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: Objective: Western Sydney Local Health District (WSLHD) measured the utility and validity of rapid molecular point‐of‐care testing (POCT) in aged care facilities (ACFs) experiencing influenza‐like illness (ILI) outbreaks against routine laboratory testing. Methods: A descriptive epidemiological study into 82 respiratory outbreaks reported across 63 ACFs within WSLHD supporting approximately 6,500 residents aged ≥65 years and staffed by ∼6,500 employees, from 1 August 2018 to 31 December 2019. Results: WSLHD Public Health Unit performed on‐site testing at 27 ACF outbreaks (34%), while 53(66%) ACFs conducted only routine laboratory testing. The Xpert®Xpress Flu/RSV molecular PCR provided a sensitivity and specificity of 100%. Those with on‐site testing, antiviral prophylaxis was prescribed at 75% of facilities within 24 hours of testing, as opposed to 32% of those using laboratory testing (p Conclusions: On‐site ACF testing is reliable and practical for early identification of influenza, enabling timely use of antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, and was associated with decreased hospitalisation. Public health implications: Enhanced respiratory surveillance and on‐site testing should be strongly considered as part of routine management of respiratory outbreaks in ACFs and may reduce outbreak severity., Respiratory viruses are highly infectious agents that adversely affect the health of adults aged ≥65 years.[sup.1] In closed population settings such as aged care facilities (ACFs) in particular, respiratory viruses [...]

: Introduction: In May 2020, The Communicable Diseases Network of Australia (CDNA) case definition introduced serological criteria to support the diagnosis of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2). We present findings that support the utility of SARS‐CoV‐2‐specific serology for public health investigations. Methods: From 24 January to 31 July 2020, the following information was collected from individuals with positive SARS‐CoV‐2‐specific immunofluorescence antibody tests: history of contact with COVID‐19 cases; recent travel; symptoms consistent with COVID‐19; and SARS‐CoV‐2 nucleic acid testing (NAT) results. Individuals were classified as confirmed or probable by CDNA criteria or additionally as possible (SARS‐CoV‐2‐specific IgG positive with compatible symptoms or epidemiologic risk) or indeterminate (SARS‐CoV‐2‐specific IgA/IgM positive only) cases. Results: A total of 10,595 individuals were tested in the six‐month period. Of these, 9.8% (1,037) individuals had positive SARS‐CoV‐2‐specific serology of which 566 (53.6%) were NAT‐confirmed COVID‐19 cases and 286 (27.6%) were part of a cruise ship outbreak sero‐survey. The remaining 185 individuals (NAT negative) were individually classified as serologically confirmed (4, 0.4%), probable (72, 6.9%) possible (66, 6.4%) and indeterminate (38, 3.7%) cases. Maternal antibody transfer was inferred in one infant and four were unclassified. Conclusion: SARS‐CoV‐2‐specific serology is a key diagnostic tool for retrospective identification of COVID‐19 infection. Implications for public health: SARS‐CoV‐2 specific serology can enhance the ability to find cases, link missing cases in clusters of infection and identify the epidemiological extent of SARS‐CoV‐2 outbreaks. A combination of epidemiological criteria, clinical criteria and a quantitative serological test can be used as an adjunct to classify SARS‐CoV‐2 cases. Our study confirms the low level of community transmission in NSW during the first year of the COVID‐19 pandemic, By 31 July 2020, 3,600 confirmed infections of severe acute respiratory syndrome‐coronavirus‐2 (SARS‐CoV‐2), the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19), had been recorded in New South Wales (NSW), Australia.[sup.1] [...]

The circumstances under which airborne transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) might occur are uncertain (1,2). Previous cluster reports have suggested involvement of airborne transmission (3,4), but [...]

