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Although Avicenna does not explicitly develop a 'theory of intentionality', one can reconstruct his account of intentionality through an analysis of his thoughts on the relation between mind, meaning, and thing. We take up this task in this paper through an analysis of Avicenna's theory of the considerations of quiddity. First, we clarify Avicenna's idea of 'quiddity', and show how it functions as a core of 'meaning' which remains identical in its different modes of realization. Second, through an examination of the very notion of 'consideration' (i'tibār), we distinguish between two aspects of the mind, i.e. mental act and mental existence. This helps us clarify what Avicenna means by the existence of a quiddity in mind and in what sense, if any, it is essential to intentionality. Third, addressing the problem of the relation between 'mental existence' and 'external existence', we show how the mode of existence of a quiddity, including its concrete existence, is posited in and through intentionality. This implies that both being and quiddity are moments of the intentional object, and thus, intentionality, for Avicenna, is a dyadic relation between the intentional act and the intentional object. We conclude by reconstructing the structure of intentionality in Avicenna. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Avicenna in two parts of the book of Al-Shifa (کتاب الشفاء) or The Book of Healing reports the theory of Platonic Ideas or Forms: first account is in the chapter 10 from the second book in the Demonstration Treatise (رسالة البرهان) and second account is in the chapter 2 from the seventh book in the Theology Treatise (رسالة الالهیّات). Both reports have explanations of the theory of Platonic Ideas and then some critiques of the theory. Here we will discuss only Avicenna's description and explanations of the theory of Ideas; what is Avicenna's understanding from Plato's Ideas? At the present essay it is necessary to investigate the range of familiarity that Avicenna has with Platonic Ideas, Aristotle's role in this familiarity and the philosophical functions of the Ideas in Avicenna's understanding and identification of them. First of all, Avicenna thinks that Platonic Ideas are universals and, on this description, he erects other descriptions of their truth. It is vital to know that Avicenna's familiarity with Platonic Forms is essentially mediate; that's by way of Aristotle's works including both descriptions and criticisms of those forms. Review and analysis of Avicenna's texts brings us to the three arguments of Platonists for the existence of Ideas: the argument from the sciences, the one over many arguments and the object of thought argument.

Abstract Evolutionary studies of plant groups which are distributed in vast geographical regions and face different ecological and environmental conditions are important as they through light on different mechanisms of local adaptation and species divergence through time. The genus Avicennia is one of these plant groups which inspire of few species show interesting geographical distribution with some degree of species-specific geographical isolations. In general, very limited molecular phylogenetic investigations have been carried out in the genus Avicennia, and therefore we conducted the present study with the following aims: 1. To estimate the species divergence time based on different nuclear and chloroplast DNA regions, separately. This will illustrate how different genetic regions evolved in this genus, 2. To identify the sequences with potential adaptive value against geographical variable by latent factor mixed models (LFMM) analysis, 3. To illustrate the phylogenetic signal of these DNA regions and their role in speciation within the genus and, 4. To introducing a new computational strategy for estimating adaptive time for the sequences. The results showed that different genetic regions may produce different species divergent time, both the nuclear ribosomal internal transcribed spacer (ITS) region and chloroplast DNA sequences, contained potentially adaptive single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).We could present a suggestive time for these adaptive sequences for the first time. In conclusion both local adaptation and independent mutations seem to have played role in Avicennia speciation and evolution.

The question of how the relationship between metaphysics and theology should be understood is one of the main topics of debate on the agenda of philosophers and theologians from Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) to Avicenna (d. 428/1037), from Avicenna to the late Islamic theological tradition, and even to medieval Jewish and Christian thought. Avicenna criticized Aristotle for identifying metaphysics with theology and presented a new perspective on the relationship between those two disciplines. He argues that God is not the subject but the goal of metaphysics, in other words — metaphysics is an ontological science in terms of its subject matter and a theological science in terms of its goal. In Islamic thought after Avicenna, the relationship between metaphysics and kalam continued to be one of the most heated topics of debate. Trying to explain the relationship between those two disciplines, thinkers such as Imam al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111), Shams al-Din Samarqandi (d. 702/1303), and Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani (d. 816/1413) made a distinction between “Islamic science and rational science” and argued that metaphysics is an intellectual science while kalam is a religious (Islamic) science. On the other hand, Siraj al-Din al-Urmawi (d. 682/1283), who dealt with the relationship between metaphysics and kalam in his treatise On the Difference between Metaphysics (God-Science) and Kalam, revised Avicenna’s approach and criticized theologians who tried to explain the problem in terms of the distinction between religious and rational sciences. The aim of this article is to analyze Avicenna’s and Urmawi’s views on the relationship between metaphysics and theology, taking into account the historical-problematic context of the issue.

