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This essay proposes a new reading of Julius Caesar 's account of friendship that also illuminates Shakespeare's broader communitarian political attitudes. It argues that the 'quarrel' (or reconciliation) scene between Brutus and Cassius presents a crucial turn in the play's closely meditated account of amity. This sheds new light on Shakespeare's response to two classical sources: Cicero's De Amicitia and Euripides' Iphigenia at Aulius , whose opening provides the model for this sequence. The significance of how Brutus and Cassius settle their differences, as well as their refusal to believe the enemy is always occulted within the friend, has been under-estimated. The high-minded ideals of Ciceronian amicitia seem wildly remote from the play's exposure of how friendship works in political life. We witness it being made serviceable to ambitions and held in bad faith: Cicero acknowledges these possibilities too. Yet the neglected later sequences of Julius Caesar tell a different story about friendship that emphasizes its role in promoting commonalty and reconciliation. The tragedy lies in the loss of this potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The challenge of distinguishing between abusive and non-abusive constitutional practices – Main ways of detecting abuse: analyses of intent and effects – Obstacles to detecting bad faith intent in constitutional law – Structured and focused analysis of the effects of abusive constitutionalism: introducing the foreseeable effects test – Normative benchmark: substantial diminishment of accountability – Step 1: probability of harm, analysing the tested constitutional measure's foreseeable effects on operability and autonomy of an accountability mechanism – Step 2: seriousness of potential harm, analysing the constitutional measure's effects in the broader constitutional context (including interaction effects) – Step 3: harm mitigation, analysing the existence and adequacy of harm-mitigating safeguards accompanying the constitutional measure – Strengths and limits of the foreseeable effects test [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay argues for a new conception of bad faith based partly on Harry Frankfurt's famous account of personal autonomy in terms of higher‐order volitions and caring, and based partly on Sartre's insights concerning tacit or pre‐thetic attitudes and "transcendent" freedom. Although Sartre and Frankfurt have rarely been connected, Frankfurt's concepts of volitional "wantonness" and "bullshit" (wantonness about truth) are similar in certain revealing respects to Sartre's account of bad faith. However, Sartre leaves no room for Frankfurt's central point that people can volitionally commit themselves to develop certain motives and reduce others, thereby shaping an authentic identity through volitional "identification" and "alienation" of motives. Frankfurt in turn minimizes the role that a sense of liberty to form and alter higher‐order volitions plays in experiences of autonomy, which Sartre recognizes in the transcendence of the "for‐itself." When these points are combined, we get a tri‐level theory of intrasubjective volitional stances that explains Sartre's cases better than his own theory can, and also clarifies how sincere or procedurally autonomous self‐relation is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a common-law world that has apparently turned its back on consumer protection because of mass-produced internet-and-technology driven commerce, it is time for mixed-civilians to refocus on consumer needs. The purpose of redhibition is and has always been to provide protection to purchasers. Unfortunately, while helpful in many respects, the inherent ambiguities in the 1995 revision have weakened its effectiveness by leading some Louisiana courts to the conclusion that ANY waiverof warranty, no matter how convoluted, irrelevant, or inappropriate, guts any and all implied warranty protection in Louisiana, especially as against manujacturers. We have problems with the meaning, applicability, and efiect of the manufacturer's presumed bad faith (art. 2545); ourcourts lack a consistent understanding of when a waiver of the implied warranties of redhibition and fitness is effective; and, the relationship between the warranty against redhibitory defects and that of jitness for ordinary purposes was not clearly spelled out by the Louisiana legislature. This Article explains how the law iii this area has developed since the 1995 revision, identifies where the problems lie, and proposes a solution. In contrast with other scholars who propose that the legislature revisit the relevant articles and either revise or repeal them, this Article argues that a more practical solution is simply for courts to interpret them in keeping with the underlying purpose of redhibition: protecting the consumer from unscrupulous sellers and manufacturers. Thus, those decisions that conclude that the mere signing of a boilerplate waiver proves the buyer understood what was being waived are inconsistent with the historical policy favoring the consumer as well as the intent of the 1995 revision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American Law Institute (ALI) has approved volume 3 of the new Restatement (Third) of Torts, which includes a section on first-party bad faith. The ALI aims to clarify and simplify the law, and the restatement process involves drafts, input from advisers and members, and final approval by the ALI Council. The Third Restatement expands on the treatment of bad faith in the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance (RLLI), specifically in section 20 A. This section provides a comprehensive overview of first-party bad faith law, covering its history, the nature of insurance contracts, the subjective and objective nature of the tort, and the obligations of insurers. It also addresses issues such as the timing of an insurer's knowledge, the scope of liability, and the damages that an insured may recover. While the impact of section 20 A on the future of first-party bad faith law is uncertain, it serves as a useful summary of the principles and may be a valuable resource for lawyers and judges in this area. [Extracted from the article]