Introduction: The New South Wales (NSW) Biocontainment Centre (NBC) is the first high-level isolation unit in Australia. This state-wide referral facility, located at Westmead Hospital, Sydney, will provide care for patients with high-consequence infectious diseases (HCIDs), including viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHF). In preparation, a tabletop exercise with key stakeholders was held to introduce and socialize the NBC's capacity to support NSW's preparedness for the management of a patient with HCID. Method: Invitations were provided to key stakeholders within Westmead Hospital (facility executive, emergency and ICU services, security, switchboard); NSW Preparedness and Response Branch; retrieval services; peripheral hospitals; pediatric hospital network; and NSW Public health units (state and district). The scenario presented was an unwell patient with suspected VHF arriving at a peripheral hospital emergency department. Discussion during the four-hour long exercise was facilitated with directed questions and injects, and was recorded. Recommendations and key learnings from the exercise and debrief provided opportunities to enhance current response assumptions. Results: Forty-five people participated both face-to-face and virtually. Participant discussion showed increasing appreciation of patient presentations to any part of the NSW health system and available assistance. Recommendations included: enhanced access to NBC support with a direct "1-800 number", coordination for communication, treatment, and transport, and if required, deployment of an NBC team to peripheral sites. Areas for future collaborative work were identified. Conclusion: This exercise successfully achieved collaboration of key stakeholders to develop an updated, comprehensive and robust plan for management of HCID patients within NSW, regardless of their presentation site. It has created an opportunity to brainstorm and optimize how the NBC can interact with other agencies to maximize the NSW HCID response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: In countries where measles is rare, health-care-setting transmissions remain problematic. Australia experienced its largest measles outbreak in 15 years in 2012 with 199 cases reported nationally; 170 cases occurred in the state of New South Wales (NSW) with symptom onset between 7 April and 29 November 2012. Methods: A descriptive study was conducted using measles case data obtained from metropolitan Sydney local health districts in NSW in 2012. Characteristics of measles source and secondary cases were described. Details of health-care presentations resulting and not resulting in measles transmission were also analysed. Results: There were 168 confirmed and two probable cases resulting in 405 documented health-care presentations. Thirty-our secondary cases acquired in health-care settings were identified, including 29 cases resulting from 14 source cases and 5 cases whose source could not be identified. Health-care-acquired cases accounted for 20% of all cases in this outbreak. Source cases were more likely to be of Pacific Islander descent (p = 0.009) and to have had more presentations before diagnosis (p = 0.012) compared to other cases. The percentage of presentations to emergency departments was higher for presentations that resulted in transmission compared to those that did not (71.4% and 37.6%, respectively, p = 0.028). There were no significant differences between transmission and non-transmission presentations with respect to presence of rash and infection control measures (p = 0.762 and p = 0.221, respectively), although the power to detect these differences was limited. Rash was reported at 66% of the presentations. Conclusion: Development of and adherence to protocols for the management of patients presenting to hospitals with fever and rash will minimize secondary transmission of measles. a National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance of Vaccine Preventable Diseases (NCIRS), The Children's Hospital at Westmead and the University of Sydney, New South Wales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Vaccination is a fundamental tenet of public and population health. Several barriers to vaccine uptake exist, exacerbated post-COVID-19, including misconceptions about vaccine efficacy and safety, vaccine hesitancy, vaccine inequity, costs, religious beliefs, and insufficient education and guidance for healthcare professionals. Vaccine uptake may be aided using microarray patches (MAPs) due to reduced pain, no hypodermic needle, enhanced thermostability, and potential for self and lay administration., Objectives: This protocol outlines the development of a scale that aims to accurately measure the perceived safety, usability, and acceptability of MAPs for vaccination among laypeople, MAP recipients, clinicians, and parents or guardians of children., Methods and Analysis: This study will follow three phases of scale development and validation, including (1) item development, (2) scale development, and (3) scale evaluation. Inductive (interviews) and deductive methods (literature searches) will be used to develop scale items, which experts from target populations will assess through an online survey. Cognitive interviews will be conducted to observe their processes of answering the draft survey. Thematic analysis will be conducted to analyse qualitative data. Lastly, four surveys will be administered online to our target populations over two time points to determine their repeatability. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, Cronbach's alpha, and construct validity will be performed., Ethics: This study was approved by Metro South Health (HREC/2021/QMS/81653) and Western Sydney Local Health District (2023/ETH00705) Human Research Ethics Committees., Discussion: The scale will support a standardised approach to assessing the social and behavioural aspects of MAP vaccines, enabling comparison of outcomes across studies. Once validated, this scale will assist vaccination programmes in developing effective strategies for integrating MAPs and overcoming barriers to vaccination. This includes improving vaccine equity and accessibility, especially in lower- and middle-income countries and rural or remote locations., (© The Author(s), 2024.)

