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Many new products and processes originate from projects. In two studies, the authors consider how a project's organizational design, as captured by its particular task configuration, impacts its ability to promote product and process innovation. Study 1 involves an analysis of panel data spanning 2001 through 2015 and involving 429 business-to-business projects in the construction industry. The authors test hypotheses regarding the role of project size, subcontractor diversity, and task configuration on product and process innovation. Their empirical tests show a pattern of nuanced effects on the two innovation types. A project's task configuration, as reflected in the general contractor's participation in project tasks, plays a coordination role that helps unlock a positive effect of project size on product innovation. At the same time, such participation impedes process innovation due to subcontractor concerns about information leakage. Study 2 bolsters the first study through a survey of 230 subcontractors in the U.S. construction industry to show how leakage concerns arise, their outcomes, and how they are mitigated. The authors also bolster their central study through (1) interviews with professional construction managers and (2) survey evidence across five industries. They draw on their findings to develop implications for innovation management, business-to-business marketing, and marketing organization.

The authors draw on the sociological theories of the “liability of newness” and the “liability of adolescence” to generate new insights into relationship evolution. First, they show how a new relationship in its “honeymoon” phase exhibits a unique constellation of two conditions, namely information asymmetry and forbearance. Next, they explain how a relationship evolves along two processes that involve passive learning and decay, respectively. In themselves, these processes will move a relationship toward a long-term “transactional” state and possibly termination, but the processes can also be actively shaped using various governance mechanisms. Doing so, however, requires a nuanced account of types of governance mechanisms and the particular conditions they are intended to induce. The authors consider how the general mechanisms of (1) incentives and (2) information sharing can be deployed in standardized or customized fashions, respectively. Next, they suggest how different manifestation of governance mechanisms impact a relationship's underlying evolutionary processes and evolved relationship states. In general, their framework represents a new perspective on relationship evolution—one that involves the purposeful management of initial conditions and their related evolutionary processes.

Organized by the European Radiation Dosimetry Group (EURADOS), a Monte Carlo code intercomparison exercise was conducted where participants simulated the emitted electron spectra and energy deposition around a single gold nanoparticle (GNP) irradiated by X-rays. In the exercise, the participants scored energy imparted in concentric spherical shells around a spherical volume filled with gold or water as well as the spectral distribution of electrons leaving the GNP. Initially, only the ratio of energy deposition with and without GNP was to be reported. During the evaluation of the exercise, however, the data for energy deposition in the presence and absence of the GNP were also requested. A GNP size of 50 nm and 100 nm diameter was considered as well as two different X-ray spectra (50 kVp and 100kVp). This introduced a redundancy that can be used to cross-validate the internal consistency of the simulation results. In this work, evaluation of the reported results is presented in terms of integral quantities that can be benchmarked against values obtained from physical properties of the radiation spectra and materials involved. The impact of different interaction cross-section datasets and their implementation in the different Monte Carlo codes is also discussed., Comment: 16 pages, 10 Figures, 1 Table. Accepted manuscript after minor revisions contained an institution without affiliated author

The authors draw on emerging research in organization theory to suggest how different firm-level identity orientations (individualistic, relational, or collectivistic) impact governance choice. They develop a conceptual framework that focuses on the relationship between a focal firm’s own identity orientation and that of a value chain partner. The framework identifies a series of match and mismatch scenarios, where the latter represent unique governance problems that are not accounted for by existing theory. Some of the mismatch scenarios involve pseudo-matches that resemble convergent orientations between parties but actually represent governance problems. Theoretically, this framework advances the governance literature by providing a comprehensive and nuanced account of (1) the orientations that parties bring to bear on a relationship, and (2) how their effects vary depending on the interdependence structure between the parties. The authors also advance the general literature on identity orientation by connecting it to concrete governance practices, by showing how multiple internal identity orientations create unique internal governance challenges, and by delineating two possible solutions to these challenges. They rely on the framework to develop managerial guidelines for governance choice.

