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This article explains the survival of the AKP in Turkey's late stage of autocratization (2017-present) through its strategy of shifting the primary drivers of competition from individual parties to pre-electoral alliances. Confronted with a decline in popular support in 2015 June elections, the article argues that the AKP created uneven patterns of competition via the system of pre-electoral alliances so that it could institutionalize a 'Rikerian offense' on the salient Turkish-Kurdish cleavage and establish an authoritarian power-sharing mechanism with its former challenger, the Turkish nationalist MHP. To illustrate the shift toward uneven patterns of electoral competition via such incumbent strategies, the article conducts a two-part analysis: It first examines the landscape of competition among parties (2002-2015) and second, evaluates competition among both parties and alliances (2018-2023) at the national and district levels in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a growing body of literature on the advancement of autocratic tactics and toolkits in competitive authoritarian regimes (CARs), we lack sufficient knowledge on the strategies that the opposition builds against populist-authoritarian governments. Using two top autocratizing cases – Turkey and Hungary – this article singles out 'transnationalization' as one such novel strategy. 'Transnationalization' is defined as a strategy through which opposition-led subnational executives transform local and global boundaries by consciously forming a link with the liberal-democratic world in order to expand their space for manoeuvre. Conducting a qualitative content analysis of the Istanbul and Budapest mayors' international Twitter accounts and using evidence from elite interviews with officials from Istanbul and Budapest municipalities, we demonstrate the material, symbolic and political means of this strategy and the rationalist and normative motivations behind it. By discussing the what, how and why of a transnationalization strategy, we fill an important gap in the scholarship regarding opposition strategies in CARs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey has experienced a heterogeneous collection of social movements and protests. While scholars have given substantial attention to coups in this context, it remains unclear if the Turkish Armed Forces have ever defected in favour of civilian mobilization during periods of political instability. In large-N databases on defection, cases in Turkey are either disproportionately skewed towards coups or are fully absent of observations on defection during resistance campaigns. In this study, we analyse cases spanning 1959–2017 to trace patterns of defection. Through triangulating qualitative evidence from memoirs of former military officers, media reports, and interviews carried out with multi-generational political actors, our analysis reveals that three instances of defection occurred in times of mass mobilization, two of which were vertical and one horizontal. Alongside three other instances of defection that occurred during coup attempts, these results illustrate the highly dynamic nature of defection in the Turkish context through interrelated processes of mobilization, defection, and coups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2013 Gezi protests still remain the largest to have arisen in the AKP era of governance in Turkey. In light of substantial interdisciplinary attention attributed to this case, this study analyses a previously neglected, yet salient activist strategy known as fraternization that arose during protester-police interactions. We argue that when entrapped in situations marked by confrontational tension with police, protesters strategically attempt to overcome outgroup divisions by getting state forces to sympathize with opposition through fraternization. Utilizing video data analysis (VDA), we assess a sample of 147 publicly available videos featuring protester-police interactions and complement our assessment with semi-structured interviews with protesters. Results reveal that significant levels of fraternization occurred between heterogeneous groups of activists (age, gender, identity) and police. In some cases fraternization attempts contributed to a positive dialogue being established with police, while other attempts had no effect in reducing repression. Although activists were ultimately unsuccessful in convincing police to defect, this inquiry presents new implications for our understanding of the situational dynamics underlying fraternization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Turkish party law (TPL) has thus far been studied only in isolation. We do not have any knowledge of where it stands compared to other party laws. This study fills this gap by comparing the TPL with other European party laws. It codes the TPL according to the categories of party regulation that exists in the current literature and finds that the TPL is the third-most heavily regulated party law in Europe. While it is particularly keen on regulating the 'activity and behavior' and 'programmatic identity' of parties similar to Ukrainian and Spanish party laws, it is significantly behind in regulating the 'party finance' and 'external oversight' compared to other European countries. This article discusses the implications of these findings on contemporary Turkish politics, arguing that the TPL's thick definition of an 'anti-system party' contributes to the current democratic recession in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In non-democratic parties, oppositional factions have difficulty making inroads to the top executive party organs. There are two consequences for these groups: party split or leadership removal. In the former case, the oppositional faction exits and establishes its own party. In the latter, the opposition succeeds in altering the balance of power by removing the leader and the party goes through change. This article suggests that the level of power concentration within the dominant faction matters for the type of outcome in factional rivalries. If the power is concentrated in the hands of a small elite, the divisions within the elite can help the oppositional faction remove the party leader. If the power resides only with a single leader, the oppositional faction is likely to lose the struggle against the dominant faction and decide to exit. This study explores the causal mechanisms involved by comparing six non-democratic parties from Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to provide insights into how and why a dominant party system emerges after an era of multipartyism. Conceptualising the emergence phase of a dominant party system within the framework of Sartori's ‘predominant party system’, it elaborates the causal weight of different theories within the Turkish context through a comparative-historical analysis. Comparing the case of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) with the Justice Party (AP), it argues that perceptions of an incumbent's good economic performance and lack of centrifugal intra-party conflicts are two crucial factors that lead to the emergence of a dominant party system after multipartyism. Restrictive electoral rules and existing social cleavages, however, create a favourable setting for this outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]