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As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more proficient, their misuse in large-scale viral disinformation campaigns is a growing concern. This study explores the capability of ChatGPT to generate unconditioned claims about the war in Ukraine, an event beyond its knowledge cutoff, and evaluates whether such claims can be differentiated by human readers and automated tools from human-written ones. We compare war-related claims from ClaimReview, authored by IFCN-registered fact-checkers, and similar short-form content generated by ChatGPT. We demonstrate that ChatGPT can produce realistic, target-specific disinformation cheaply, fast, and at scale, and that these claims cannot be reliably distinguished by humans or existing automated tools.

The UK has had a volatile political environment for some years now, with Brexit and leadership crises marking the past five years. With this work, we wanted to understand more about how the global health emergency, COVID-19, influences the amount, type or topics of abuse that UK politicians receive when engaging with the public. With this work, we wanted to understand more about how the global health emergency, COVID-19, influences the amount, type or topics of abuse that UK politicians receive when engaging with the public. This work covers the period of June to December 2020 and analyses Twitter abuse in replies to UK MPs. This work is a follow-up from our analysis of online abuse during the first four months of the COVID-19 pandemic in the UK. The paper examines overall abuse levels during this new seven month period, analyses reactions to members of different political parties and the UK government, and the relationship between online abuse and topics such as Brexit, government's COVID-19 response and policies, and social issues. In addition, we have also examined the presence of conspiracy theories posted in abusive replies to MPs during the period. We have found that abuse levels toward UK MPs were at an all-time high in December 2020 (5.4% of all reply tweets sent to MPs). This is almost 1% higher that the two months preceding the General Election. In a departure from the trend seen in the first four months of the pandemic, MPs from the Tory party received the highest percentage of abusive replies from July 2020 onward, which stays above 5% starting from September 2020 onward, as the COVID-19 crisis deepened and the Brexit negotiations with the EU started nearing completion.

The 2019 UK general election took place against a background of rising online hostility levels toward politicians and concerns about its impact on democracy. We collected 4.2 million tweets sent to or from election candidates in the six week period spanning from the start of November until shortly after the December 12th election. We found abuse in 4.46\% of replies received by candidates, up from 3.27\% in the matching period for the 2017 UK general election. Abuse levels have also been climbing month on month throughout 2019. Abuse also escalated throughout the campaign period. Abuse focused mainly on a small number of high profile politicians. Abuse is "spiky", triggered by external events such as debates, or certain tweets. Abuse increases when politicians discuss inflammatory topics such as borders and immigration. There may also be a backlash on topics such as social justice. Some tweets may become viral targets for personal abuse. On average, men received more general and political abuse; women received more sexist abuse. MPs choosing not to stand again had received more abuse during 2019., Comment: Second draft, January 30th 2020

Against a backdrop of tensions related to EU membership, we find levels of online abuse toward UK MPs reach a new high. Race and religion have become pressing topics globally, and in the UK this interacts with "Brexit" and the rise of social media to create a complex social climate in which much can be learned about evolving attitudes. In 8 million tweets by and to UK MPs in the first half of 2019, religious intolerance scandals in the UK's two main political parties attracted significant attention. Furthermore, high profile ethnic minority MPs started conversations on Twitter about race and religion, the responses to which provide a valuable source of insight. We found a significant presence for disturbing racial and religious abuse. We also explore metrics relating to abuse patterns, which may affect its impact. We find "burstiness" of abuse doesn't depend on race or gender, but individual factors may lead to politicians having very different experiences online., Comment: This is an earlier version of a paper currently under review. This version spans January to June 2019 whereas the paper under review covers January to September 2019, as well as adding further analysis

We extend previous work about general election-related abuse of UK MPs with two new time periods, one in late 2018 and the other in early 2019, allowing previous observations to be extended to new data and the impact of key stages in the UK withdrawal from the European Union on patterns of abuse to be explored. The topics that draw abuse evolve over the four time periods are reviewed, with topics relevant to the Brexit debate and campaign tone showing a varying pattern as events unfold, and a suggestion of a "bubble" of topics emphasized in the run-up to the highly Brexit-focused 2017 general election. Brexit stance shows a variable relationship with abuse received. We find, as previously, that in quantitative terms, Conservatives and male politicians receive more abuse. Gender difference remains significant even when accounting for prominence, as gauged from Google Trends data, but prominence, or other factors related to being in power, as well as gender, likely account for the difference associated with party membership. No clear relationship between ethnicity and abuse is found in what remains a very small sample (BAME and mixed heritage MPs). Differences are found in the choice of abuse terms levelled at female vs. male MPs.

Societal debates and political outcomes are subject to news and social media influences, which are in turn subject to commercial and other forces. Local press are in decline, creating a ``news gap''. Research shows a contrary relationship between UK regions' economic dependence on EU membership and their voting in the 2016 UK EU membership referendum, raising questions about local awareness. We draw on a corpus of Twitter data which has been annotated for user location and Brexit vote intent, allowing us to investigate how location, topics of concern and Brexit stance are related. We compare this with a large corpus of articles from local and national news outlets, as well as survey data, finding evidence of a distinctly different focus in local reporting. National press focused more on terrorism and immigration than local press in most areas. Some Twitter users focused on immigration. Local press focused on trade, unemployment, local politics and agriculture. We find that remain voters shared interests more in keeping with local press on a per-region basis.

The recent past has highlighted the influential role of social networks and online media in shaping public debate on current affairs and political issues. This paper is focused on studying the role of politically-motivated actors and their strategies for influencing and manipulating public opinion online: partisan media, state-backed propaganda, and post-truth politics. In particular, we present quantitative research on the presence and impact of these three `Ps' in online Twitter debates in two contexts: (i) the run up to the UK EU membership referendum (`Brexit'); and (ii) the information operations of Russia-backed online troll accounts. We first compare the impact of highly partisan versus mainstream media during the Brexit referendum, specifically comparing tweets by half a million `leave' and `remain' supporters. Next, online propaganda strategies are examined, specifically left- and right-wing troll accounts. Lastly, we study the impact of misleading claims made by the political leaders of the leave and remain campaigns. This is then compared to the impact of the Russia-backed partisan media and propaganda accounts during the referendum. In particular, just two of the many misleading claims made by politicians during the referendum were found to be cited in 4.6 times more tweets than the 7,103 tweets related to Russia Today and Sputnik and in 10.2 times more tweets than the 3,200 Brexit-related tweets by the Russian troll accounts., Comment: This is now published in the Journal of Web Science. Please cite accordingly. https://webscience-journal.net/webscience/article/view/84