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Jury duty serves as one of the fundamental pillars of American democracy, for it encourages direct citizen participation. Yet, the process of selecting its members is characterised by a flaw in form of a peremptory challenge -- a tool with considerable potential for abuse since it permits covert discrimination against members of visible minority groups. Despite not being a procedural right protected by the Constitution of the United States, peremptories have entered the canon of provisions thought to be necessary for preserving the fairness of trial due to their long history of employment in the legal system. In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky ruled the exclusion of jurors solely on the basis of their race to be unconstitutional and established the first preventative procedural standard against dubious usage of peremptories in form of the Batson Rule. The effectiveness of the said standard remains questionable, for it did not successfully deal with racial discrimination during voir dire but only enabled to formally object to the questionable juror's strike. This paper aims to put racial discrimination within the American jury system into a historical perspective, analyze the arguments of both the supporters and the opponents of further peremptory challenge usage and consider probable alternatives that might be implemented to successfully prevent discriminatory practices within the American jury selection process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Batson v. Kentucky argues that a socio-legal, ethnographic approach to how lawyers perpetuate discrimination in jury selection. It mentions how ethnography leads to a more sophisticated, empirically grounded understanding of these issues, casting new light on racial and other forms of exclusion, including exclusion based on socioeconomic status and previous contact with the legal system.

The article discusses how the Arizona Supreme Court has abolished peremptory strikes in jury selection, following the U.S. Supreme Court's Batson v. Kentucky decision. It reports that the court changed the laws to make it impossible for plaintiffs to remove potential jurors without cause. It mentions that Arizona defendants continue to confront cause challenges, and the court should have increased voir dire standards to protect against prejudiced jurors.

Racial discrimination during jury selection is a form of prosecutorial misconduct with very real consequences for criminal defendants. Despite being prohibited by the Supreme Court in the well-known 1986 case of Batson v. Kentucky, racial discrimination during jury selection by prosecutors remains a prominent form of racial bias affecting criminal defendants and their constitutional rights. This is exceptionally true for Curtis Flowers, a man who spent twenty-three years in prison while being tried six times by the same prosecutor who was ultimately found, by the Supreme Court, to have racially discriminated during the venire of all six trials. Flowers v. Mississippi exemplifies how the existing procedure for safeguarding the rights of criminal defendants impacted by racial discrimination during jury selection is desperately lacking because it allows prosecutors to commit repeated acts of racially motivated misconduct over the course of countless trials with little recourse for the defendant. This Comment examines the many trials of Curtis Flowers and proposes how a more expansive remedy could help protect the rights of criminal defendants in similar situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Flowers v. Mississippi may alter the approaches in which lower courts analyze claims of racial discrimination in the use of preemptory challenges. Topics discussed include the value of equal protection in jury selection, the Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, and pre-Batson approach to racial bias in jury selection.

Among the central issues in scholarship on the American jury is the effect of Batson v. Kentucky (1986) on discriminatory empanelment. Empirical legal research has confirmed that despite the promise of the Watson doctrine, both peremptory strikes and challenges for cause remain tools of racial exclusion. But these studies, based on post. Aic to interviews, transcript analysis, and quantitative methods offer little insight into Batson's critical impact on real-time decision-making and strategy in voir dire. If we increasingly know what kinds of juries are produced in the post-Watson world, we know very little about how they are produced. This Article addresses this problem with data derived from a five-year field study of Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Through interviews and participant observation during jury selection proceedings, it provides an unprecedented empirical perspective on how Batson has made race central to the ways prosecutors perceive, pick, and strike jurors. Rather than diminishing race's influence on voir dire, Batson has made it an essential consideration for prosecutors concerned with their in-court performance and professional reputations. This race-conscious approach to jury selection has arisen in part due to a clear doctrinal shift in courts' analyses of juror questioning and striking. This shift has expanded the scope of judicial inquiry during the adjudication of Batson challenges jtom scrutiny of individual "neutral" rationales for juror dismissals to a more robust comparative juror analysis. My empirical findings indicate that there is a meaningful connection between this latter approach and the incorporation of antidiscrimination norms into prosecutorial approaches to voir dire. Having identified and described this link, it becomes possible to perform a deeper audit of the Batson framework, and suggest, as this Article does, that with reform and expansion to address welldocumented limitations, it may serve to narrow the gap between juries as they are and juries as the Constitution would have them be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the important role lawyers play in protecting against discrimination in the jury selection process. Topics covered include the issue of systemic racism in the U.S., the development and current scope of the Batson challenge, and the tools needed by lawyers to fulfill their role in eliminating discrimination during jury selection. Also discussed is the use of Batson challenges in Missouri state court.

