפשרה לבסס את המעמד החוקתי של הנורמות המוסדיות, אך היא הובילה להחלה של המבחן הדו-שלבי של דיני זכויות האדם גם על חובת הציות להן. לפי מבחן זה, החובה לפעול בהתאם לנורמות המוסדיות אינה מוחלטת, אלא יש לבחון בכל מקרה ומקרה, מכוח דוקטרינת המידתיות, אם הפרת הנורמה מוצדקת, בהתחשב במכלול הנסיבות הרלוונטיות. יתר על-כן, מגמה זו החלה מוחלת בשנים האחרונות גם באשר לנורמות מוסדיות שמעוגנות במפורש בחוקי היסוד, מכוח מה שמקובל לכנות "פסקת הגבלה משתמעת". חיבור זה נועד לאפיין את ההתפתחויות הללו ולהציע דיון ביקורתי בהן. בצד תמיכה בהכרה במעמד החוקתי של הנורמות המוסדיות, חיבור זה נועד להצביע על החשיבות שבהתוויה מחדש של ההבחנה בין משפט חוקתי מוסדי לדיני זכויות האדם. מוצע כאן להימנע מלהחיל ביחס לנורמות המוסדיות את המבחן הדו-שלבי. ביסוד כך הטענה שאין מקום להניח, כמובן מאליו, שכל נורמה חוקתית צריכה להיות "סטנדרט" ולא "כלל". בהתאם לכך, המאמר עוסק במשמעות הבחירה בין כללים לבין סטנדרטים בפסיקה במשפט הציבורי. English Abstract: It is customary to distinguish between two main branches of constitutional law: institutional norms and human rights law. While the former type of norms primarily regulates the government to enhance the public interest, the latter aims at protecting individual interests. The Israeli Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence reflects interesting developments regarding the institutional norms. On one hand, the Court has recognized the constitutional status of several such norms, notwithstanding the fact that they are not explicitly enumerated in the set of Basic-Laws that serves as Israel’s Constitution. This ruling has lead to a significant restriction of the Knesset’s power to enact laws catering for special interests groups, privatization of certain governmental powers, and more. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has ruled that the constitutional status of these norms is based on an expansive interpretation of Israel’s Bill of Rights, namely Basic-Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The Court ruled that a person has a constitutional right that the government will act in accordance with the rule of law, which incorporates the entire set of “institutional” norms. This reading provided a basis for establishing the constitutional status of institutional public law. However, it has blurred the distinction between institutional norms and human rights law. In particular, this development has lead to the implementation of human rights law methodology in reviewing state actions that arguably violate institutional norms. It is a standards-based approach, requiring a case-by-case, all-things-considered analysis, implementing the proportionality doctrine to determine if the infringement of the norm is justified. Furthermore, in recent years, the Court has applied this methodology even to institutional norms that are explicitly anchored in the Basic Laws, developing the doctrine known as “implied” limitation clause. In this article (written in Hebrew), we characterize these developments in Israel’s constitutional law and critically evaluate them. While justifying the recognition of a constitutional status of unenumerated institutional public law norms, we argue that these norms’ constitutional status should be anchored in institutional Basic-Laws, namely Basic-Law: the Knesset, and Basic-Law: the Government, rather than in human rights law. We maintain that the two-stage, standards-based human rights methodology is not suitable for reviewing state actions that violates these norms. Rather, a rule-based approach should be preferred.

In our book, Law, Economics, and Morality (OUP, 2010), we proposed to combine economic methodology and deontological morality through explicit incorporation of moral constraints into economic models. We argued that the normative flaws of economic analysis can be rectified without relinquishing its methodological advantages and that moral constraints can be formalized so as to make their analysis more rigorous. We then illustrated the implementation of constrained CBA in several legal fields, including contract law, freedom of speech, the fight against terrorism, and legal paternalism. In this paper, we respond to critical reviews of the book written by Professors Larry Alexander, Ariel Porat, and Avihay Dorfman. Among other things, we clarify the scope and goals of the book, elucidate the relationships between deontology and consequentialism, discuss the relationships between deontological constraints and options, and address various issues in contract law and remedies.