Increasingly, marketing activity is carried out within temporary organizations, whereby teams are assembled to complete a specific task within a predetermined time frame. Such organizations are uniquely suited to promoting various marketing outcomes but are not well understood. From a practical standpoint, their inherent characteristics create organizational challenges that, if not appropriately managed, can compromise performance. Drawing on agency theory and research on embedded ties, the authors conceptualize these challenges in terms of particular selection and enforcement problems. They identify three forms of temporary marketing organizations that vary in their selection and enforcement qualities. Next, the authors develop a conceptual framework that shows the selection and enforcement implications of a temporary organization’s task, timeline, and team composition. They also demonstrate that selection and enforcement mechanisms have portable qualities and can be “imported” to a given temporary organization, from either a prior temporary organization or a larger permanent one.

Within EURADOS Working Group 6 'Computational Dosimetry', the micro and nanodosimetry task group 6.2 has recently conducted a Monte Carlo (MC) exercise open to participants around the world. The aim of this exercise is to quantify the contribution to the uncertainty of micro and nanodosimetric simulation results arising from the use of different electron-impact cross-sections, and hence physical models, employed by different MC codes (GEANT4-DNA, PENELOPE, MCNP6, FLUKA, NASIC and PHITS). Comparison of the participants' simulation results for both micro and nanodosimetric quantities using different MC codes was the first step of the exercise. The deviation between results is due to different cross-sections but also different tracking methods and particle transport cut-off energies. The second step of the exercise will involve using identical cross-section datasets to account only for the other variations in the first step, thus enabling the determination of the uncertainty contribution due to different cross-sections. This paper presents a comparison of the MC simulation results obtained in the first part of the exercise. For the microdosimetric simulations, particularly in the configuration where the electron source is contained within the micrometric target, the choice of MC code has a small influence on the results. For the nanodosimetric results, on the other hand, the mean ionisation cluster size distribution (ICSD) was sensitive to the physical models used in the MC codes. The ICSD was therefore chosen to study the influence of different cross-section data on the uncertainty of simulation results.

Many marketing transactions between buyers and suppliers involve short-term collaborations or so-called temporary organizations. Such organizations have considerable value-creation potential but also face challenges, as evidenced by their mixed performance records. One particular challenge involves relationship governance, and in this respect, temporary organizations represent a conundrum: On the one hand, they pose significant governance problems due to the need to manage numerous independent specialists under time constraints. On the other hand, temporary organizations lack the inherent governance properties of other organizational forms such as permanent organizations. The authors conduct an empirical study of 429 business-to-business construction projects designed to answer two specific questions: First, how are particular selection and pricing strategies deployed in response to monitoring and coordination problems? Second, does the joint alignment between the two mechanisms and their respective attributes help mitigate cost overruns? The authors follow a formal hypothesis test with a series of in-depth interviews to explore and to gain insight into the validity of the key constructs, explanatory mechanisms, and outcomes. Managerially, the authors answer the long-standing question of how to mobilize a temporary organization. Theoretically, they develop an augmented “discriminating alignment” heuristic for relationship management involving multiple governance mechanisms and attributes.

Corrigendum to “Intercomparison of dose enhancement ratio and secondary electron spectra for gold nanoparticles irradiated by X-rays calculated using multiple Monte Carlo simulation codes” [Phys. Med. 69 (2020) 147–163] (Physica Medica (2020) 69 (147–163), (S1120179719305320), (10.1016/j.ejmp.2019.12.011)); International audience; Purpose: Targeted radiation therapy has seen an increased interest in the past decade. In vitro and in vivo experiments showed enhanced radiation doses due to gold nanoparticles (GNPs) to tumors in mice and demonstrated a high potential for clinical application. However, finding a functionalized molecular formulation for actively targeting GNPs in tumor cells is challenging. Furthermore, the enhanced energy deposition by secondary electrons around GNPs, particularly by short-ranged Auger electrons is difficult to measure. Computational models, such as Monte Carlo (MC) radiation transport codes, have been used to estimate the physical quantities and effects of GNPs. However, as these codes differ from one to another, the reliability of physical and dosimetric quantities needs to be established at cellular and molecular levels, so that the subsequent biological effects can be assessed quantitatively. Methods: In this work, irradiation of single GNPs of 50 nm and 100 nm diameter by X-ray spectra generated by 50 and 100 peak kilovoltages was simulated for a defined geometry setup, by applying multiple MC codes in the EURADOS framework. Results: The mean dose enhancement ratio of the first 10 nm-thick water shell around a 100 nm GNP ranges from 400 for 100 kVp X-rays to 600 for 50 kVp X-rays with large uncertainty factors up to 2.3. Conclusions: It is concluded that the absolute dose enhancement effects have large uncertainties and need an inter-code intercomparison for a high quality assurance; relative properties may be a better measure until more experimental data is available to constrain the models.