The author details the need for a rule that will protect queer jurors in the U.S. against peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation. She provides a historical background of peremptory challenge. She explores the limitations of the Supreme Court's ruling in Batson v. Kentucky including the failure to address racial discrimination in juries. She also discusses the General Rule 37 which was adopted in Washington state to limit explicit and implicit racial biases against jurors.

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to eliminate racial discrimination in jury selection by prohibiting the use of peremptory challenges to intentionally strike prospective jurors based on their race. Today, more than thirty years later, Batson’s now-familiar three-part framework is widely considered to be a toothless and inadequate decision that fails to reduce the unfair exclusion of jurors of color. In 2018, the Washington Supreme Court took a remarkable step by enacting a first-of-its-kind court rule that substantially altered the Batson framework. Specifically, the new court rule rejects Batson’s intentional discrimination requirement and instead expressly addresses implicit and institutional bias. This Note is the first to discuss Washington’s historic court rule. In this Note, I offer both a descriptive account of the rule’s enactment and a normative assessment of the rule’s framework. Through interviews with lawyers and judges in Washington, I explore the backdrop and debate over the rule’s implementation as well as its initial effects. Considering the values at stake in jury selection, I argue that the rule’s expansion of Batson is a desirable step toward improving jury diversity and enhancing judicial integrity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peremptory strikes are a longstanding subject of controversy. Critics concerned with the continued discriminatory use of peremptory strikes after Batson v. Kentucky have called for their elimination. Defenders of peremptory strikes have resisted elimination by pointing to the value of impartiality that they believe peremptory strikes serve. Both sides of the controversy, this Note argues, have missed an additional value served by peremptory strikes: democratic legitimacy. The selection of jurors is analogous to the election of political representatives. Political elections give citizens a say in order to help legitimate the state's coercive power. Likewise, jury selections give parties a say in order to help legitimate the trial's coercive power. Viewing peremptory strikes through the lens of democratic legitimacy helps us to understand previously unjustified features of peremptory strikes--including the varying numbers of peremptory strikes across offenses and between parties, the default rule that parties need not justify their strikes, and the resistance to eliminating peremptory strikes in favor of expanded strikes for cause. But viewing peremptory strikes through this lens also highlights the need for certain reforms to current practices. The Note urges that we eliminate peremptory strikes by prosecutors in criminal proceedings and by the state in civil proceedings. Barring elimination, the Note asks us to require reasons for prosecutorial and state peremptories and to limit their numbers. It also asks us to give more peremptories to civil parties threatened with deprivations of liberty, on the theory that such deprivations require greater democratic justification than deprivations of property. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because legal determinations often turn on motive, and motives are often complex, courts must decide what to do about mixed motives. For example, a boss might fire someone both for lawful reasons relating to job performance and also because of illegal prejudice. Increasingly, courts evaluate such cases under a "But-For standard," which finds for the plaintiff only if the defendant would have acted differently but for the bad motive. Put another way, the defendant loses unless the bad motive made some kind of causal difference in outcomes. While this approach is intuitive, I argue that the But-For standard is problematic. The widespread acceptance of the But-For standard is the most important failure in our jurisprudence of mixed motives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the implementation of psychology into the legal system, detailing the origin of the trial consulting field, the job description of the modern trial consultant, and the critiques often associated with the profession. Topics include U.S. Supreme Court case Batson v. Kentuck on peremptory challenges; removing discrimination in the modern jury system; and improving the constitutional fairness of a jury trial.

