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This article will explore in what sense subject and object are considered reciprocally in Hegel's first three chapters in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The third chapter, although notoriously difficult to read, is one of the most important epistemological documents in modern philosophy. Hegel's approach will be traced within the debate stemming from Kant's transcendental philosophy mainly through Fichte and Schelling. It will be shown that Hegel incorporated elements from all these figures to arrive at his unique position. Kant's transcendental philosophy established the idea that the thinking consciousness contributes fundamentally to knowledge to the extent that knowledge is fully produced by the subject, and the true nature of the object is unattainable to consciousness. The widely held conclusion was that Kant's thought amounted to a too strong divide between subject and object. Fichte and Schelling managed, thanks to the notion of the absolute, to mediate between subject and object, thereby opening the door to Hegel's dialectics as a philosophy of mediation. Both Fichte and Schelling, as was the case, broadly speaking, with German Idealism taken as a whole, still considered thinking as an activity of being that contributes to the fulfilment of being, linking objects to consciousness. Fichte's "absolute I", a consciousness that precedes the consciousness of the self, standing over the self and the object, was deemed to resemble the Kantian subject too closely. Schelling's natural philosophy, on the other hand, situates the absolute within nature and consciousness as developing from within nature towards the deployment of the self. This approach was considered potentially falling back into a dogmatic mode of thinking. Even if these positions remain caught in problems they seek to overcome, they did make notable progress in addressing the question of the relation of the subject to the object in a modern context. Hegel develops his initial answer to this question in the Phenomenology of Spirit first as an inheritor of the Enlightenment, notably empiricism, but stands critical of its basic suppositions. He does not accept that complete knowledge is immediately accessible, and resorts to the notion of the Absolute to indicate that mediated knowledge leads to truth. Unlike Fichte, Reinhold and Schelling, he does not immediately introduce the absolute as a mediator of knowledge but arrives at it through counterarguments for the positions put forward by the assumption of immediate objective knowledge. This dialectic approach leads to the unfolding of consciousness, self-consciousness and Spirit. Our subjective contribution to knowledge production is also not assumed beforehand, like in Kant, but is the result of the confrontation with the assumptions made by experiential knowledge. Without subjectivity, knowledge of the unity of reality is impossible, as is knowledge of the difference between objects. Knowing objects according to their nature requires subjectivity from which order is established, but the subject experiences itself as standing in relation to objects. Consciousness is confronted by an outside world that must be made sense of. Not only is the establishment of the relation between subject and object important but according to Hegel, the subject's relation to the object is reflected in his self-understanding and self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness is revealed precisely by the relation between subject and object, but not before this relation. Hegel therefore starts his journey to the absolute through natural consciousness, a consciousness that takes immediate knowledge of objects around us as authoritative. One can call this immediate knowledge objective in the sense that it takes no queues from subjectivity. Hegel proceeds to critique objective knowledge, claiming that immediate knowledge doesn't reckon with the factor of time, and therefore cannot be the ultimate source of truth. This critique is ambivalent, as it does recognise the world of objects as a source for knowledge, however, this must be supplemented by our own consciousness in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of this knowledge. Consciousness becomes an essential ingredient necessary for understanding. The second chapter introduces perception as the measure of reality. Perception brings a multitude of things under a general principle, thereby creating an understanding between things and their general substance. This second approach to truth cannot explain how generality and particularity exist in the first place. Hegel moves to the notoriously difficult third chapter in which he describes the dynamic relation between force and understanding. Force is identified as the underlying dimension of external reality, but it has in turn to be postulated, making necessary the involvement of the understanding as hypothesising activity. At first, force is merely described in terms of its expressions, but acknowledgement of its fundamental trait as underlying the whole of physical reality without being a tangible thing, leads to the realisation of the role of the understanding. This realisation is self-consciousness. Self-consciousness becomes aware of its participative role in its determination of the underlying structures of reality, structures that are postulated, and not apparent. In the last section, it is pointed out that self-consciousness is not to be understood as standing alone concerning objects - self-consciousness also stands in relation to other-selves. Self-consciousness is not an object and cannot be fully determined as is the case with things. This does not form the primary concern of the article and will merely be described to