The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question which is that of, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we are in a position to know that they are in bad faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the changes to the long-standing attorney fee and bad faith statutes in the context of property insurance policies. Topics discussed include the history, intent, and application of such laws by courts throughout the state of Florida, legislation altering these long-standing laws, and the potential retroactive application of the enacted laws to the existing contracts and claims.

The article discusses the meaning of bad faith prosecution and provides a taxonomy of different types of claims of bad faith prosecution and the procedural settings in which they arise. Topics include the focus of claims on prosecution motivated by race or speech, criticisms that the standards of proof for bad faith prosecution claims are too high and inconsistent with other claims involving subjective ill will and the possible impact of progressive prosecutors on bad faith prosecution claims.

The article explores the application of crime-fraud exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and work conduct doctrine to bad-faith litigation and proposes amended language to Proposed Rule 503(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The article sheds light on state law rights to postpetition default interest in the U.S. Topics include the history of bankruptcy law; In re Family Pharmacy court case dealing with postpetition default interest; and the U.S. Supreme Court case Law v. Siegel dealing with the extent of the powers of bankruptcy courts in dealing with the bad faith of debtors.

The article explores the impact of the bad-faith exception to the one-year bar on diversity removals in the U.S. courts. It is reported that the bad-faith exception allows defendants to remove an action for diversity more than one year after commencement if the district court finds that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in order to prevent removal. It examines how this exception to federal jurisdiction has been used by litigants and understood by courts.

The article presents a summary analysis of the legal concepts underlying bankruptcy remoteness. Topics discussed are bankruptcy remote terms of a special purpose vehicle's organizational and transactional documents, unanimity requirements for bankruptcy filings and golden share enforceability, bad faith bankruptcy filings, substantive consolidation doctrine of bankruptcy law, true sale of assets from a special purpose entity and factors in determining true sale including risk of loss/recourse.

The article discusses the legal issue of what constitutes bad faith under Pennsylvania's Right to Know Law (RTKL), particularly on the actions of an agency or open records officer when responding to public record requests. Also cited are the case Union Town v. Dept. of Corrections, the need for said officer to examine the records in the agency's possession to determine whether they are subject to disclosure and the appropriate judicial review of the decisions of government agencies.

The human desire to live together as a community or a nation is predicated on the conditions of equity, justice and fairness to all. However, the urge to dominate others has entrenched social injustice in society. This nature of human living breeds different kinds of human reactions which philosophers have identified. In his phenomenological ontology, Jean-Paul Sartre developed some concepts he believed to define our relationships with the world around us and how that world responds to our desires: Being-initself, Being-for-Itself, Facticity, Bad Faith and Authenticity are some concepts explored in this study. Sartre argues that because humans are ongoing projects with future possibilities, attaining our full potential as human beings only become valued through the ways we respond to these ideals. In the application of the above concepts using Sam Ukala's The Placenta of Death, this study, through a content analysis of the qualitative research method, interrogated human attitudes in an oppressive and unjust world seeking justification or otherwise for human actions that would provide us with what human society should be like for our experience of it to be what it ought to be. Our findings, among others, revealed that oppression and injustice in society breed political and material denials which lead to resentment and the consequent desire for political struggles. It also discovered that those who resign to bad faith (self-deceptive and compromised persons) are afraid to take responsibility for their past and present actions and thereby closing future possibilities for themselves and others. The study concluded that in a society of entrenched oppression and injustice, it is obligated and justified that one takes a political stand: one against oppression and injustice, but in favour of political emancipation and freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article discusses the origin and evolution of the concept of insurance bad faith actions in the U.S. Also cited are how English merchant Robert Hayman owned maritime insurance policies in 1628 that started the principle of good faith in the insurance sector, and how insurers have the duty to investigate all claims and pay only those that are valid.