The article focuses on challenges of race-based discrimination in the U.S. It informs on U.S. Supreme Court case Batson v. Kentucky addressing race discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges during jury selection in criminal and civil jury trials; People v. Bridgeforth court case addressing discrimination based on skin color; and anti-discrimination laws in the country.

The article provides overview of the system of peremptory strikes in the U.S. It informs on problem of rampant racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty; challenges surrounding denial of black jurors from serving; and current legal framework of constitutional jurisprudence for addressing the same; and the court case Batson v. Kentucky.

Batson v. Kentucky is widely regarded as a failure. In the thirtyplus years since it was decided by the Supreme Court, the doctrine has been subjected to unrelenting criticism for its inability to stop the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. The scholarly literature is nearly unanimous: Batson is broken. But this Article approaches Batson from a different perspective, focusing on Batson's appellate virtues rather than its trial shortcomings. This change in focus reveals a number of ways in which the Batson doctrine provides opportunities on appeal that do not exist at trial. In short, this Article argues that appellate Batson punches far above its trial weight. Batson's appellate virtues have been overlooked by the literature, and this Article's first task is to illustrate them. This Article's second project is to reorient the discussion about Batson by placing the doctrine in the proper context. In comparison to other antidiscrimination claims--and to other postconviction claims, more broadly--Batson has a real luster. Though not often acknowledged as such, Batson is the one meaningful doctrine for fighting discrimination in the jury-selection process and in the criminal justice system more generally. Enormous pressure is put on Batson as a result, and maybe Batson is not up to the task. But with Batson's appellate dimension, the doctrine is more up to the task than previously thought. This Article's final goal, in light of Batson's appellate virtues, is to suggest a reconceptualization of Batson as not merely a jury-selection doctrine but rather a multipurpose vehicle capable of fighting discrimination wherever it occurs in the trial process--even if the discrimination takes place outside of jury selection. For appellate judges who want to correct the injustice of a trial stained by discrimination, a broad-based Batson doctrine may be their best, last, and only hope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In U.S. law, the Batson decision and subsequent decisions forbids the use of peremptory challenges for jury selection in ways that disproportionately eliminate cognizable classes: by race, sex, ethnicity, etc. The court designed a three-stage process: a prima facie case requires a timely objection, the identification of a cognizable class, and facts sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination. If a prima facie case is found, the side using the peremptory challenge has the opportunity of explaining its decisions, and then the court decides whether discrimination has occurred. This article addresses how statistics can be used to address the strength of evidence provided by the history of the use of peremptory challenges in a case. It contrasts two different procedures used by judges in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Frequentist and Bayesian analyses are given for both procedures, using data from a recent cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on history of the no-impeachment rule and the various approaches to this rule from an evidence perspective in federal and state jurisdictions in the U.S. It informs on the U.S. Supreme Court case Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado makes a constitutional exception to this rule in the context of expressions of racial bias during jury deliberations in criminal cases. It informs on Batson v. Kentucky court case on peremptory challenges.

