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This paper presents a set-up for momentum map reduction of nonholonomic systems with symmetries, extending previous constructions in [3,25], based on the existence of certain conserved quantities and making essential use of the nonholonomic momentum bundle map of [10]. We show that the reductions of the momentum level sets carry an almost symplectic form codifying the reduced dynamics. These reduced manifolds are the leaves of the foliation associated with an almost Poisson bracket obtained by a (dynamically compatible) gauge transformation of the nonholonomic bracket. We show that each leaf is a "Chaplygin-type leaf", in the sense that it is isomorphic to a cotangent bundle with the canonical symplectic form plus a "magnetic term".

In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace this autobidding and cover a range of topics in this area, including bidding algorithms, equilibrium analysis and efficiency of common auction formats, and optimal auction design.

Electric power systems are undergoing a major transformation as they integrate intermittent renewable energy sources, and batteries to smooth out variations in renewable energy production. As privately-owned batteries grow from their role as marginal "price-takers" to significant players in the market, a natural question arises: How do batteries operate in electricity markets, and how does the strategic behavior of decentralized batteries distort decisions compared to centralized batteries? We propose an analytically tractable model that captures salient features of the highly complex electricity market. We derive in closed form the resulting battery behavior and generation cost in three operating regimes: (i) no battery, (ii) centralized battery, and (ii) decentralized profit-maximizing battery. We establish that a decentralized battery distorts its discharge decisions in three ways. First, there is quantity withholding, i.e., discharging less than centrally optimal. Second, there is a shift in participation from day-ahead to real-time, i.e., postponing some of its discharge from day-ahead to real-time. Third, there is reduction in real-time responsiveness, or discharging less in response to smoothing real-time demand than centrally optimal. We quantify each of the three forms of distortions in terms of market fundamentals. To illustrate our results, we calibrate our model to Los Angeles and Houston and show that the loss from incentive misalignment could be consequential.

In robust decision-making under non-Bayesian uncertainty, different robust optimization criteria, such as maximin performance, minimax regret, and maximin ratio, have been proposed. In many problems, all three criteria are well-motivated and well-grounded from a decision-theoretic perspective, yet different criteria give different prescriptions. This paper initiates a systematic study of overfitting to robustness criteria. How good is a prescription derived from one criterion when evaluated against another criterion? Does there exist a prescription that performs well against all criteria of interest? We formalize and study these questions through the prototypical problem of robust pricing under various information structures, including support, moments, and percentiles of the distribution of values. We provide a unified analysis of three focal robust criteria across various information structures and evaluate the relative performance of mechanisms optimized for each criterion against the others. We find that mechanisms optimized for one criterion often perform poorly against other criteria, highlighting the risk of overfitting to a particular robustness criterion. Remarkably, we show it is possible to design mechanisms that achieve good performance across all three criteria simultaneously, suggesting that decision-makers need not compromise among criteria.

We study the behavior of the conductance and the current-noise in three-terminal configurations of edge modes of a quantum Hall system in the nu=2 filling factor with normal and s-wave superconducting contacts. We discuss the impact of spin-orbit coupling in the quantum Hall system and the possibility of effectively inducing triplet pairing in the egde states. We show that the presence of these correlations imprints very clear signatures in both the non-linear conductance and noise in these type of devices., Comment: 5 pages, 3 figures, supplemental material

Motivated by real-world applications such as rental and cloud computing services, we investigate pricing for reusable resources. We consider a system where a single resource with a fixed number of identical copies serves customers with heterogeneous willingness-to-pay (WTP), and the usage duration distribution is general. Optimal dynamic policies are computationally intractable when usage durations are not memoryless, so existing literature has focused on static pricing, whose steady-state reward rate converges to optimality at rate $\mathcal{O}(c^{-1/2})$ when supply and demand scale with $c$. We show, however, that this convergence rate is suboptimal, and propose a class of dynamic "stock-dependent" policies that 1) preserves computational tractability and 2) has a steady-state reward rate converging to optimality faster than $c^{-1/2}$. We characterize the tight convergence rate for stock-dependent policies and show that they can in fact be achieved by a simple two-price policy, that sets a higher price when the stock is below some threshold and a lower price otherwise. Finally, we demonstrate this "minimally dynamic" class of two-price policies to perform well numerically, even in non-asymptotic settings, suggesting that a little dynamicity can go a long way.