Evolutionary studies of plant groups which are distributed in vast geographical regions and face different ecological and environmental conditions are important as they through light on different mechanisms of local adaptation and species divergence through time. The genus Avicennia is one of these plant groups which inspire of few species show interesting geographical distribution with some degree of species-specific geographical isolations. In general, very limited molecular phylogenetic investigations have been carried out in the genus Avicennia, and therefore we conducted the present study with the following aims: To estimate the species divergence time based on different nuclear and chloroplast DNA regions, separately. This will illustrate how different genetic regions evolved in this genus, To identify the sequences with potential adaptive value against geographical variable by latent factor mixed models (LFMM) analysis, To illustrate the phylogenetic signal of these DNA regions and their role in speciation within the genus and, To introducing a new computational strategy for estimating adaptive time for the sequences. The results showed that different genetic regions may produce different species divergent time, both the nuclear ribosomal internal transcribed spacer (ITS) region and chloroplast DNA sequences, contained potentially adaptive single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).We could present a suggestive time for these adaptive sequences for the first time. In conclusion both local adaptation and independent mutations seem to have played role in Avicennia speciation and evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The Avicenna unified Health Information System (HIS) was implemented by the Palestinian Ministry of Health in 2010 across government hospitals. Despite its potential, the acceptance of Avicenna HIS by healthcare providers remains unclear after 14 years of application. Understanding the factors that influence healthcare provider acceptance is essential for optimizing the system's success. We investigated factors affecting acceptance of Avicenna HIS among healthcare providers in Palestinian healthcare institutions, focusing on perceived usefulness, ease of use, human factors, technological factors, and organizational support. Materials and methods: A cross-sectional study was conducted at the Palestine Medical Complex (PMC) in Ramallah, West Bank, where the Avicenna HIS has been fully implemented since 2010. A systematic random sampling was used to select participants, resulting in 300 completed questionnaires. The study utilized a self-administered questionnaire adapted from a structured tool based on the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). The questionnaire was validated through expert review and pilot testing, achieving a Cronbach's alpha of 0.86. Each selected healthcare provider was contacted face-to-face, and written informed consent was obtained before administering the questionnaire. Results: A total of 300 questionnaires were completed and returned. The study sample included 178 males (59.3%) and 122 females (40.7%). The majority of participants was aged 20-39 years (270 participants, 90%) and held a bachelor's degree (250 participants, 83.3%). Nurses comprised the largest professional group (153 participants, 51.0%). High levels of perceived usefulness and ease of use were reported, both with mean scores of 4.511 (S.D. = 0.295). Technological factors had a mean score of 4.004 (S.D. = 0.228), while organizational factors scored 2.858 (S.D. = 0.304). Overall acceptance of the HIS was moderately high, with a mean score of 4.218 (S.D. = 0.387). Significant differences in perceived usefulness and ease of use were noted based on gender, age, and experience. Conclusion: This study concludes that both technological and human factors significantly influence the acceptance of HIS among healthcare providers in Palestine. To improve HIS adoption, it is recommended to enhance system functionality, ensure reliable data quality, and provide comprehensive training programs for healthcare providers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, the evidence used by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī to prove the existence of abstract mind (d. 672/1274) is examined. He developed his proof method in parallel with the proof methods of previous thinkers. For this reason, the approaches of pre-Tusi thinkers are also included in the scope of our study. It is understood that the mind, which corresponds to the concept of nous, has expressed different meanings over time in the history of Islamic philosophy. In fact, although this concept was used epistemologically in the early periods of Islamic philosophy, it was handled in a way that had ontological value in later periods. For example, philosophers such as Fârâbî (d. 339/950) and Avicenna (d. 428/1037) used reason in the sense of the principle of existence, in addition to the meanings of knowledge and perception it contains in terms of its functionality. The reason for this is that especially those two philosophers explain the existence by adhering to the theory of emanation. However, before using reason in this sense, philosophers discussed its existence and tried to prove it in different ways. Especially the mentioned philosophers accepted the mind as existing because they saw it as a requirement of the emanation theory. But al-Ṭūsī does not find their approach in this direction correct. In fact, al-Ṭūsī, who philosophically generally follows Peripatetic philosophers such as Ibn Sina, partially differs from them regarding the origin of existence. Because al-Ṭūsī criticizes the emanation theory. For this reason, he also criticizes the emanation-centered evidence that Avicenna used to prove the existence of abstract mind. However, although he criticizes the evidence in question, especially in his work tajrid al-i‘tiqad, he generally accepts the existence of abstract mind. He also, he wrote an independent treatise called Risaâlet'ün fî İsbati’l-ʿaḳl el-Mücerred to prove the existence of abstract reason. The philosopher wrote an independent treatise of summary value to prove the existence of abstract mind. In the treatise in question, he tries to prove the existence of abstract mind with an evidence consisting of eight introductions. The philosopher's evidence is actually built on epistemological foundations. Namely, he sees the abstract mind as the source of mental forms and sometimes refers to it as nefsul-amr. According to al-Ṭūsī, proving the existence of abstract mind is only possible by starting from the universal forms and essential knowledge that humans perceive. Because there must be an external criterion that measures the accuracy of the information we accept as accurate. Thus, he argues that the criterion is abstract reason. In fact, this evidence was developed for the possibility of true knowledge. Because, although the philosopher's aim here is to prove the existence of the abstract mind, in a sense, it is to protect the accuracy of such information by mentally proving the existence of the source of that essential and essential information. When Tusi's approach is looked at from this perspective, it is understood that it is a valuable approach because it proves the possibility of true knowledge. In addition, although the introductions that constitute the philosopher's evidence are found in the books of previous philosophers, it is possible to say that they are original in terms of composition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the advantages of Islamic and Iranian culture and civilization is the controversy, discussion and criticism of the opinions of its thinkers, which has increasingly developed based on the teachings of the Quran and the Prophetic tradition and