The article focuses on denial of tax exemption the export in cases of fraud and items carried in personal baggage of travelers. It mentions Article 146 (1) (b) of the Value-added tax (VAT) Directive VAT exemption on the delivery in question can be applied and taxpayer issued the form in bad faith. It also mentions violation of a formal requirement denotes the reliable evidence prevents the material requirements.

An assessment of the credibility of the EU trade mark system in the light of the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-371/18 Sky v SkyKick leads to the following conclusions: the decisions that lack of clarity and precision of specifications of goods and services is not a ground of invalidity and that partial bad faith when applying to register a trade mark leads to partial invalidity are unsurprising; the decision that applying to register a trade mark without intending to use it can amount to bad faith, at least in some circumstances, is an important step forward that gives national courts a tool with which to combat unjustifiably broad specifications of goods and services; but the jury is still out with regard to the EU trade mark system's acceptance of broad terms such as 'computer software' in specifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the role of civil society in monitoring the executive as perceived by the European Court of Human Rights. Although this role is traditionally associated with the judiciary and the legislature, in light of the institutional mutations in modern States, the ECtHR case-law envisages a multitude of forms through which civil society can monitor the government and thus uphold the 'rule of law from below.' In addressing this recasting of the rule of law, the article discusses in particular the role of good and bad faith on the part of both the State and civil society. The ECtHR case-law on the mala fides restrictions of rights under Article 18 ECHR highlights the idea that the monitoring of the executive by civil society is even more crucial in States where the rule of law is suffering from a systemic point of view and thus civil society is the only entity within the State that can genuinely monitor the executive. Civil society, on its part, should exercise these monitoring functions in good faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study analyses from the point of view of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) a topic of current interest in the Romanian law, namely the topic of the legality of evidence as a link between the rule of law and the right to a fair trial. By corroborating general principles and individual solutions emerges a differentiation mechanism used by the ECHR in order to distinguish between possible breaches of the domestic law in respect to their nature and degree. While in principle the way the law is interpreted and the breach of law allegedly committed in obtaining and presenting the evidence are by themselves irrelevant from the perspective of the fair trial, the arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable interpretation of the law, which violates the principles of the rule of law, is relevant from that perspective. A serious breach of law can mean the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby. The ECHR doesn't lay down general rules regarding the assessment of the arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable character of the interpretation of the law and, respectively, the seriousness of its breach, but from the case-law emerges a series of relevant criteria, such as the manifest error of assessment, the breach of law committed in bad faith or systematically, inevitable discovery of evidence and the purpose of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that courts in the U.S. should more readily permit extra-record discovery when preliminary signs of pretext suggest bad faith and improper behavior by agency decision-makers. Topics discussed include basic mechanics of litigation challenging agency decisions, agencies' reliance on pretextual justifications, and factors that courts should consider when determining whether the context surrounding an agency's actions sufficiently suggest pretext.