A seller wants to sell an item to n buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in [a, b]. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism that optimizes the worst-case performance relative to the first-best benchmark. Our analysis unifies the regret and the ratio objectives. For these objectives, we derive an optimal mechanism and the corresponding performance in quasi-closed form, as a function of the support information and the number of buyers n. Our analysis reveals three regimes of support information and a new class of robust mechanisms. i.) With "low" support information, the optimal mechanism is a second-price auction (SPA) with random reserve, a focal class in earlier literature. ii.) With "high" support information, SPAs are strictly suboptimal, and an optimal mechanism belongs to a class of mechanisms we introduce, which we call pooling auctions (POOL); whenever the highest value is above a threshold, the mechanism still allocates to the highest bidder, but otherwise the mechanism allocates to a uniformly random buyer, i.e., pools low types. iii.) With "moderate" support information, a randomization between SPA and POOL is optimal. We also characterize optimal mechanisms within nested central subclasses of mechanisms: standard mechanisms that only allocate to the highest bidder, SPA with random reserve, and SPA with no reserve. We show strict separations in terms of performance across classes, implying that deviating from standard mechanisms is necessary for robustness., Comment: An abstract of this work appeared in Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'23)

Budget pacing is a popular service that has been offered by major internet advertising platforms since their inception. Budget pacing systems seek to optimize advertiser returns subject to budget constraints by smoothly spending advertiser budgets. In the past few years, autobidding products that provide real-time bidding as a service to advertisers have seen a prominent rise in adoption. A popular autobidding strategy is value maximization subject to return-on-spend (ROS) constraints. For historical/business reasons, the systems that govern these two services, namely budget pacing and ROS pacing, are not always a unified and coordinated entity that optimizes a global objective subject to both constraints. The purpose of this work is to theoretically and empirically compare algorithms with different degrees of coordination between these two pacing systems. In particular, we compare (a) a fully-decoupled sequential algorithm that first constructs the advertiser's ROS-pacing bid and then lowers that bid for budget pacing; (b) a minimally-coupled min-pacing algorithm that runs these two services independently, obtains the bid multipliers from both of them and applies the minimum of the two multipliers as the effective multiplier; and (c) a fully-coupled dual-based algorithm that optimally combines the dual variables from both the systems. Our main contribution is to theoretically analyze the min-pacing algorithm and show that it attains similar guarantees to the fully-coupled canonical dual-based algorithm. On the other hand, we show that the sequential algorithm, even though appealing by virtue of being fully decoupled, could badly violate the constraints. We validate our theoretical findings empirically by showing that the min-pacing algorithm performs almost as well as the canonical dual-based algorithm on a semi-synthetic dataset based on a large online advertising platform's data.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in $T$ second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of $T\log T$ samples per distribution to achieve the optimal $O(\sqrt{T})$-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal $\tilde O(\sqrt{T})$-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

Multi-terminal Josephson junctions were recently proposed as a versatile and tunable platform to emulate topological Bloch-like Hamiltonians in arbitrary dimensions. In this perspective article, we will give a brief overview of the subject and recognize these mesoscopic devices as realizations of topological flux networks as the ones envisioned by J. E. Avron and coworkers in their seminal works on the early days of the quantum Hall effect. We summarize the current state-of-the-art theoretical and experimental research regarding these Josephson devices, highlighting recent developments and giving an outlook on current trends., Comment: 7 pages, 5 figures

We present a systematic study of the dynamical phase diagram of a periodically driven BCS system as a function of drive strength and frequency. Three different driving mechanism are considered and compared: oscillating density of states, oscillating pairing interaction and oscillating external paring field. We identify the locus in parameter space of parametric resonances and four dynamical phases: Rabi-Higgs, gapless, synchronized Higgs and time-crystal. We demonstrate that the main features of the phase diagram are quite robust to different driving protocols and discuss the order of the transitions. By mapping the BCS problem to a collection of nonlinear and interacting classical oscillators, we shed light on the origin of time-crsytalline phases and parametric resonances appearing for subgap excitations., Comment: 15 pages, including 12 figures, appendix and references

This paper presents a reduction procedure for nonholonomic systems admitting suitable types of symmetries and conserved quantities. The full procedure contains two steps. The first (simple) step results in a Chaplygin system, described by an almost symplectic structure, carrying additional symmetries. The focus of this paper is on the second step, which consists of a Marsden-Weinstein--type reduction that generalizes constructions in [4,17]. The almost symplectic manifolds obtained in the second step are proven to coincide with the leaves of the reduced nonholonomic brackets defined in [7]. We illustrate our construction with several classical examples.