This Article challenges the premise that the separation of state and religion is a necessary predicate for religious free exercise. The state's duty to treat people as equals requires it to ensure that all citizens enjoy reasonable access to religious services. Public supply of religious services thus enhances the exercise of freedom of religion. The extent of public involvement in the provision of a religious service is not by itself a sufficient justification for the regulation of the relevant activity. In certain cases, the intervention is justified by reasons that are unrelated to the scope of government involvement. A prominent example is the case of competition between different religious congregations over limited resources, such as space and time at a holy site. Regulation of activity is then required in order to ensure reasonable access. In other cases, the government enhances the powers of religious bodies, and thus generates a concern of religious coercion. In these cases the governmental role may well result in an infringement of religious freedom. However, such a conclusion is not self-evident, and a detailed assessment of the over all effect of the government involvement is required in order to determine whether the involvement—and what type of involvement—is desirable.These and related arguments are demonstrated through a discussion of the Israeli experience of almost six decades of intensive involvement of a democratic state in supplying religious services. The Israeli case can serve as a thought-provoking hypothetical on the consequences—and thus of the desirability—of adopting a model of extensive establishment of religion(s) by a democratic state.

At issue is the appropriate legal reaction to so-called “selective” conscientious objections in the current Israeli context, accounting for both consequential considerations and deontological ones. It is argued that a relevant distinction in this respect is between objections committed by members of a permanent minority, which are based on views that are practically excluded from the political discourse, and objections which are guided by what Rawls calls “political principles”, that is, “the principles of justice which regulate the constitution”. This distinction can explain and justify the current policy of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) of granting exemptions to Ultra-Orthodox Jews and to Arabs (even if not all these cases reflect so-called “full” conscientious objection) while denying an exemption to those who refuse to serve based on their opposition to the IDF's activities in the Occupied Territories. However, it is argued that the important expressive role of such refusals requires a more measured approach, by either legitimizing a limited number of such acts or imposing only minimal sanctions (while formally de-legitimizing such acts). These arguments are preceded by an assessment of an alternative possible justification of legitimizing refusals, to prevent the implementation of unlawful activities by the IDF. It is argued that this purpose does not justify legitimization of refusals except in particular instances that are specified.

Lawyers’ Contingent Fee (CF) rates are rather uniform, often one-third of the recovery. Arguably, this uniformity is a type of anti-competitive price-fixing, which results in clients paying supra-competitive fees. This paper challenges this argument. It shows that uniform CF rates provide clients with an important advantage, as suchthey rates enable them to make a de facto “take-it-or-leave-it” offer. Consequently, lawyers cannot exploit their private information, and clients retain the transaction’s entire surplus and may hire the best lawyer among those who find it profitable to handle the case. The paper also addresses the effect of uniformity of CF rates when lawyers refer cases to other lawyers. It shows that uniformity facilitates matching of clients and lawyers through the referral system. It also demonstrates that the fact that both direct clients and those obtained through paid-for referrals pay the same CF rate does not attest to cross-subsidization. The clients whose cases are transferred for a referral fee (paid by the handling lawyer) “pay” for the referral service by obtaining a less highly ranked lawyer.

Transitivity is a fundamental requirement for consistency. Legal systems, especially when composed over time and by different agencies, may encounter non-transitive cycles, in which by one rule the law prefers one outcome a over another outcome b, by another rule b trumps some third result c, but a third rule ranks c higher than a. This paper discusses a new solution to such cycles in which the relevant rules of preferences are ranked and then applied until a transitive order of the options is obtained. The paper provides a formal generalization of this solution, and demonstrates its possible implementation to some legal issues. It is also shown that this solution can be traced to the Rabbinic literature, starting with the Mishnah and the Talmud (1st–5th c CE).