The focus of this paper is dual distribution channels in business-to-business markets. We take the perspective of the distributor, and examine how different forms of competition with a manufacturer-owned channel impact distributor opportunism. Next, we consider how the same forms of competition impact the distributor’s end customers. Based on a multi-industry field study of industrial distributors, we highlight the complex processes that characterize dual distribution systems. We show that while competition with a manufacturer-owned channel increases distributor opportunism, it also has the potential to benefit the distributor’s end customers. In addition, although actions taken by a manufacturer to create vertical separation between channels limit competition, such actions also reduce end customer satisfaction.

We examine transaction governance in the context of concurrent sourcing, where a manufacturer relies on sourcing from external suppliers and in-house production simultaneously. Our focus is on (1) a buyer's use of particular safeguards or governance mechanisms vis-a-vis an external supplier and (2) how the effects of these mechanisms on various performance outcomes are influenced by the joint presence of an internal manufacturing branch. We conduct two studies in the apparel industry and show that performance outcomes are a joint function of (1) the individual governance mechanisms that are deployed in a particular relationship and (2) the larger sourcing context (concurrent or singular)

The capability level of a product that a firm provides to a customer is an important marketing decision. In the extant literature, the normative heuristic for this decision is one of matching—of providing product capability levels that meet customer needs. However, industry evidence suggests that supplier firms routinely make product decisions that lead to “overshot” customers, whereby customers receive products with capabilities that exceed their requirements. The authors demonstrate how a supplier firm's organizational culture can cause overshooting scenarios and how these effects can be attenuated to the extent that the focal firm's basic values also reflect a customer orientation.

In order to assess the reliability of Monte Carlo (MC)-based numerical calibration of in vivo counting systems the EURADOS network supported a comparison of MC simulation of well-defined experiments. This action also provided training for the use of voxel phantoms. In vivo measurements of enriched uranium in a thoracic phantom have been carried out and the needed information to simulate these measurements was distributed to 17 participants. About half of the participants managed to simulate the measured counting efficiency without support from the organisers. Following additional support all participants managed to simulate the counting efficiencies within a typical agreement of ±5% with experiment. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Past research has shown how outcomes in interorganizational relationships are influenced by the characteristics of the individual relationship in question. Focusing on relationships between suppliers and their organizational buyers, we augment this perspective by positing that relationship outcomes are also influenced by social comparison processes involving perceptions of a supplier's practices across comparable buyer relationships. Based on past research on embedded ties and institutional theory, we propose that the effect of these comparison processes depends on the nature of a buyer's existing interorganizational ties and on the norms that are brought to bear on the relationship in question. We test our propositions based on 788 observations of organizational buyers who have relationships with the same supplier. Our findings paint a complex, multilevel picture of the process by which relationship outcomes come about in interorganizational networks. This paper was accepted by Jesper Sørensen, organizations.

Prior work emphasizes the role of satisfaction and positive word-of-mouth in affecting customer behavior. This research introduces customer input as an additional important mediating variable and driver of actual customer behavior. Specifically, we combine survey-based data with behavioral data to show that the impact of satisfaction on customer behavior is fully mediated by customer input, while word of mouth acts as a partial mediator in the satisfaction-customer behavior relationship. We thus reveal that the effect of customer satisfaction on actual behavior is contingent on levels of customer input. Furthermore, we demonstrate that satisfaction affects customer input, which ultimately leads to greater future customer purchase from a firm. The results of the study empirically demonstrate that customer participation plays an important role in understanding how satisfaction influences actual customer purchasing behavior.

This article examines how a manufacturer's governance of an external supplier relationship affects its performance toward a downstream retail customer. In line with sociological and economic theory, a manufacturer's reliance on supplier norms and incentives, respectively, promotes performance. However, the performance effect of each external governance mechanism weakens in the presence of a different governance regime within the manufacturer firm itself. Specifically, internal incentives weaken the effect of external norms, and internal norms weaken the effect of external incentives. From a practical standpoint, these findings point to the difficulty of managing sets of relationships that involve different parties and mechanisms. From a theoretical standpoint, they point to the complex interplay between social norms and economic incentives in driving performance outcomes.