point to the position of self-consciousness within the larger scheme of Hegel's thinking. This does not take away the importance that the topic under discussion here has for the development of Hegel's system, which is the reason for the focus given here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A language that seeks to grow and branch out needs to keep itself rooted. The possibilities of a language are co-determined by external and internal factors. The balance between the grammatical as such, or the grammatica tecne, as it was called in earlier times, alongside the local dialect, or the vulgare eloquentia, as Dante called it, will be explored. It will be argued that rootedness and branching are concurrent forces pulling in different directions, both contributing to the growth of the language in substantial measure. On the one hand entrance into what is historical is informed by current topics; and, on the other, what is current forms part of an unfolding of history. The relation between language studies and politics once again has become an issue featuring in the discussions regarding the indigenous status of Afrikaans. If a language were to be considered as authentic solely on account of its indigenous status, it would be difficult to forward an argument for English being authentically "English", given the fact that most of the vocabulary is borrowed from Frisian and Latin, and very little from Celtic. The real issue to be considered rather, is what purposes the speakers have in mind for the language, mere day-to-day communication or a distinguished literature? Should the latter be the preferred option, it follows that one will have to incorporate the development of the history of writing and study the fruits that were borne along with it. Dutch underwent similar developments during the so-called "Golden Age", developments from which Afrikaans has also been able to benefit to a certain extent. Grammar is not merely an objective science that examines and describes languages from a distance, but it is also historically embedded. Learning not only the rules and the scientific side of grammar, but also studying some of the languages that innovated these developments benefits any language, it binds a language into history. In his Poetics, Aristotle compares the different kinds of words to parts of a body but goes beyond that to speak about the physiological effects that certain kinds of metre have. We form sounds as much as sounds form us. Poetry specifically has two purposes for Aristotle - on the one hand it exposes the reader or listener to me tapeinen, or the unusual, which comprises of strange words or techniques; while on the other, it familiarises the reader with safe, the norms and words of the language with which people are familiar. Without a good balance between these dimensions, poetry will remain either decadent or too mundane. If we accept the unfamiliar to be a key for unlocking meaning in our own language, it again raises the question of the relation between languages. Han interprets Heidegger's notion of the bridge in the latter's essay Building, Dwelling, Thinking to mean that both the domain of exchange and the divine horizon on the other side of the bridge are to remain intact. In the case of Afrikaans, Van Wyk Louw can therefore speak of the fundamental indebtedness of Afrikaans to Dutch, as a source from which it cannot separate itself, especially in the context of education, while simultaneously having been formed in South Africa, thus being a bridge language between the continents. However great we judge our indebtedness to the development of grammar and the languages through which the history of literature was formed, we cannot neglect the particularity of our own language, and its ability to articulate what is universal in a unique manner, adding to the richness of the whole. In other words, the grammatical can become a hindrance in the development of language when a norm or a language dominates others to the extent that no more bridges can be extended. This was the case with Latin in the Middle Ages, and one might add with English today. Dante's essay Vulgare eloquentia laid the basis for a new appreciation for the local language and its ability to extend itself to universal heights, which Dante accomplished with his great Divine Comedy. Louw emphasises the importance of translation as a means whereby the speakers can extend their horizons to a world of meaning previously unknown to them. Translation does not necessarily mean that the speakers are motivated not to learn other languages, translation is itself not possible without building a bridge between languages, between the dwelling spaces of languages. The bridge allows one to dwell inside the limits of a world previously unknown. To manage this complex relation of the localities within a language, as well as the languages with one another, institutions are needed. But the mere existence of an institution does not automatically lead to literature. Humboldt calls for "spirited" writers, poets and philosophers to add new meaning and nuance to a language. This implies the study of these fields within institutions. If this does not happen, languages will to a great extent fall victim to the "hastiness" of the "newspaper men" as Louw calls the media. The hastiness relegates words to immediate meaning leaving little room for interpretation. The frequency of the word is therefore no yardstick for the health of a language. The limit represents the possibility of understanding, of making concrete, while at the same time acknowledging itself as limit, as being in need of extending itself beyond itself to another modus of expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the nature and importance of the notion of absolute knowing