"Equality" is a notion about which disagreement arises not simply due to lack of clarity and precision (or intellectual dishonesty and bad faith). Rather, equality is an idea that implies and implicates some form of disagreement as a constitutive possibility of its horizon of discussion. This, in my view, is both a problem and an opportunity. I submit that equality is a plural notion: There are only equalities, practices aimed at removing situated circumstances of inequality and discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that wrongful discharge laws—laws that protect employees against unjust dismissal—spur innovation and new firm creation. Wrongful discharge laws, particularly those that prohibit employers from acting in bad faith ex post, limit employers' ability to hold up innovating employees after the innovation is successful. By reducing the possibility of holdup, these laws enhance employees'innovative efforts and encourage firms to invest in risky but potentially mould-breaking projects. We develop a model and provide supporting empirical evidence of this effect using the staggered adoption of wrongful discharge laws across U.S. states. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on lawyers, soldiers, and intelligence officers all belong to distinct but fundamentally similar ethical professions which are characterized by special expertise, training, licensing, and ethical obligations. It mentions complexity of challenges facing the country, and their independence works as a check on error and bad faith by public officials. It also mentions need to manage themselves individually, particularly their human susceptibility for corruption.

The study addresses good faith as a uniform, but flexible, multi-faceted concept within contractual relationships. After analyzing the ambivalent character of the concept of good faith, in antithesis to the abuse of law in the form of bad faith and contractual wrongdoing, the study leans on the functions of good faith, which materialize the principle at its institutional and formal dimensions, namely the interpretative function of contracts, the completive, moderating or limitative, and adaptive function. In approaching the contractual illicit and the bad faith, as a basis of contractual liability, the study shows that good faith is a standard in quantifying them, and the legal language of good faith is a supreme norm of the contractual law, in a means of contractual jurisdiction, meant to limit the principle of contractual freedom. The study addresses the contractual loyalty as a subcategory of good faith, as an objective and moral aspect of this concept and the role of good faith as a factor in achieving the contractual balance. On this occasion, there are brought to attention the remedies of the Civil Code oriented towards the revision of the contract and the forms of these remedies, depending on the causes of the imbalances. Equity, as complex and fluid moral concept, which is added to good faith, without being confused with it, is analyzed in the objective dimension, associated with the notion of justice, and in the subjective one, which refers to equality and balance, but also as an instrument to which the judge resorts in order to fulfil the will of the parties in order to establish their rights and obligations, without however altering or distorting the legal act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the benefits of using the accession principle to resolve different kinds of property disputes. It mentions concludes with remarks on the role of common law on the frontiers of property and Roman civil law applied three doctrines to determine ownership of the commingled product. It also mentions acting in bad faith, trespasses onto the land of another and converts the landowner's grapes into wine.

The article addresses developments in insurance coverage in the U.S. Topics discussed include insurance response to mass shootings, whether an insurer is in bad faith when it did not settle a claim against its insured, because its policy required the insured to consent to the settlement and he would not, and California finding notice-prejudice rule a fundamental public policy for choice of law analysis.

In Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC and its progeny, the Delaware courts made clear that a fully informed, uncoerced vote by disinterested stockholders triggers the waste standard. In Corwin, the Delaware Supreme Court also indicated that Revlon was only meant to provide stockholders with an expedited process for obtaining a preliminary injunction before the closing of a transaction. However, more recent cases indicate that Revlon in fact does apply after the closing of a transaction. Unfortunately, the Delaware courts have not been given an opportunity to determine which standard of review should apply at this stage--enhanced scrutiny, waste, or the traditional business judgment rule. This Note argues that both doctrinal evolution and modern corporate governance developments support the application of the traditional business judgment rule. In practice, this means that the plaintiff would need to prove a breach of the duty of loyalty by showing bad faith. This provides an appropriate balance between accountability and authority--courts should not reward corporate defendants with the waste standard in the post-closing context where Corwin obligations have not been met. Applying the bad faith standard to post-closing Revlon claims where Corwin does not apply also reflects the typical process by which corporate actions are reviewed by courts: by separating the standard of conduct from the standard of review. Recognizing Revlon as a standard of conduct--not as a conflation of a standard of conduct with a particular standard of review--highlights the doctrine's importance in serving as a guide for corporate actors in the M&A context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Migrants can obtain permanent residency in Canada under the family-reunification category set out in s. 12(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Canadian citizens or permanent residents may apply to sponsor their non-citizen spouse, common law or conjugal partner, or other relatives to move to Canada pursuant to s. 117(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR). The bad-faith clause under s. 4(1) of the IRPR requires spousal-sponsorship applicants to prove to visa officers that, on a balance of probabilities, their relationship is "genuine" and not "entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the [IRPA]". The bad-faith clause is meant to prevent socalled marriage fraud: the idea that migrants, hoping to take advantage of the family-reunification regime, trick vulnerable Canadians into marriage and then subsequently abandon them once they have obtained citizenship status. Drawing on the work of feminist, antiracist, and anti-colonial scholars, this paper argues that the construction of marriage fraud as a threat to national security rationalizes an increasingly exclusionary spousalsponsorship regime post 9/11. Focusing on this "threat" detracts from the insidious naturalization of the neoliberal, hetero-patriarchal, and white settler-colonial values that animate the exclusionary nature of family class migration--values that pre-date the recent moral panic over marriage fraud. This paper concludes by sounding a cautionary bell: Canadians must be wary of the ongoing reproduction and sedimentation of exclusionary values that give meaning to legal constructions of family because they reinforce and perpetuate experiences of precarity among migrants who live on the underside of global capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-evaluation, a devolved, rigorous form of teacher inspection, has increasingly been promoted in educational circles as a way to balance both teacher autonomy and accountability. Such balancing acts help to alleviate anxiety around inspection, for the teacher who would otherwise face a visit from an inspector, and for the public who are concerned about self-evaluation being less objective. Using the Irish policy of self-evaluation, this paper will first explore the evidence-based approaches and the appropriation of a 'language of evaluation' that are inherent to so-called low-stakes accountability systems. In part, such mechanisms are used in order to alleviate anxiety. The anxiety that self-evaluation focuses on, however, corresponds only to aspects of teaching that are conducive to measurement, and therefore refers solely to what may be called an anxiety of performativity. Furthermore, its attempts to repress an anxiety of performativity ironically fails to acknowledge a more fundamental form of anxiety that teaching as a 'performance' involves. Using Sartre's idea of 'bad faith', this paper will ultimately argue that teaching inevitably involves an element of anxiety that should not be repressed but rather should be lived and worked with well, something which self-evaluation in its current form fails to capture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc. that the "good faith" element of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, a common-law affirmative defense to trademark infringement, requires the junior user to have used the trademark without knowledge of the senior user's prior use of the mark. This ruling echoed the Seventh Circuit's similar finding in 1982 in Money Store v. Harriscorp Finance, Inc., and the Eighth Circuit's finding in 2001 in National Association for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Central Arkansas Area Agency on Aging, Inc. The Ninth Circuit decision deepened the split with the Tenth and Fifth Circuits, which ruled in 1991 and 2001, respectively, that knowledge is not dispositive of bad faith, but is merely one factor to consider in a good faith inquiry. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly decided that knowledge of a senior user's prior use of a mark destroys the good faith defense under the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this research is to analyse critically the British colonial understanding of allodial title. Its significance is its substantive grounding in prior Yale, Harvard, and other highly authoritative research, however with entirely new syntheses. Noy stated the rule that any custom should not be construed so as to allow a person to do a wrongful act. Thus, importing a legal maxim such as the bases for English land title into a foreign country by force, as a wrongful act, could well have been a nullity. The research question is whether a colonial regime could ever lawfully seise the lands of prior undocumented owners, capriciously and without natural justice and procedural fairness, based on imported legal maxims. Argument tries to show that colonisers' claims never exceeded the status of defective applications by way of colour of allodial title. The research will show that the entire English colonial system of land law was grounded in a system of foreign customary doctrines. Further, introducing a foreign custom to a new land would always fail for lack of the kind of prescription set out by Noy. Torrens title was an attempt to cure defects in customary title that had subsisted only in England since ancient Anglo-Saxon times. The real prospect of mal-administration of the register would make the objects of Torrens title difficult to achieve. In Australia, the crown had tried to introduce English custom in Australia as local law, but they did it by committing serious wrongs. This would nullify introduction of their legal maxims into Australia. Their claims to acquisition of allodial title to Australian lands would thus be sufficiently defective to reduce their holdings to mere colour of title. Their mala fides in their attempts at land acquisition would defeat any claim to convert their colour of title into a successful claim for adverse possession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April of 2018, the New Mexico Supreme Court heard State v. Martinez. In that case, the defendants sought to quash their indictment, as the grand jury had been presented with unlawfully obtained evidence. Reversing the district court, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that judicial review of the grand jury indictment was not available, as there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. This Case Note analyzes Martinez and summarizes the likely implications of the holding in the case. Background information to the relevant statute is included, along with past appellate interpretations of the statute. The holding of Martinez is analyzed on its own, and through the lens of a parallel method of challenging grand jury proceedings, most recently explained in Herrera v. Sanchez. The holding of Martinez will make it more difficult to successfully challenge grand jury proceedings under the applicable statute. Parties will instead avail themselves of the "structural integrity" challenge in the future, and since there are not clear lines on what is and is not an acceptable challenge under this model, it is likely to increase the workload of district and appellate courts. This Case Note argues that the New Mexico Supreme Court should harmonize these two methods of challenging grand jury proceedings, given that the grand jury is a Constitutionallyprotected body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses updates on insurance coverage-related decisions issued by U.S. federal and state courts. Topics explored include the coverage dispute involved in J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. v. Vigilant Insurance Co., the breach of contract allegations filed in Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut v. Richard McKenzie & Sons, Inc., and the damages linked to bad faith conduct in Colony Insurance Co. v. Colorado Casualty Insurance Co.