We introduce a model of interorganizational governance within regional clusters. Drawing on the “new institutional economics” literature, we show how firms' governance designs are shaped by the relationship between transaction-level characteristics and the cluster macroculture. We then consider how subsequent transaction-level governance designs are affected by path dependencies from past governance choices. Finally, we suggest that intertransactional path dependencies exhibit directional asymmetries, and we draw implications for the literature on clusters, on transaction costs, and on interorganizational relationships.

The usage of beta-radiation sources in various nuclear medicine therapies is increasing. Consequently, enhanced radiation protection measures are required, as medical staff more frequently handle high-activity sources required for therapy. Inhomogeneous radiation fields make it difficult to determine absorbed dose reliably. Routine monitoring with dosimeters does not guarantee any accurate determination of the local skin dose (LSD). In general, correction factors are used to correct for the measured dose and the maximum absorbed dose received. However, strong underestimations of the maximum exposure are possible depending on the individual handling the process and the reliability of dose measurements. Simulations can be used as a tool for a better understanding of the maximum possible exposure depending on the individual-related handling. While measurements reveal the overall dose during the entire irradiation time of the dosimeter, simulations help to analyse sequences of action. Hence, simulations allow for tracking the points of highest absorbed dose received during the handling process. In this respect, simulations were performed using the MCNPX software. In order to investigate the LSD, two hand phantoms were used, a model based on geometrical elements and a voxel hand. A typical situation of radiosynoviorthesis, i.e. handling a syringe filled with (90)Y, was simulated. The results of the simulations show that the annual dose limit may be exceeded within minutes at the position of maximum absorbed dose received and that finger-ring dosimeters measure significantly different doses depending on their wearing position. It is of essential importance to wear the dosimeter properly and to use suitable correction factors with respect to the individual. Simulations are a suitable tool for ensuring reliable dose determination and may help to derive recommendations regarding radiation protection measures.

This article examines the effects of monitoring on interfirm relationships. Whereas some research suggests that monitoring can serve as a control mechanism that reduces exchange partner opportunism, there is also evidence showing that monitoring can actually promote such behavior. The authors propose that the actual effect of monitoring depends on (1) the form of monitoring used (output versus behavior) and (2) the context in which monitoring takes place. With regard to the form of monitoring, the results from a longitudinal field study of buyer–supplier relationships show that output monitoring decreases partner opportunism, as transaction cost and agency theory predict, whereas behavior monitoring, which is a more obtrusive form of control, increases partner opportunism. With regard to the context, the authors find that informal relationship elements in the form of microlevel social contracts serve as buffers that both enhance the effects of output monitoring and permit behavior monitoring to suppress opportunism in the first place.

This study develops and empirically tests a model of how exchange transactions are structured within inter-organizational relationships and the ensuing performance outcomes. It directly compares two different, and partly competing, theoretical perspectives on inter-organizational relationships, resource dependence and transaction cost theory.

Using the extant literature on social networks and organizational learning, and drawing from the available work on social networks in marketing, we propose a model of vertical and horizontal network relationships among boundary spanning service employees, the climate of communication openness, information processing, customer orientation and the customer orientation of retail stores. The model is tested using a sample of 413 service employees within a national retail organization comprising 112 stores. The model is largely supported by the data. Implications for management and further research are discussed.

This article develops a conceptual framework of roles in marketing relationships. Drawing on emerging theory from economic sociology and March's (1994) notion of decision “logics,” the authors discuss two prototypical relationship roles, namely (1) a “friend,” who uses a “logic of appropriateness” and follows established rules, and (2) a “businessperson,” whose decisions are guided by utility-maximizing considerations under a “logic of consequences.” Next, they use extant theories of interfirm governance to suggest that firms’ relationship strategies can be used both to create different relationship roles in the first place and to activate them over time. The authors posit that activation can have several different outcomes, including reinforcement of an existing dominant role or actual switching to a new one. Theoretically, the conceptual framework allows for integration of different perspectives on interfirm relationships, some of which have provided seemingly inconsistent accounts of firm behavior. From a managerial perspective, the framework identifies specific matches between particular relationship roles on the one hand and firms’ governance strategies on the other hand. In general, the framework suggests that an in-depth understanding of roles is a prerequisite for the deployment of relationship management initiatives toward resellers, customers, and suppliers.