in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The avoidance, undervaluation and misinterpretation of absolute knowing, especially in 20th-century interpretations of Hegel's work, are challenged on the basis of Hegel's own account of absolute knowing. Three characteristics of absolute knowing stand out: first, absolute knowing is not a ready-made blueprint that can be applied blindly, but is achieved only through a laborious process that has to be completed in person and not at arms length. Second, absolute knowing can only result from the strictest possible proof in the form of complete scepticism or what Hegel termed "sich vollbringende Skeptizismus". Third, that which is criticised by the proof must be sublimated into the absolute as part of the processal nature of absolute knowing. The process reveals that self-negation, indicating shortcomings, and self-attainment, representing self-awareness of the spirit, are two sides of the same coin, namely what Hegel describes as the movement of spirit. Hegel does not avoid the topic of truth and goes so far as to claim that those who do avoid it, in fact make a claim to truth themselves (in so far as they presuppose that the denial of truth is true) and in turn deny others. Some take Hegel's explicit reference to truth, with which his philosophy is preoccupied, to be bold and too arrogant. Consequently, the tendency recently has been to work eclectically with parts of Hegel's philosophy and dialectical approach, but largely to reject his system as a whole. Hegel was sensitive to the claims emanating from a sceptical approach to overarching truth and incorporated the critique expressed by that approach into his account of truth, along with his own critique of scepticism. Hegel s critique of modern scepticism's denial of truth (in this case modern philosophy since Descartes) does not mean he regards it as being without merit. In fact, Hegel not only accepts, but also recommends, that any claim to truth must be subjected to scepticism in the form of science (Wissenschaft). The very essence of science (Wissenschaft) is knowing, and what else is worthy of knowing but truth? Truth, therefore, does not undermine scepticism, but rather leads scepticism to its own limits and therefore its fulfilment. The process of leading scepticism to fulfilment is described in terms of a sublimation. Sublimation (Lauterung) is understood as an arduous process that rectifies, but does not exclude, the parts that it problematises. It is in this sense of sublimation that Hegel's famous statement that "truth is the whole " is to be understood. However, the exacting passage to truth cannot begin with the whole, as the whole has not legitimised itself, which leads Hegel to consider the way towards the whole as just as important as the destination. Natural (immediate) consciousness must therefore be allowed to present its claims to truth, after which scepticism is employed to question the claims. This process of constantly questioning certainty corresponds with the Socratic method and, unsurprisingly, finds expression in a dialectic. The dialectic is more than a mere back-and-forth exchange, but rather an unfolding of truth itself. Without such dynamism a fuller conception of truth would not take shape, and in any case would not be able to legitimise itself. To overcome the presuppositions of every stage, a certain leap over the position is required, a leap away from the position that is to be overcome, but at the same time a leap that recognises that very position. The process therefore involves active participation and expanding awareness, on the one hand, but, on the other, a measure of fate, by which Hegel means that the course of knowing is destined to lead to fulfilment (a "homecoming") in the guise of absolute knowing, a knowing that is in and for itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores possibilities for the future of, and need for philosophy in Afrikaans in the light of the recent exorcism-like removal of Afrikaans from local universities. To do this, firstly the phenomenon of the manner in which English is taking over as the only medium of instruction not only locally, but also internationally, will come under scrutiny. Secondly, the meaning of thinking philosophically in a particular language will be explored, followed by pointers towards a way forward into a situation where philosophy in Afrikaans can be thought from outside of the margins of tertiary institutions, but never closed off to conversation with the public institutions and the broader context of South Africa. I will challenge the claim that English is merely a more practical lingua franca, by rooting it in its colonial prejudices, claiming to be the medium of the Christian message, similar to the way Latin before it was seen. It will be argued that secularisation did not neccessarily root out these issues, but appropriated this salvific quality of the English language into modern science and its claims to objective and universal truth. As a first step towards reaching objectivity, the mind needs to be detoxified from the malnutrition of the inferior and limited mother tongue, the indigenous language. The move from the smaller to the larger language, supposedly correlates to the movement from the subjective to the objective realm. Instead of accomplishing this goal however, the movement rather results in what Van Wyk Louw calls "modern barbarism". The effects of modern barbarism, is that it creates in its homogeneity a sort of contemporary tower of Babel, with an exorcised Faustian workforce, toiling away at producing consumables that constantly reproduce the initial process to drive out souls and imprint on these blank pages (tabula rasa) global trade-"marks". The passage to knowledge has become an automation of the