Search

Discussions of hope can be found throughout the history of philosophy and across all Western philosophical traditions, even though philosophy has traditionally not paid the same attention to hope as it has to attitudes like belief and desire. However, even though hope has historically only rarely been discussed systematically—with important exceptions, such as Aquinas, Bloch and Marcel—almost all major philosophers acknowledge that hope plays an important role in regard to human motivation, religious belief or politics. Historically, discussions of the importance of hope were often embedded in particular philosophical projects. More recent discussions of hope provide independent accounts of its nature and its relation to other mental phenomena, such as desire, intention and optimism.

In Krisenzeiten suchen Menschen nach einem Zeichen der Hoffnung. Hoffnung steht auch im Zentrum der Forschung von Claudia Blöser. Ein Gespräch mit der Philosophin über die Beziehung zwischen Hoffnung, Wissen und Angst und darüber, warum das Konzept der radikalen Hoffnung in einer Krisensituation hilfreich sein kann.

This article corrects the following: Hope in political philosophy, Claudia Blöser Jakob Huber Darrel Moellendorf. Volume 15Issue 5Philosophy Compass First Published online: April 17, 2020. It has come to the author's attention that the reference citation of ‘Meirav, 2009’ on page 2 of his published article entitled, ‘Hope in political philosophy’ does not provide bibliographical details regarding the article and does not include it in its list of works cited. Here is the bibliographical information: Meirav, A. (2009). The nature of hope. Ratio, 22, 216–233.

Discussions of hope can be found throughout the history of philosophy and across all Western philosophical traditions, even though philosophy has traditionally not paid the same attention to hope as it has to attitudes like belief and desire. However, even though hope has historically only rarely been discussed systematically—with important exceptions, such as Aquinas, Bloch and Marcel—almost all major philosophers acknowledge that hope plays an important role in regard to human motivation, religious belief or politics. Historically, discussions of the importance of hope were often embedded in particular philosophical projects. More recent discussions of hope provide independent accounts of its nature and its relation to other mental phenomena, such as desire, intention and optimism.

Discussions of hope can be found throughout the history of philosophy and across all Western philosophical traditions, even though philosophy has traditionally not paid the same attention to hope as it has to attitudes like belief and desire. However, even though hope has historically only rarely been discussed systematically—with important exceptions, such as Aquinas, Bloch and Marcel—almost all major philosophers acknowledge that hope plays an important role in regard to human motivation, religious belief or politics. Historically, discussions of the importance of hope were often embedded in particular philosophical projects. More recent discussions of hope provide independent accounts of its nature and its relation to other mental phenomena, such as desire, intention and optimism.

Dieser Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Möglichkeit von Graden der Zurechnung in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Es ist bezweifelt worden, dass Kant in seiner Theorie Platz für Grade der Zurechnung einräumen kann, sodass wir Kant zufolge entweder voll verantwortlich für jede unserer Handlungen sind, oder eben gar nicht zum Kreis der verantwortungsfähigen Akteure gehören, so wie Kinder oder Geisteskranke. Ich werde die Gründe in der Kantischen Theorie darstellen, die gegen die Möglichkeit von Entschuldigungen und Graden der Zurechnung sprechen. Doch Kant selbst nimmt in einer Passage in der Metaphysik der Sitten an, dass es Zurechnungsgrade gibt. Ausgehend von dieser Passage argumentiere ich für eine Lösung, wie Grade der Zurechnung mit Kants Theorie vereinbart werden können. Diese Lösung beruht auf der Unterscheidung zweier Stufen von Zurechnung und dementsprechend zweier Arten von Gründen, die die Zurechnung von Handlungen anfechten können.