show the religious atmosphere of its time relatively. Abu Hamid Al-Ghazzali is one of the great and rare scholars in the Islamic world. He also has been one of the strongest opponents of philosophy throughout history, who wrote the book entitled Tahafut-Al-Falasifah to examine the opinions and thoughts of philosophers, including Avicenna, and to express the weakness of their thoughts in a fair manner. Tahafut-Al-Falasifah is one of the greatest and most influential books that has been written throughout the history of criticizing philosophical ideas in accordance with Islamic and Iranian customs. The present paper has tried to elucidate the position of rational sciences in the era of Imam Muhammad Ghazzali and to explain disagreements between Avicenna and Ghazzali using descriptive-analytical approach. The research findings indicate that Ghazzali has sought to return the faith of Muslims to its strength and originality, but with his opposition to philosophy and philosophers caused the roots of philosophy to wither and dry up in many Islamic countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Alā' al-dīn al-Kirmānī was a member of the 'Abd al-Ra'mān Jāmī (Mullā Jāmī, d. 1492) circle who lived during the reign of the Timurid ruler 'usayn Bāyqarā (A.R. 1470-1506) and at the same time, he is a scholar who dedicated his works to Me'med II (A.R. 1444-6 and 1451-81) and Bāyezīd II (A.R. 1481-1512). Although we do not have much information about his life, we have the opportunity to examine his thoughts through his works. Therefore, this study aims to examine the development of Kirmānī's thought on the soul and the soul-body relationship through his three works. Kirmānī, who aims to make the science of dream interpretation a science with a determined subject, issues and principles, focused on Avicenna's understanding of the soul as the subject of the science of dream interpretation in his two works entitled al-'Asharah al-kāmilah and Lawāmi' tanwīr al-maqām fī jawâmi' ta'bîr al-manām, which he wrote on this subject. However, in his works he also combined the methodology of the Akbarian tradition, which he belonged, with Ibn Sīnā's understanding of the soul in his works. On the other hand, his treatise entitled Mas'ala min 'ilm ma'rifah alnafs appears to be his most striking work, in which he claims that "the soul and the body are one thing". As this is a newly discovered work of Kirmānī, we have also included its critical edition in the appendix. In his treatise, Kirmānī mentions that the soul and the body are one and the same thing in terms of being abstract and being a body and in this way, he applies the Akbarian understanding of existence based on the distinction between the immutable entities (a'yān al-thābita), the subt world ('ālam al-mithāl) and the visible world ('ālam almulk wa al-shahāda), to Avicenna's soul-body dualism. In this way, he aims to resolve the difficulties arising from the nature of the soul and the body. The study attempts to show Kirmānī's original theory of the soul, based on Avicenna's interpretation and Akbarian principles. In the article, Kirmānī's view of the soul in the above-mentioned works has been examined according to the possible writing order based on content and style -since the actual order of writing is not known-in order to show its gradual change/development. However, his peripatetic views on the soul have been compared with those of Avicenna, and his original view of the soul has been compared with the views of Ibn 'Arabī-Mullā Jāmī. Finally, this study aims to show the contributions of the Herat school and the Mullā Jāmī circle to the Ottoman intellectual life by unearthing Kirmānī's works, the only surveving copies of which are in Anatolia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are some discursive arguments that justify the proposition that the intellect and the intelligible are one unified thing. One scholar who has paid attention to this proposition is Avicenna. The examination of this proposition is one of the key principles of Avicenna’s epistemology. In his al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma’ad, Avicenna agrees with the justifying arguments for the proposition, but in his other works he seriously disagrees with it. As a prominent researcher, Lahigi deeply looked into the issue and after the description of Avicenna’s view, he criticized Avicenna’s propositional justification in al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma’ad .Viewing the importance of the earlier study in the light of the later study, the author has reported Lahigi’s view and criticism of Avicenna. In the course of his study, Lahigi has demonstrated that Avicenna’s true view on the intellect-and-intelligible union is to disagree with it and his agreement in al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma’ad along with his suggested arguments is only on the face of it. The approaches of the two philosophers to the issue reveal how they have conceived the concept of union. Accordingly, they have sought for the union of two concepts, rather than two modes of existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Islamic Research / İslâmi Araştırmalar Dergisi is the property of Turkey Economical & Cultural Solidarity (TEK-DAV) Foundation and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Islamic Research / İslâmi Araştırmalar Dergisi is the property of Turkey Economical & Cultural Solidarity (TEK-DAV) Foundation and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Two general perspectives have been proposed regarding the existential realms of human beings. Proponents of the first perspective believe in two existential realms: the immaterial essence (soul) and the material body, attributing human actions primarily to the immaterial essence. Followers of the second perspective consider humans to be unidimensional and confined to physical existence, reducing all human actions to their physicality, especially the brain, and denying any immaterial essence. The present study aims to elucidate the first perspective by examining Avicenna's notion of the soul's immateriality in the context of critiquing the second perspective. The research method is descriptive-analytical. The findings and results indicate that Avicenna, by presenting elements of proof and various arguments, has endeavored to substantiate the immateriality of the soul through an explanation of the soul's actions. Accordingly, in Avicenna's paradigm, the immateriality of the soul is based on three pillars: intellect, immanence, and independence. Physicalists believe that the belief in an essence independent of the body to explain and understand human perceptions arises from a lack of sufficient awareness regarding the brain's and nervous system's functions and complexities. Furthermore, the claim that bodily changes are due to the body's instrumental relationship with the soul is unprovable. Thus, the denial and critiques of physicalists are formed around three axes: the capability of the brain and nervous system, the ambiguity of philosophy in logically explaining the soul-body relationship, and cognitive ignorance. Avicenna, with seven arguments in proving the immateriality of the soul, responds to the corresponding physicalist critiques. However, two physicalist objections remain ambiguous in Avicenna's paradigm: the inexplicability of the soul-body connection and the objection based on the premise of intuitive understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role did Avicenna play in the evolution of philosophical thought regarding the recognition of presential knowledge? The clearest example of presential knowledge is human awareness of their own essence (self-awareness), and Avicenna used this selfawareness as the basis for his argument to prove the soul in the "suspended