The authors examine how a firm's strategy in a (downstream) customer relationship is contingent on how a related relationship outside of the focal dyad is organized. Drawing on emerging perspectives on interfirm governance and networks, the authors propose that the ability to show flexibility toward a (downstream) customer under uncertain market conditions depends on the governance mechanisms that have been deployed in an (upstream) supplier relationship. The governance mechanisms take the form of (1) supplier qualification programs and (2) incentive structures based on hostages. The authors develop a set of contingency predictions and test them empirically in the context of vertical supply chain networks in the apparel industry. The tests show good support for the hypotheses. The authors discuss the implications of the findings for marketing theory and practice.

This article examines the phenomenon of plural governance, a firm's simultaneous use of market contracting and vertical integration for the same basic transaction. The author studies two particular aspects of plural governance, namely the conditions that motivate firms to deploy plural governance and the manner in which one governance form influences the other when the two coexist in a joint structure. Drawing on agency theory and information economics, the author develops a set of research hypotheses and tests them empirically in the context of industrial purchasing decisions. The results suggest that the plural governance phenomenon can be understood from the perspective of solving information asymmetry problems between buyers and suppliers. The author discusses the implications of a “make and buy” approach to extant theory of interfirm governance, relationship management, and marketing strategy in business-to-business settings.

Specific investments, which are tailored to a particular company or value-chain partner, are important components of firms' marketing strategies. At the same time, extant theory suggests that such investments pose considerable risk, because they put the receiver in a position to opportunistically exploit the investor. In this article, the authors examine this “expropriation” scenario but also consider whether specific investments, because of their specialized nature, may actually “bond” the receiver and reduce opportunism under certain conditions. These conditions involve a focal relationship's time horizon (i.e., its extendedness) and particular norms. The key theoretical argument is that the effect of specific investments on opportunism will shift in a nonmonotonic fashion over the range of these relationship conditions. The authors test their research hypotheses empirically through parallel analyses on each side of 198 matched buyer–supplier dyads. The empirical tests provide general support for the predictions but also reveal differences between buyers and suppliers regarding the focal effects. The authors discuss the implications of the findings for marketing theory and practice.

Recent research has documented how exchanges between buyers and sellers are frequently embedded in social relationships. An unresolved question, however, is the extent to which such relationships protect incumbent suppliers from new competitors and their marketing programs. The authors develop a conceptual framework of how relationship and marketing variables influence choice of supplier and test the framework empirically in the context of business-to-business services. The results show that interpersonal relationships between buyers and suppliers serve as a switching barrier but are considerably less important than both firm-level switching costs and marketing variables. Moreover, unlike switching costs, interpersonal relationships do not play the frequently mentioned role of a buffer against price and product competition. Finally, the authors show that buyers and suppliers hold systematically different views of the determinants of switching.

Much of the recent literature on interfirm relationships has focused on strategies for controlling opportunism. Somewhat surprisingly, little attention has been paid in this literature to the opportunism construct itself. Specifically, prior research has failed to recognize the different types of behavior that are hidden behind the general opportunism label. As a consequence, the knowledge of strategies for managing opportunism remains incomplete. The authors review the original and emergent conceptualizations of opportunism and illustrate them using actual industry cases. The authors also develop a conceptual framework of governance strategies that can be used to manage different forms of opportunism.

Exclusive dealing has been the subject of intense public policy debate. A central issue in this debate has been the relationship between exclusive dealing and business efficiency. Despite its importance, there has been a general lack of empirical evidence on business efficiency arguments. The existing evidence on exclusive dealing is limited almost entirely to legal case studies involving firms whose distribution practices have been challenged under antitrust law. In this article we use a new source of microlevel data to study the use of exclusive dealing in industrial markets, gathered through a survey of managers who were responsible for making the distribution decisions in their firms. Our central finding is that business efficiency factors play a significant role in firms' decisions regarding exclusive dealing. Specifically, we find evidence that firms are more likely to use exclusive dealing when there is a potential that other manufacturers can free ride on the services they provide. We als...