We study stochastic online resource allocation: a decision maker needs to allocate limited resources to stochastically-generated sequentially-arriving requests in order to maximize reward. At each time step, requests are drawn independently from a distribution that is unknown to the decision maker. Online resource allocation and its special cases have been studied extensively in the past, but prior results crucially and universally rely on the strong assumption that the total number of requests (the horizon) is known to the decision maker in advance. In many applications, such as revenue management and online advertising, the number of requests can vary widely because of fluctuations in demand or user traffic intensity. In this work, we develop online algorithms that are robust to horizon uncertainty. In sharp contrast to the known-horizon setting, no algorithm can achieve even a constant asymptotic competitive ratio that is independent of the horizon uncertainty. We introduce a novel generalization of dual mirror descent which allows the decision maker to specify a schedule of time-varying target consumption rates, and prove corresponding performance guarantees. We go on to give a fast algorithm for computing a schedule of target consumption rates that leads to near-optimal performance in the unknown-horizon setting. In particular, our competitive ratio attains the optimal rate of growth (up to logarithmic factors) as the horizon uncertainty grows large. Finally, we also provide a way to incorporate machine-learned predictions about the horizon which interpolates between the known and unknown horizon settings.

We study a dynamic allocation problem in which $T$ sequentially arriving divisible resources are to be allocated to a number of agents with linear utilities. The marginal utilities of each resource to the agents are drawn stochastically from a known joint distribution, independently and identically across time, and the central planner makes immediate and irrevocable allocation decisions. Most works on dynamic resource allocation aim to maximize the utilitarian welfare, i.e., the efficiency of the allocation, which may result in unfair concentration of resources on certain high-utility agents while leaving others' demands under-fulfilled. In this paper, aiming at balancing efficiency and fairness, we instead consider a broad collection of welfare metrics, the H\"older means, which includes the Nash social welfare and the egalitarian welfare. To this end, we first study a fluid-based policy derived from a deterministic surrogate to the underlying problem and show that for all smooth H\"older mean welfare metrics it attains an $O(1)$ regret over the time horizon length $T$ against the hindsight optimum, i.e., the optimal welfare if all utilities were known in advance of deciding on allocations. However, when evaluated under the non-smooth egalitarian welfare, the fluid-based policy attains a regret of order $\Theta(\sqrt{T})$. We then propose a new policy built thereupon, called Backward Infrequent Re-solving with Thresholding ($\mathsf{BIRT}$), which consists of re-solving the deterministic surrogate problem at most $O(\log\log T)$ times. We prove the $\mathsf{BIRT}$ policy attains an $O(1)$ regret against the hindsight optimal egalitarian welfare, independently of the time horizon length $T$. We conclude by presenting numerical experiments to corroborate our theoretical claims and to illustrate the significant performance improvement against several benchmark policies.

Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but such prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms that relax this assumption: the seller is selling an indivisible item to $n$ buyers such that the buyers' valuations are drawn from a joint distribution that is unknown to both the buyers and the seller; buyers do not need to form beliefs about competitors, and the seller assumes the distribution is adversarially chosen from a specified class. We measure performance through the worst-case regret, or the difference between the expected revenue achievable with perfect knowledge of buyers' valuations and the actual mechanism revenue. We study a broad set of classes of valuation distributions that capture a wide spectrum of possible dependencies: independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) distributions, mixtures of i.i.d. distributions, affiliated and exchangeable distributions, exchangeable distributions, and all joint distributions. We derive in quasi closed form the minimax values and the associated optimal mechanism. In particular, we show that the first three classes admit the same minimax regret value, which is decreasing with the number of competitors, while the last two have the same minimax regret equal to that of the single buyer case. Furthermore, we show that the minimax optimal mechanisms have a simple form across all settings: a second-price auction with random reserve prices, which shows its robustness in prior-independent mechanism design. En route to our results, we also develop a principled methodology to determine the form of the optimal mechanism and worst-case distribution via first-order conditions that should be of independent interest in other minimax problems., Comment: An extended abstract of this work appeared in Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'22)