man" argument. However, what type of knowledge is this self-awareness: presential or acquired? Avicenna's statements about this self-awareness sometimes suggest it is presential knowledge and sometimes align with it being acquired knowledge. This article, using a descriptive, analytical, and critical method, examines and analyzes his statements, especially in the book "Mubahathat," where he defends the suspended man argument and addresses questions related to self-awareness. The aim is to clarify the connection between his concept of self-awareness and presential knowledge and to determine the position of his teachings on self-awareness in the development of the division of knowledge into presential and acquired in Islamic philosophy. The result of this research is that Avicenna's concept of self-awareness should be considered presential knowledge, even though he did not use this term and sometimes explained it using terms and concepts related to acquired knowledge. Therefore, he can be regarded as the pioneer in drawing philosophers' attention to this type of knowledge in the history of Islamic philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the reality of entities can be approached through two methods: a) positively, to discern the essence of the object, and b) negatively, to delineate what the object is not. This study investigates Avicenna's perspective on the essence of the soul. While previous research has extensively explored the positive attributes, this study delves into the less organized negative attributes, shedding light on the soul's distinctions from nature, the Spirit of vapor, temperament, body, corporeality, intellect, and vitality. The significance of the soul's divergence from corporeality lies in its implicit deviation from temperament, the Spirit of vapor, the physical body, and other material elements. Notably, disassociating the soul from intellect is essential to prevent misunderstandings, avoiding the misconception of the human soul as a purely abstract concept. Furthermore, examining the soul's connection with vitality elucidates shared attributes and encompasses a diverse spectrum of entities characterized as living. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Divine love stands as a pivotal aspect of the intricate relationship between humans and God. Despite its multifaceted presence in theological and mystical traditions, achieving consensus on its nature remains challenging. The inherently personal essence of divine love introduces a level of ambiguity when considering it in the context of an impersonal God, as exemplified by Avicenna's Necessary Existent Deity. Avicenna portrays God as a metaphysical entity characterized by pure transcendence, devoid of personal emotions and passions. In contrast, he positions love as the pinnacle of the human-God connection. This article seeks to elucidate the significance and realization of this love through a semantical lens. While Avicenna provides a comprehensive definition of love as a "propensity for goodness," constructing a cohesive semantic system, the culmination suggests that human love for The Pure Good ultimately sheds any personal attributes. Instead, it transforms into a form of inner metamorphosis, encompassing rational-practical perfection. Hence, articulating divine love in a literal sense seems implausible for The Necessary Existent. Avicenna, in his elimination of dialectics, metaphorically applies divine love to convey a metaphysical rationality and an inner transformative process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses a written debate between Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675 AH/1277 AD) and Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672 AH/1274 AD) on the contingency argument, which is one of the most well-known proofs offered in history regarding the existence of God. According to thinkers before al-Kātibī, the contingency argument verifies the Necessary Being, and then it debunks the possibility of infinite regress. By “earlier thinkers,” al-Kātibī means especially Avicenna (d. 428 AH/1037 AD) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). According to al-Kātibī, the notion of the Necessary Being was proved through the contingency argument they put forward, but a careful examination of their arguments indicates that they presented no definitive proof refuting the notion of infinite regress. Therefore, according to al-Kātibī, what Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī claimed to prove the impossibility of infinite regress through the contingency argument is not valid. As al-Ṭūsī responded to al-Kātibī’s objections, a debate consisting of three letters from each side emerged between them. At the end of the debate, al-Kātibī found al-Ṭūsī’s explanations reasonable, and he admitted that they were correct. However, the parties did not mention the agreed version of the argument at the end of the debate. For this reason, I added this agreed argument at the end of this study in accordance with the parties’ declarations. The purpose of the present study is to analyse this debate in its natural order and to eliminate technical ambiguities it involves, defending Avicenna’s, al-Rāzī’s, and al-Ṭūsī’s philosophical position in the contingency argument about proving the impossibility of infinite regress through the argument. On the other hand, this debate is an epitome of the classical debate tradition. It is also significant in the sense that it reveals one of the best examples of the interdisciplinary discussion between kalām and philosophical schools, and the application of classical logic to theoretical disciplines. As a result of our analyses of the debate, we have concluded that the objections brought by al-Kātibī against the contingency argument in parallel with the conclusion of the debate accepted by the parties, maintain the contingency argument. According to this conclusion, the contingency argument is a proof which invalidates infinite regress while proving the existence of the Necessary Being.

Immunology has played a prominent role in the history of medicine and considerable research has been conducted to explore the history of this science. However, the use of blood serum to treat diseases in pre-medieval times lacks a well-documented history. Despite this knowledge gap, Emil Adolf von Behring is recognized for his groundbreaking discovery of serum therapy. Serum therapy involves the administration of animal or human blood serums as a means of combating infections, paving the way for more effective disease management in the medical field.This research, citing the book, The Canon of Medicine, written by Avicenna, states that there is evidence suggesting that serum therapy can be seen much earlier than its use in the Western world. In the discussion of poisonous animal bites, Avicenna first states the significance of fortifying the immune system to protect the body. In Avicenna’s work on rabies, he states that if a patient bitten by a rabid dog eats the blood of the rabid dog that bit him, or eats the rabid dog’s liver and heart, or puts it on his wound, especially if the liver and heart belong to the same dog that bit him, the patient will be healed. This early exploration of utilizing animal-derived substances to combat disease may be regarded as an antecedent to contemporary serum therapy, which was later developed by Emil Adolf von Behring.This research reveals that Islamic scholars, especially Avicenna, through their clinical and practical experiences, possessed knowledge of the immune system and serum therapy long before the discoveries of Edward Jenner and Emil Adolf von Behring. Consequently, they were able to successfully apply this knowledge in treating patients well before the formal recognition of these principles in Western medicine.