Is it permissible to extra-judicially detain a person or even intentionally kill him, based on information that he is a “member” of a terror organization? The prevailing approach calls for applying the international laws of war, where the answer is based on determining the “status” of the targeted-person. Once it is established that a person’s involvement in the hostilities meets some threshold, he loses the protection afforded to civilians and may thus be targeted or detained.This Article questions this approach. It suggests that the unique characteristics of the fight on terror require imposing a duty to justify, on an individualized basis, targeting and detaining persons. Anti-terror warfare is an armed conflict of a special type in two main aspects: the terrorists often disguise themselves among civilians, thus creating an enhanced risk that anti-terror warfare will result in mistakenly targeting innocent people; and the terrorists are not acting as part of a political entity, which may be reasonably held responsible for the terrorists’ choice to employ this practice of blurring the distinction between combatants and civilians. Consequently, a state that fights terror is required to further mitigate the risk of targeting or detaining innocent people. For this purpose, the power to target or detain suspected terrorists should be subject to the constraints that result from human rights law. The Article presents the conditions of the permissibility of employing anti-terror measures: The purpose of the action must be preemption rather than retribution or deterrence, the risk posed by the targeted person should be sufficiently high, in terms of the probability that he will be involved in a terror attack if not thwarted, and the measure taken should be the least harmful alternative to achieve its aim. The Article discusses this doctrine of “individual dangerousness,” and presents the plausibility of its implementation through a discussion of the Israeli Supreme Court anti-terror jurisprudence, which already applies, to some extent, this doctrine.

Lawyers’ Contingent Fee (CF) rates are rather uniform, often one-third of the recovery. Arguably, this uniformity attests to collusion in the market, resulting in clients paying supra-competitive fees. This paper challenges this common argument.Uniform CF rates are not necessarily superior to negotiable ones; yet they provide clients with an important advantage. They result in clients making a defacto “take-it-or-leave-it” offer. It precludes lawyers from exploiting their private information about the lawsuit’s expected value and the amount of work it requires. The uniformity of CF rates enables clients to hire the best available lawyer, either directly, if clients know lawyers’ ranking, or indirectly, through the referral system. This uniformity thus fosters a positive assortative matching of lawyers and clients. Finally, the fact that both direct clients and clients obtained through paid-for referrals pay the same CF rate does not attest to cross-subsidization, as the cases a lawyer gets through referrals are quite different than those she gets directly.

This chapter presents welfare economics and its consequentialist nature. It first discusses the main features of positive and normative economic analysis and the meaning of “consequentialism.” It then analyzes the deontological critique of consequentialism, specifically consequentialism's lack of constraints on attaining the best outcomes. It critically examines various attempts at defending consequentialism in general, and welfare economics in particular, against this critique. It concludes that all of the attempts to downplay, deny, or circumvent the deontological critique are doomed to failure. The responses that come closest to actually addressing the critique do so by endorsing deontological constraints (and options) on the factoral level. They imply that agents and policy-makers should only strive to attain the overall best outcomes subject to constraints and that agents sometimes have options not to attain the best outcomes.

The conclusion briefly summarizes the main argument of the book.

This chapter examines discrimination in the marketplace and, more specifically, the legitimacy and appropriate scope of anti-discrimination legislation. Following a brief survey of current legal norms, it relies on positive economic analysis to explain possible motivations for discrimination. It then examines the efforts made to justify anti-discrimination legislation on standard efficiency grounds. It argues that these efforts are unsuccessful. Rather, the appropriate way to adequately capture the issues pertaining to market discrimination is to directly take into account a deontological constraint against harming people by discriminating against them. The chapter analyzes the deontological constraint against discrimination, examines the relationships between this constraint and distributive bases for anti-discrimination legislation, and demonstrates how current legal norms are best understood as resting on moderate deontology and embodying threshold constraints.