Single-leg revenue management is a foundational problem of revenue management that has been particularly impactful in the airline and hotel industry: Given $n$ units of a resource, e.g. flight seats, and a stream of sequentially-arriving customers segmented by fares, what is the optimal online policy for allocating the resource. Previous work focused on designing algorithms when forecasts are available, which are not robust to inaccuracies in the forecast, or online algorithms with worst-case performance guarantees, which can be too conservative in practice. In this work, we look at the single-leg revenue management problem through the lens of the algorithms-with-advice framework, which attempts to harness the increasing prediction accuracy of machine learning methods by optimally incorporating advice about the future into online algorithms. In particular, we characterize the Pareto frontier that captures the tradeoff between consistency (performance when advice is accurate) and competitiveness (performance when advice is inaccurate) for every advice. Moreover, we provide an online algorithm that always achieves performance on this Pareto frontier. We also study the class of protection level policies, which is the most widely-deployed technique for single-leg revenue management: we provide an algorithm to incorporate advice into protection levels that optimally trades off consistency and competitiveness. Moreover, we empirically evaluate the performance of these algorithms on synthetic data. We find that our algorithm for protection level policies performs remarkably well on most instances, even if it is not guaranteed to be on the Pareto frontier in theory. Our results extend to other unit-cost online allocations problems such as the display advertising and the multiple secretary problem together with more general variable-cost problems such as the online knapsack problem.

Dual-based proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controllers are often employed in practice to solve online allocation problems with global constraints, such as budget pacing in online advertising. However, controllers are used in a heuristic fashion and come with no provable guarantees on their performance. This paper provides the first regret bounds on the performance of dual-based PID controllers for online allocation problems. We do so by first establishing a fundamental connection between dual-based PID controllers and a new first-order algorithm for online convex optimization called \emph{Convolutional Mirror Descent} (CMD), which updates iterates based on a weighted moving average of past gradients. CMD recovers, in a special case, online mirror descent with momentum and optimistic mirror descent. We establish sufficient conditions under which CMD attains low regret for general online convex optimization problems with adversarial inputs. We leverage this new result to give the first regret bound for dual-based PID controllers for online allocation problems. As a byproduct of our proofs, we provide the first regret bound for CMD for non-smooth convex optimization, which might be of independent interest.

In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve prices, however, usually do not help improve total welfare of the auctioneer and the bidders. In this paper, we focus on value maximizing bidders with return on spend constraints -- a paradigm that has drawn considerable attention recently as more advertisers adopt auto-bidding algorithms in advertising platforms -- and show that the introduction of reserve prices has a novel impact on the market. Namely, by choosing reserve prices appropriately the auctioneer can improve not only the total revenue but also the total welfare. Our results also demonstrate that reserve prices are robust to bidder types, i.e., reserve prices work well for different bidder types, such as value maximizers and utility maximizers, without using bidder type information. We generalize these results for a variety of auction mechanisms such as VCG, GSP, and first-price auctions. Moreover, we show how to combine these results with additive boosts to improve the welfare of the outcomes of the auction further. Finally, we complement our theoretical observations with an empirical study confirming the effectiveness of these ideas using data from online advertising auctions.

We study the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer condensate subject to a periodic drive. We demonstrate that the combined effect of drive and interactions results in emerging parametric resonances, analogous to a vertically driving pendulum. In particular, Arnold tongues appear when the driving frequency matches $2\Delta_0/n$, with $n$ a natural number, and $\Delta_0$ the equilibrium gap parameter. Inside the Arnold tongues we find a commensurate time-crystal condensate which retains the $U(1)$ symmetry breaking of the parent superfluid/superconducting phase and shows an additional time-translational symmetry breaking. Outside these tongues, the synchronized collective Higgs mode found in quench protocols is stabilized without the need of a strong perturbation. Our results are directly relevant to cold-atom and condensed-matter systems and do not require very long energy relaxation times to be observed.

In this work, we theoretically study transverse magnetic focusing in a two-dimensional electron gas with strong Rashba spin-orbit interaction when proximitized along its edge with a superconducting contact. The presence of superconducting correlations leads to the emergence of chiral Andreev edge states which -- within this weak magnetic field regime -- may be pictured as states following semiclassical skipping orbits with alternating electron-hole nature. The spin-orbit induced splitting of the Fermi surface causes these carriers to move along cyclotron orbits with different radii, allowing for their spatial spin separation. When Andreev reflection takes place at the superconducting lead, scattered carriers flip both their charge and spin, generating distinguishable features in the transport properties of the device. In particular, we report a notable enhancement of the separation between the spin-split focal points, which scales linearly with the number of Andreev scattering events at the anomalous terminal. We support our results by calculating conductance maps to arbitrary points in the sample that provide a complete image of the ballistic electron-hole cyclotron paths., Comment: 8 pages, 7 figures