On April 30, 1986, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Batson v. Kentucky. The opinion reiterated that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the exercise of peremptory strikes on the basis of race during jury selection. The Court provided what is now a familiar three-step framework for determining whether purposeful discrimination against minority jurors has occurred. Since its decision in Batson, the Supreme Court has continued to explore issues arising within this framework and has offered further guidance in adjudicating Batson claims. Our research examines North Carolina's disappointing Batson record in the thirty years since the decision was handed down. In the 114 cases decided on the merits by North Carolina appellate courts, the courts have never found a substantive Batson violation where a prosecutor has articulated a reason for the peremptory challenge of a minority juror. In all of the seventyfour cases decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina during that time, that court has never once found a substantive Batson violation. In contrast, over the past thirty years every state appellate court located in the Fourth Circuit has found at least one substantive Batson violation where the State struck a minority juror. North Carolina's remarkable record is even more disappointing in the light of recent studies finding the existence of pervasive prosecutorial racial discrimination in North Carolina jury selection. In an attempt to explain this record, this Article maintains that North Carolina courts misapply Batson jurisprudence in several important ways, namely at the first and third step of the framework. This article concludes that North Carolina courts should implement a correct application of Batson's principles in order to provide minority defendants a fair shot at eliminating racial discrimination in jury selection at trial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Serving on a jury is an important civic duty. As such, the exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of their race, gender, or other discriminatory characteristics violates their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, according to Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny. This Note proposes replacing the practice of comparative juror analysis with increased deference to trial courts to determine an attorney's intent in striking a particular juror. This Note supports this proposal by exploring the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories and its implications for Batson's three-part test to challenge a discriminatory peremptory strike. Specifically, this Note focuses on how the Ninth Circuit's decision highlights the practical limitations of conducting a comparative juror analysis for "nonvisible" protected classes. Comparative juror analysis became central to the three-part Batson test following the Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El v. Dretke. In that case, the Court emphasized that trial judges should effectuate Batson's third prong by comparing a struck juror with "nonstruck" panelists to determine if the reason proffered for the removal was pretextual. But this process is problematic because it assumes that a person has a "categorical identity" that is easily identifiable to the public. Even prior to the Ninth Circuit's extension of Batson, this aspect of comparative juror analysis presented challenges. First, comparative juror analysis does not address how to treat nonvisible--and therefore not-easily-identifiable--traits. For example, comparative juror analysis fails to articulate how to treat persons who may be multiracial and who still may be struck for discriminatory reasons. Second, comparative juror analysis fails to articulate whose perspective is considered (e.g., if multiracial jurors identify as "white," but the litigants identify them as "black"). These shortcomings are particularly relevant when Batson's protections are extended to sexual orientation. Specifically, because comparative juror analysis assumes that protected traits are visibly apparent, this prong fails to address the nonvisible nature of sexual orientation. This is true both for the struck juror, who must be a "member" of the protected class to meet Batson's first prong, and for the entire panel, whose treatment must be compared to that of the struck juror to determine if the proffered reason for the peremptory strike was pretextual. With this in mind, this Note proposes eliminating the use of comparative juror analysis and, instead, proposes that greater deference be given to trial courts to determine the intent of the attorney exercising the strike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Batson v. Kentucky which limit the problems of peremptory challenges by constraining parties' ability to strike jurors because of their race. It mentions that demographic profiling remains a principal strategy during voir dire and roles of ideology and race in the jury-selection process. It also mentions that bias disadvantages certain litigants from tort plaintiffs to criminal defendants.

The article reports the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case 'Batson v. Kentucky' in which the Court ruled that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenge in a criminal case may not be used to exclude jurors based solely on their race. It discusses how race affects the likelihood that a person will have an arrest record.

The article examines transgender people and their protection under the law. Particular focus is given to an argument to extend the results of the U.S. Supreme Court Case Batson v. Kentucky, which dealt with the dismissal of jurors without stating a valid cause for doing so. Additional topics discussed include discrimination of transgender jurors, the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and insights on jury selection.