The standard interpretation of Avicenna's correspondence theory of truth posits that propositions either correspond to what exists extramentally or otherwise their truthmaker is mental existence. An influential post-Avicennian philosopher, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274) points to the insufficiency of the above division of propositions and their respective truthmakers. He mentions the possibility of conceiving false propositions, such as ‘One is not half of two’ and postulates the necessity of the existence of another truthmaking domain for their true counterparts which he calls nafs al-amr. It is where objective and timeless entities, such as mathematical propositions, are located. While some claim that Ṭūsī's identification of this domain with the first Separate Intellect is a testimony to his Avicennian convictions, Ṭūsī's solution is a conspicuous departure from Avicenna that not only helps him remedy the insufficiency of Avicenna's theory of truth but is consistent with his critique of Avicenna's theory of God’s knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Madness as a medical, social, literary, and philosophical issue has always been the focus of thinkers. Avicenna, as a philosopher-physician, investigated and analyzed this issue in two medical (physical) and philosophical (metaphysical) areas. In the framework of medical science, based on the mechanism of human temperament, he analyzes why madness occurs. However, temperamental disorders are the starting point of Avicenna's philosophical explanation of melancholic illusions, and Avicenna's innovation was sought in this field. Temperament disorder leads to a disorder in the functioning of the rūh-i bukhārī, and this leads to a disorder in the relationship between the rational soul (nafs-i nāteqah) and the body. Through this disorder, a disconnection is created between the mental forms of the madmen and reality, because the imaginative (mukhayyalah) faculty as the generator of imaginary forms, and the common sense (hiss al-mushtarak) as the home of tangible and imaginary forms due to the disconnection or weakening of their connection with the intellectual faculty, deprives the insane person of this possibility to separate the illusive forms from the real. The main problem that this research delves into is to explain the phenomenon of madness from Avicenna's point of view with a descriptive- analytical approach, and it is an attempt to provide a detailed and comprehensive presentation of his point of view based on medical and philosophical foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medical clinical research, otherwise defined as research on human subjects, represents the standardized method unanimously accepted by the medical, scientific community, as well as by civil society, as the only way that allows the approval of the use in medical practice of a new drug, as well as of a new method of investigation or treatment. We will briefly present the history of medical research, with reference to Hippocrates, Galen, Avicenna, Ambroise Paré, James Lind, Edward Jenner, Pasteur, as well as about the negative examples and errors that manifested themselves in the name of medical research, from the perspective of medical ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Avicenna's discussion of future contingent propositions is sometimes considered to entail metaphysical indeterminism. In this paper, I argue that his logical analysis of future contingent statements is best understood in terms of the epistemic modality of those statements, which has no consequences for modal metaphysics. This interpretation is corroborated by hitherto neglected material concerning the question of God's knowledge of particulars. In the Taʿlīqāt, Avicenna argues that God knows particulars by knowing their complete causes, and when contrasted with the human knowledge of particulars, this epistemically superior access shows that the contingency of statements about future particulars is not due to the modal properties of real particulars but to the nature of human access to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In classical Arabic philosophy, the topic of consciousness is commonly associated with Avicenna's 'Flying Man' thought experiment. But Avicenna's explorations of the nature of consciousness are not confined to the Flying Man, and he is by no means the only classical Islamic thinker to deem consciousness an important feature of our experience. Consciousness also plays a important role in the epistemology and moral psychology of Avicenna's intellectual rivals, the theologians (mutakallumūn), who represent important sources for Avicenna's own theorizing about consciousness. And while Avicenna's philosophical successor and critic, Averroes, seems to banish consciousness from the core of his cognitive psychology, in doing so he seems to anticipate contemporary efforts to expand the scope of consciousness through the notion of the 'extended' mind. This paper examines the varieties of consciousness recognized by Avicenna and several other classical Islamic thinkers with a view to understanding the extent to which their accounts can be mapped on to some of the concepts of consciousness delineated by contemporary philosophers of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Appealing to some analytic tools developed by contemporary analytic philosophers, I discuss Avicenna's views regarding the problem(s) of linguistic and mental reference to non-existents, also known as the problem(s) of 'empty intentionality'. I argue that, according to Avicenna, being in an intentional state directed towards an existing thing involves three elements: (1) an indirect relation to that thing, (2) a direct relation to a mental representation of that thing, and (3) a direct relation to the essence of that thing. Empty intentionality does not involve the first element. Moreover, depending on the nature of the non-existent we are thinking about, the third element may not be involved either. Thus, the necessary element of being in an intentional state towards something is to be related to a mental representation of that thing. The nature of this representation may vary depending on the nature of the non-existent towards which our thought is directed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the perspective Islamic of Philosophers, particularly the Peripatetics, cognition is primarily an act of the soul rather than the body. While conventional philosophical approaches often view cognition as entirely separate from the body, this article employs an analyticaldescriptive methodology to explore how the body might influence cognition within Avicenna’s philosophical and medical frameworks. Despite Avicenna’s dualistic view that soul and body are distinct entities and his identification of the soul as the primary agent of cognition, his understanding of the soul-body relationship allows for a form of embodied cognition. In this view, variation or changes in the body at any level of perception can affect the soul, thereby altering the cognition of a single known object. However, Avicenna’s concept of embodied cognition is fundamentally different from physicalism, as the soul retains its role as the essential principle in the emergence of cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A meta-theology makes claims about the structure of theological claims: it identifies a single, fundamental claim about God, and shows how other theological claims are derivable from the fundamental claim. In his book Depicting Deity and other articles, Jon Kvanvig has identified three distinct meta-theologies: Creator Theology, Perfect Being Theology, and Worship-worthiness Theology. In this article, we argue that the medieval Islamic philosopher Avicenna's views about God have the structure of a meta-theology, and that it is distinct from the three projects Kvanvig identifies. This view is Necessary Existent Theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In Thinking with Assent: Renewing a Traditional Account of Knowledge and Belief, Maria Rosa Antognazza offers a historical narrative of pre-modern epistemology. She argues that until very recently, philosophers generally held that "knowing and believing are distinct in kind in the strong sense that they are mutually exclusive mental states". This paper tests, and ultimately confirms, that account by applying it two thinkers of the Islamic world, al-Fārābī (d.950 CE) and Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d.1037 CE). It is shown that both of them used the term 'assent (taṣdīq)' as an umbrella term covering two very different states, knowledge and belief. In the case of Ibn Sīnā, this contrast is ultimately