abstracted head function (Capitas in Latin) into which all impulses should neatly fit. As an alternative to this state of affairs, a call is made for an orientated thinking, that never loses sight of the Delphic principle "know thyself", without which further "objective" knowledge has the danger of being disjointed from the concrete situation and becoming oppressive. Knowing yourself conversely also means familiarising oneself with the larger framework in which one is situated. The solution is therefore active and dynamic translation and expression in which the languages are given platforms to be cultivated and to crosspollinate. Philosophy itself has benefited from many languages through which it has been able to form concepts that have influenced the history of thinking. Outside of the public tertiary institution, philosophy steps into the sphere in which Afrikaans has been cultivated over the last few years, the market. In a certain sense, philosophy returns to the place where it first attained a clear manifestation, as itself a form of exchange (in Afrikaans: "handel"), but a form of exchange that mediates between other exchanges, from the most particular to the overarching. This interaction is also the movement in which justice (as right) crystallizes, justice understood in the sense of letting things come to right ("teregkom"). Through this exchange, the understanding of economy as that which is informed by abstract principles, in which the free play between the oikos and the nomos is determined by the nomos alone, is challenged by one in which the local, in all its complexity, is invited to participate and contribute to the global discourse on an open platform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the question concerning technics will be considered, not in terms of its current nature/state, or the impact that it has on contemporary society, but rather in terms of the myths on its origin and meaning. These myths point to the access gained through the use of technology in two senses: to the sphere of the gods on the one hand, but also to the solitude and independence of mankind from the gods on the other. Plato's account of the myth of the theft of technics by Prometheus will serve as an example of the first approach, and Nietzsche's lingual turn in On Truth and Lying in a non-moral sense will represent the latter. A space for the middle-ground between these approaches will be explored in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, in which language and technics are depicted as being simultaneously bound to an overarching principle, as well as being representative of a concrete situation. In the tragedy, the characters representing both positions don't fit comfortably within the spheres they represent: firstly, Hephaestus was a cripple god that created technics to compensate for his shortcoming, and secondly there is Prometheus, the giant who sympathised with humanity by stealing technics from the gods. It will be argued that the use of technics positions humanity in a similar "in-between" position, a position that is constitutive of being human. The position comprises of a necessary tension between the metaphysical and the concrete, a tension that should not be resolved in favour of one side, but rather strengthened. This notion will be supported by Freud's term Spur, as appropriated by Derrida into différance. Spur refers to the trace of what is thought. However, this trace does not serve as an exact replica of what it depicts, because what is thought always remains beyond its representation. Furthermore, the means of and the act of representation bring about deviation in relation to what is represented, hence the description of différance. This does not imply that the act of thinking should be regarded as failing in its very purpose, but rather as a proof of the interplay between the elements constituting the zone of the imprint. Therefore, the zone of the imprint, différance, opens itself to what lies beyond itself without claiming to contain it on the one hand, and recognizes itself as being situated and limited on the other. But bringing these two parts together also implies changing our perceptions about truth and relativity. To this end, the suggestion of Heidegger to regard truth not as static, but as simultaneously/ continuous veiling and unveiling, could be considered for bringing together or making the two approaches adaptable to each other. The binding force between the act of seeking what lies beyond, and the expression of what is immanent, is technics. Technics should not therefore be regarded merely as a supplement to or extension of human capabilities, but as something constitutive of being human. Such an explanation may leave the impression that humanity could be defined in terms of its technicity, which would amount to a distortion of the nature of the relationship between humanity and technics. The relationship in its most preferable form, is one in which a tension between that which lies beyond one's immediate situation and the immanent is maintained, a tension through which meaning becomes constituted. The tension is maintained by two aspects of technicity, firstly the always temporally transcendent character of technology, that seeks by means of invention and archiving to reach beyond its particular milieu, and secondly, the always pragmatic use of technology, that seeks to maintain and improve conditions. In conclusion a case will be made that the above-mentioned dichotomy between the universal and particular should instead be interpreted as an ongoing dynamism which seeks a balance between facilitating the preservation and transfer of that which shapes human society, as well as preventing its detrimental stagnation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]