Economic analysis of law is a powerful analytical methodology. However, as a purely consequentialist approach, which determines the desirability of acts and rules solely by assessing the goodness of their outcomes, standard cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is normatively objectionable. Moderate deontology prioritizes such values as autonomy, basic liberties, truth-telling, and promise-keeping over the promotion of good outcomes. It holds that there are constraints on promoting the good. Such constraints may be overridden only if enough good (or bad) is at stake. While moderate deontology conforms to prevailing moral intuitions and legal doctrines, it is arguably lacking in methodological rigor and precision. This book examines the possibility of combining economic methodology and deontological morality through explicit and direct incorporation of moral constraints (and options) into economic models. It argues that the normative flaws of economic analysis can be rectified without relinquishing its methodological advantages, and that moral constraints can be formalized so as to make their analysis more rigorous. The book discusses various substantive and methodological choices involved in modeling deontological constraints. It proposes to determine the permissibility of any act or rule infringing a deontological constraint by means of mathematical threshold functions. The book presents the general structure of threshold functions, analyzes their elements, and addresses possible objections to this proposal. It then illustrates the implementation of constrained CBA in several legal fields, including the fight against terrorism, freedom of speech, anti-discrimination law, contract law, and legal paternalism.

This chapter discusses contract law. Ordinarily, market transactions do not involve infringements of deontological constraints. For this reason (and since they usually involve money or easily monetized goods), standard cost-benefit analysis is particularly apt for analyzing contract law. Nevertheless, it is argued that certain deontological constraints apply to contracting behavior and that combining deontological constraints with economic analysis of contract law, may be fruitful. The chapter briefly surveys the deontological constraints pertinent to contract law and critically examines the standard economic response to them. It then demonstrates how deontological constraints may be integrated with economic analysis of the contracting stage, focusing on the doctrines of mistake and misrepresentation. Last, it highlights the differences between economic and deontological analyses of contract performance and breach, and discusses the difficulties facing integration of deontological constraints with the economic analysis of contract remedies, given the current state of the pertinent theories.

This chapter discusses moderate (or threshold) deontology, its critique, and possible responses. Deontological theories prioritize values such as autonomy, human dignity, and keeping one's promises over the promotion of good outcomes. In prohibiting the infliction of harm on other people, they resort to distinctions such as that between actively doing harm and merely allowing it, and between intending to do harm and merely foreseeing it. Moderate deontology holds that constraints (and options) have thresholds. A constraint may be overridden for the sake of furthering good outcomes or avoiding bad ones if enough good (or bad) is at stake; and an option not to promote the good may be overridden for the sake of attaining enough good or avoiding enough bad. The chapter analyzes the main critiques leveled against deontology in general and moderate deontology in particular. It concludes that threshold constraints (and options) are an indispensable part of any acceptable factoral moral theory, but that threshold deontology suffers from a lack of methodological rigor and precision.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book's motivation and goals, and describes the structure of the discussion.

This chapter discusses the claim that even if moderate deontology is the correct moral theory for individuals, consequentialism is the appropriate moral theory for legal policymakers such as legislators, judges, and regulators, and for academic policy-analysts. It refutes the argument that the distinction between actively doing harm and passively allowing it is inapplicable in the public sphere. It similarly counters the argument that the distinction between intending harm and merely foreseeing it is only applicable in the private sphere. The chapter contends that these arguments confuse, among other things, between constraints and options, and between the actor's perspective and the perspective of an external reviewer. It ultimately rejects the alleged dichotomy between personal and public morality.

This chapter discusses various substantive and methodological choices involved in formalizing deontological constraints and options. It proposes to determine the permissibility of any act or rule infringing a deontological constraint by means of a threshold function. It outlines the scope of this proposal by describing the role of threshold functions within a broader context that may involve conflicting constraints and require a choice between several deontologically permissible acts. It then delineates the general structure of threshold functions. To capture the essence of deontological constraints, threshold functions set the magnitude and shape of the threshold, as well as the types of costs and benefits that are taken into account in determining whether the act's (or rule's) net benefit meets the threshold. The construction of threshold functions for deontological options is also discussed.