In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor to strike a black juror based solely on race violated the Equal Protection Clause. This Note argues that Batson should be extended to prohibit discriminatory use of peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation. The Ninth Circuit has adopted this approach, recently holding both that Batson extends to sexual orientation and that heightened scrutiny applies to such challenges. The Supreme Court should uphold the Ninth Circuit' s decision as an important step on the road to securing gay rights both in the courtroom and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent Ninth Circuit decision, prohibiting peremptory challenges on the basis of sexual orientation, reveals the continuing evolution of the Batson doctrine. Meanwhile, contrary judicial voices demand the abolition of the peremptory challenge. This Article uncovers two phenomena that militate against abolition of the peremptory challenge, and in favor of allowing Batson's evolution. First, the justifications for abolition apply asymmetrically to prosecution and defense, suggesting that an asymmetrical approach is more apt. Second, the states historically adopted an asymmetrical approach--unequal allocation o f peremptory challenges to prosecution and defense--and yet many state legislatures have recently abandoned asymmetry, with some legislators declaring that there are no reasons not to. This Article supplies those reasons, demonstrating that asymmetrical allocation of peremptory challenges not only brings benefits in the context of jury selection but also may help resist tendencies elsewhere in the criminal justice system to equate asymmetry with unfairness, and thus to erode foundational protections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court faced an important ideological choice when it banned the racial use of peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky. The Court could either ground the rule in equality rights designed to protect potential jurors from stereotyping, or it could base the rule on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury" drawn from a "fair cross-section of the community." By choosing the equal protection analysis, the Court turned away from the defendant and the fair functioning of the criminal justice system, and instead focused on protecting potential jurors. In doing so, the Court built a fatal error into the Batson rule, a doctrine which has failed to meaningfully reform jury selection. This Article proposes to revisit that fork in the road, and for the first time, to describe how a Sixth Amendment test would function far better in comparison to the present rule. Unlike Batson, a Sixth Amendment test would focus on the impact of jury selection on diversity instead of attempting to divine the subjective intent of lawyers. The test would function as follows: If peremptory challenges skewed the diversity of suspect classifications on the jury, then a lawyer would need to justify his strikes with reference to specific and individualized concerns about each juror's impartiality. The judge would then balance the strength of the proffered reason for the strike against the value of the lost diversity. Although this remains a subjective test, it would prove much stronger than the Batson rule. Pragmatically, the test would measure the relevance and importance of a proffered reason rather than its sincerity, and would prove far less insulting to enforce. Ideologically, the test would focus on the more important constitutional goals of the diversity and impartiality of the jury. Instead of vainly regulating the color blindness of jury selection, a Sixth Amendment rule would focus on gathering as diverse a jury as possible while rooting out individual bias. This would require reversal of the Court's reasoning in Batson, a decision that would greatly improve equal protection law. Scholars divided between the worlds of constitutional and criminal law rarely place the Batson cases into an equal protection context and thus fail to recognize that those cases prove outliers in their insistence on absolute color blindness. Stranger still, each side of the Court switched positions in the jury cases on the value of diversity, on whether race can predict belief, and on whether racial stereotyping standing alone causes constitutional injury. This Article argues that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment as valuing diversity, and indeed requiring a jury drawn from a "fair cross-section of the community," creates a constitutional right for defendants that trumps color blindness. Jury discrimination has plagued our criminal justice system for too long to settle for the Court's current state of denial. As mandated by the Constitution, we should focus on the quest for an impartial jury, not just a color-blind selection process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critics of peremptory-challenge systems commonly contend that they inevitably inflict "inequality harm" on many excused persons and should be abolished. Ironically, the Supreme Court fueled this argument with its decision in Batson v. Kentucky by raising and endorsing the inequality claim sua sponte and then purporting to solve it with an approach that preserved peremptories. This Article shows, however, that the central problem is something other than inequality harm to excused persons. The central problem is the harm to disadvantaged litigants when their opponents use peremptories to secure a one-sided jury. This problem can arise often--whenever a venire is slanted in favor of one of the parties. The advantaged litigant can use peremptories to seat a large group of favorable jurors regardless of how the disadvantaged litigant exercises its peremptories. The Court in the Batson cases only obliquely confronted that problem, because constitutional rulings cannot appropriately resolve it. However, there is a remedy. Peremptory systems reflect the idea that parties acting in their self-interests can help pursue group neutrality on a jury. Similarly, by conferring on litigants a right to stop peremptories at any time, states can enlist them to determine when opposing parties are using peremptories to promote group bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article addresses the role stereotypes, particularly racial stereotypes, play in the process of jury selection in criminal cases. This Article discusses the law that has evolved since Batson and uses empirical data to provide added insight into the exercise of peremptory challenges. Further, the authors consider how current scholarship in cognitive psychology reveals the influence of stereotypes on decision-making. In the final section, the authors offer practical approaches that both prosecutors and defense lawyers can use while making jury decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the history, development and use of peremptory challenges, which provides an obligation for lawyers to avoid discrimination in practice of law based on sexual orientation. It focuses on the application of a heightened scrutiny standard to laws and practices for preempting discrimination against gay, lesbian, and bisexual jurors by Court rule of the U.S. It discusses Batson v. Kentucky regarding a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenge in a criminal case.