Mycoplasma pneumoniae is a leading cause of encephalitis and pneumonia in children. Active surveillance identified a cluster of children with suspected encephalitis associated with M.pneumoniae in NSW during July, 2015. An investigation that cross validated encephalitis surveillance with ED pneumonia surveillance and senitenal reference laboratory data revealed probable epidemic M.pneumoniae disease activity in Sydney during 2015., (This work is copyright. You may download, display, print and reproduce the whole or part of this work in unaltered form for your own personal use or, if you are part of an organisation, for internal use within your organisation, but only if you or your organisation do not use the reproduction for any commercial purpose and retain this copyright notice and all disclaimer notices as part of that reproduction. Apart from rights to use as permitted by the Copyright Act 1968 or allowed by this copyright notice, all other rights are reserved and you are not allowed to reproduce the whole or any part of this work in any way (electronic or otherwise) without first being given the specific written permission from the Commonwealth to do so. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights are to be sent to the Online, Services and External Relations Branch, Department of Health, GPO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, or by email to copyright@health.gov.au.)

In 2007, Australia recorded the highest notification rate (2.8 per 100,000) for mumps since it became notifiable, with outbreaks in Western Australia and the Northern Territory. Of particular concern was the number of cases seen in vaccinated individuals. The aim of this study was to review subsequent epidemiological data. Notification, hospitalisation and mortality data from the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, the National Hospital Morbidity Database and Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) respectively, from 2008 to 2012 for notifications and 2008 to 2011 for hospitalisations and deaths, were analysed by age, year and jurisdiction. ABS population data were used to calculate rates. National mumps notification rates decreased from 1.3 per 100,000 in 2008 to 0.4 per 100,000 in 2010, but then increased to 0.9 per 100,000 in 2012, predominantly due to increased notifications in New South Wales (1.4 per 100,000). Hospitalisation rates remained stable at 0.4 per 100,000 over the 2008-2011 period. The median age of notified cases was 30 years and for hospitalisations, 27 years. The highest rate of notifications and hospitalisations was in the 25-34 years age group. Completeness of vaccination status ranged from 16% to 39%. The increasing trend in mumps notifications needs to be closely monitored. Improved data quality, in particular on vaccination status, is needed to inform the monitoring of vaccine effectiveness. In March 2014 the World Health Organization certified that Australia had achieved measles elimination. Greater availability of case history (vaccination status and place of acquisition) and genotyping data would facilitate an assessment of Australia's progress in relation to mumps elimination., (This work is copyright. You may download, display, print and reproduce the whole or part of this work in unaltered form for your own personal use or, if you are part of an organisation, for internal use within your organisation, but only if you or your organisation do not use the reproduction for any commercial purpose and retain this copyright notice and all disclaimer notices as part of that reproduction. Apart from rights to use as permitted by the Copyright Act 1968 or allowed by this copyright notice, all other rights are reserved and you are not allowed to reproduce the whole or any part of this work in any way (electronic or otherwise) without first being given the specific written permission from the Commonwealth to do so. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights are to be sent to the Online, Services and External Relations Branch, Department of Health, GPO Box 9848, Canberra ACT 2601, or by email to copyright@health.gov.au.)