tied to his sharp distinction between immaterial intellective thinking and embodied thinking that uses a physical organ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Heidegger contrasts meditative thinking, which allows detachment from beings, with calculative thinking, which maintains an instrumental and interested relationship with them. In his view, the principle of reason is the main tool for dominating available things. He also embeds the Medieval essence-existence duality within this framework of causality geared towards manipulating beings, judging that the religious notion of creation failed to distance this duality from Greek essentialism. Now, by appropriating the Islamic notion of creation ex nihilo, Avicenna places an ontological indigence at the heart of the created world. He believes that a being necessary by something other than itself remains contingent in itself, even after being caused. Thus, knowledge of the cause doesn't grant dominance over the thing but fosters detachment from contingent being, recognizing its dependence on an upstream otherness. Moreover, Meister Eckhart, who according to Heidegger perfectly illustrates meditative thought, is indebted precisely to this ontological poverty established by Avicenna. In addition to describing this possible objection from Avicenna to Heidegger, the more general aim of this study is to explore the possibility of an ethical and disinterested use of the principle of reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immunology has played a prominent role in the history of medicine and considerable research has been conducted to explore the history of this science. However, the use of blood serum to treat diseases in pre-medieval times lacks a well-documented history. Despite this knowledge gap, Emil Adolf von Behring is recognized for his groundbreaking discovery of serum therapy. Serum therapy involves the administration of animal or human blood serums as a means of combating infections, paving the way for more effective disease management in the medical field. This research, citing the book, The Canon of Medicine, written by Avicenna, states that there is evidence suggesting that serum therapy can be seen much earlier than its use in the Western world. In the discussion of poisonous animal bites, Avicenna first states the significance of fortifying the immune system to protect the body. In Avicenna’s work on rabies, he states that if a patient bitten by a rabid dog eats the blood of the rabid dog that bit him, or eats the rabid dog’s liver and heart, or puts it on his wound, especially if the liver and heart belong to the same dog that bit him, the patient will be healed. This early exploration of utilizing animal-derived substances to combat disease may be regarded as an antecedent to contemporary serum therapy, which was later developed by Emil Adolf von Behring. This research reveals that Islamic scholars, especially Avicenna, through their clinical and practical experiences, possessed knowledge of the immune system and serum therapy long before the discoveries of Edward Jenner and Emil Adolf von Behring. Consequently, they were able to successfully apply this knowledge in treating patients well before the formal recognition of these principles in Western medicine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

BackgroundThe Avicenna unified Health Information System (HIS) was implemented by the Palestinian Ministry of Health in 2010 across government hospitals. Despite its potential, the acceptance of Avicenna HIS by healthcare providers remains unclear after 14 years of application. Understanding the factors that influence healthcare provider acceptance is essential for optimizing the system's success. We investigated factors affecting acceptance of Avicenna HIS among healthcare providers in Palestinian healthcare institutions, focusing on perceived usefulness, ease of use, human factors, technological factors, and organizational support.Materials and methodsA cross-sectional study was conducted at the Palestine Medical Complex (PMC) in Ramallah, West Bank, where the Avicenna HIS has been fully implemented since 2010. A systematic random sampling was used to select participants, resulting in 300 completed questionnaires. The study utilized a self-administered questionnaire adapted from a structured tool based on the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). The questionnaire was validated through expert review and pilot testing, achieving a Cronbach's alpha of 0.86. Each selected healthcare provider was contacted face-to-face, and written informed consent was obtained before administering the questionnaire.ResultsA total of 300 questionnaires were completed and returned. The study sample included 178 males (59.3%) and 122 females (40.7%). The majority of participants was aged 20–39 years (270 participants, 90%) and held a bachelor's degree (250 participants, 83.3%). Nurses comprised the largest professional group (153 participants, 51.0%). High levels of perceived usefulness and ease of use were reported, both with mean scores of 4.511 (S.D. = 0.295). Technological factors had a mean score of 4.004 (S.D. = 0.228), while organizational factors scored 2.858 (S.D. = 0.304). Overall acceptance of the HIS was moderately high, with a mean score of 4.218 (S.D. = 0.387). Significant differences in perceived usefulness and ease of use were noted based on gender, age, and experience.ConclusionThis study concludes that both technological and human factors significantly influence the acceptance of HIS among healthcare providers in Palestine. To improve HIS adoption, it is recommended to enhance system functionality, ensure reliable data quality, and provide comprehensive training programs for healthcare providers.

Undoubtedly, Ibn Sina is the most important philosopher in the Islamic world. Understanding his thought requires new readings that can enable us to comprehend and explain philosophy in the Islamic world more accurately. To this end, in the first step of this research, the concept of philosophy in Ibn Sina's view has been analyzed. This analysis is refined in the reading of the idea of philosophy as a way of life, whose architect is the French philosopher Pierre Hadot. Hadot's work on ancient philosophy challenged the understanding of that period by contemporary philosophers. It seems that such a reading can also be applied on the philosophy in the Islamic world. This can be better understood in light of the Muslim philosophers' view of happiness. To this end, by presenting a holistic view of Ibn Sina's thought, we will show that Ibn Sina's existential view is consistent with his philosophical system. It seems that such an explanation offers a more useful reading of Ibn Sina in Hadot's idea. Therefore, to achieve this goal, this research has attempted to briefly explain the importance of the question of what philosophy is among contemporary thinkers and then present a theory of philosophy as a way of life. In the following, an attempt has been made to examine the concept of philosophy in Ibn Sina's thought with the aforementioned idea and an analysis of the necessity of accepting Ibn Sina's holistic system.

The question of the relationship between the rational soul and the body, and the mediating role of the vaporous soul, has led to the formation of many philosophical discussions in this area. One of these cases is the causes and symptoms of mental illnesses, such as melancholic depression, which, from Avicenna's perspective, the most important reason for its occurrence and the most effective method of treatment should be sought in the relationship between the rational soul and the body. Melancholic depression means the deviation of human thoughts and mental images from the correct path, in which case the correspondence of cognitive concepts with the external world is disrupted, and therefore the person is immersed in their own incorrect thoughts and beliefs. This mental illness has different levels, and in its most severe form, mania, the patient's perceptions are greatly deviated from the real world, they constantly think about the dead, and may consider themselves dead. From Avicenna's point of view, the main cause of this disease should be sought in the weakness of the vaporous soul, which weakens the connection between the soul and the body. The root of this weakness is also the predominance of the melancholic temperament in the brain, which disrupts the function of the vaporous soul as the link between the soul and the body. Overall, Avicenna's approach to melancholic depression shows his comprehensive approach to mental disorders, an approach that is rooted both in his philosophical foundations and in empirical evidence and studies.