This chapter discusses freedom of speech. It briefly describes current constitutional protection of this freedom and surveys its standard economic analysis. It then introduces the deontological constraint against curtailing free speech and analyzes in some detail the normative judgments involved in conducting a constrained cost-benefit analysis of speech regulation. As to calculating the benefit of speech regulation — which is tantamount to calculating the speech's expected harm — it examines the desirability of excluding, or radically discounting, various types of harms, such as chronologically-remote and low-probability harms, small harms, harms brought about through rational persuasion, and mere offensiveness. Various ways of formalizing such excluders and combining them are examined. The chapter then analyzes the threshold that has to be met to justify speech regulation, including its shape, the setting of different thresholds for content-based and for content-neutral regulation, and different thresholds for different categories of speech.

This chapter analyzes legal paternalism in its various manifestations. It first argues that contrary to prevailing notions, normative economics does not entail principled anti-paternalism. In fact, the consequentialist nature of standard welfare economics — namely the absence of constraints on promoting good outcomes — opens the door to limiting people's freedom with a view to promoting their own good. Economists ordinarily object to paternalism, but rather than pointing to the intrinsic value of freedom, they base their anti-paternalistic stance on various secondary considerations, thus missing the real dilemmas inherent in paternalism. Adding deontological constraints to the analysis better captures the pertinent issues, and provides more accurate yardsticks with which to evaluate paternalistic legal norms and explain existing ones. The chapter constructs formal models to evaluate the desirability of paternalistic legal norms from both economic and moderate deontological perspectives.

This chapter tackles a number of methodological and principled objections to the incorporation of deontological constraints into economic analysis. It discusses the claims that such incorporation would adversely affect the normative neutrality of economic analysis; that monetizing deontological constraints faces insurmountable obstacles; that it would lead to setting too low thresholds for constraints; and that it is incompatible with the expressivist role of the law. It concludes that most of these objections are unpersuasive, and none is conclusive.

This chapter presents a constrained cost-benefit analysis of measures taken in the fight against terrorism. It begins by characterizing and criticizing existing normative economic analysis of the fight against terrorism as reflecting a simplified ad-hoc balancing. It then presents the central deontological constraints pertaining to the fight on terror. The chapter discusses threshold functions that should be employed in order to determine the permissibility of such measures as targeted killings and torture. It discusses the factors affecting the evaluation of the act's relevant net benefit, and those determining the amount of net benefit required to justify an infringement. It argues that standard economic analysis fails to take into account critical distinctions. These include the distinction between different goals of anti-terrorist measures; the difference between harms the state inflicts through antiterrorist measures, and those resulting from unthwarted terrorist attacks; and the distinction between intended and unintended harm. Deontologically-constrained CBA, which incorporates all of these distinctions, is shown to be methodically workable and normatively superior.

The Israeli Supreme Court recently decided to strike down legislation to establish a privately operated prison. The Court’s decision to invalidate this legislation is interesting, as it stipulates that prison privatization is unconstitutional per se, irrespective of its specific characteristics or expected outcome. It ruled that executing governmental powers by prison staff employed by a for-profit organization violates the prisoners’ basic rights to liberty and human dignity. This essay discusses this position, and points out some of its difficulties. It suggests that while the decision’s ultimate outcome can be justified, it would have gained greater (normative) legitimacy if it were based on a constitutional norm prohibiting the privatization of 'core' governmental powers rather than on an analysis of human rights.

In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction courts compare the expected irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued to the irreparable harm that would result if the injunction is issued. An injury is considered irreparable only as far as it "cannot be cured by a remedy after trial." We argue that efficiency entails that this definition is incorrect. Harm to one party which does not correlate to a corresponding benefit to the other party is a deadweight-loss. The court must take such harm into account in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, irrespective of the availability of an ex-post remedy. Consequently, the implementation of the current doctrine, which allows courts to disregard certain social harms (losses that can be compensated for), leads courts to grant, in some cases, inefficient preliminary injunctions, and to reject, in other cases, applications for efficient ones.