Many marketing exchanges are characterized by an information asymmetry between suppliers and customers. Specifically, customers are faced with both adverse selection and moral hazard problems that involve, respectively, uncertainty about supplier characteristics and the risk of quality cheating. Drawing on prior research, the authors propose that agency problems in a customer relationship can be resolved by means of customer bonds and price premiums, which serve as signals and supplier incentives, respectively. The authors also propose that adverse selection and moral hazard problems exist in relationships between suppliers and their employees. Similar to the customer relationship, these problems can be addressed with signals and incentives of various kinds. The authors present hypotheses regarding the agency problems in both of these relationships and test them empirically in the context of automotive service purchases. Data obtained from 287 service managers support the hypotheses. The data also suggest that institutional differences across service outlets (e.g., ownership structure and size) influence how the two types of agency problems are managed.

Exclusive territory distribution arrangements are commonly observed in many markets. Once deployed, such arrangements are often subject to gray market activity, in the form of unauthorized sales which violate assigned restrictions. Interestingly, however, firms frequently choose to tolerate violations, rather than pursuing complete enforcement (i.e., by terminating violators) or abandoning exclusivity entirely. We draw from the literature on transaction cost economics to propose that tolerance of gray market activity is a function of a firm’s ability to detect violations, and of the existence of credible threats and commitments. We also draw on the traditional literature on exclusive territories to suggest that minimizing distributor free-riding on services, which influences the decision to use exclusive territories in the first place, continues to be a concern after deployment. We collect micro-level data and test our predictions through a survey of managers who were responsible for the distribution decisions in their respective companies. Our results suggest that tolerance of violations is influenced both by transaction cost and free-riding considerations. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The authors report the results of a study that examines retailer participation in manufacturer-sponsored promotion programs. Two particular aspects of participation are studied, namely, (1) retailer agreement to participate in point-of-purchase programs and (2) retailer compliance with established agreements. Previous research in marketing, economics, sociology, and organization theory suggests that participation is influenced by two types of variables. The first is the nature of the interpersonal relationship that exists between the boundary personnel in the retailer's and manufacturer's firms. The second are various organization-level variables, including incentive premiums (promotional allowances) and monitoring efforts. The authors extend previous research by examining both the independent and joint effects of these factors on retailer participation. On the basis of an empirical study involving a conjoint task, the authors show that the presence of a strong interpersonal relationship does not diminish the importance of other variables, such as incentives. Within the limits of the conjoint task, the results also suggest that interpersonal relationships are less important determinants of participation than economic incentives. The authors discuss the implications of the study for marketing theory and practice.

Over the past decade, transaction cost analysis (TCA) has received considerable attention in the marketing literature. Marketing scholars have made important contributions in extending and refining TCA's original conceptual framework. The authors provide a synthesis and integration of recent contributions to TCA by both marketers and scholars in related disciplines, an evaluation of recent critiques of TCA, and an agenda for further research on TCA.

The recent marketing literature reflects a growing interest in relationship management issues. In particular, several recent studies have drawn on transaction cost and agency theory to examine how interfirm relationships are organized. The general premise is that explicit control mechanisms must be deployed in a relationship to manage a partner's potential opportunism. Although previous research has shown that different mechanisms can be used, the tendency has been to examine individual mechanisms in isolation. The authors develop hypotheses about interdependences between different control mechanisms. They also identify some of the contextual factors that influence their use. The framework is tested empirically by examining how chemical manufacturers organize their supplier relationships. The results generally support the hypothesis that firms’ choices among control mechanisms are influenced by contextual factors. Only limited support is found for the hypothesis that interdependencies exist between different mechanisms.

High-technology markets represent unique problems for organizational buyers and, in turn, for their existing and potential vendors. These problems are due to high levels of uncertainty and the presence of switching costs tied to existing technologies or vendors. The authors focus on two aspects of buyer decision making in such markets: (1) whether buyers include new vendors at the consideration stage of the process and (2) whether they switch to new vendors at the choice stage. Using survey data from organizational buyers’ purchases of computer workstation equipment, the authors present a joint test of the antecedent conditions that influence the two processes. Based on a sequential logit model, they show that individual antecedents have different effects on consideration and switching behavior. The authors then discuss the implications of their study for the literatures on high-technology markets and organizational buyer behavior.