Since Avicenna considers the main function of the estimative faculty to be the apprehension of intentions (maʿānī), other functions of this faculty must be understood in light of this form of apprehension. His primary and well-known meaning of intention is something inherently non-sensible that nonetheless exists within the particular sensibles. These intentions can generally be categorized under the duality of agreeableness (muwāfaqa) and disagreeableness (muẖālafa). Thus, a connection can be established between this class of intentions and particular accidents of existent qua existent. However, intentions never lose their relational aspect to the sensibles neither in the actualization nor in conceptualization. Avicenna also considers another kind of intention apprehended by estimation. This type of intention is nothing but the relation among the sensible forms, which is perceived from the external sensible objects and entities. Although this intention is non-sensible, unlike the first type, it is derived from and reducible to sensibles. Based on this second kind of intention, one can explain how, in estimative propositions (wahmiyyāt), judgments about sensibles are generalized to non-sensible objects. Furthermore, this generalization, if applied to the sensibles and their attributes, leads to the formation of induction. Given that Avicenna considers methodic experience (tajriba) to be the result of the conjunction between sensory induction and syllogism, it can be concluded that the estimative faculty and its apprehended intentions play a central role in the formation of empirical method and knowledge.

The explanation of the possibility of the reality of the primary intelligibles in the realm of habitual intelligence is an important epistemological issue. Two perspectives on explaining this matter are noteworthy: first, the speculative intellect at the level of habitual intelligence possesses the primary (non-acquired) intelligibles, and these intelligibles themselves (independent of anything external to the intellect) are valid. Second, verifying the reality of the primary intelligibles is not possible without relying on presential sensory perception. In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, this dependence has been emphasized more in the discussion of the "levels of speculative intellect." However, in the reinterpretation of Avicenna's epistemology, attention has generally been paid to expressions that demonstrate the independence of the intellect from the senses or any matter external to the intellect. In the forthcoming paper, after expounding and criticizing the first perspective, we will show that Avicenna's views support the second perspective. Any kind of reinterpretation of Avicenna's epistemological perspective in this regard, without considering his views on the "levels of speculative intellect" and the intellect's dependence on presential sensory perception, is not in line with his perspective. In general, according to the selected perspective, "sense intuition" is the first psychical reality to which the self is connected. The prior connection of the self to the psychical reality is the origin of actualization and the basis of the validity of the primary intelligibles; therefore, the speculative intellect relies on presential sensory perception while being independent in other respects.

Thought is a fundamental and intrinsic characteristic of humans, setting them apart from other beings. For this reason, one of the influential factors in education is the cultivation and strengthening of the rational faculty. In Islamic philosphy, rational education has also been given serious attention. The main purpose of this research is to explain the methods of rational education in Ibn Sina's philosophical system. To achieve this goal, a descriptive-analytical method has been used. The research population includes the works of Ibn Sina, from which materials related to philosophical and educational foundations and methods of rational education have been purposefully selected. The findings indicate that the methods of rational education should be in line with the goals and principles and in accordance with them, and should guide the learners to choose the correct rational path and enrich the levels of reason until they reach the ultimate goal of rational education -which is divine proximity. These methods include cultivating creativity (creating a creative space), cultivating reason (through play and argumentative dialogue), question-based dialogue, participation, controlling the excesses of the soul, intellectual intuition, and the method of asceticism, which have been identified and explained. The application of the aforementioned methods can be effective in creating a foundation and smoothing the path for rational education in the educational system.

Many scholars consider Avicenna’s theory of cognitive forms a theory of representation, which raises two questions. First, why does a cognitive form represent a particular object instead of another? This issue is known as the determination problem. Second, what is the nature of intentionality of the cognitive form? This is known as the nature problem. This paper examines Avicenna’s theory of cognitive forms and focuses on how he would address the two problems. I argue that Avicenna offers a pluralistic approach to the determination problem: depending on the type of representation, the object of representation is determined differently. Additionally, Avicenna views the nature of intentionality as a referential relation towards the object that can be attributed to the representation in virtue of the object somehow existing in the subject immaterially. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments worldwide have made it a priority to combat religious extremism, resulting in various disciplinary and soft-power policies. This study focuses on dialogue as an effective way to counter and prevent religious extremism, using the Kharijites (the first extremist faction that mutinied against the caliphal authority) as a case study. Historical methodology is used to collect data, and a critical analysis is conducted using inductive and deductive methods to draw conclusions and insights for a proposed dialogue model. The essay argues that military power is ephemeral and sometimes counterproductive, so the emphasis should be on a long-lived "mind power." Further, given the embedded nature of religious underpinnings of extremists' ideologies, the study highlights seven key terms that form the foundation of the three-level dialogue model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to analyze Utopia from Avicenna and Ibn Khaldun’s socio ـ political point of view based on Spriggans’ model. Therefore, the research question is: How did Avicenna and Ibn Khaldun think about the idea of Utopia and what ideal solution did they propose to get rid of its crises? Using the descriptive ـ analytical method, as well as library resources, the researcher found out that in an effort to create a link between politics and prophecy, Avicenna considered the crisis to be a lack of centralized national power, which in turn led to a lack of prophetic policy and proper implementation of sharia laws. Proposing the Utopia, he considered a prophetic political law as the best system, in which the prophet or his successor is at the forefront. His Utopia includes reconciliation of religion and philosophy, linking politics with sharia, and maintaining the unity of the Muslim community through the philosopher ـ prophet concentrated power. In fact, proposing of Utopia from the socio ـ political perspective was based on the divine nature of man and the maximum role of government in the felicity and salvation of citizens in this world and hereafter. However, in Ibn Khaldun’s point of view, formation and expansion of powerful and vast governments are related to origin of religious principles and the role of religion in the