This Comment seeks to show the deficiencies of the Youngblood bad faith doctrine, particularly when applied to death row cases. Then it proposes a new method for dealing with spoliation issues in death penalty cases that introduces a negligent standard that can provide relief for many inmates as compared to the current small number that are successful under the current bad faith analysis. To accomplish these goals, this Comment examines the facts of Youngblood, how the opinion set current law, how it has been largely applied on the federal and state levels with a heavy focus on Texas law, and then starts looking at possible alternatives. Lastly, this Comment recommends a two-part test for death penalty cases that can help alleviate at least some of the issues that have arisen out of the Youngblood decision and the resulting bad faith doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Online and offline, relations between consumers and businesses are most frequently governed by consumer standard form contracts. For decades such contracts have been assumed to be one-sidedly biased against consumers. Consumer law seeks to alleviate this bias and empower consumers. Legislatures, consumer organizations, scholars, and judges constantly look for ways to protect consumers from unscrupulous firms and unfair behaviors. While consumer-business relations are assumedly administered by standardized contracts, firms do not always follow these contracts in practice. Sometimes there is significant disparity between what the written contract stipulates and what consumers experience de facto. Interestingly, firms often deviate from the written contract in favor of consumers, thus creating a gap (the Gap). In other words, firms often take a lenient approach despite the stringent written contracts they draft. This Article examines whether, counter-intuitively, policy makers should add firms' leniency to the growing list of firms' suspicious behaviors. This Article proposes that firms' lenient approach, coupled with online tools and human psychology, may occasionally have surprising and harmful qualities. It illustrates how technological changes can turn the Gap into a key component in consumers' understanding, or perhaps misunderstanding, of consumer contracts. It examines when firms' leniency should be considered manipulative or exercised in bad faith. It then explores whether firms should be allowed to enforce the written contract even if they deliberately and consistently deviate from it. The main contribution of this article is threefold: First, it points to the Gap and examines its foundations and origins. Second, it illustrates how the Gap complicates the interplay between reputation, conduct, trust, and the need to protect consumers. While it is generally believed that the Gap is harmless or even desirable, we show that it might have serious adverse effects. Third, it identifies key questions policy makers and courts should consider with respect to this Gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]