The article discusses whether the U.S. Supreme Court (USSC) created a legal right without a remedy, focusing on whether a court's erroneous granting of a Batson objection based on the USSC's ruling in the racial discrimination during jury selection case Batson v. United States (Batson v. Kentucky) can ever constitute reversible error. The U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and American constitutional violations are mentioned, along with U.S. evidence laws and a harmless error doctrine.

The article focuses on issues surrounding death qualification of capital jurors in the U.S with reference to several cases involving death penalty sentences. Topics discussed include the U.S Supreme Court's rejection of the use of death penalty in cases addressing aggravated rape of child victims such as Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court's decision in case Norris v. Alabama that involved conviction for rape and Batson v. Kentucky that addressed the use of peremptory challenges.

The article offers information on the 50th anniversary celebration of the U.S. Supreme Court's judicial decision in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright, in which the Court ruled that state courts must provide a counsel to defendants in criminal cases who are unable to afford to pay for a lawyer under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Topics discussed include the important decisions in other cases including the Batson v. Kentucky, Strickland v. Washington and Johnson v. Zerbst.

This Note evaluates the convergence of the standards articulated in Batson v. Kentucky and those of Strickland v. Washington. Specifically, how can a defendant demonstrate actual prejudice as a result of defense counsel's failure to challenge the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory strikes? Lower courts have differed over whether the test should be outcome-based--a demonstration of actual prejudice in the outcome or verdict of the trial--or composition-based--a showing that the result of the jury selection process would have been different. I argue that the latter test is preferable to the former for several reasons. First, the composition-based test will ensure fuller protection of the rights contemplated in Batson and Strickland. Second, the necessary evaluation under the outcome-based test would dramatically shift the Supreme Court's current colorblind approach in equal protection jurisprudence. Rather than shifting the current equal protection doctrine, the composition-based test allows for incorporation of the doctrine through the use of the diversity rationale. Third, a properly administered outcome-based test would require the exploration of the impact of race and background on the relevant evidence and on perceptions of the criminal justice system, including its principal setting (the courtroom) and primary actors, as contrasted with the much more concrete--if not necessarily simpler--task of determining only whether the composition of the jury itself would have differed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Teague v. Lane generally precludes the retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to collateral review of criminal convictions. When federal courts reviewing state convictions apply this rule, it has a certain amount of logic: it protects society's interest in federalism and finality. But courts apply this rule to cases in myriad procedural postures, even when the forces motivating Teague are not present. This Note will examine three scenarios where Teague has been blindly invoked. It will then explain why this blind invocation is not only theoretically but also practically problematic, and it will suggest a solution (or a start of a solution) to the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the significance of civil jury diversity. It examines jury service as an aspect of political participation in a democratic society, the role of the jury in establishing the legitimacy of verdicts and the legal system, and jury service as an opportunity to learn about the operation of the judicial system and learn about and communicate with fellow members of the political community. The article also discusses the diversity as defined in the U.S. Supreme Court case Batson v. Kentucky.