Central and semi-central Au + Au collisions at 150 and 250 A ·MeV are investigated in the framework of a hybrid model with dynamical and statistical components. Starting from the BUU approach and ansatz for the Wigner function is made which describes thermal and collective motion of the nucleons and models the transition from the one-source to the two-source behavior. Anisotropic flow energies and temperatures as well as angular momenta are extracted. Nucleonic flow and pre-equilibrium emission reduce considerably the excitation energy of the matter. The cluster formation is described by the Copenhagen multifragmentation model. Charge spectra, energy spectra and two-particle correlations of the fragments are reproduced. Agreement with experiment can be improved by assuming a reduced transverse flow.

Increasing international competition in a number of industries has required U.S. manufacturers to undertake strategic realignments of various kinds. One of the most noticeable changes has been in the purchasing area, where industrial buyers frequently have made deliberate efforts to establish stronger relationships with suppliers. Although recent research has generated considerable insight into the nature of such relationships, the existing literature is incomplete in several important respects. In particular, the performance implications of adopting particular forms of relationships are virtually undocumented in the extant literature. This article draws on transaction cost theory (TCA) to propose that: (1) crafting stronger relationships is partly a response to the presence of uncertainty and transaction-specific assets and (2) structuring relationships in accordance with TCA prescriptions should have positive performance implications. Regression analysis conducted in a sample of OEM-supplier relationships shows good support for our hypotheses.

The fragment-fragment correlation is investigated for nearly central collisions of Au on Au at 150 MeV per nucleon. The properties of the fragmenting source are determined within the Boltzmann-Uhling-Uhlenbeck approach. The final decay is described by a statistical multifragmentation model including secondary decay and Coulomb expansion. An anisotropic radial flow is needed to reproduce the energy spectra, the relative velocity distribution of the fragments and their correlation function.

Previous research on buyer behavior in high technology markets has focused on specific outcomes (product adoption or rejection) as opposed to buyers’ underlying processes. The authors identify key dimensions of high technology markets and draw on organization theory and information economics to develop hypotheses about their effects on organizational buyers’ search behavior. They also present propositions about how certain aspects of a firm's present buying situation may influence its perceptions of the characteristics of a given market. An empirical test of the propositions in a sample of computer workstation purchases shows good support for the hypothesized relationships.

This communication summarizes the results concerning the Monte Carlo (MC) modelling of Germanium detectors for the measurement of low energy photons arising from the "International comparison on MC modelling for in vivo measurement of Americium in a knee phantom" organized within the EU Coordination Action CONRAD (Coordinated Network for Radiation Dosimetry) as a joint initiative of EURADOS working groups 6 (computational dosimetry) and 7 (internal dosimetry). MC simulations proved to be an applicable way to obtain the calibration factor that needs to be used for in vivo measurements. © 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe operates a partial body counter, which is designed for the in vivo measurement of low-energy photon emitters in the human body. Recently, a numerical procedure has been developed which allows for the calculation of individual calibration factors for this partial body counter. The procedure is based on a Monte Carlo simulation of the radiation transport from the contaminated organ or tissue within the body to the detectors using the MCNP5 code. For simulation of the human body, the MEET Man dataset of the Institute of Biomedical Techniques of the University Karlsruhe has been applied. The derived calibration factors were compared with the respective values measured using some physical phantoms such as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory torso phantom and the bone phantoms of the New York University Medical Center and the US Transuranium and Uranium Registry.

Plural distribution systems are often found in industrial markets. Although transaction cost analysis has been successfully applied to understanding decisions about distribution systems, these plural forms have been virtually ignored in extant empirical work. Critics suggest that extant transaction cost models are inadequate to study these systems. We contend that transaction cost reasoning can be readily applied to understanding these systems, and undertake an analysis of a common plural form, namely, the simultaneous use of an independent rep system with a company-operated, "house account" system. Familiar transaction cost problems like lock-in (the safeguarding problem), and difficulties in evaluating an independent rep's performance (the behavioral uncertainty problem) are posited to lead firms to deploying house accounts to augment an independent rep system. Using data from a survey of independent agents, we provide preliminary evidence for these predictions. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice. Coauthors are Mark Bergen, Jan B. Heide, and George John. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.