lifespan of the states. He considers the state a fluid and declining phenomenon that, like humans, has a natural lifespan from its emergence to its decadence. Given that, in addition to tribal solidarity (Asabiyyah), religious solidarity can strengthen governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Avicenna did not explicitly present a distinct theory titled “Theory of Emotions” in his works. However, based on scattered references, it appears that the core of emotions, in his view, is evaluation, divided into two categories: motivational and non-motivational. Another component that seems common in all instances of emotions is pleasure and pain, although there is also evidence against this claim. There are ambiguities in Avicenna’s text regarding the relationship between emotions and the body, but most evidence favors the assumption of a non-essential relationship between emotions and the body. Concerning the relationship between emotions and ethics, the conceptual analysis of virtue as one of the pillars of ethical discourse indicates a necessary relationship between emotions and virtues, suggesting a connection between emotions and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the theory of "Hylomorphism", the structure of material objects is composed of two components, matter and form. "Avicenna" and "Kit Fine" believe in Hylomorphism. The main point of the article is to find out, what is Avicenna's response to contemporary Hylomorphism? This effort is focused on the form and has several stages; 1. The nature of the form, 2. The proof of the form, 3. The possibility of presenting a hierarchical structure of the metaphysics of objects. According to Fine, the form is an immaterial part and constituent of the object. In material objects with timeless components, form is a property or relationship between the material component of the object, and in objects with temporal components, form is a function of time on objects and maintains the survival of the object over time. Avicenna believes in at least two types of face; Physical form is an essence property common to all objects and at least one form is a type. Avicenna, like Fain, considers the form in composite objects to be a substantial and immaterial part, but according to him, the nature of the form is the same in all composite objects. Although Avicenna's argument to prove the form is different from Fine's, but according to Avicenna and Fine, essence property is constitution, and this constituent is the form. The most important proof of Avicenna's form must be reconstructed. Summary of the revised argument: essence means the constituent, and the constituent is the form. So Fine and Avicenna accept that a property that is essence is a constituent and vice versa, and the constituent is nothing but form. One of the advantages of Fine's theory is that material objects have a hierarchical structure, in Avicenna's philosophy, it is possible to present hierarchical structure of the metaphysics of objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the classification of intelligibles into first intelligibles, secondary philosophical intelligibles and secondary logical intelligibles, was presented by Mirdamad and confirmed and consolidated by Mulla Sadra, the final point of view in the classification of intelligibles has been considered until today. However, there are differences in the views of those regarding the philosophers who lived before Mirdamad, such as Avicenna. Some hold that Avicenna believes in the threefold classification of intelligibles in such a way that the secondary intelligibles is equal to the logical secondary intelligibles but although he knew the philosophical second intelligibles, he did not put an independent term for them. On the other hand, another point of view says that Avicenna believes in a dual division, and in his opinion, the first intelligibles are not only first intelligibles that known as substantive concepts, but also considered philosophical concepts that known as secondary philosophical intelligibles in addition to substantive concepts, and in his opinion, the secondary intelligibles are the same logical secondary intelligibles. According to this research, avicenna classified intelligibles into two categories, first and secondary, in a primary division, not the triple classification that some have thought and not the dual division that is assumed in the second view, but in the way that he classified intelligibles into two categories, first and second, in a primary classification Then, some secondary intelligibles are discussed in logic from the perspective of what associate to them that is achieving the our logical goal, otherwise according to him The proof and how they exist are discussed in philosophy. They are therefore essentially secondary philosophical intelligibles (to use well-known phrase) and accidently logical secondary inelligibles. As a result, according to Avicenna not only the secondary inelligibles not equivalent to the secondary logical intelligibles but includes them and philosophical concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fakhr al-Dīn Abū Sulaiman Dāwūd al-Banāqitī (d. 730/1329-30 [?]), known as Fakhr al-Banāqitī, is one of the scholars of the Ilkhanid period whose life and education we have limited information about. The thinker, who is mostly emphasized as a historian and poet in the sources, is famous for his Persian historical work Ravzatu ulī al-albāb fī marifat al-tawārīh wa’l-ansāb, also known as Tārīkh al-Banāqitī. In fact, until recently it was thought that only this work of his had survived. However, the manuscript that is the subject of this article also brings his other works to the agenda. This manuscript, which is preserved in the Beyazit State Library (Beyazit, nr. 3438), contains three works, namely Ğâisat al-daqāiq, Mi’yār al-abhār, and al-Risālat al-Fakhriyye, all of which are attributed to Banāqitī. The primary objective of this article is to present the Persian text of al-Risālat al-Fakhriyya and to examine Banāqitī’s views on the classification of sciences through information about its content. In addition, biographical information about Banāqitī himself and his family members will be systematized through the identified works. Indeed, these works contain important clues about the thinker’s identity as a poet, his teachers, his travels, and the cities he visited, as well as the scholarly personality and circle of his father, Ṭāj al-Dīn Abū al-Fadl Muhammad b. Muhammad (d. 682/1283). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Aristotelian sense of mimesis (i.e., fictional representation of an evoked world through plot and characters) continues to shape modern views of literature. The medieval Arabic reception of the concept of mimesis and its closely related concept of mythos (fable, story, or plot) through Aristotle's Poetics reveals a different conception of literature—one that this article argues is not representational but analogical. While Aristotle sees mythos/plot as forming the main vehicle through which mimesis manifests itself in poetry, mythos (khurāfa) according to the philosophers of the Islamic world was irrelevant for the poetic. This is because they understood mythos not as "plot" but as referring, on the one hand, to the fictionality and fantasticness of poetic metaphor, which they deemed inessential for the success of poetry; on the other hand, they understood mythos as "story," in which case they relegated to it a rhetorical function of persuasion rather than a poetic function of make-believe. Fundamentally, in both the poetic and the rhetorical, mimesis was understood as the expression of the comparable, not the representation of the likeness of an evoked world. This exposes an Arabic conception of "mimesis" that reflects a literature that seeks comparisons and demands the inference of similarities from the reader. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]