Harsh sanctions are conventionally assumed to primarily benefit vulnerable targets. Contrary to this perception, this article shows that augmented sanctions often serve the less vulnerable targets. While decreasing crime, harsher sanctions also induce the police to shift enforcement efforts from more to less vulnerable victims. When this shift is substantial, augmented sanctions exacerbate--rather than reduce--the risk to vulnerable victims. Based on this insight, this article suggests several normative implications concerning the efficacy of enhanced sanctions, the importance of victims' funds,and the connection between police operations and apprehension rates.

The extent of public sector involvement in providing religious services is an important factor in determining the scope of legitimate regulation of relevant religious activities. However, I argue that the existence of a government role is not a sufficient justification for such regulation. Participation in the supply of religious services does not exempt the government from the constraints of its duty to respect freedom of religion. I point to two main considerations in this respect. First, in certain cases, accomplishing the purpose of government involvement — securing reasonable access to religious services — entails government intervention in religious activities. Second, more extensive regulation can be justified when involvement of the public authority intensifies the harm that the relevant religious practice imposes on other interests. These and related arguments are illustrated through a case-study — the Israeli experience of almost six decades of intensive involvement of a democratic state in supplying religious services.

What kind of remedies should be available for those enjoined by a wrong preliminary injunction? Assuming that the remedy should be designed to minimize the irreparable harm from a wrong preliminary injunction, two considerations should be taken into account: first, from an ex-ante perspective, the remedy can increase the likelihood that a preliminary injunction is issued only when it is expected to induce irreparable social harms that are lower than those expected if it is not issued; second, from an ex-post perspective, the remedy can contribute to the minimization of the irreparable social harms inflicted when a preliminary injunction was issued. This Article demonstrates that these considerations lead to two central conclusions: (1) it is desirable to award the remedy of restitution, which requires the moving-party to disgorge the benefits obtained at the expense of the defendant by the wrong preliminary injunction; (2) it is unjustified to require the moving-party to compensate the defendant for all harms inflicted due to the wrong preliminary injunction. The analysis also calls for a revision of the definition of irreparable harms. It shows that a deadweight-loss suffered by one party is socially irreparable even if this party's private loss can be cured by a remedy after trial. The available remedies - both when the plaintiff prevails and a preliminary injunction was not issued, and when a wrong preliminary injunction was issued but the defendant prevails - determine only what undeserved-wealth-transfers should be regarded as relevant irreparable social costs. From a broader perspective, the analysis enriches our understanding of restitutionary remedies. In addition to internalizing positive benefits and deterring wrongful conducts, the remedy of disgorgement of profits can also serve to remove improper motives to engage in an overall socially desirable behavior. In the current context, establishing an expansive duty to disgorge profits derived from unsuccessful litigation can mitigate the threat of frivolous suits, without jeopardizing the main instrument available to encourage disputants to turn to the judicial system - the grant of immunity from tortious liability. The case of remedies for wrong preliminary injunctions can thus demonstrate that restitution can serve as a middle ground between the ideal, which drives us to confer rights and liberties, and reality, which forces us to be minded of their misuse.

Richard Posner has recently reviewed, in The New Republic, Aharon Barak's book, The Judge in a Democracy. Posner criticizes Barak for both his theoretical argument and for what Posner portrays as Barak's legacy as the President of Israel's Supreme Court. Posner accuses Barak for acting as "a legal buccaneer," and describes his approach as "usurpative." Posner crowns Barak, in the very title of his review, as no less than an "Enlightened Despot." In this response I claim that Posner's critique lacks a proper understanding of the legal situation in Israel, it misrepresents Barak's activities as a judge, and fails to contend properly with Barak's doctrine which it purports to reject.