The article discusses the legal aspects of negotiating peremptory challenges (PCs) which allow litigants to remove otherwise qualified prospective jurors from a jury panel without any showing of cause as of January 2014, focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the 1986 case Batson v. Kentucky which deals with remedies for race- and gender-related abuses of the PC process. According to the article, negotiating PCs could protect the rights of excluded jurors and preserve party autonomy. Human behavior and the motivations of attorneys are also examined.

The article focuses on the significance and influence of racial diversity to juries under the analysis of the North Carolina Racial Justice Act of 2009 (RJA). It discusses the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, whose regimes had put an effort in prohibiting racial discrimination.

The article discusses an academic conference organized to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Batson v. Kentucky that was held at the University of Wisconsin, Wisconsin on October 20, 2011. It informs that legal scholar David Baldus has accepted an invitation for the conference despite his bad health, but was not able to attend due to his death. Different lectures were presented regarding Baldus study in cases such as McCleskey v. Kemp.

The article discusses 'The North Carolina Racial Justice Act' which enacted the Racial Justice Act (RJA) in 2009 in the case of McCleskey and Batson. The act defines the use of statistical evidence which is important in determining whether racial discrimination could challenge death penalty. It describes the case of McCleskey and Batson, and also mentions the disadvantages of McCleskey in the case, indiating that the litigation might solve the issues related to RJA in the future.

In the twenty-five years since Batson v. Kentucky, courts have gradually narrowed its holding and limited its application. Subsequent decisions have diminished the utility of Batson as a means of challenging racially discriminatory peremptory strikes. This Essay examines why the doctrine has evolved this way. Elsewhere I have explored the influence of contextual variables--the available remedy, the facts that courts encounter, and the procedural posture in which rights-making occurs--on the ultimate scope of the substantive right that courts articulate. Batson provides a particularly rich opportunity to consider these variables because peremptory challenges are adjudicated in a highly idiosyncratic context: a criminal defendant, appealing his conviction by a jury, seeks the strong medicine of reversal for a harm that was perpetrated against a juror--not against the defendant directly--and that may not even have affected the outcome of the trial. The idiosyncrasies of the context in which Batson is litigated lend themselves to an intriguing inquiry: How might Batson doctrine have evolved differently if peremptory challenges were also litigated by the jurors who had been struck ? I conclude that--were courts to adjudicate peremptory challenges both in the context of claims by criminal defendants seeking reversal and in the context of claims by struck jurors seeking money damages or declaratory relief--the shape of the doctrine would provide a more accurate appraisal of the harms flowing from the use of race in peremptory challenges and a more robust mechanism for addressing those harms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on jurisprudence related challenges of discriminatory grand jury selection practices that form the basis for Batson decision in Batson v. Kentucky, a case from the Supreme Court of the U.S. It discusses the effectiveness of grand jury and its potential to improvise the administration of criminal justice. It explores the relevance of Batson decision that provides equal protection benefits in the jury selection without any racial discrimination.

The article focuses on limitations of jury deliberations in McCleskey v. Kemp, a case from the U.S. Supreme Court to protect rights of jurors from endemic jury racism. It discusses Batson conflicts, based on the decision from the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky with procedural protections made to prevent biased juries. It emphasized the need of protecting the rights of defendants and public to fair criminal justice system.

An essay is presented on relationship between peremptory challenges and Batson decision, a case from the U.S. Supreme Court decision on Batson v. Kentucky to protect people's voice and vision by analyzing political functions. It suggests removal of race based exclusions from jury service and benefits of political justifications to encourage racially diverse juries. It discusses efforts to maximize the likelihood of racial diversity by encouraging ocular and vocal justice system approach.

An essay is presented which focuses on the Coase theorem, which analyzes the impact and factors involved in jury selection procedures. It discusses the ineffectiveness in policy objectives and the defendants' ability to have jurors to analyze the choice of peremptory strikes. It provides information on the isolation of the Batson rule for preventing illegal discrimination from the rules governing jury selection, based on the U.S. Supreme Court case Batson v. Kentucky.